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BOOK     18  1.3.H95    c.  1 

HUSIK    #    HISTORY    OF    MEDIEVAL 

JEWISH    PHILOSOPHY 


3  T153  000b3537  7 


be  ken" 


A  HISTORY  OF  MEDLEVAL  JEWISH 
PHILOSOPHY 


>9         -o        - 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO    ■  DALLAS 
ATLANTA    •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON   •  BOMBAY   •  CALCDTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


A  HISTORY  OF 

MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
ISAAC  HUSIK,  A.M.,   Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1918 


All  rights  reserved 


COPYMGHT,  I916 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  October,  1916. 


This  book  is  issued  by  the  Macmillan  Company 
in  conjunction  with  the  Jewish  Publication  Society 
of  America. 


TO 

SOLOMON  SOLIS  COHEN,  M.D. 

AS    A   TOKEN 

OF 

GRATITUDE    AND    ESTEEM 


PREFACE 

No  excuse  is  needed  for  presenting  to  the  English  reader  a  History 
of  Mediaeval  Jewish  Philosophy.  The  English  language,  poor  enough 
in  books  on  Jewish  history  and  literature,  can  boast  of  scarcely  any- 
thing at  all  in  the  domain  of  Jewish  Philosophy.  The  Jewish  Ency- 
clopedia has  no  article  on  Jewish  Philosophy,  and  neither  has  the 
eleventh  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica.  Hastings'  Encyclo- 
pedia of  Religion  and  Ethics  will  have  a  brief  article  on  the  subject 
from  the  conscientious  and  able  pen  of  Dr.  Henry  Malter,  but  of  books 
there  is  none.  But  while  this  is  due  to  several  causes,  chief  among 
them  perhaps  being  that  English  speaking  people  in  general  and  Amer- 
icans in  particular  are  more  interested  in  positive  facts  than  in  tentative 
speculations,  in  concrete  researches  than  in  abstract  theorizing — there 
are  ample  signs  that  here  too  a  change  is  coming,  and  in  many  spheres 
we  are  called  upon  to  examine  our  foundations  with  a  view  to  making 
our  superstructure  deep  and  secure  as  well  as  broad  and  comprehen- 
sive. And  this  is  nothing  else  than  philosophy.  Philosophical  studies 
are  happily  on  the  increase  in  this  country  and  more  than  one  branch 
of  literary  endeavor  is  beginning  to  feel  its  influence.  And  with  the 
increase  of  books  and  researches  in  the  history  of  the  Jews  is  coming 
an  awakening  to  the  fact  that  the  philosophical  and  rationalistic  move- 
ment among  the  Jews  in  the  middle  ages  is  well  worth  study,  in- 
fluential as  it  was  in  forming  Judaism  as  a  religion  and  as  a  theological 
and  ethical  system. 

But  it  is  not  merely  the  English  language  that  is  still  wanting  in  a 
general  history  of  Mediaeval  Jewish  Philosophy,  the  German,  French 
and  ItaHan  languages  are  no  better  off  in  this  regard.  For  while  it  is 
true  that  outside  of  the  Hebrew  and  Arabic  sources,  German  books 
and  monographs  are  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  student  who  wishes  to 
investigate  the  philosophical  movement  in  mediaeval  Jewry,  and  the 
present  writer  owes  very  much  to  the  researches  of  such  men  as  Joel, 
Guttmann,  Kaufmann  and  others,  it  nevertheless  remains  true  that 
there  is  as  yet  no  complete  history  of  the  subject  for  the  student  or  the 


viii  PREFACE 

general  reader.  The  German  writers  have  done  thorough  and  distin- 
guished work  in  expounding  individual  thinkers  and  problems,  they 
have  gathered  a  complete  and  detailed  bibliography  of  Jewish  philo- 
sophical writings  in  print  and  in  manuscript,  they  have  edited  and 
translated  and  annotated  the  most  important  philosophical  texts. 
France  has  also  had  an  important  share  in  these  fundamental  under- 
takings, but  for  some  reason  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  has  so  far 
undertaken  to  present  to  the  general  student  and  non-technical  reader 
the  results  of  their  researches. 

What  was  omitted  by  the  German,  French  and  English  speaking 
writers  was  accomplished  by  a  scholar  who  wrote  in  Hebrew.  Dr. 
S.  Bernfeld  has  written  in  Hebrew  under  the  title  "Daat  Elohim" 
(The  Knowledge  of  God)  a  readable  sketch  of  Jewish  Religious  philos- 
ophy from  Biblical  times  down  to  "  Ahad  Haam."  A  German  scholar 
(now  in  America),  Dr.  David  Neumark  of  Cincinnati,  has  undertaken 
on  a  very  large  scale  a  History  of  Jewish  Philosophy  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  of  which  only  a  beginning  has  been  made  in  the  two  volumes  so 
far  issued. 

The  present  writer  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Publication  Committee 
of  the  Jewish  Publication  Society  of  America  has  undertaken  to  write 
a  history  of  mediaeval  Jewish  rationalistic  philosophy  in  one  volume 
— a  history  that  will  appeal  alike  to  the  scholar  and  the  intelhgent 
non-technical  reader.  Treating  only  of  the  rationalistic  school,  I 
did  not  include  anything  that  has  to  do  with  mysticism  or  Kabbala. 
In  my  attempt  to  please  the  scholar  and  the  layman,  I  fear  I  shall 
have  succeeded  in  satisfying  neither.  The  professional  student  will 
miss  learned  notes  and  quotations  of  original  passages  in  the  language 
of  their  authors.  The  general  reader  will  often  be  wearied  by  the 
scholastic  tone  of  the  problems  as  well  as  of  the  manner  of  the  discus- 
sion and  argument.  And  yet  I  cannot  but  feel  that  it  will  do  both 
classes  good — the  one  to  get  less,  the  other  more  than  he  wants.  The 
latter  will  find  oases  in  the  desert  where  he  can  refresh  himseK  and  take 
a  rest,  and  the  former  will  find  in  the  notes  and  bibUography  references 
to  sources  and  technical  articles  where  more  can  be  had  after  his  own 
heart. 

There  is  not  much  room  for  originality  in  a  historical  and  expository 
work  of  this  kind,  particularly  as  I  believe  in  writing  history  objec- 


PREFACE  IX 

tively.  I  have  not  attempted  to  read  into  the  mediaeval  thinkers 
modern  ideas  that  were  foreign  to  them.  I  endeavored  to  interpret 
their  ideas  from  their  own  point  of  view  as  determined  by  their  history 
and  environment  and  the  hterary  sources,  religious  and  philosophical, 
under  the  influence  of  which  they  came.  I  based  my  book  on  a  study 
of  the  original  sources  where  they  were  available — and  this  applies 
to  all  the  authors  treated  with  the  exception  of  the  two  Karaites, 
Joseph  al  Basir  and  Jeshua  ben  Judah,  where  I  had  to  content  my- 
seK  with  secondary  sources  and  a  few  fragments  of  the  original  texts. 
For  the  rest  I  tried  to  tell  my  story  as  simply  as  I  knew  how,  and  I  hope 
the  reader  will  accept  the  book  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  is  offered — as 
an  objective  and  not  too  critical  exposition  of  Jewish  rationalistic 
thought  in  the  middle  ages. 

My  task  would  not  be  done  were  I  not  to  express  my  obligations 
to  the  PubHcation  Committee  of  the  Jewish  Publication  Society  of 
America  to  whose  encouragement  I  owe  the  impulse  but  for  which 
the  book  would  not  have  been  written,  and  whose  material  assistance 
enabled  the  pubUshers  to  bring  out  a  book  typographically  so  attrac- 
tive. 

Isaac  Husik. 
Philadelphia, 

July,  igi6. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface vii 

Introduction xiii 

CHAPTER 

I.  Isaac  Israeli i 

II.  David  ben  Merwan  Al  Mukammas 17 

III.  Saadia  ben  Joseph  Al-Fayyumi 23 

IV.  Joseph  Al-Basir  and  Jeshua  ben  Judah 48 

V.  Solomon  Ibn  Gabirol 59 

VT.  Bahya  Ibn  Pakuda 80 

VII.  Pseudo-Bahya 106 

VIII.  Abraham  Bar  Hiyya 114 

IX.  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik 125 

X.  Judah  Halevi 150 

XI.  Moses  and  Abraham  Ibn  Ezra 184 

XII.  Abraham  Ibn  Daud 197 

XIII.  Moses  Maimonides 236 

XIV.  Hillel  ben  Samuel 312 

XV.  Levi  ben  Gerson 328 

XVI.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  of  Nicomedia 362 

XVII.  Hasdai  ben  Abraham  Crescas 388 

XVIII.  Joseph  Albo 406 

Conclusion 428 

Bibliography 433 

Notes 439 

List  of  Biblical  and  Rabbinic  Passages 449 

Index 451 


INTRODUCTION 

The  philosophical  movement  in  mediaeval  Jewry  was  the  result  of 
the  desire  and  the  necessity,  felt  by  the  leaders  of  Jewish  thought,  of 
reconciling  two  apparently  independent  sources  of  truth.  In  the 
middle  ages,  among  Jews  as  well  as  among  Christians  and  Moham- 
medans, the  two  sources  of  knowledge  or  truth  which  were  clearly 
present  to  the  minds  of  thinking  people,  each  claiming  recognition, 
were  religious  opinions  as  embodied  in  revealed  documents  on  the 
one  hand,  and  philosophical  and  scientific  judgments  and  arguments, 
the  results  of  independent  rational  reflection,  on  the  other.  Revela- 
tion and  reason,  religion  and  philosophy,  faith  and  knowledge,  author- 
ity and  independent  reflection  are  the  various  expressions  for  the 
dualism  in  mediaeval  thought,  which  the  philosophers  and  theologians 
of  the  time  endeavored  to  reduce  to  a  monism  or  a  unity. 

Let  us  examine  more  intimately  the  character  and  content  of  the 
two  elements  in  the  intellectual  horizon  of  mediaeval  Jewry.  On  the 
side  of  revelation,  rehgion,  authority,  we  have  the  Bible,  the  Mishna, 
the  Tahnud.  The  Bible  was  the  written  law,  and  represented  Uterally 
the  word  of  God  as  revealed  to  lawgiver  and  prophet;  the  Talmud 
(including  the  Mishna)  was  the  oral  law,  embodying  the  unwritten 
commentary  on  the  words  of  the  Law,  equally  authentic  with  the 
latter,  contemporaneous  with  it  in  revelation,  though  not  committed 
to  writing  until  many  ages  subsequently  and  until  then  handed  down 
by  word  of  mouth;  hence  depending  upon  tradition  and  faith  in  tradi- 
tion for  its  validity  and  acceptance.  Authority  therefore  for  the 
Rabbanites  was  two-fold,  the  authority  of  the  direct  word  of  God 
which  was  written  down  as  soon  as  communicated,  and  about  which 
there  could  therefore  be  no  manner  of  doubt;  and  the  authority  of 
the  indirect  word  of  God  as  transmitted  orally  for  many  generations 
before  it  was  written  down,  requiring  belief  in  tradition.  By  the 
Karaites  tradition  was  rejected,  and  there  remained  only  belief  in  the 
words  of  the  Bible. 

On  the  side  of  reason  was  urged  first  the  claim  of  the  testimony  of 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

the  senses,  and  second  the  vaHdity  of  logical  inference  as  determined 
by  demonstration  and  syllogistic  proof.  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
Jewish  thinkers  of  the  middle  ages  developed  unaided  from  without  a 
system  of  thought  and  a  Weltanschauung,  based  solely  upon  their  own 
observation  and  ratiocination,  and  then  found  that  the  view  of  the 
world  thus  acquired  stood  in  opposition  to  the  rehgion  of  the  Bible 
and  the  Talmud,  the  two  thus  requiring  adjustment  and  reconciliation. 
No!  The  so-called  demands  of  the  reason  were  not  of  their  own  mak- 
ing, and  on  the  other  hand  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  reli- 
gion was  not  altogether  one  of  opposition.  To  discuss  the  latter  point 
first,  the  teachings  of  the  Bible  and  the  Talmud  were  not  altogether 
clear  on  a  great  many  questions.  Passages  could  be  cited  from  the 
religious  documents  of  Judaism  in  reference  to  a  given  problem  both 
pro  and  con.  Thus  in  the  matter  of  freedom  of  the  will  one  could 
argue  on  the  one  hand  that  man  must  be  free  to  determine  his  conduct 
since  if  he  were  not  there  would  have  been  no  use  in  giving  him  com- 
mandments and  prohibitions.  And  one  could  quote  besides  in  favor  of 
freedom  the  direct  statement  in  Deuteronomy  30,  19,  "I  call  heaven 
and  earth  to  witness  against  you  this  day,  that  I  have  set  before 
thee  life  and  death,  the  blessing  and  the  curse:  therefore  choose  life, 
that  thou  mayest  Hve,  thou  and  thy  seed."  But  on  the  other  hand  it 
was  just  as  possible  to  find  Biblical  statements  indicating  clearly  that 
God  preordains  how  a  person  shall  behave  in  a  given  case.  Thus 
Pharaoh's  heart  was  hardened  that  he  should  not  let  the  children  of 
Israel  go  out  of  Egypt,  as  we  read  in  Exodus  7,  3:  "And  I  will  harden 
Pharaoh's  heart,  and  multiply  my  signs  and  my  wonders  in  the  land  of 
Egypt.  But  Pharaoh  will  not  hearken  unto  you,  and  I  will  lay  my 
hand  upon  Egypt,  and  bring  forth  my  hosts,  my  people,  the  children 
of  Israel,  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt  by  great  judgments."  Similarly 
in  the  case  of  Sihon  king  of  Heshbon  we  read  in  Deuteromony  2,  30: 
"But  Sihon  king  of  Heshbon  would  not  let  us  pass  by  him:  for  the 
Lord  thy  God  hardened  his  spirit,  and  made  his  heart  obstinate,  that 
he  might  deliver  him  into  thy  hand,  as  at  this  day."  And  this  is  true 
not  merely  of  heathen  kings,  Ahab  king  of  Israel  was  similarly  en- 
ticed by  a  divine  instigation  according  to  I  Kings  22,  20:  "And  the 
Lord  said.  Who  shall  entice  Ahab,  that  he  may  go  up  and  fall  at 
Ramoth-Gilead?" 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  the  Bible  is  not  a  systematic  book,  and 
principles  and  problems  are  not  clearly  and  strictly  formulated  even 
in  the  domain  of  ethics  which  is  its  strong  point.  It  was  not  therefore 
a  question  here  of  opposition  between  the  Bible  and  philosophy,  or 
authority  and  reason.  What  was  required  was  rather  a  rational 
analysis  of  the  problem  on  its  own  merits  and  then  an  endeavor  to 
show  that  the  conflicting  passages  in  the  Scriptures  are  capable  of 
interpretation  so  as  to  harmonize  with  each  other  and  with  the  results 
of  rational  speculation.  To  be  sure,  it  was  felt  that  the  doctrine  of 
freedom  is  fundamental  to  the  spirit  of  Judaism,  and  the  philosophic 
analyses  led  to  the  same  result  though  in  differing  form,  sometimes 
dangerously  approaching  a  thorough  determinism,  as  in  Hasdai 
Crescas.  ^ 

If  such  doubt  was  possible  in  an  ethical  problem  where  one  would 
suppose  the  Bible  would  be  outspoken,  the  uncertainty  was  still 
greater  in  purely  metaphysical  questions  which  as  such  were  really 
foreign  to  its  purpose  as  a  book  of  religion  and  ethics.  While  it  was 
clear  that  the  Bible  teaches  the  existence  of  God  as  the  creator  of  the 
universe,  and  of  man  as  endowed  with  a  soul,  it  is  manifestly  difficult 
to  extract  from  it  a  rigid  and  detailed  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  God, 
the  manner  in  which  the  world  was  created,  the  nature  of  the  soul 
and  its  relation  to  man  and  to  God.  As  long  as  the  Jews  were  self- 
centered  and  did  not  come  in  close  contact  with  an  alien  civilization  of 
a  philosophic  mould,  the  need  for  a  carefully  thought  out  and  con- 
sistent theory  on  all  the  questions  suggested  was  not  felt.  And  thus 
we  have  in  the  Talmudic  literature  quite  a  good  deal  of  speculation 
concerning  God  and  man.  But  it  can  scarcely  lay  claim  to  being 
rationalistic  or  philosophic,  much  less  to  being  consistent.  Nay,  we 
have  in  the  Bible  itself  at  least  two  books  which  attempt  an  anti- 
dogmatic  treatment  of  ethical  problems.  In  Job  is  raised  the  question 
whether  a  man's  fortunes  on  earth  bear  any  relation  to  his  conduct 
moral  and  spiritual.  Ecclesiastes  cannot  make  up  his  mind  whether 
life  is  worth  Hving,  and  how  to  make  the  best  of  it  once  one  finds  him- 
self aHve,  whether  by  seeking  wisdom  or  by  pursuing  pleasure.  But 
here  too  Job  is  a  long  poem,  and  the  argument  does  not  progress  very 
rapidly  or  very  far.  Ecclesiastes  is  rambling  rather  than  analytic,  and 
on  the  whole  mostly  negative.    The  Talmudists  were  visibly  puzzled 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

in  their  attitude  to  both  books,  wondered  whether  Job  really  existed 
or  was  only  a  fancy,  and  seriously  thought  of  excluding  Ecclesiastes 
from  the  canon.  But  these  attempts  at  questioning  the  meaning  of 
life  had  no  further  results.  They  did  not  lead,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Greek  Sophists,  to  a  Socrates,  a  Plato  or  an  Aristotle.  Philo  in  Alexan- 
dria and  Maimonides  in  Fostat  were  the  products  not  of  the  Bible  and 
the  Talmud  alone,  but  of  a  combination  of  Hebraism  and  Hellenism, 
pure  in  the  case  of  Philo,  mixed  with  the  spirit  of  Islam  in  Maimonides. 

And  this  leads  us  to  consider  the  second  point  mentioned  above, 
the  nature  and  content  of  what  was  attributed  in  the  middle  ages 
to  the  credit  of  reason.  It  was  in  reality  once  more  a  set  of  documents. 
The  Bible  and  Talmud  were  the  documents  of  revelation,  Aristotle 
was  the  document  of  reason.  Each  was  supreme  in  its  sphere,  and  all 
efforts  must  be  bent  to  make  them  agree,  for  as  revelation  cannot  be 
doubted,  so  neither  can  the  assured  results  of  reason.  But  not  all 
which  pretends  to  be  the  conclusion  of  reason  is  necessarily  so  in  truth, 
as  on  the  other  hand  the  documents  of  faith  are  subject  to  interpreta- 
tion and  may  mean  something  other  than  appears  on  the  surface. 

That  the  Bible  has  an  esoteric  meaning  besides  the  Kteral  has  its 
source  in  the  Talmud  itself.  Reference  is  found  there  to  a  mystic 
doctrine  of  creation  known  as  "Maase  Bereshit"  and  a  doctrine  of 
the  divine  chariot  called  "Maase  Merkaba."  ^  The  exact  nature  of 
these  teachings  is  not  known  since  the  Talmud  itself  prohibits  the 
imparting  of  this  mystic  lore  to  any  but  the  initiated,  i.  e.,  to  those 
showing  themselves  worthy;  and  never  to  more  than  one  or  two  at  a 
time.^  But  it  is  clear  from  the  names  of  these  doctrines  that  they 
centered  about  the  creation  story  in  Genesis  and  the  account  of  the 
divine  chariot  in  Ezekiel,  chapters  one  and  ten.  Besides  the  Halaka 
and  Agada  are  full  of  interpretations  of  Biblical  texts  which  are  very 
far  from  the  literal  and  have  httle  to  do  with  the  context.  Moreover, 
the  beliefs  current  among  the  Jews  in  Alexandria  in  the  first  century 
B.  C.  found  their  way  into  mediaeval  Jewry,  that  the  philosophic 
literature  of  the  Greeks  was  originally  borrowed  or  stolen  from  the 
Hebrews,  who  lost  it  in  times  of  storm  and  stress.^  This  being  the 
case,  it  was  believed  that  the  Bible  itself  cannot  be  without  some  al- 
lusions to  philosophic  doctrines.  That  the  Bible  does  not  clearly 
teach  philosophy  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  intended  for  the  salva- 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

tion  of  all  men,  the  simple  as  well  as  the  wise,  women  and  children 
as  well  as  male  adults.  For  these  it  is  sufficient  that  they  know  cer- 
tain religious  truths  within  their  grasp  and  conduct  themselves  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  goodness  and  righteousness.  A  strictly  philo- 
sophic book  would  have  been  beyond  their  ken  and  they  would  have 
been  left  without  a  guide  in  life.  But  the  more  intellectual  and  the 
more  ambitious  are  not  merely  permitted,  nay  they  are  obHgated  to 
search  the  Scriptures  for  the  deeper  truths  found  therein,  truths  akin 
to  the  philosophic  doctrines  found  in  Greek  literature;  and  the  latter 
will  help  them  in  understanding  the  Bible  aright.  It  thus  became  a 
duty  to  study  philosophy  and  the  sciences  preparatory  thereto, 
logic,  mathematics  and  physics;  and  thus  equipped  to  approach  the 
Scriptures  and  interpret  them  in  a  philosophical  manner.  The  study 
of  mediaeval  Jewish  rationahsm  has  therefore  two  sides  to  it,  the  analy- 
sis of  metaphysical,  ethical  and  psychological  problems,  and  the  ap- 
plication of  these  studies  to  an  interpretation  of  Scripture. 

Now  let  us  take  a  closer  glance  at  the  rationalistic  or  philosophic 
literature  to  which  the  Jews  in  the  middle  ages  fell  heirs.  In  529  A.  D. 
the  Greek  schools  of  philosophy  in  Athens  were  closed  by  order  of 
Emperor  Justinian.  This  did  not,  however,  lead  to  the  extinction  of 
Greek  thought  as  an  influence  in  the  world.  For  though  the  West  was 
gradually  dechning  intellectually  on  account  of  the  fall  of  Rome  and 
the  barbarian  invasions  which  followed  in  its  train,  there  were  signs 
of  progress  in  the  East  which,  feeble  at  first,  was  destined  in  the  course 
of  several  centuries  to  illumine  the  whole  of  Europe  with  its  enlight- 
ening rays. 

Long  before  529,  the  date  of  the  closing  of  the  Greek  schools,  Greek 
influence  was  introduced  in  the  East  in  Asia  and  Africa.^  The  whole 
movement  goes  back  to  the  days  of  Alexander  the  Great  and  the 
victories  he  gained  in  the  Orient.  From  that  time  on  Greeks  settled  in 
Asia  and  Africa  and  brought  along  with  them  Greek  manners,  the 
Greek  language,  and  the  Greek  arts  and  sciences.  Alexandria,  the 
capital  of  the  Ptolemies  in  Egypt  after  the  death  of  Alexander,  and 
Antioch,  the  capital  of  Syria  under  the  empire  of  the  Seleucidae, 
were  well-known  centres  of  Greek  learning. 

When  Syria  changed  masters  in  64  B.  C.  and  became  a  Roman 
province,  its  form  of  civilization  did  not  change,  and  the  introduction 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

of  Christianity  had  the  effect  of  spreading  the  influence  of  the  Greeks 
and  their  language  into  Mesopotamia  beyond  the  Euphrates.  The 
Christians  in  Syria  had  to  study  Greek  in  order  to  understand  the 
Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  the  New  Testaments,  the  decrees  and  canons 
of  the  ecclesiastical  councils,  and  the  writings  of  the  Church  Fathers. 
Besides  rehgion  and  the  Church,  the  hberal  arts  and  sciences,  for 
which  the  Greeks  were  so  famous,  attracted  the  interests  of  the  Syrian 
Christians,  and  schools  were  established  in  the  ecclesiastical  centres 
where  philosophy,  mathematics  and  medicine  were  studied.  These 
branches  of  knowledge  were  represented  in  Greek  literature,  and  hence 
the  works  treating  of  these  subjects  had  to  be  translated  into  Syriac 
for  the  benefit  of  those  who  did  not  know  Greek.  Aristotle  was  the 
authority  in  philosophy,  Hippocrates  and  Galen  in  medicine. 

The  oldest  of  these  schools  was  in  Edessa  in  Mesopotamia,  founded 
in  the  year  363  by  St.  Ephrem  of  Nisibis.  It  was  closed  in  489  and  the 
teachers  migrated  to  Persia  where  two  other  schools  became  famous, 
one  at  Nisibis  and  the  other  at  Gandisapora,  A  third  school  of  phil- 
osophy among  the  Jacobite  or  Monophysite  Christians  was  that  con- 
nected with  the  convent  of  Kinnesrin  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Eu- 
phrates, which  became  famous  as  a  seat  of  Greek  learning  in  the 
beginning  of  the  seventh  century. 

Christianity  was  succeeded  in  the  Orient  by  Mohammedanism, 
and  this  change  led  to  even  greater  cultivation  of  Greek  studies 
on  the  part  of  the  Syrians.  The  Mohammedan  Caliphs  employed 
the  Syrians  as  physicians.  This  was  especially  true  of  the  Abbasid 
dynasty,  who  came  into  power  in  750.  When  they  succeeded  to  the 
CaUphate  they  raised  Nestorian  Syrians  to  ofl&ces  of  importance,  and 
the  latter  under  the  patronage  of  their  masters  continued  their  studies 
of  Greek  science  and  philosophy  and  translated  those  writings  into 
Syriac  and  Arabic.  Among  the  authors  translated  were,  Hippocrates 
and  Galen  in  medicine,  Euclid,  Archimedes  and  Ptolemy  in  mathe- 
matics and  astronomy,  and  Aristotle,  Theophrastus  and  Alexander 
of  Aphrodisias  in  philosophy.  In  many  cases  the  Greek  writings  were 
not  turned  directly  into  Arabic  but  as  the  translators  were  Syrians, 
the  versions  were  made  first  into  Syriac,  and  then  from  the  Syriac 
into  Arabic.  The  Syrian  Christians  were  thus  the  mediators  between 
the  Greeks  and  the  Arabs.    The  latter,  however,  in  the  course  of  time 


INTRODUCTION  xiy 

far  surpassed  their  Syrian  teachers,  developed  important  schools  of 
philosophy,  became  the  teachers  of  the  Jews,  and  with  the  help  of  the 
latter  introduced  Greek  philosophy  as  well  as  their  own  development 
thereof  into  Christian  Europe  in  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth 
century. 

We  see  now  that  the  impulse  to  philosophizing  came  from  the 
Greeks, — and  not  merely  the  impulse  but  the  material,  the  matter 
as  well  as  the  method  and  the  terminology.  In  the  Aristotelian  writ- 
ings we  find  developed  an  entire  system  of  thought.  There  is  not  a 
branch  of  knowledge  dealing  with  fundamental  principles  which  is  not 
there  represented.  First  of  all  Aristotle  stands  alone  as  the  discoverer 
of  the  organon  of  thought,  the  tool  which  we  all  employ  in  our  reason- 
ing and  reflection;  he  is  the  first  formula  tor  of  the  science  and  art  of 
logic.  He  treats  besides  of  the  principles  of  nature  and  natural  phe- 
nomena in  the  Physics  and  the  treatise  on  the  Heavens.  He  discusses 
the  nature  of  the  soul,  the  senses  and  the  intellect  in  his  '  Psychology." 
In  the  '  History  of  Animals"  and  other  minor  works  we  have  a  treat- 
ment of  biology.  In  the  Nikomachean  and  Eudemian  Ethics  he  analy- 
zes the  meaning  of  virtue,  gives  a  list  and  classification  of  the  virtues 
and  discusses  the  summum  bonum  or  the  aim  of  human  life.  Finally  in 
the  Metaphysics  we  have  an  analysis  of  the  fundamental  notions  of 
being,  of  the  nature  of  reality  and  of  God. 

The  Jews  did  not  get  all  this  in  its  purity  for  various  reasons.  In 
the  first  place  it  was  only  gradually  that  the  Jews  became  acquainted 
with  the  wealth  of  Aristotelian  material.  We  are  sure  that  Abraham 
Ibn  Daud,  the  forerunner  of  Maimonides,  had  a  thorough  familiarity 
with  the  ideas  of  Aristotle;  and  those  who  came  after  him,  for  example 
Maimonides,  Gersonides,  Hasdai  Crescas,  show  clearly  that  they  were 
deep  students  of  the  ideas  represented  in  the  writings  of  the  Stagirite. 
But  there  is  not  the  same  evidence  in  the  earlier  writings  of  Isaac 
Israeli,  Saadia,  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  Gabirol,  Bahya  Ibn  Pakuda, 
Judah  Halevi.  They  had  picked  up  Aristotelian  ideas  and  principles, 
but  they  had  also  absorbed  ideas  and  concepts  from  other  schools, 
Greek  as  well  as  Arabian,  and  unconsciously  combined  the  two. 

Another  explanation  for  the  rarity  of  the  complete  and  unadulter- 
ated Aristotle  among  the  Jewish  thinkers  of  the  middle  ages  is  that 
people  in  those  days  were  very  uncritical  in  the  matter  of  historical 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

facts  and  relations.  Historical  and  literary  criticism  was  altogether 
unknown,  and  a  number  of  works  were  ascribed  to  Aristotle  which 
did  not  belong  to  him,  and  which  were  foreign  in  spirit  to  his  mode  of 
thinking.  They  emanated  from  a  different  school  of  thought  with 
different  presuppositions.  I  am  referring  to  the  treatise  called  the 
"Theology  of  Aristotle,"^  and  that  known  as  the  "Liber  de  Causis."^ 
Both  were  attributed  to  Aristotle  in  the  middle  ages  by  Jews  and 
Arabs  alike,  but  it  has  been  shown  recently  ^  that  the  former  represents 
extracts  from  the  works  of  Plotinus,  the  head  of  the  Neo-Platonic 
school  of  philosophy,  while  the  latter  is  derived  from  a  treatise  of 
Proclus,  a  Neo-Platonist  of  later  date. 

Finally  a  third  reason  for  the  phenomenon  in  question  is  that  the 
Jews  were  the  pupils  of  the  Arabs  and  followed  their  lead  in  adapting 
Greek  thought  to  their  own  intellectual  and  spiritual  needs.  It  so 
happens  therefore  that  even  in  the  case  of  Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  Mai- 
monides  and  Gersonides,  who  were  without  doubt  well  versed  in 
Aristotelian  thought  and  entertained  not  merely  admiration  but 
reverence  for  the  philosopher  of  Stagira,  we  notice  that  instead  of 
reading  the  works  of  Aristotle  himself,  they  preferred,  or  were  obliged 
as  the  case  may  be,  to  go  to  the  writings  of  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and 
Averroes  for  their  information  on  the  views  of  the  philosopher.  In 
the  case  of  Gersonides  this  is  easily  explained.  It  seems  he  could  read 
neither  Latin  nor  Arabic^  and  there  was  no  Hebrew  translation  of  the 
text  of  Aristotle.  Averroes  had  taken  in  the  fourteenth  century  the 
place  of  the  Greek  philosopher  and  instead  of  reading  Aristotle  all 
students  read  the  works  of  the  Commentator,  as  Averroes  was  called. 
Of  course  the  very  absence  of  a  Hebrew  translation  of  Aristotle's 
text  proves  that  even  among  those  who  read  Arabic  the  demand  for 
the  text  of  Aristotle  was  not  great,  and  preference  was  shown  for  the 
works  of  the  interpreters,  compendists  and  commentators,  like  Alfarabi 
and  Avicenna.  And  this  helps  us  to  understand  why  it  is  that  Ibn 
Daud  and  Maimonides  who  not  only  read  Arabic  but  wrote  their 
philosophical  works  in  Arabic  showed  the  same  preference  for  the 
secondhand  Aristotle.  One  reason  may  have  been  the  lack  of  historical 
and  literary  criticism  spoken  of  above,  and  the  other  the  difficulty 
of  the  Arabic  translations  of  Aristotle.  Aristotle  is  hard  to  translate 
into  any  language  by  reason  of  his  peculiar  technical  terminology; 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

and  the  difficulty  was  considerably  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the 
Syriac  in  many  cases  stood  between  the  original  Greek  and  the  Arabic, 
and  in  the  second  place  by  the  great  dissimilarity  between  the  Semitic 
language  and  its  Indo-European  original.  This  may  have  made  the 
copies  of  Aristotle's  text  rare,  and  gradually  led  to  their  disuse.  The 
great  authority  which  names  like  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and  Averroes 
acquired  still  further  served  to  stamp  them  as  the  approved  expositors 
of  the  AristoteHan  doctrine. 

Among  the  Arabs  the  earliest  division  based  upon  a  theoretical 
question  was  that  of  the  parties  known  as  the  ''Kadariya"  and  the 
"Jabariya."  ^°  The  problem  which  was  the  cause  of  the  difference 
was  that  of  free  will  and  determinism.  Orthodox  Islam  favored  the 
idea  that  man  is  completely  dependent  upon  the  divine  will,  and  that 
not  only  his  destiny  but  also  his  conduct  is  determined,  and  his  own 
will  does  not  count.  This  was  the  popular  feehng,  though  as  far  as  the 
Koran  is  concerned  the  question  cannot  be  decided  one  way  or  the 
other,  as  it  is  not  consistent  in  its  stand,  and  arguments  can  be  drawn 
in  plenty  in  favor  of  either  opinion.  The  idea  of  determinism,  however, 
seemed  repugnant  to  many  minds,  who  could  not  reconcile  this  with 
their  idea  of  reward  and  punishment  and  the  justice  of  God.  How  is  it 
possible  that  a  righteous  God  would  force  a  man  to  act  in  a  certain 
manner  and  then  punish  him  for  it?  Hence  the  sect  of  the  "  Kadariya," 
who  were  in  favor  of  freedom  of  the  will.  The  Jabariya  were  the 
determinists. 

This  division  goes  back  to  a  very  early  period  before  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy  among  the  Arabs,  and  hence  owes 
its  inception  not  to  reason  as  opposed  to  religious  dogma,  but  to  a 
pious  endeavor  to  understand  clearly  the  rehgious  view  upon  so  im- 
portant a  question. 

From  the  Kadariya,  and  in  opposition  to  the  AristoteUan  move- 
ment which  had  in  the  meantime  gained  ground,  developed  the  school 
of  theologians  known  as  the  "Mutakallimun."  They  were  the  first 
among  the  Arabs  who  dehberately  laid  down  the  reason  as  a  source 
of  knowledge  in  addition  to  the  authority  of  the  Koran  and  the 
"Sunna"  or  tradition.  They  were  not  freethinkers,  and  their  object 
was  not  to  oppose  orthodoxy  as  such.  On  the  contrary,  their  purpose 
was  to  purify  the  faith  by  freeing  it  from  such  elements  as  obscured 


xxii  INTRODUCTION 

in  their  minds  the  purity  of  the  monotheistic  tenet  and  the  justice  of 
God.  They  started  where  the  Kadariya  left  off  and  went  further. 
As  a  school  of  opposition  their  efforts  were  directed  to  prove  the 
creation  of  the  world,  individual  providence,  the  reality  of  miracles, 
as  against  the  "philosophers,"  i.  e.,  the  Aristotehans,  who  held  to  the 
eternity  of  motion,  denied  God's  knowledge  of  particulars,  and  in- 
sisted on  the  unchanging  character  of  natural  law. 

For  this  purpose  they  placed  at  the  basis  of  their  speculations  not 
the  AristoteHan  concepts  of  matter  and  form,  the  former  uncreated 
and  continuous,  but  adopted  the  atomistic  theory  of  Democritus, 
denied  the  necessity  of  cause  and  effect  and  the  validity  of  natural 
law,  and  made  God  directly  responsible  for  everything  that  happened 
every  moment  in  life.  God,  they  said,  creates  continually,  and  he  is 
not  hampered  by  any  such  thing  as  natural  law,  which  is  merely  our 
name  for  that  which  we  are  accustomed  to  see.  Whenever  it  rains  we 
are  accustomed  to  see  the  ground  wet,  and  we  conclude  that  there  is 
a  necessary  connection  of  cause  and  effect  between  the  rain  and  the 
wetness  of  the  ground.  Nothing  of  the  kind,  say  the  Mutakallimun, 
or  the  Mu  tazila,  the  oldest  sect  of  the  school.  It  rains  because  God 
willed  that  it  should  rain,  and  the  ground  is  wet  because  God  wills  it 
shall  be  wet.  If  God  willed  that  the  ground  should  be  dry  following 
a  rain,  it  would  be  dry;  and  the  one  is  no  more  and  no  less  natural 
than  the  other.  Miracles  cease  to  be  miracles  on  this  conception  of 
natural  processes.  Similarly  the  dogma  of  creation  is  easily  vindi- 
cated on  this  theory  as  against  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  eternity 
of  the  world,  which  follows  from  his  doctrine  of  matter  and  form,  as 
we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  later. 

The  Mu  tazila  were,  however,  chiefly  known  not  for  their  principles 
of  physics  but  for  their  doctrines  of  the  unity  of  God  and  his  justice. 
It  was  this  which  gave  them  their  name  of  the  "Men  of  Unity  and 
Justice,"  i.  e.,  the  men  who  vindicate  against  the  unenlightened  views 
of  popular  orthodoxy  the  unity  of  God  and  his  justice. 

The  discussion  of  the  unity  centered  about  the  proper  interpreta- 
tion of  the  anthropomorphic  passages  in  the  Koran  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  divine  attributes.  When  the  Koran  speaks  of  God's  eyes, 
ears,  hands,  feet;  of  his  seeing,  hearing,  sitting,  standing,  walking, 
being  angry,  smiling,  and  so  on,  must  those  phrases  be  understood 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

literally?  If  so  God  is  similar  to  man,  corporeal  like  him,  and  swayed 
by  passions.  This  seemed  to  the  Mu  tazila  an  unworthy  conception 
of  God.  To  vindicate  his  spirituality  the  anthropomorphic  passages 
in  the  Koran  must  be  understood  metaphorically. 

The  other  more  difficult  question  was  in  what  sense  can  attributes 
be  ascribed  to  God  at  all?  It  is  not  here  a  question  of  anthropomor- 
phism. If  I  say  that  God  is  omniscient,  omnipotent  and  a  living  God, 
I  attribute  to  God  life,  power,  knowledge.  Are  these  attributes  the 
same  with  God's  essence  or  are  they  different?  If  different  (and  they 
must  be  eternal  since  God  was  never  without  them),  then  we  have 
more  than  one  eternal  being,  and  God  is  dependent  upon  others.  If 
they  are  not  different  from  God's  essence,  then  his  essence  is  not  a 
strict  unity,  since  it  is  composed  of  life,  power,  knowledge;  for  life  is 
not  power,  and  power  is  not  knowledge.  The  only  way  to  defend  the 
unity  of  God  in  its  absolute  purity  is  to  say  that  God  has  no  attri- 
butes, i.  e.,  God  is  omniscient  but  not  through  knowledge  as  his 
attribute;  God  is  omnipotent  but  not  through  power  as  his  attribute, 
and  so  on.  God  is  absolutely  one,  and  there  is  no  distinction  between 
knowledge,  power,  and  life  in  him.  They  are  all  one,  and  are  his 
essence. 

This  seemed  in  opposition  to  the  words  of  the  Koran,  which  fre- 
quently speaks  of  God's  knowledge,  power,  and  so  on,  and  was  ac- 
cordingly condemned  as  heretical  by  the  orthodox. 

In  the  tenth  century  a  new  sect  arose  named  the  "Ashariya"  after 
Al-Ashari,  its  founder.  This  was  a  party  of  moderation,  and  tended  to 
conciliate  orthodoxy  by  not  going  too  far  in  the  direction  of  rationalis- 
tic thinking.  They  solved  the  problem  by  saying,  "God  knows 
through  a  knowledge  which  is  not  different  from  his  essence." 

The  other  problem  to  which  the  Mu' tazila  devoted  their  attention 
was  that  of  the  justice  of  God.  This  was  in  line  with  the  efforts  of  the 
Kadariya  before  them.  It  concerned  itself  with  the  doctrine  of  free 
will.  They  defended  man's  absolute  freedom  of  action,  and  insisted 
on  justice  as  the  only  motive  of  God's  deahngs  with  men.  God  must 
be  just  and  cannot  act  otherwise  than  in  accordance  with  justice. 

In  reference  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil,  the 
orthodox  position  was  that  good  is  that  which  God  commands,  evil 
that  which  God  forbids.    In  other  words,  nothing  is  in  itself  good  or 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

evil,  the  ethical  character  of  an  act  is  purely  relative  to  God's  attitude 
to  it.  If  God  were  to  command  cannibalism,  it  would  be  a  good  act. 
The  Mu'tazila  were  opposed  to  this.  They  believed  in  the  absolute 
character  of  good  and  evil.  What  makes  an  act  good  or  bad  is  reason, 
and  it  is  because  an  act  is  good  that  God  commands  it,  and  not  the 
reverse. 

The  foregoing  account  gives  us  an  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  Mu'tazi- 
lite  discussions  of  the  two  problems  of  God's  unity  and  God's  justice. 
Their  works  were  all  arranged  in  the  same  way.  They  were  divided 
into  two  parts,  one  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  unity,  and  the 
other  with  that  of  justice.  The  proofs  of  the  unity  were  preceded  by 
the  proofs  of  God's  existence,  and  the  latter  were  based  upon  a  demon- 
stration that  the  world  is  not  eternal,  but  bears  traces  of  having  come 
to  be  in  time.  These  are  the  earmarks  by  which  a  Mu'taziHte  book 
could  be  recognized,  and  the  respect  for  them  on  the  part  of  the 
philosophers,  i.  e.,  the  AristoteUans,  was  not  great.  The  latter  did  not 
consider  them  worthy  combatants  in  a  philosophical  fight,  claiming 
that  they  came  with  preconceived  notions  and  arranged  their  concep- 
tions of  nature  to  suit  the  religious  beUefs  which  they  desired  to  de- 
fend. Maimonides  expresses  a  similar  judgment  concerning  their 
worthlessness  as  philosophical  thinkers.  ^^ 

This  school  of  the  Mutakallimun,  or  of  the  more  important  part  of 
it  known  as  the  Mu'tazila,  is  of  great  interest  for  the  history  of  Jewish 
rationaHsm.  In  the  first  place  their  influence  on  the  early  Jewish 
philosophers  was  great  and  unmistakable.  It  is  no  discovery  of  a 
late  day  but  is  well  known  to  Maimonides  who  is  himself,  as  has  just 
been  said  and  as  will  appear  with  greater  detail  later,  a  strong  opponent 
of  these  to  him  unphilosophical  thinkers.  In  the  seventy-first  chapter 
of  his  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed,"  he  says,  "You  will  find  that  in  the 
few  works  composed  by  the  Geonim  and  the  Karaites  on  the  unity  of 
God  and  on  such  matter  as  is  connected  with  this  doctrine,  they  fol- 
lowed the  lead  of  the  Mohammedan  Mutakallimun.  ...  It  also 
happened,  that  at  the  time  when  the  Mohammedans  adopted  this 
method  of  the  Kalam,  there  arose  among  them  a  certain  sect,  called 
Mu'tazila.  In  certain  things  our  scholars  followed  the  theory  and  the 
method  of  these  Mu'tazila." 

Thanks  to  the  researches  of  modern  Jewish  and  non- Jewish  scholars 


INTRODUCTION  XXV 

we  know  now  that  the  Rabbanite  thinker  Saadia  and  the  Karaite 
writers,  like  Joseph  Al  Basir  and  Jeshuah  ben  Judah,  are  indebted 
far  more  to  the  Mohammedan  Mu'tazihtes  than  would  appear  from 
Maimonides's  statement  just  quoted.  The  Rabbanites  being  staunch 
adherents  of  the  Talmud,  to  the  influence  of  which  they  owed  a 
national  and  religious  self-consciousness  much  stronger  than  that  of 
the  Karaites,  who  rejected  the  authority  of  tradition,  did  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  carried  away  so  far  by  the  ideas  of  the  Mohammedan 
rationalists  as  to  become  their  slavish  followers.  The  Karaites  are  less 
scrupulous;  and  as  they  were  the  first  among  the  Jews  to  imitate  the 
Mu'tazila  in  the  endeavor  to  rationalize  Jewish  doctrine,  they  adopted 
their  views  in  all  details,  and  it  is  sometimes  impossible  to  tell  from  the 
contents  of  a  Karaite  Mu'tazilite  work  whether  it  was  written  by  a 
Jew  or  a  Mohammedan.  The  arrangement  of  the  work  in  the  two 
divisions  of  "Unity"  and  "Justice,"  the  discussion  of  substance  and 
accident,  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  of  the  existence,  unity  and 
incorporeality  of  God,  of  his  attributes,  of  his  justice,  and  of  human 
free  will,  are  so  similar  in  the  two  that  it  is  external  evidence  alone 
to  which  we  owe  the  knowledge  of  certain  Karaite  works  as  Jewish. 
There  are  no  mediaeval  Jewish  works  treating  of  religious  and  theolog- 
ical problems  in  which  there  is  so  much  aloofness,  such  absence  of 
theological  prepossession  and  religious  feeling  as  in  some  Karaite 
writings  of  Mu'tazilite  stamp.  Cold  and  unredeemed  logic  gives  the 
tone  to  the  entire  composition. 

Another  reason  for  the  importance  of  the  Mu  tazilite  school  for  the 
history  of  Jewish  thought  is  of  recent  discovery.  Schreiner  has  sug- 
gested ^^  that  the  origin  of  the  Mu' tazilite  movement  was  due  to  the 
influence  of  learned  Jews  with  whom  the  Mohammedans  came  in  con- 
tact, particularly  in  the  city  of  Basra,  an  important  centre  of  the 
school.  The  reader  will  recall  that  the  two  main  doctrines  of  the 
Mu  tazila  were  the  unity  of  God  and  his  justice.  The  latter  really 
signified  the  freedom  of  the  will.  That  these  are  good  Jewish  views 
would  of  course  prove  nothing  for  the  origin  of  similar  opinions  among 
the  Mohammedans.  For  it  is  not  here  a  question  simply  of  the  dog- 
matic belief  in  Monotheism  as  opposed  to  polytheism.  Mohammed- 
anism is  as  a  religion  Monotheistic  and  we  know  that  Mohammed  was 
indebted  very  much  to  Jews  and  Judaism.    We  are  here  concerned 


xxvi  INTRODUCTION 

with  the  origin  of  a  rationalistic  movement  which  endeavors  to  defend 
a  spiritual  conception  of  God  against  a  crude  anthropomorphism,  to 
vindicate  a  conception  of  his  absolute  unity  against  the  threatened 
multiplication  of  his  essence  by  the  assumption  of  eternal  attributes, 
and  which  puts  stress  upon  God's  justice  rather  than  upon  his  omnip- 
otence so  as  to  save  human  freedom.  Another  doctrine  of  the 
Mu  tazila  was  that  the  Koran  was  not  eternal  as  the  orthodox  be- 
lieved, but  that  it  was  created.  Now  we  can  find  parallels  for  most 
of  these  doctrines.  Anthropomorphism  was  avoided  in  the  Aramaic 
translations  of  the  Pentateuch,  also  in  certain  changes  in  the  Hebrew 
text  which  are  recorded  in  Rabbinical  literature,  and  known  as 
"Tikkune  Soferim,"  or  corrections  of  the  Scribes.  ^^  Concern  for 
maintaining  the  unity  of  God  in  its  absolute  purity  is  seen  in  the  care 
with  which  the  men  of  the  Agada  forbid  any  prayer  which  may  have 
a  semblance,  however  remote,  of  dualism.  ^^  The  freedom  of  the  will  is 
clearly  stated  in  the  Rabbinic  expression,  "All  is  in  the  hands  of  God 
except  the  fear  of  Heaven."  ^^  And  an  apparently  deterministic  pas- 
sage in  Job  23,  13,  "But  he  is  one  and  who  can  turn  him,  and  what 
his  soul  desire th,  even  that  he  doeth, "  is  explained  by  Rabbi  Akiba 
in  the  following  manner,  "It  is  not  possible  to  answer  the  words  of 
him  who  with  his  word  created  the  world,  for  he  rules  all  things  with 
truth  and  with  righteousness."  ^^  And  we  find  a  parallel  also  for  the 
creation  of  the  Koran  in  the  Midrashic  statement  that  the  Torah  is  one 
of  the  six  or  seven  things  created  before  the  world.  ^'^ 

These  parallels  alone  would  not  be  of  much  weight,  but  they  are 
strengthened  by  other  considerations.  The  Mu'tazilite  movement 
seems  to  have  developed  among  the  ascetic  sects,  with  the  leaders  of 
whom  its  founders  were  in  close  relation.  ^^  The  ascetic  literature 
bears  unmistakable  traces  of  having  been  influenced  by  the  Halaka 
and  the  Agada.  ^^  Moreover,  there  is  a  Mohammedan  tradition  or 
two  to  the  effect  that  the  doctrine  of  the  creation  of  the  Koran  and 
also  of  the  rejection  of  anthropomorphism  goes  back  to  a  Jew,  Lebid- 
ibn  Al-A'sam.2° 

More  recently  still  *  C.  H.  Becker  proved  from  a  study  of  certain 
Patristic  writings  that  the  polemical  literature  of  the  Christians 
played  an  important  role  in  the  formation  of  Mohammedan  dogma, 
*CJ.  Zeitschrift  fiir  Assyriologie,  1912,  175  ff. 


INTRODUCTION  sxvii 

and  he  shows  conclusively  that  the  form  in  which  the  problem  of 
freedom  was  discussed  among  the  Mohammedans  was  taken  from 
Christianity,  The  question  of  the  creation  or  eternity  of  the  Koran 
or  word  of  Allah,  is  similarly  related  to  the  Christian  idea  of  the 
eternal  Logos,  who  is  on  the  one  hand  the  Word  and  the  Wisdom, 
and  is  on  the  other  identified  with  Jesus  Christ.  And  the  same  thing 
holds  of  the  doctrine  of  attributes.  It  played  a  greater  role  in  Chris- 
tian dogma  than  it  ever  did  in  Judaism  prior  to  the  philosophic  era 
in  the  middle  ages.  To  be  sure,  the  Patristic  writers  were  much  in- 
debted to  Philo,  in  whose  writings  the  germ  of  the  mediaeval  doctrine 
of  attributes  is  plainly  evident.  But  the  Mohammedan  schools  did 
not  read  Philo.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  Schreiner's  view  must 
be  considerably  modified,  if  not  entirely  rejected,  in  view  of  the  later 
evidence  adduced  by  Becker. 

The  more  extreme  doctrines,  however,  of  the  more  orthodox  Ash- 
ariya,  such  as  the  denial  of  natural  law  and  the  necessity  of  cause  and 
effect,  likewise  the  denial  of  man's  abihty  to  determine  his  actions, 
none  of  the  Jews  accepted.  Here  we  have  again  the  testimony  of 
Maimonides,  who,  however,  is  not  inclined  to  credit  this  circumstance 
to  the  intelligence  and  judgment  of  his  predecessors,  but  to  chance. 
His  words  are,  "Although  another  sect,  the  Ashariya,  with  their  own 
pecuhar  views,  was  subsequently  established  among  the  Moham- 
medans, you  will  not  find  any  of  these  views  in  the  writings  of  our 
authors;  not  because  these  authors  preferred  the  opinions  of  the  first 
named  sect  to  those  of  the  latter,  but  because  they  chanced  first  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  theory  of  the  Mu'tazila,  which  they 
adopted  and  treated  as  demonstrated  truth."^^ 

The  influence  of  the  Kalam  is  present  in  greater  or  less  degree  in  the 
philosophers  up  to  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  and  Maimonides.  The  latter 
gave  this  system  its  death  blow  in  his  thoroughgoing  criticism, ^^  and 
thenceforth  Aristotelianism  was  in  possession  of  the  field  until  that 
too  was  attacked  by  Hasdai  Crescas. 

Another  sect  of  the  Mohammedans  which  had  considerable  in- 
fluence on  some  of  the  Jewish  philosophical  and  ethical  writers  are  the 
ascetics  and  the  Sufis  who  are  related  to  them.  The  latter  developed 
their  mode  of  life  and  their  doctrines  under  the  influence  of  the  Chris- 
tian monks,  and  are  likewise  indebted  to  Indian  and  Persian  ideas.  ^^ 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

In  their  mode  of  life  they  belong  to  the  class  of  ascetics  and  preach 
abstinence,  indifference  to  human  praise  and  blame,  love  of  God  and 
absolute  trust  in  him  even  to  the  extent  of  refraining  from  all  effort  in 
one's  own  behalf,  and  in  extreme  cases  going  so  far  as  to  court  danger. 
In  theoretical  teaching  they  adopted  the  emanatistic  doctrine  of  the 
Neo-Platonic  School.  This  has  been  called  dynamic  Pantheism.  It  is 
Pantheism  because  in  its  last  analysis  it  identifies  God  with  the 
universe.  At  the  same  time  it  does  not  bring  God  directly  in  contact 
with  the  world,  but  only  indirectly  through  the  powers  or  Bvvdfiei^^ 
hence  dynamic  Pantheism.  These  powers  emanate  successively  from 
the  highest  one,  forming  a  chain  of  intermediate  powers  mediating 
between  God  and  the  world  of  matter,  the  links  of  the  chain  growing 
dimmer  and  less  pure  as  they  are  further  removed  from  their  origin, 
while  the  latter  loses  nothing  in  the  process.  This  latter  condition 
saves  the  Neo-Platonic  conception  from  being  a  pure  system  of  emana- 
tion like  some  Indian  doctrines.  In  the  latter  the  first  cause  actually 
gives  away  something  of  itself  and  loses  thereby  from  its  fulness.  The 
process  in  both  systems  is  explained  by  use  of  analogies,  those  of  the 
radiation  of  light  from  a  luminous  body,  and  of  the  overflowing  of  a 
fountain  being  the  most  common. 

The  chief  exponent  of  the  ethics  of  the  Sufis  in  mediaeval  Jewish 
literature  is  Bahya  Ibn  Pakuda.  In  his  ethical  work  "The  Duties  of 
the  Hearts,"  he  lays  the  same  stress  on  intention  and  inwardness  in 
rehgious  life  and  practice  as  against  outward  performance  with  the 
limbs  on  the  one  hand  and  dry  scholasticism  on  the  other,  as  do  the 
Sufis.  In  matters  of  detail  too  he  is  very  much  indebted  to  this  Arab 
sect  from  whose  writings  he  quotes  abundantly  with  as  well  as  without 
acknowledgment  of  his  sources  except  in  a  general  way  as  the  wise 
men.  To  be  sure,  he  does  not  follow  them  slavishly  and  rejects  the 
extremes  of  asceticism  and  unworldly  cynicism  which  a  great  many 
of  the  Sufis  preached  and  practiced.  He  is  also  not  in  sympathy  with 
their  mysticism.  He  adopts  their  teachings  only  where  he  can  support 
them  with  analogous  views  as  expressed  in  the  Rabbinical  writings, 
which  indeed  played  an  important  role  in  Mohammedan  ascetic  lit- 
erature, being  the  source  of  many  of  the  sayings  found  in  the  latter.  ^^ 

The  systems  of  thought  which  had  the  greatest  influence  upon 
Jewish  as  well  as  Mohammedan  theology,  were  the  great  systems  of 


INTRODUCTION  xxix 

Plato  (especially  as  developed  in  Neo-Platonism)  and  Aristotle. 
These  two  philosophies  not  merely  affected  the  thinking  of  Jew  and 
Mohammedan  but  really  transformed  it  from  rehgious  and  ethical 
discussions  into  metaphysical  systems.  In  the  Bible  and  similarly  in 
the  Koran  we  have  a  purely  personal  view  of  God  and  the  world.  God 
is  a  person,  he  creates  the  world — out  of  nothing  to  be  sure — but  never- 
theless he  is  thought  of  doing  it  in  the  manner  in  which  a  person  does 
such  things  with  a  will  and  a  purpose  in  time  and  place.  He  puts  a 
soul  into  man  and  communicates  to  him  laws  and  prohibitions.  Man 
must  obey  these  laws  because  they  are  the  will  of  God  and  are  good, 
and  he  will  be  rewarded  and  punished  according  to  his  attitude  in 
obedience  and  disobedience.  The  character  of  the  entire  point  of  view 
is  personal,  human,  teleological,  ethical.  There  is  no  attempt  made 
at  an  impersonal  and  objective  analysis  of  the  common  aspects  of  all 
existing  things,  the  elements  underlying  all  nature.  Nor  is  there  any 
conscious  effort  at  a  critical  classification  of  the  various  kinds  of  things 
existing  in  nature  beyond  the  ordinary  and  evident  classification  found 
in  Genesis — heaven  and  earth;  in  heaven,  sun,  moon  and  stars;  on 
earth,  grass,  fruit  trees,  insects,  water  animals,  birds,  quadrupeds, 
man.  Then  light  and  darkness,  the  seasons  of  the  year,  dry  land  and 
water. 

In  Greek  philosophy  for  the  first  time  we  find  speculations  concern- 
ing the  common  element  or  elements  out  of  which  the  world  is  made — 
the  material  cause  as  Aristotle  later  called  it.  The  Sophists  and  Soc- 
rates gave  the  first  impulse  to  a  logical  analysis  of  what  is  involved  in 
description  or  definition.  The  concept  as  denoting  the  essence  of  a 
thing  is  the  important  contribution  Socrates  made  to  knowledge. 
Plato  objectified  the  concept,  or  rather  he  posited  an  object  as  the 
basis  of  the  concept,  and  raised  it  out  of  this  world  of  shadows  to  an 
inteUigible  world  of  realities  on  which  the  world  of  particulars  depends. 
But  it  was  Aristotle  who  made  a  thoroughgoing  analysis  of  thing  as 
well  as  thought,  and  he  was  the  master  of  knowledge  through  the 
middle  ages  alike  for  Jew,  Christian  and  Mohammedan. 

First  of  all  he  classified  all  objects  of  our  experience  and  found  that 
they  can  be  grouped  in  ten  classes  or  categories  as  he  called  them. 
Think  of  any  thing  you  please  and  you  will  find  that  it  is  either  an 
object  in  the  strict  sense,  i.  e.,  some  thing  that  exists  independently 


XXX  INTRODUCTION 

of  anything  else,  and  is  the  recipient  of  quahties,  as  for  example  a  man, 
a  mountain,  a  chair.  Or  it  is  a  quantity,  like  four,  or  cubit;  or  a  qual- 
ity, like  good,  black,  straight;  or  a  relation  like  long,  double,  master, 
slave;  and  so  on  throughout  the  ten  categories.  This  classification 
applies  to  words  and  thoughts  as  well  as  to  things.  As  an  analysis  of 
the  first  two  it  led  him  to  more  important  investigations  of  speech  and 
thinking  and  arguing,  and  resulted  in  his  system  of  logic,  which  is 
the  most  momentous  discovery  of  a  single  mind  recorded  in  history. 
As  applied  to  things  it  was  followed  by  a  more  fundamental  analysis  of 
all  real  objects  in  our  world  into  the  two  elements  of  matter  and  form. 
He  argued  as  follows:  nothing  in  the  material  world  is  permanent  as 
an  individual  thing.  It  changes  its  state  from  moment  to  moment 
and  finally  ceases  to  be  the  thing  it  was.  An  acorn  passes  a  number  of 
stages  before  it  is  ripe,  and  when  it  is  placed  in  the  ground  it  again 
changes  its  form  continually  and  then  comes  out  as  an  oak.  In  ar- 
tificial products  man  in  a  measure  imitates  nature.  He  takes  a  block 
of  marble  and  makes  a  statue  out  of  it.  He  forms  a  log  into  a  bed. 
So  an  ignorant  man  becomes  civilized  and  learned.  All  these  examples 
illustrate  change.  What  then  is  change?  Is  there  any  similarity  in 
all  the  cases  cited?  Can  we  express  the  process  of  change  in  a  formula 
which  will  apply  to  all  instances  of  change?  If  so,  we  shall  have  gained 
an  insight  into  a  process  of  nature  which  is  all-embracing  and  universal 
in  our  experience.  Yes,  we  can,  says  Aristotle.  Change  is  a  play  of 
two  elements  in  the  changing  thing.  When  a  thing  affected  with  one 
quality  changes  into  a  thing  with  the  opposite  quahty,  there  must 
be  the  thing  itself  without  either  of  the  opposite  qualities,  which  is 
changing.  Thus  when  a  white  fence  becomes  black,  the  fence  itself 
or  that  which  undergoes  the  change  is  something  neither  white  nor 
black.  It  is  the  uncolored  matter  which  first  had  the  form  of  white 
and  now  lost  that  and  took  on  the  form  of  black.  This  is  typical  of  all 
change.  There  is  in  all  change  ultimately  an  unchanging  substratum 
always  the  same,  which  takes  on  one  quality  after  another,  or  as 
Aristotle  would  say,  one  form  after  another.  This  substratum  is 
matter,  which  in  its  purity  is  not  affected  with  any  quality  or  form,  of 
which  it  is  the  seat  and  residence.  The  forms  on  the  other  hand  come 
and  go.  Form  does  not  change  any  more  than  matter.  The  changing 
thing  is  the  composite  of  matter  and  form,  and  change  means  separa- 


INTRODUCTION  xxxi 

tion  of  the  actual  components  of  which  one,  the  form,  disappears 
and  makes  room  for  its  opposite.  In  a  given  case,  say,  when  a  statue 
is  made  out  of  a  block  of  marble,  the  matter  is  the  marble  which  lost 
its  original  form  and  assumed  the  form  of  a  statue.  In  this  case  the 
marble,  if  you  take  away  both  the  previous  form  and  the  present,  will 
still  have  some  form  if  it  is  still  marble,  for  marble  must  have  certain 
qualities  if  it  is  to  be  marble.  In  that  case  then  the  matter  underlying 
the  change  in  question  is  not  pure  matter,  it  is  already  endowed  with 
some  primitive  form  and  is  composite.  But  marble  is  ultimately 
reducible  to  the  four  elements,  fire,  air,  water,  earth,  which  are  simpler; 
and  theoretically,  though  not  in  practice,  we  can  think  away  all  form, 
and  we  have  left  only  that  which  takes  forms  but  is  itself  not  any  form. 
This  is  matter. 

Here  the  reader  will  ask,  what  kind  of  thing  is  it  that  has  no  form 
whatsoever,  is  it  not  nothing  at  all?  How  can  anything  exist  without 
being  a  particular  kind  of  thing,  and  the  moment  it  is  that  it  is  no 
longer  pure  matter.  Aristotle's  answer  is  that  it  is  true  that  pure 
matter  is  never  found  as  an  objective  existence.  Point  to  any  real 
object  and  it  is  composed  of  matter  and  form.  And  yet  it  is  not  true 
that  matter  is  a  pure  figment  of  the  imagination;  it  has  an  existence  of 
its  own,  a  potential  existence.  And  this  leads  us  to  another  important 
conception  in  the  Aristotelian  philosophy. 

PotentiaHty  and  actuality  are  correlative  terms  corresponding  to 
matter  and  form.  Matter  is  the  potential,  form  is  the  actual.  What- 
ever potentiaHties  an  object  has  it  owes  to  its  matter.  Its  actual 
essence  is  due  to  its  form.  A  thing  free  from  matter  would  be  all  that 
it  is  at  once.  It  would  not  be  liable  to  change  of  any  kind,  whether 
progress  or  retrogression.  All  the  objects  of  our  experience  in  the 
sublunar  world  are  not  of  this  kind.  They  realize  themselves  gradu- 
ally, and  are  never  at  any  given  moment  all  that  they  are  capable  of 
becoming.  This  is  due  to  their  matter.  On  the  other  hand,  pure 
matter  is  actually  nothing.  It  is  just  capacity  for  being  anything,  and 
the  moment  it  is  anything  it  is  affected  with  form. 

It  is  clear  from  this  account  that  matter  and  form  are  the  bases  of 
sublunar  life  and  existence.  No  change,  no  motion  without  matter 
and  form.  For  motion  is  presupposed  in  all  kinds  of  change.  If 
then  all  processes  of  life  and  death  and  change  of  all  kinds  presuppose 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

matter  and  form,  the  latter  cannot  themselves  be  liable  to  genesis  and 
decay  and  change,  for  that  would  mean  that  matter  is  composed  of 
matter  and  form,  which  is  absurd.  We  thus  see  how  Aristotle  is  led 
to  believe  in  the  eternity  of  matter  and  motion,  in  other  words,  the 
eternity  of  the  world  processes  as  we  know  them. 

Motion  is  the  realization  of  the  potential  qua  potential.  This  is 
an  Aristotelian  definition  and  applies  not  merely  to  motion  in  the 
strict  sense,  i.  e.,  movement  in  place,  or  motion  of  translation, 
but  embraces  all  kinds  of  change.  Take  as  an  example  the  warming 
of  the  air  in  a  cold  room.  The  process  of  heating  the  room  is  a  kind 
of  motion;  the  air  passes  from  a  state  of  being  cold  to  a  state  of  being 
warm.  In  its  original  state  as  cold  it  is  potentially  warm,  i.  e.,  it  is 
actually  not  warm,  but  has  the  capacity  of  becoming  warm.  At  the 
end  of  the  process  it  is  actually  warm.  Hence  the  process  itself  is 
the  actualization  of  the  potential.  That  which  is  potential  cannot 
make  itself  actual,  for  to  make  itself  actual  it  must  be  actual,  which 
is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis  of  its  being  potential.  Potentiality  and 
actuality  are  contradictory  states  and  cannot  exist  side  by  side  in  the 
same  thing  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  relation.  There  must  there- 
fore be  an  external  agent,  itself  actual,  to  actualize  a  potential.  Thus, 
in  the  above  illustration,  a  cold  room  cannot  make  itself  warm.  There 
must  be  some  agency  itself  actually  warm  to  cause  the  air  in  the  room 
to  pass  from  cold  to  warm.  This  is  true  also  of  motion  in  place,  that 
a  thing  cannot  move  itself  and  must  be  moved  by  something  else. 
But  that  something  else  if  itself  in  motion  must  again  be  moved  by 
something  else.  This  process  would  lead  us  to  infinity.  In  order 
that  a  given  thing  shall  be  in  motion,  it  would  be  necessary  for  an 
infinite  number  of  things  to  be  in  motion.  This  is  impossible,  because 
there  cannot  be  an  infinite  number  of  things  all  here  and  now.  It 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Hence  if  anything  is  to  move  at  all, 
there  must  be  at  the  end  of  the  finite  chain  a  link  which  while  causing 
the  next  link  to  move,  is  itself  unmoved.  Hence  the  motion  existing 
in  the  world  must  be  due  ultimately  to  the  existence  of  an  unmoved 
mover.  If  this  being  causes  motion  without  being  itself  in  motion 
it  does  not  act  upon  the  bodies  it  moves  as  one  body  acts  upon  another, 
for  a  body  can  move  another  body  only  by  being  itself  in  motion.  The 
manner  in  which  the  unmoved  mover  moves  the  world  is  rather  to  be 


INTRODUCTION  xxxiii 

conceived  on  the  analogy  of  a  loved  object  moving  the  loving  object 
without  itself  being  moved.  The  person  in  love  strives  to  approach 
and  unite  with  the  object  of  his  love  without  the  latter  necessarily 
being  moved  in  turn.  This  is  the  way  in  which  Aristotle  conceives 
of  the  cause  of  the  world's  motion.  There  is  no  room  here  for  the 
creation  of  the  world.  Matter  is  eternal,  motion  is  eternal,  and  there 
is  an  eternal  mind  for  the  love  of  which  all  motions  have  been  going 
on  eternally. 

The  unmoved  mover,  or  God,  is  thus  not  body,  for  no  body  can 
move  another  body  without  being  itself  in  motion  at  the  same  time. 
Besides,  all  body  is  finite,  i.  e.,  it  has  a  finite  magnitude.  A  body  of 
infinite  magnitude  is  an  impossibihty,  as  the  very  essence  of  body  is 
that  it  must  be  bounded  by  surfaces.  A  finite  body  cannot  have  an 
infinite  power,  as  Aristotle  proves,  though  we  need  not  at  present 
go  into  the  details  of  his  proof.  But  a  being  which  causes  eternal 
motion  in  the  world  must  have  an  infinite  power  to  do  this.  Hence 
another  proof  that  God  is  not  corporeal. 

If  God  is  not  subject  to  motion,  he  is  not  subject  to  change  of  any 
kind,  for  change  involves  motion.  As  matter  is  at  the  basis  of  all 
change  God  is  without  matter,  hence  he  is  pure  form,  i.  e.,  pure  ac- 
tuahty  without  the  least  potentiahty.  This  means  that  he  is  what  he 
is  wholly  all  the  time;  he  has  no  capacities  of  being  what  he  is  at  any 
time  not.  But  if  he  is  not  corporeal,  the  nature  of  his  actuahty  or 
activity  must  be  Thought,  pure  thinking.  And  the  content  of  his 
thought  cannot  vary  from  topic  to  topic,  for  this  would  be  change, 
which  is  foreign  to  him.  He  must  be  eternally  thinking  the  same 
thought;  and  the  highest  thought  it  must  be.  But  the  highest  thought 
is  himself;  hence  God  is  pure  thought  thinking  himself,  thought 
thinking  thought. 

The  universe  is  in  the  shape  of  a  sphere  with  the  earth  stationary 
in  the  centre  and  the  heavens  revolving  around  it  exactly  as  appears 
to  us.  The  element  earth  is  the  heaviest,  hence  its  place  is  below  or, 
which  is  the  same  thing,  in  the  centre.  This  is  its  natural  place;  and 
its  natural  motion  when  away  from  the  centre  is  in  a  straight  line 
toward  the  centre.  Water  is  the  next  heaviest  element  and  its  natural 
place  is  just  above  earth;  hence  the  water  in  the  world  occupies  a 
position  spherical  in  shape  round  about  the  earth,  i.  e.,  it  forms  a 


xxxiv  INTRODUCTION 

hollow  sphere  concentric  with  the  earth.  Next  comes  the  hollow 
sphere  of  air  concentric  with  the  other  two.  Its  natural  motion  when 
away  from  its  place  in  the  direction  of  the  earth  is  in  a  straight  line 
toward  the  circumference  of  the  world,  not  however  going  beyond 
the  sphere  of  the  lightest  element  of  all,  namely,  fire.  This  has  its 
natural  place  outside  of  the  other  elements,  also  in  the  form  of  a  hollow 
sphere  concentric  with  the  other  three.  Its  natural  motion  is  in  a 
straight  line  away  from  the  centre  of  the  world  and  in  the  direction 
of  the  circumference.  Our  earth,  water,  air  and  fire  are  not  really 
the  elements  in  their  purity.  Each  one  has  in  it  also  mixtures  of 
the  other  three  elements,  the  one  which  gives  it  the  name  predom- 
inating. 

All  minerals,  plants  and  animals  are  formed  from  these  four  elements 
by  various  combinations,  all  together  forming  the  sublunar  world, 
or  the  world  of  generation  and  decay.  No  individual  thing  in  this 
world  is  permanent.  All  are  subject  to  change  and  to  ultimate  de- 
struction, though  the  destruction  of  one  thing  is  the  genesis  of  another. 
There  is  no  annihilation. 

The  causes  of  the  various  combinations  of  the  elements  and  the 
generation  and  destruction  of  mineral,  plant  and  animal  resulting 
therefrom,  are  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  These  are  made 
of  a  purer  substance  than  that  of  the  four  elements,  the  ether.  This 
is  proven  by  the  fact  that  the  heavenly  bodies  are  not  subject  to 
change  or  destruction.  They  are  all  permanent  and  the  only  change 
visible  in  them  is  change  of  place.  But  even  their  motions  are  different 
from  those  of  the  four  elements.  The  latter  are  in  a  straight  line 
toward  the  centre  or  away  from  it,  whereas  the  heavenly  bodies  move 
in  a  circle  eternally  around  the  centre.  This  is  another  proof  that 
they  are  not  composed  of  the  same  material  as  sublunar  bodies. 

The  heavens  consist  of  transparent  spheres,  and  the  stars  as  well 
as  the  planets  are  set  in  them  and  remain  fixed.  The  motions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  are  due  to  the  revolutions  of  the  spheres  in  which 
they  are  set.  These  spheres  are  hollow  and  concentric.  The  outer- 
most sphere  forming  the  outer  limit  of  the  universe  (the  world  is  finite 
according  to  Aristotle)  is  studded  with  the  fixed  stars  and  moves 
from  east  to  west,  making  a  complete  revolution  in  twenty-four 
hours.    This  motion  is  transmitted  to  the  other  spheres  which  carry 


INTRODUCTION  xxxv 

the  planets.  Since,  however,  we  notice  in  the  sun,  moon  and  the  other 
planetary  bodies  motions  in  the  contrary  direction  in  addition  to  that 
from  east  to  west,  there  must  be  other  spheres  having  the  motions 
apparent  to  us  in  the  positions  of  the  planets  borne  by  them.  Thus  a 
given  body  like  the  sun  or  moon  is  set  in  more  than  one  sphere,  each 
of  which  has  its  own  proper  motion,  and  the  star's  apparent  motion 
is  the  resultant  of  the  several  motions  of  its  spheres.  Without  entering 
into  further  details  concerning  these  motions,  it  will  be  sufficient  for 
us  to  know  that  Aristotle  counted  in  all  fifty-five  spheres.  First 
came  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars,  then  in  order  the  spheres  of  Saturn, 
Jupiter,  Mars,  Mercury,  Venus,  Sun,  Moon. 

God  himself  sets  the  outer  sphere  in  motion,  or  rather  is  the  eternal 
cause  of  its  motion,  as  the  object  of  its  desire;  and  in  the  same  way 
each  of  the  other  motions  has  also  its  proper  mover,  likewise  a  pure 
form  or  spirit,  which  moves  its  sphere  in  the  same  incorporeal  and 
unmoved  manner  as  God. 

Thus  we  have  in  the  supra-lunar  world  pure  forms  without  mat- 
ter in  God  and  the  spirits  of  the  spheres,  whereas  in  the  sublunar 
world  matter  and  form  are  inseparable.  Neither  is  found  separately 
without  the  other. 

In  man's  soul,  however,  or  rather  in  his  intellect  we  find  a  form 
which  combines  in  itself  the  peculiarities  of  sublunar  as  well  as  celestial 
forms.  When  in  contact  with  the  human  body  it  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  other  sublunar  forms  exhibiting  its  activity  through  matter 
and  being  inseparable  from  it.  But  it  is  not  destroyed  with  the  death 
of  the  body.    It  continues  as  a  separate  form  after  death. 

The  soul,  Aristotle  defines  as  the  first  entelechy  of  the  body.  The 
term  entelechy  which  sounds  outlandish  to  us  may  be  replaced  by 
the  word  realization  or  actualization  and  is  very  close  in  meaning  to 
the  Aristotelian  use  of  the  word  form.  The  soul  then,  according 
to  Aristotle,  is  the  realization  or  actualization  or  form  of  the  body. 
The  body  takes  the  place  of  matter  in  the  human  composite.  It  has 
the  composition  and  the  structure  which  give  it  the  capacity  for  per- 
forming the  functions  of  a  human  being,  as  in  any  other  composite, 
say  an  axe,  the  steel  is  the  matter  which  has  the  potentiality  or  capac- 
ity of  being  made  into  a  cutting  instrument.  Its  cutting  function 
is  the  form  of  the  axe — we  might  almost  say  the  soul  of  the  axe,  if 


xxxvi  INTRODUCTION 

it  were  not  for  the  circumstance  that  it  cannot  do  its  own  cutting;  it 
must  be  wielded  by  someone  else. 

So  far  then  the  human  soul  forms  an  inseparable  unit  with  the  body 
which  it  informs.  As  we  do  not  think  of  the  cutting  function  of  an 
axe  existing  apart  from  the  axe,  so  neither  can  we  conceive  of  sensa- 
tion, emotion  or  memory  as  existing  without  a  body.  In  so  far  as  the 
soul  is  this  it  is  a  material  form  like  the  rest,  and  ceases  with  the  dis- 
solution of  the  body.  But  the  soul  is  more  than  this.  It  is  also  a 
thinking  faculty.  As  such  it  is  not  in  its  essence  dependent  upon  the 
body  or  any  corporeal  organ.  It  comes  from  without,  having  existed 
before  the  body,  and  it  will  continue  to  exist  after  the  body  is  no  more. 
That  it  is  different  from  the  sensitive  soul  is  proven  by  the  fact  that 
the  latter  is  inherent  in  the  physical  organ  through  which  it  acts, 
being  the  form  of  the  body,  as  we  have  seen.  And  hence  when  an 
unusually  violent  stimulus,  say  a  very  bright  light  or  a  very  loud  sound, 
impinges  upon  the  sense  organ,  the  faculty  of  sight  or  hearing  is 
injured  to  such  an  extent  that  it  cannot  thereafter  perceive  an  ordinary 
sight  or  sound.  But  in  the  rational  faculty  this  is  not  the  case.  The 
more  intense  the  thought  occupying  the  thinking  soul,  the  more  ca- 
pable it  becomes  of  thinking  lesser  thoughts.  To  be  sure,  the  reason 
seems  to  weaken  in  old  age,  but  this  is  due  to  the  weakening  of  the 
body  with  which  the  soul  is  connected  during  life;  the  soul  itself  is 
just  as  active  as  ever. 

We  must,  however,  distinguish  between  two  aspects  of  the  rational 
soul,  to  one  of  which  alone  the  above  statements  apply.  Thought 
differs  from  sensation  in  that  the  latter  perceives  the  particular  form 
of  the  individual  thing,  whereas  the  former  apprehends  the  essential 
nature  of  the  object,  that  which  constitutes  it  a  member  of  a  certain 
class.  The  sense  of  sight  perceives  a  given  individual  man;  thought  or 
reason  understands  what  it  is  to  be  a  member  of  the  human  species. 
Reason  therefore  deals  with  pure  form.  In  man  we  observe  the 
reason  gradually  developing  from  a  potential  to  an  actual  state.  The 
objects  of  the  sense  with  the  help  of  the  faculties  of  sensation,  memory 
and  imagination  act  upon  the  potential  intellect  of  the  child,  which 
without  them  would  forever  remain  a  mere  capacity  without  ever 
being  realized.  This  aspect  of  the  reason  then  in  man,  namely,  the 
passive  aspect  which  receives  ideas,  grows  and  dies  with  the  body. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxvii 

But  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  reason,  the  active  reason  which  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  body,  though  it  is  in  some  manner  resident  in 
it  during  the  life  of  the  latter.  This  it  is  which  enables  the  passive 
intellect  to  become  realized.  For  the  external  objects  as  such  are  in- 
sufficient to  endow  the  rational  capacity  of  the  individual  with  actual 
ideas,  any  more  than  a  surface  can  endow  the  sense  of  sight  with 
the  sensation  of  color  when  there  is  no  hght.  It  is  the  active  intellect 
which  develops  the  human  capacity  for  thinking  and  makes  it  active 
thought.  This  alone,  the  active  intellect,  is  the  immortal  part  of 
man. 

This  very  imperfect  sketch  of  Aristotle's  mode  of  approach  to  the 
ever-living  problems  of  God,  the  universe  and  man  shows  us  the  wide 
diversity  of  his  method  from  that  with  which  the  Jews  of  Bibhcal  and 
Rabbinic  tradition  were  identified.  Greek  philosophy  must  have 
seemed  a  revelation  to  them,  and  we  do  not  wonder  that  they  became 
such  enthusiastic  followers  of  the  Stagirite,  feeUng  as  they  must  have 
done  that  his  method  as  well  as  his  results  were  calculated  to  enrich 
their  intellectual  and  spiritual  life.  Hence  the  current  belief  of  an 
original  Jewish  philosophy  borrowed  or  stolen  by  the  Greeks,  and  still 
betraying  its  traces  in  the  Bible  and  Talmud  was  more  than  welcome 
to  the  enlightened  spirits  of  the  time.  And  they  worked  this  unhis- 
torical  belief  to  its  breaking  point  in  their  Biblical  exegesis. 

Aristotle,  however,  was  not  their  only  master,  though  they  did  not 
know  it.  Plotinus  in  Aristotelian  disguise  contributed  not  a  little  to 
their  conception  of  God  and  his  relation  to  the  universe.  The  so-called 
"Theology  of  Aristotle"  ^^  is  a  Plotinian  work,  and  its  Pantheistic 
point  of  view  is  in  reahty  foreign  to  Aristotle's  dualism.  But  the  middle 
ages  were  not  aware  of  the  origin  of  this  treatise,  and  so  they  attrib- 
uted it  to  the  Stagirite  philosopher  and  proceeded  to  harmonize  it 
with  the  rest  of  his  system  as  they  knew  it. 

Aristotle's  system  may  be  called  theistic  and  duahstic;  Plotinus's  is 
pantheistic  and  monistic.  In  Aristotle  matter  is  not  created  by  or 
derived  from  God,  who  is  external  to  the  universe.  Plotinus  derives 
everything  from  God,  who  through  his  powers  or  activities  pervades 
all.  The  different  gradations  of  being  are  static  in  Aristotle,  dynamic 
in  Plotinus.  Plotinus  assumes  an  absolute  cause,  which  he  calls  the 
One  and  the  Good.    This  is  the  highest  and  is  at  the  top  of  the  scale  of 


xxxviii  INTRODUCTION 

existence.  It  is  superior  to  Being  as  well  as  to  Thought,  for  the  latter 
imply  a  duality  whereas  unity  is  prior  to  and  above  all  plurality. 
Hence  we  can  know  nothing  as  to  the  nature  of  the  Highest.  We 
can  know  only  that  He  is,  not  what  he  is.  From  this  highest  Being 
proceeds  by  a  physical  necessity,  as  light  from  a  luminous  body  or 
water  from  an  overflowing  spring,  a  second  hypostasis  or  substance, 
the  nous  or  Reason.  This  is  a  duality,  constituting  Being  and  Knowl- 
edge. Thus  Thought  and  Being  hold  a  second  place  in  the  universe. 
In  a  similar  way  from  Reason  proceeds  the  third  h3^ostasis  or  the 
World-Soul.  This  stands  midway  between  the  intelligible  world,  of 
which  it  is  the  last,  and  the  phenomenal  world,  of  which  it  is  the  first. 
The  Soul  has  a  dual  aspect,  the  one  spiritual  and  pertaining  to  the 
intelligible  world,  the  other,  called  Nature,  residing  in  the  lower  world. 
This  is  the  material  world  of  change  and  decay.  Matter  is  responsible 
for  all  change  and  evil,  and  yet  matter,  too,  is  a  product  of  the  powers 
above  it,  and  is  ultimately  a  derivative  of  the  Absolute  Cause,  though 
indirectly.  Matter  is  two-fold,  intelligible  and  sensible.  The  matter  of 
the  lower  world  is  the  non-existent  and  the  cause  of  evil.  Matter  in  a 
more  general  sense  is  the  indeterminate,  the  indefinite  and  the  poten- 
tial. Matter  of  this  nature  is  found  also  in  the  intelligible  world.  The 
Reason  as  the  second  hj^ostasis,  being  an  activity,  passes  from 
potentiality  to  actuality,  its  indeterminateness  being  made  determin- 
ate by  the  One  or  the  Good.  This  potentiality  and  indeterminateness 
is  matter,  but  it  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  other  matter  of  the  phe- 
nomenal world. 

Man  partakes  of  the  intelligible,  as  well  as  of  the  sensible  world. 
His  body  is  material,  and  in  so  far  forth  partakes  of  the  evil  of  matter. 
But  his  soul  is  derived  from  the  universal  soul,  and  if  it  conducts  itself 
properly  in  this  world,  whither  it  came  from  without,  and  holds  itself 
aloof  from  bodily  contamination,  it  will  return  to  the  intelligible  world 
where  is  its  home. 

We  see  here  a  number  of  ideas  foreign  to  Aristotle,  which  are  found 
first  in  Philo  the  Jew  and  appear  later  in  mediaeval  philosophy.  Thus 
God  as  a  Being  absolutely  unknowable,  of  whom  negations  alone  are 
true  just  because  he  is  the  acme  of  perfection  and  bears  no  analogy  to 
the  imperfect  things  of  our  world;  matter  in  our  world  as  the  origin 
of  evil,  and  the  existence  of  matter  in  the  intelligible  world — all  these 


INTRODUCTION  xxxix 

ideas  will  meet  us  again  in  Ibn  Gabirol,  in  Ibn  Daud,  in  Mainionides, 
some  in  one,  some  in  the  other. 

Alike  in  respect  to  Aristotle  as  in  reference  to  Plotinus,  the  Jewish 
philosophers  found  their  models  in  Islamic  writers.  The  "Theology  of 
Aristotle"  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  really  Plotinian  rather  than 
Aristotelian,  was  translated  into  Arabic  in  the  ninth  century  and 
exerted  its  influence  on  the  Brethren  of  Purity,  a  Mohammedan  secret 
order  of  the  tenth  century.  These  men  composed  an  encyclopaedia  of 
fifty-one  treatises  in  which  is  combined  Aristotelian  logic  and  physics 
with  Neo-Platonic  metaphysics  and  theology.  In  turn  such  Jewish 
writers  as  Ibn  Gabirol,  Bahya,  Ibn  Zaddik,  Judah  Halevi,  Moses  and 
Abraham  Ibn  Ezra,  were  much  indebted  to  the  Brethren  of  Purity. 
This  represents  the  Neo-Platonic  influence  in  Jewish  philosophy. 
The  Arab  Aristotelians,  Al  Kindi,  Al  Farabi,  Avicenna  and  Averroes, 
while  in  the  main  disciples  of  the  Stagirite,  were  none  the  less  unable 
to  steer  clear  of  Neo-Platonic  coloring  of  their  master's  doctrine,  and 
they  were  the  teachers  of  the  Jewish  AristoteUans,  Abraham  Ibn 
Daud,  Moses  ben  Maimon,  Levi  ben  Gerson. 

One  other  phase  must  be  mentioned  to  complete  the  parallelism  of 
Islamic  and  Jewish  philosophy,  and  that  is  the  anti-philosophic 
attitude  adopted  by  Judah  Halevi  and  Hasdai  Crescas.  It  was  not  a 
dogmatic  and  unreasoned  opposition  based  simply  upon  the  un- 
Jewish  source  of  the  doctrines  in  question  and  their  incompatibility 
with  Jewish  behef  and  tradition,  such  as  exhibited  itself  in  the  con- 
troversies that  raged  around  the  "Guide"  of  Maimonides.  Here  we 
have  rather  a  fighting  of  the  philosophers  with  their  own  weapons. 
Especially  do  we  find  this  to  be  the  case  in  Crescas  who  opposes 
Aristotle  on  philosophic  grounds.  In  Judah  Halevi  similarly,  though 
with  less  rigor  and  Httle  technical  discussion,  we  have  nevertheless  a 
man  trained  in  philosophic  hterature,  who  found  the  philosophic 
attitude  unsympathetic  and  unsatisfying  because  cold  and  impersonal, 
faihng  to  do  justice  to  the  warm  yearning  after  God  of  the  rehgious 
soul.  He  could  not  abide  the  philosophic  exclusion  from  their  natural 
theology  of  all  that  was  racial  and  national  and  historic  in  religion, 
which  was  to  him  its  very  heart  and  innermost  essence. 

In  this  attitude,  too,  we  find  an  Arab  prototype  in  the  person  of  Al 
Gazali,  who  similarly  attacked  the  philosophers  on  their  own  ground 


xl  INTRODUCTION 

and  found  his  consolation  in  the  asceticism  and  mysticism  of  the 
Sufis. 

We  have  now  spoken  in  a  general  way  of  the  principal  motives  of 
mediaeval  Jewish  philosophy,  of  the  chief  sources,  philosophical  and 
dogmatic,  and  have  classified  the  Jewish  thinkers  accordingly  as 
Mutakallimun,  Neo-Platonists  and  Aristotelians.  We  also  sketched 
briefly  the  schools  of  philosophy  which  influenced  the  Jewish  writers 
and  determined  their  point  of  view  as  Kalamistic,  Neo-Platonic  or 
AristoteUan.  There  still  remains  as  the  concluding  part  of  the  in- 
troductory chapter,  and  before  we  take  up  the  detailed  exposition  of 
the  individual  philosophers,  to  give  a  brief  and  compendious  char- 
acterization of  the  content  of  mediaeval  Jewish  philosophy.  We  shall 
start  with  the  theory  of  knowledge. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  attitude  generally  adopted  by  the 
mediaeval  Jewish  thinkers  on  the  relation  between  rehgion  and  philos- 
ophy. With  the  exception  of  Judah  Halevi  and  Hasdai  Crescas  the 
commonly  accepted  view  was  that  philosophy  and  religion  were  at 
bottom  identical  in  content,  though  their  methods  were  different; 
philosophy  taught  by  means  of  rational  demonstration,  religion  by 
dogmatic  assertion  based  upon  divine  revelation.  So  far  as  the  actual 
philosophical  views  of  an  Aristotle  were  concerned,  they  might  be 
erroneous  in  some  of  their  details,  as  was  indeed  the  case  in  respect  to 
the  origin  of  the  world  and  the  question  of  Providence.  But  apart 
from  his  errors  he  was  an  important  guide,  and  philosophy  generally  is 
an  indispensable  adjunct  to  rehgious  behef  because  it  makes  the  latter 
intelligent.  It  explains  the  why's  and  the  wherefore's  of  religious 
traditions  and  dogmas.  Into  detailed  discussions  concerning  the 
origin  of  our  knowledge  they  did  not  as  a  rule  go.  These  strictly 
scientific  questions  did  not  concern,  except  in  a  very  general  way,  the 
main  object  of  their  philosophizing,  which  was  to  gain  true  knowledge 
of  God  and  his  attributes  and  his  relation  to  man.  Accordingly  we 
find  for  the  most  part  a  simple  classification  of  the  sources  of  knowl- 
edge or  truth  as  consisting  of  the  senses  and  the  reason.  The  latter 
contains  some  truths  which  may  be  called  innate  or  immediate,  such 
as  require  no  experience  for  their  recognition,  like  the  logical  laws  of 
thought,  and  truths  which  are  the  result  of  inference  from  a  fact  of 
sensation  or  an  immediate  truth  of  the  mind.    To  these  human  sources 


INTRODUCTION  xli 

was  added  tradition  or  the  testimony  of  the  revealed  word  of  God  in 
the  written  and  oral  law. 

When  Aristotle  began  to  be  studied  in  his  larger  treatises  and  the 
details  of  the  psychology  and  the  metaphysics  became  known  espe- 
cially through  Averroes,  we  find  among  the  Jews  also  an  interest  in  the 
finer  points  of  the  problem  of  knowledge.  The  motives  of  Plato's 
idealism  and  Aristotle's  conceptualism  (if  this  inexact  description  may 
be  allowed  for  want  of  a  more  precise  term)  are  discussed  with  fulness 
and  detail  by  Levi  ben  Gerson.  He  realizes  the  difficulty  involved  in 
the  problem.  Knowledge  must  be  of  the  real  and  the  permanent. 
But  the  particular  is  not  permanent,  and  the  universal,  which  is 
permanent,  is  not  real.  Hence  either  there  is  no  knowledge  or  there  is  a 
reality  corresponding  to  the  universal  concept.  This  latter  was  the 
view  adopted  by  Plato.  Gersonides  finds  the  reality  in  the  thoughts  of 
the  Active  Intellect,  agreeing  in  this  with  the  views  of  Philo  and 
Augustine,  substituting  only  the  Active  Intellect  for  their  Logos. 
Maimonides  does  not  discuss  the  question,  but  it  is  clear  from  a  casual 
statement  that  like  Aristotle  he  does  not  believe  in  the  independent 
reahty  of  the  universal  (Guide  III,  i8). 

In  theoretical  physics  the  Arabian  Mutakallimun,  we  have  seen 
(p.xxii),  laid  great  stress  on  the  theory  of  atom  and  accident  as  opposed 
to  the  concepts  of  matter  and  form  by  which  Aristotle  was  led  to 
believe  in  the  eternity  of  the  world.  Accordingly  every  Mutakallim 
laid  down  his  physical  theory  and  based  on  it  his  proof  of  creation. 
This  method  was  followed  also  by  the  early  Jewish  thinkers.  The 
Karaites  before  Maimonides  adopted  the  atomic  theory  without 
question.  And  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  who  had  Maimonides's  "Guide" 
before  him,  was  nevertheless  sufficiently  loyal  to  his  Karaite  predeces- 
sors to  discuss  their  views  side  by  side  with  those  of  the  Aristotelians 
and  to  defend  them  against  the  strictures  of  Maimonides.  Saadia, 
the  first  Rabbanite  philosopher,  discusses  no  less  than  thirteen  er- 
roneous views  concerning  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  world,  but  he 
does  not  lay  down  any  principles  of  theoretical  physics  explicitly. 
He  does  not  seem  to  favor  the  atomic  theory,  but  he  devotes  no  special 
treatment  to  the  subject,  and  in  his  arguments  for  creation  as  opposed 
to  eternity  he  makes  use  of  the  Kalamistic  concepts  of  substance 
and  accident  and  composition  and  division.     The  same  is  true  of 


xlii  INTRODUCTION 

Bahya  Ibn  Pakuda.  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik  is  the  first  who  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  give  an  independent  treatment  of  the  sciences  before  proceed- 
ing to  construct  his  rehgious  philosophy,  and  in  so  doing  he  expounds 
the  concepts  of  matter  and  form,  substance  and  accident,  genesis  and 
destruction,  the  four  elements  and  their  natures  and  so  on — all  these 
Aristotelian  concepts.  Ibn  Daud  follows  in  the  path  of  Ibn  Zaddik 
and  discusses  the  relevant  concepts  of  potentiaHty  and  actuality  and 
the  nature  of  motion  and  infinity,  upon  which  his  proof  is  based  of 
the  existence  of  God.  Maimonides  clears  the  ground  first  by  a  thor- 
ough criticism  and  refutation  of  the  Kalamistic  physics,  but  he  does 
not  think  it  necessary  to  expound  the  Aristotelian  views  which  he 
adopts.  He  refers  the  reader  to  the  original  sources  in  the  Physics 
and  Metaphysics  of  Aristotle,  and  contents  himself  with  giving  a  list 
of  principles  which  he  regards  as  estabHshed.  Aristotle  is  now  the 
master  of  all  those  who  know.  And  he  reigns  supreme  for  over  a 
century  until  the  appearance  of  the  Or  Adonai"  of  Hasdai  Crescas, 
who  ventured  to  deny  some  of  the  propositions  upon  which  Maimon- 
ides based  his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God — such,  for  example,  as 
the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  magnitude,  the  non-existence  of  an 
infinite  fulness  or  vacuum  outside  of  the  limits  of  our  world,  the 
finiteness  of  our  world  and  its  unity,  and  so  on. 

These  discussions  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  physics  were 
applied  ultimately  to  prove  the  existence  of  God.  But  there  was  a 
difference  in  the  manner  of  the  application.  During  the  earlier  period 
before  the  "Emunah  Ramah"  of  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  was  written, 
the  method  employed  was  that  of  the  Arabian  Mutakallimun.  That 
is,  the  principles  of  physics  were  used  to  prove  the  creation  of  the 
world  in  time,  and  from  creation  inference  was  made  to  the  existence 
of  a  Creator,  since  nothing  can  create  itseK.  The  creation  itself  in 
time  as  opposed  to  eternity  was  proved  from  the  fact  of  the  composite 
character  of  the  world.  Composition,  it  was  said,  implies  the  prior 
existence  of  the  constituent  elements,  and  the  elements  cannot  be 
eternal,  for  an  infinite  past  time  is  unthinkable.  This  method  is 
common  to  Saadia,  Bahya,  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  and  others. 

With  the  appearance  of  Ibn  Daud's  masterpiece,  which  exhibits 
a  more  direct  familiarity  with  the  fundamental  ideas  of  Aristotle, 
the  method  changed.    The  existence  of  God  is  proved  directly  from 


INTRODUCTION  xliii 

physics  without  the  mediation  of  the  doctrine  of  creation.  Motion 
proves  a  mover,  and  to  avoid  an  infinite  regress  we  must  posit  an 
unmoved  mover,  that  is,  a  first  mover  who  is  not  himself  moved  at 
the  same  time.  An  unmoved  mover  cannot  be  corporeal,  hence  he 
is  the  spiritual  being  whom  we  call  God.  Ibn  Daud  does  not  make 
use  of  creation  to  prove  the  existence  of  God,  but  neither  does  he 
posit  eternal  motion  as  Aristotle  does.  And  the  result  is  that  he  has 
no  vaHd  proof  that  this  unmoved  mover  is  a  pure  spirit  not  in  any 
way  related  to  body.  This  defect  was  made  good  by  Maimonides. 
Let  us  frankly  adopt  tentatively,  he  says,  the  Aristotehan  idea  of  the 
eternity  of  the  world,  i.  e.,  the  eternity  of  matter  and  motion.  We  can 
then  prove  the  existence  of  an  unmoved  mover  who  is  pure  spirit, 
for  none  but  a  pure  spirit  can  have  an  infinite  force  such  as  is  mani- 
fested in  the  eternal  motion  of  the  world.  Creation  cannot  be  demon- 
strated with  scientific  rigor,  hence  it  is  not  safe  to  build  so  important 
a  structure  as  the  existence  of  God  upon  an  insecure  foundation. 
Show  that  eternity  of  the  world  leads  to  God,  and  you  are  safe  no 
matter  what  the  ultimate  truth  turns  out  to  be  concerning  the  origin 
of  the  world.  For  if  the  world  originated  in  time  there  is  no  doubt 
that  God  made  it. 

Thus  Maimonides  accepted  provisionally  the  eternity  of  matter 
and  motion,  but  provisionally  only.  No  sooner  did  he  prove  his  point, 
than  he  takes  up  the  question  of  the  world's  origin  and  argues  that 
while  strict  demonstration  there  is  as  yet  none  either  for  or  against 
creation,  the  better  reasons  are  on  the  side  of  creation. 

Gersonides,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  truer  Aristotelian  than  Mai- 
monides and  he  decided  in  favor  of  the  eternity  of  matter,  though 
not  of  this  our  world. 

The  Jewish  Mutakallimun,  as  we  have  seen,  proved  the  existence  of 
God  from  the  fact  that  a  created  world  impUes  a  creator.  The  next 
step  was  to  show  that  there  is  only  one  God,  and  that  this  one  God  is 
simple  and  not  composite,  and  that  he  is  incorporeal.  The  unity  in 
the  sense  of  uniqueness  was  shown  by  pointing  out  that  dualism  or 
pluralism  is  incompatible  with  omnipotence  and  perfection — attri- 
butes the  possession  of  which  by  God  was  not  considered  to  require 
proof.  Maimonides,  indeed,  pointed  out,  in  his  opposition  to  the 
Mutakallimun,  that  if  there  is  a  plurality  of  worlds,  a  plurality  of 


xKv  INTRODUCTION 

Gods  would  not  necessarily  be  in  conflict  with  the  omnipotence  and 
perfection  of  each  God  in  his  own  sphere  (Guide  I,  75),  and  he  in- 
ferred the  unity  of  God  from  his  spirituaHty. 

The  simpHcity  of  God  was  proved  by  arguing  that  if  he  is  composite, 
his  parts  are  prior  to  him,  and  he  is  neither  the  first,  nor  is  he  eternal, 
and  hence  not  God;  and  the  incorporeality  followed  from  his  simplicity, 
for  all  body  is  composite.  Maimonides  proved  with  one  stroke  God's 
existence,  unity  and  incorporeality.  For  his  argument  from  motion 
leads  him  to  conceive  of  the  first  mover  as  a  "separate"  form  or  in- 
tellect. This  clearly  denotes  incorporeality,  for  body  is  composed  of 
matter  and  form.  But  it  also  denotes  unity,  for  the  immaterial  is  not 
subject  to  numerical  distinction  unless  the  one  be  the  cause  and  the 
other  the  effect.    But  in  that  case  the  cause  alone  is  God. 

Next  in  importance  to  the  proof  of  God's  existence,  unity  and  in- 
corporeahty,  is  the  doctrine  of  attributes.  We  have  seen  (p.xxiii)  how 
much  emphasis  the  Arabian  Mutakalhmun  placed  upon  the  problem 
of  attributes.  It  was  important  to  Jew,  Christian  and  Mohammedan 
alike  for  a  number  of  reasons.  The  crude  anthropomorphism  of  many 
expressions  in  the  Bible  as  well  as  the  Koran  offended  the  more  sophis- 
ticated thinkers  ever  since  Alexandrian  days.  Hence  it  was  neces- 
sary to  deal  with  this  question,  and  the  unanimous  view  was  that  the 
Biblical  expressions  in  question  are  to  be  understood  as  figures  of 
speech.  The  more  difl&cult  problem  was  how  any  predicates  at  all 
can  be  applied  to  God  without  endangering  his  unity.  If  God  is  the 
possessor  of  many  qualities,  even  though  they  be  purely  spiritual, 
such  as  justice,  wisdom,  power,  he  is  composite  and  not  simple.  The 
Christian  theologians  found  indeed  in  this  problem  of  attributes  a 
philosophical  support  for  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Since  God 
cannot  be  devoid  of  power,  reason  and  life,  he  is  trinitarian,  though 
he  is  one.  The  difi&culty  was  of  course  that  the  moment  you  admit 
distinctions  within  the  Godhead,  there  is  no  reason  for  stopping  at 
three.  And  the  Jewish  critics  were  not  slow  to  recognize  this  weak- 
ness in  the  system  of  their  opponents.  At  the  same  time  they  found 
it  necessary  to  take  up  a  positive  attitude  toward  the  question  of 
attributes  so  as  to  harmonize  the  latter  with  God's  absolute  unity. 
And  the  essence  of  the  solution  of  the  problem  was  to  explain  away 
the  attributes.     Saadia  says  that  the  ascription  of  life,  power  and 


INTRODUCTION  xlv 

knowledge  to  God  does  not  involve  plurality  in  his  essence.  The 
distinction  of  three  attributes  is  due  to  our  limited  mind  and  inade- 
quate powers  of  expression.  In  reality  the  essence  of  which  we  predi- 
cate these  attributes  is  one  and  simple.  This  solution  did  not  seem 
thoroughgoing  enough  to  Saadia's  successors,  and  every  one  of  the 
Jewish  philosophers  tried  his  hand  at  the  problem.  All  agreed  that 
the  attributes  cannot  apply  to  God  in  the  same  signification  as  they 
have  when  we  use  them  in  our  own  experience.  The  meaning  of  the 
term  attribute  was  investigated  and  the  attributes  were  divided  into 
classes,  until  finally  in  the  system  of  Maimonides  this  question  too 
received  its  classical  solution.  God  is  conceived  as  absolutely  trans- 
cendent and  unknowable.  No  positive  predicate  can  apply  to  him  so 
as  to  indicate  his  essence.  We  can  say  only  what  he  is  not,  we  cannot 
say  what  he  is.  There  is  not  the  faintest  resemblance  between  him 
and  his  creatures.  And  yet  he  is  the  cause  of  the  world  and  of  all  its 
happenings.  Positive  attributes  signify  only  that  God  is  the  cause  of 
the  experiences  denoted  by  the  attributes  in  question.  When  we  say 
God  is  just  we  mean  that  he  is  not  unjust,  and  that  he  is  the  cause  of 
all  justice  in  the  world.  Hence  Maimonides  says  there  are  no  essen- 
tial attributes,  meaning  attributes  expressive  of  God's  essence,  and 
the  only  predicates  having  application  are  negative  and  such  as  desig- 
nate efifects  of  God's  causal  activity  in  the  world.  Gersonides  was 
opposed  to  Maimonides's  radical  agnosticism  in  respect  of  the  nature 
of  God,  and  defended  a  more  human  view.  If  God  is  pure  thought, 
he  is  of  the  nature  of  our  thought,  though  of  course  infinitely  greater 
and  perfect,  but  to  deny  any  relation  whatsoever  between  God's 
thought  and  ours,  as  Maimonides  does,  is  absurd. 

From  God  we  pass  to  man.  And  the  important  part  of  man  is  his 
soul.  It  is  proved  that  man  has  a  soul,  that  the  soul  is  not  material  or 
corporeal,  that  it  is  a  substantial  entity  and  not  a  mere  quality  or 
accident  of  the  body.  Both  Plato  and  Aristotle  are  laid  under  con- 
tribution in  the  various  classifications  of  the  soul  that  are  found  in 
Saadia,  in  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  in  Judah  Halevi,  in  Abraham  Ibn  Daud, 
in  Maimonides.  The  commonest  is  the  three-fold  division  into  vegeta- 
tive, animal  and  rational.  We  also  find  the  Platonic  division  into 
appetitive,  spirited  and  rational.  Further  psychological  details  and 
descriptions  of  the  senses,  external  and  internal,  the  latter  embracing 


xlvi  INTRODUCTION 

the  common  sense,  memory,  imagination  and  judgment,  are  ultimately 
based  upon  Aristotle  and  are  found  in  Judah  Halevi,  Abraham  Ibn 
Daud  and  Maimonides,  who  derived  them  from  Avicenna  and  Al- 
farabi.  In  the  Neo-Platonic  writers,  such  as  Isaac  Israeli,  Solomon  Ibn 
Gabirol,  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  Moses  Ibn  Ezra,  Pseudo-Bahya,  Abraham 
Bar  Hiyya,  and  so  on,  we  also  find  reference  to  the  World  Soul  and  its 
emanation  from  Intelligence.  In  the  conception  of  the  human  soul  the 
Jewish  philosophers  vary  from  the  Platonic  view,  related  to  the 
BibUcal,  that  the  soul  is  a  distinct  entity  coming  into  the  body  from  a 
spiritual  world,  and  acting  in  the  body  by  using  the  latter  as  its  in- 
strument, to  the  Aristotelian  view  that  at  least  so  far  as  the  lower 
faculties  of  sense,  memory  and  imagination  are  concerned,  the  soul  is 
the  form  of  the  body,  and  disappears  with  the  death  of  the  latter. 
The  human  unit,  according  to  this  opinion,  is  body-and-mind,  and  the 
human  activities  are  psycho-physical  and  not  purely  psychical  as  they 
are  according  to  Plato.  Some  writers  occupying  intermediate  positions 
combine  unwittingly  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  views,  or  rather 
they  use  Aristotelian  expressions  and  interpret  them  Platonically 
(Saadia,  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  Hillel  ben  Samuel). 

As  the  influence  of  the  Arab  Aristotelians,  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and 
especially  Averroes,  began  to  make  itseK  felt,  the  discussions  about  the 
Active  Intellect  and  its  relation  to  the  higher  Intelligences  on  the  one 
hand  and  to  the  human  intellect  on  the  other  found  their  way  also 
among  the  Jews  and  had  their  effect  on  the  conception  of  prophecy. 
Aristotle's  distinction  of  an  active  and  a  passive  intellect  in  man,  and 
his  ideas  about  the  spheral  spirits  as  pure  Intelligences  endowing  the 
heavenly  spheres  with  their  motions,  were  combined  by  the  Arabian 
Aristotehans  with  the  Neo-Platonic  theory  of  emanation.  The  result 
was  that  they  adopted  as  Aristotehan  the  view  that  from  God  em- 
anated in  succession  ten  Intelligences  and  their  spheres.  Thus  the 
first  emanation  was  the  first  Intelligence.  From  this  emanated  the 
sphere  of  the  fixed  stars  moved  by  it  and  the  second  Intelligence. 
From  this  emanated  in  turn  the  sphere  of  Saturn  and  the  third  In- 
telligence, and  so  on  through  the  seven  planets  to  the  moon.  From  the 
Intelligence  of  the  lunar  sphere  emanated  the  Active  Intellect  and  the 
sublunar  spheres  of  the  four  elements.  These  Intelligences  were 
identified  with  the  angels  of  Scripture.    With  some  modifications  this 


INTRODUCTION  xlvii 

laeory  was  adopted  by  the  Jewish  AristoteUans,  Abraham  Ibn  Daud, 
Maimonides,  Levi  ben  Gerson. 

The  Active  Intellect  was  thus  placed  among  the  miiversal  Intelli- 
gences whose  function  it  is  to  control  the  motions  of  the  sublunar 
world,  and  in  particular  to  develop  the  human  faculty  of  reason  which 
is  in  the  infant  a  mere  capacity — a  material  intellect.  Sensation  and 
experience  alone  are  not  sufficient  to  develop  the  theoretical  reason  in 
man,  for  they  present  concrete,  individual  material  objects,  whereas 
the  reason  is  concerned  with  universal  truth.  The  conversion  of  sense 
experience  into  immaterial  concepts  is  accomplished  through  the  aid  of 
the  Active  Intellect.  And  at  the  end  of  the  process  a  new  intellect  is 
produced  in  man,  the  Acquired  Intellect.  This  alone  is  the  immortal 
part  of  man  and  theoretical  study  creates  it.  Averroes  believed  that 
this  Acquired  Intellect  exists  separately  in  every  individual  so  long 
only  as  the  individual  is  alive.  As  soon  as  the  individual  man  dies, 
his  acquired  intellect  loses  its  individuahty  (there  being  no  material 
body  to  individuate  it)  and  there  is  only  one  acquired  intellect  for  the 
entire  human  species,  which  in  turn  is  absorbed  into  the  Active  Intel- 
lect. There  is  thus  no  individual  immortality.  Maimonides,  it  would 
seem,  though  he  does  not  discuss  the  question  in  his  "Guide,"  shared 
the  same  view.  Gersonides  devotes  an  entire  book  of  his  "Milhamot 
Adonai"  to  this  problem,  but  he  defends  individuation  of  the  acquired 
intellect  as  such  and  thus  saves  personal  immortality. 

The  practical  part  of  philosophy,  ethics,  the  Mutakallimun  among 
the  Arabians  discussed  in  connection  with  the  justice  of  God.  In 
opposition  to  the  Jabariya  and  the  Ashariya  who  advocated  a 
fatalistic  determinism  denying  man's  ability  to  determine  his  own 
actions,  some  going  so  far  as  to  say  that  right  and  wrong,  good  and 
evil,  are  entirely  relative  to  God's  will,  the  Mu'tazila  insisted  that  man 
is  free,  that  good  and  evil  are  absolute  and  that  God  is  just  because 
justice  is  inherently  right,  injustice  inherently  wrong.  Hence  reward 
and  punishment  would  be  unjust  if  man  had  not  the  freedom  to  will 
and  to  act.  The  Karaites  Joseph  Al  Basir  and  Jeshua  ben  Judah  dis- 
cuss the  problem  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil  and  vindicate  their 
absolute  character.  God  desires  the  good  because  it  is  good,  and  it  is 
not  true  that  a  thing  is  good  because  God  has  commanded  it.  Freedom 
of  man  is  a  coroUary  of  the  goodness  of  God.    The  Rabbanites  take  it 


xlviii  INTRODUCTION 

for  granted  that  good  is  good  inherently,  and  God  desires  and  com- 
mands it  because  it  is  identical  with  his  wisdom  and  his  will.  Freedom 
of  man  does  follow  as  a  corollary  from  the  justice  of  God  and  it  is  also 
taught  in  the  Bible  and  the  Talmud.  The  very  fact  of  the  existence  of 
a  divine  law  and  commandments  shows  that  man  has  freedom.  And 
those  passages  in  Scripture  which  seem  to  suggest  that  God  sometimes 
interferes  with  man's  freedom  are  explained  away  by  interpretations 
ad  hoc.  Our  own  consciousness  of  power  to  determine  our  acts  also 
is  a  strong  argument  in  favor  of  freedom.  Nevertheless  the  subject  is 
felt  to  have  its  difficulties  and  the  arguments  against  free  will  taken 
from  the  causal  sequences  of  natural  events  and  the  influence  of 
heredity,  environment  and  motive  on  the  individual  will  are  not 
ignored.  Judah  Halevi  as  well  as  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  discuss  these 
argimients  in  detail.  But  freedom  comes  out  triumphant.  It  is  even 
sought  to  reconcile  the  antinomy  of  freedom  vs.  God's  foreknowledge. 
God  knows  beforehand  from  all  eternity  how  a  given  man  will  act  at  a 
given  moment,  but  his  knowledge  is  merely  a  mirror  of  man's  actual 
decision  and  not  the  determining  cause  thereof.  This  is  Judah  Halevi's 
view.  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  with  better  insight  realizes  that  the  con- 
tingent, which  has  no  cause,  and  the  free  act,  which  is  undetermined, 
are  as  such  unpredictable.  He  therefore  sacrifices  God's  knowledge  of 
the  contingent  and  the  free  so  as  to  save  man's  freedom.  It  is  no  de- 
fect, he  argues,  not  to  be  able  to  predict  what  is  in  the  nature  of  the  case 
unpredictable.  Maimonides  cannot  admit  any  ignorance  in  God,  and 
takes  refuge  in  the  transcendent  character  of  God's  knowledge.  What 
is  unpredictable  for  us  is  not  necessarily  so  for  God.  As  he  is  the  cause 
of  everything,  he  must  know  everything.  Gersonides  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  unwilling  to  admit  Maimonides's  agnosticism  and  tran- 
scendentalism, solves  the  problem  in  the  same  way  as  Ibn  Daud. 
God  knows  events  in  so  far  as  they  are  determined,  he  does  not  know 
them  in  so  far  as  they  are  contingent.  There  is  still  another  possibility 
and  that  is  that  God  knows  in  advance  every  man's  acts  because  no 
act  is  absolutely  free.  And  there  is  an  advocate  of  this  opinion  also. 
Hasdai  Crescas  frankly  adopts  the  determinist  position  on  the  basis  of 
God's  knowledge,  which  cannot  be  denied,  as  well  as  of  reason  and 
experience,  which  recognizes  the  determining  character  of  tempera- 
ment and  motive.    But  reward  and  punishment  are  natural  and  nee- 


INTRODUCTION  xlix 

essary  consequences,  and  are  no  more  unjust  than  is  the  burning  of 
the  finger  when  put  into  the  fire. 

In  respect  to  the  details  of  ethical  doctrine  and  the  classification  of 
the  virtues,  we  find  at  first  the  Platonic  virtues  and  their  relation  to 
the  parts  of  the  soul,  in  Saadia,  Pseudo-Bahya,  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik 
and  even  Abraham  Ibn  Daud.  In  combination  with  this  Platonic 
basis  expression  is  given  also  to  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  mean. 
Maimonides,  as  in  other  things,  so  here  also,  adopts  the  Aristotelian 
views  almost  in  their  entirety,  both  in  the  definition  of  virtue,  in  the 
division  of  practical  and  intellectual  virtues,  and  the  hst  of  the  virtues 
and  vices  in  coimection  with  the  doctrine  of  the  mean.  As  is  to  be 
expected,  the  ultimate  sanction  of  ethics  is  theistic  and  BibUcal,  and 
the  ceremonial  laws  also  are  brought  into  relation  with  ethical  motives. 
In  this  rationalization  of  the  ceremonial  prescriptions  of  Scripture 
Maimonides,  as  in  other  things,  surpasses  all  his  predecessors  in  his 
boldness,  scientific  method  and  completeness.  He  goes  so  far  as  to 
suggest  that  the  institution  of  sacrifice  has  no  inherent  value,  but  was 
in  the  nature  of  a  concession  to  the  crude  notions  of  the  people  who, 
in  agreement  with  their  environment,  imagined  that  God's  favor  is 
obtained  by  the  slaughter  of  animals. 

Among  the  pecuHar  phenomena  of  religion,  and  in  particular  of 
Judaism,  the  one  that  occupies  a  fundamental  position  is  the  revela- 
tion of  God's  will  to  man  and  his  announcement  of  the  future  through 
prophetic  visions.  Dreams  and  divination  had  already  been  investi- 
gated by  Aristotle  and  explained  psychologically.  The  Arabs  made 
use  of  this  suggestion  and  endeavored  to  bring  the  phenomenon  of 
prophecy  under  the  same  head.  The  Jewish  philosophers,  with  the 
exception  of  Judah  Halevi  and  Hasdai  Crescas,  followed  suit.  The 
suggestion  that  prophecy  is  a  psychological  phenomenon  related  to 
true  dreams  is  found  as  early  as  Isaac  Israeli.  Judah  Halevi  mentions 
it  with  protest.  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  adopts  it,  and  Maimonides 
gives  it  its  final  form  in  Jewish  rationahstic  philosophy.  Levi  ben 
Gerson  discusses  the  finer  details  of  the  process,  origin  and  nature  of 
prophetic  visions.  In  short  the  generally  accepted  view  is  that  the 
Active  Intellect  is  the  chief  agent  in  communicating  true  visions  of 
future  events  to  those  worthy  of  the  gift.  And  to  become  worthy  a 
combination  of  innate  and  acquired  powers  is  necessary  together  with 


1  INTRODUCTION 

the  grace  of  God.  The  faculties  chiefly  concerned  are  reason  and 
imagination.  Moral  excellence  is  also  an  indispensable  prerequisite 
in  aiding  the  development  of  the  theoretical  powers. 

Proceeding  to  the  more  dogmatic  elements  of  Judaism,  Maimonides 
was  the  first  to  reduce  the  613  commandments  of  Rabbinic  Judaism 
to  thirteen  articles  of  faith.  Hasdai  Crescas  criticised  Maimonides's 
principle  of  selection  as  well  as  the  list  of  dogmas,  which  he  reduced 
to  six.  And  Joseph  Albo  went  still  further  and  laid  down  three  funda- 
mental dogmas  from  which  the  rest  are  derived.  They  are  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  revelation  of  the  Torah  and  future  reward  and  punish- 
ment. 

The  law  of  Moses  is  unanimously  accepted  as  divinely  revealed. 
And  in  opposition  to  the  claims  of  Christianity  and  Mohammedanism 
an  endeavor  is  made  to  prove  by  reason  as  well  as  the  exphcit  state- 
ment of  Scripture  that  a  divine  law  once  given  is  not  subject  to  repeal. 
The  laws  are  divided  into  two  classes,  rational  and  traditional;  the 
former  comprising  those  that  the  reason  approves  on  purely  rational 
and  ethical  grounds,  while  the  latter  consist  of  such  ceremonial  laws 
as  without  specific  commandment  would  not  be  dictated  by  man's 
own  reason.  And  in  many  of  these  commandments  no  reason  is 
assigned.  Nevertheless  an  endeavor  is  made  to  rationahze  these  also. 
Bahya  introduced  another  distinction,  viz.,  the  "duties  of  the  heart," 
as  he  calls  them,  in  contradistinction  to  the  "duties  of  the  limbs." 
He  lays  stress  on  intention  and  motive  as  distinguished  from  the  mere 
external  observance  of  a  duty  or  commandment. 

Finally,  some  consideration  is  given  in  the  works  of  the  majority 
of  the  writers  to  eschatological  matters,  such  as  the  destiny  of  the  soul 
after  death,  the  nature  of  future  reward  and  punishment,  the  resur- 
rection of  the  body  and  the  Messianic  period,  and  its  relation  to  the 
other  world.  This  brief  sketch  will  suffice  as  an  introduction  to  the 
detailed  treatment  of  the  individual  philosophers  in  the  following 
chapters. 


A  HISTORY  OF  MEDLEVAL  JEWISH 
PHILOSOPHY 


MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER  I 

ISAAC    ISRAELI 

We  know  next  to  nothing  about  the  condition  of  the  Jews  in  Mo- 
hammedan Eg}^t  in  the  ninth  and  tenth  centuries.  But  the  fact  that 
the  two  first  Jewish  writers  who  busied  themselves  with  philosophical 
problems  came  from  Egypt  would  indicate  that  the  general  level  of 
intellectual  culture  among  the  Jews  at  that  time  was  not  so  low  as  the 
absence  of  literary  monuments  would  lead  us  to  believe.  Every  one 
knows  of  Saadia,  the  first  Hebrew  grammarian,  the  first  Hebrew  lex- 
icographer, the  first  Bible  translator  and  exegete,  the  first  Jewish 
philosopher  of  mediaeval  Jewry.  He  was  born  in  Egypt  and  from 
there  was  called  to  the  Gaonate  of  Sura  in  Babylonia.  But  not  so  well 
known  is  his  earher  contemporary,  Isaac  ben  Solomon  Israeh,  who 
also  was  born  in  Egypt  and  from  there  went  later  to  Kairuan,  where 
he  was  court  physician  to  several  of  the  Fatimide  Califs.  The  dates 
of  his  birth  and  death  are  not  known  with  certainty,  but  he  is  said  to 
have  lived  to  the  age  of  one  himdred  years,  and  to  have  survived  the 
third  Fatimide  Calif  Al-Mansur,  who  died  in  953.  Accordingly  we 
may  assume  the  years  of  his  birth  and  death  as  855  and  955  respec- 
tively. 

His  fame  rests  on  his  work  in  theory  and  practice  as  a  physician;  and 
as  such  he  is  mentioned  by  the  Arab  annalists  and  historians  of  med- 
icine.^® To  the  Christian  scholastics  of  mediceval  Europe  he  is  known 
as  the  Jewish  physician  and  philosopher  next  in  importance  to  Mai- 
monides.^^  This  is  due  to  the  accident  of  his  works  having  been  trans- 
lated into  Latin  by  Constantinus  Afer,^^  and  thus  made  accessible  to 
men  like  Albertus  Magnus,  Vincent  of  Beauvais,  Thomas  Aquinas  and 
others.  For  his  intrinsic  merits  as  a  philosopher,  and  particularly  as  a 
Jev/ish  philosopher,  do  not  by  any  means  entitle  him  to  be  coupled 
with  Maimonides.    The  latter,  indeed,  in  a  letter  which  he  wrote  to 


2  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Samuel  Ibn  Tibbon,  the  translator  of  the  "  Guide  of  the  Perplexed," 
expresses  himself  in  terms  little  flattering  concerning  Israeli's  worth  as 
a  philosopher.^^  He  is  a  mere  physician,  Maimonides  says,  and  his 
treatises  on  the  Elements,  and  on  Definitions  consist  of  windy  imagin- 
ings and  empty  talk.  We  need  not  be  quite  as  severe  in  our  judgment, 
but  the  fact  remains  that  Israeli  is  little  more  than  a  compiler  and, 
what  is  more  to  the  purpose,  he  takes  no  attitude  in  his  philosophical 
writings  to  Judaism  as  a  theological  doctrine  or  to  the  Bible  as  its 
source.  The  main  problem,  therefore,  of  Jewish  philosophy  is  not 
touched  upon  in  Israeli's  works,  and  no  wonder  Maimonides  had  no 
use  for  them.  For  the  purely  scientific  questions  treated  by  Israeli 
could  in  Maimonides's  day  be  studied  to  much  better  advantage  in 
the  works  of  the  great  Arabian  Aristotehans,  Al  Farabi  and  Avicenna, 
compared  to  whom  Israeli  was  mediocre.  We  are  not  to  judge  him, 
however,  from  Maimonides's  point  of  view.  In  his  own  day  and  gener- 
ation he  was  surpassed  by  none  as  a  physician;  and  Saadia  alone  far 
outstrips  him  as  a  Jewish  writer,  and  perhaps  also  David  Al  Mukam- 
mas,  of  whom  we  shall  speak  later.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the 
intrinsic  value  of  the  content  of  his  philosophical  work,  none  can  take 
away  from  him  the  merit  of  having  been  the  first  Jew,  so  far  as  we 
know,  to  devote  himself  to  philosophical  and  scientific  discussions, 
though  not  with  the  avowed  aim  of  serving  Judaism.  The  rest  was 
bound  to  come  later  as  a  result  of  the  impulse  first  given  by  him. 

The  two  works  of  Israeli  which  come  in  consideration  for  our  pur- 
pose are  those  mentioned  by  Maimonides  in  his  letter  to  Samuel 
Ibn  Tibbon  spoken  of  above,  namely,  the  "Book  of  the  Elements,"  ^° 
and  the  "Book  of  Definitions."  ^^  Like  all  scientific  and  philosophic 
works  by  Jews  between  the  ninth  and  thirteenth  centuries  with  few 
exceptions,  these  were  written  in  Arabic.  Unfortunately,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  fragment  recently  discovered  of  the  ''Book  of  Definitions," 
the  originals  are  lost,  and  we  owe  our  knowledge  of  their  contents  to 
Hebrew  and  Latin  translations,  which  are  extant  and  have  been  pub- 
lished.^^ We  see  from  these  that  Israeli  was  a  compiler  from  various 
sources,  and  that  he  had  a  special  predilection  for  Galen  and  Hip- 
pocrates, with  whose  writings  he  shows  great  familiarity.  He  makes 
use  besides  of  Aristotelian  notions,  and  is  influenced  by  the  Neo- 
Pla tonic  treatise,  known  as  the  "Liber  de  Causis,"  and  derived  from 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  3 

a  work  of  Proclus.  It  is  for  this  reason  difficult  to  characterize  his 
standpoint,  but  we  shall  not  go  far  wrong  if  we  call  him  aNeo-Platonist, 
for  reasons  which  will  appear  in  the  sequel. 

It  would  be  useless  for  us  here  to  reproduce  the  contents  of  Israeli's 
two  treatises,  which  would  be  more  appropriate  for  a  history  of  me- 
diaeval science.  A  brief  resume  will  show  the  correctness  of  this  view. 
In  his  "Book  of  the  Elements"  Israeh  is  primarily  concerned  with  a 
definite  physical  problem,  the  definition  of  an  element,  and  the  number 
and  character  of  the  elements  out  of  which  the  sublunar  world  is  made. 
He  begins  with  an  Aristotelian  definition  of  element,  analyzes  it 
into  its  parts  and  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  elements  are  the 
four  weU-known  ones,  fire,  air,  water,  earth.  Incidentally  he  seizes 
opportunities  now  and  then,  sometimes  by  force,  to  discuss  points  in 
logic,  physics,  physiology  and  psychology.  Thus  the  composition 
of  the  human  body,  the  various  modes  in  which  a  thing  may  come 
into  being,  that  the  yellow  and  black  galls  and  the  phlegm  are  resident 
in  the  blood,  the  purpose  of  phlebotomy,  the  substantial  character  of 
prime  form,  that  the  soul  is  not  an  accident,  the  two  kinds  of  blood 
in  the  body,  the  various  kinds  of  "accident,"  the  nature  of  a  "prop)- 
erty"  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  caused — all  these  topics  are  dis- 
cussed in  the  course  of  proof  that  the  four  elements  are  fire,  air,  water, 
earth,  and  not  seed  or  the  quahties  of  heat,  cold,  dryness  and  moisture. 
He  then  quotes  the  definitions  of  Galen  and  Hippocrates  and  insists 
that  though  the  wording  is  different  the  meaning  is  the  same  as  that 
of  Aristotle,  and  hence  they  all  agree  about  the  identity  of  the  elements. 
Here  again  he  takes  occasion  to  combat  the  atomic  theory  of  the 
Mu  tazila  and  Democritus,  and  proves  that  a  fine  is  not  composed  of 
points.  In  the  last  part  of  the  treatise  he  refutes  contrary  opinions 
concerning  the  number  and  identity  of  the  elements,  such  as  that  there 
is  only  one  element  which  is  movable  or  immovable,  finite  or  infinite, 
namely,  the  power  of  God,  or  species,  or  fire,  or  air,  or  water,  or  earth; 
or  that  the  number  is  two,  matter  and  God;  or  three,  matter,  form  and 
motion;  or  six,  viz.,  the  four  which  he  himself  adopts,  and  composition 
and  separation;  or  the  number  ten,  which  is  the  end  and  completion 
of  number.  In  the  course  of  this  discussion  he  takes  occasion  to  define 
pain  and  pleasure,  the  nature  of  species,  the  difference  between  ele- 
ment and  principle.    And  thus  the  book  draws  to  a  close.    Not  very 


4  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

promising  material  this,  it  would  seem,  for  the  ideas  of  which  we  are 
in  search. 

The  other  book,  that  dealing  with  definitions  of  things,  is  more 
promising.  For  while  there  too  we  do  not  find  any  connected  account 
of  God,  of  the  world  and  of  man,  Israeli's  general  attitude  can  be 
gathered  from  the  manner  in  which  he  explains  some  important  con- 
cepts. The  book,  as  its  title  indicates,  consists  of  a  series  of  definitions 
or  descriptions  of  certain  terms  and  ideas  made  use  of  by  philosophers 
in  their  construction  of  their  scheme  of  the  world — such  ideas  and 
terms  as  Intelligence,  science,  philosophy,  soul,  sphere,  spirit,  nature, 
and  so  on.  From  these  we  may  glean  some  information  of  the  school 
to  which  Israeli  belongs.  And  in  the  "  Book  of  the  Elements,"  too, 
some  of  the  episodic  discussions  are  of  value  for  our  purpose. 

Philosophy,  Israeli  tells  us,  is  self-knowledge  and  keeping  far  from 
evil.  When  a  man  knows  himself  truly — his  spiritual  as  well  as  his 
corporeal  aspects — he  knows  everything.  For  in  man  are  combined 
the  corporeal  and  the  spiritual.  Spiritual  is  the  soul  and  the  reason, 
corporeal  is  the  body  with  its  three  dimensions.  In  his  qualities  and 
attributes — "  accidents  "  in  the  terminology  of  Israeli — we  similarly 
find  the  spiritual  as  well  as  the  corporeal.  Humility,  wisdom  and 
other  similar  quahties  borne  by  the  soul  are  spiritual;  complexion, 
stature,  and  so  on  are  corporeal.  Seeing  that  man  thus  forms  an 
epitome,  as  it  were,  of  the  universe  (for  spiritual  and  corporeal  sub- 
stance and  accident  exhausts  the  classes  of  existence  in  the  world), 
a  knowledge  of  self  means  a  knowledge  of  everything,  and  a  man  who 
knows  all  this  is  worthy  of  being  called  a  philosopher. 

But  philosophy  is  more  than  knowledge;  it  involves  also  action. 
The  formula  which  reveals  the  nature  and  aim  of  philosophy  is  to 
become  like  unto  God  as  far  as  is  possible  for  man.  This  means  to 
imitate  the  activities  of  God  in  knowing  the  realities  of  things  and  do- 
ing what  the  truth  requires.  To  know  the  realities  of  things  one  must 
study  science  so  as  to  know  the  various  causes  and  purposes  existing 
in  the  world.  The  most  important  of  these  is  the  purpose  of  the  union 
in  man  of  body  and  soul.  This  is  in  order  that  man  may  know  reahty 
and  truth,  and  distinguish  between  good  and  evil,  so  as  to  do  what  is 
true  and  just  and  upright,  to  sanctify  and  praise  the  Creator  and  to 
keep  from  impure  deeds  of  the  animal  nature.    A  man  who  does  this 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  S 

will  receive  reward  from  the  Creator,  which  consists  in  cleaving  to  the 
upper  soul,  in  receiving  light  from  the  light  of  knowledge,  and  the 
beauty  of  splendor  and  wisdom.  When  a  man  reaches  this  degree, 
he  becomes  spiritual  by  cleaving  to  the  created  Hght  which  comes 
directly  from  God,  and  praising  the  Creator.  This  is  his  paradise 
and  his  reward  and  perfection.  Hence  Plato  said  that  philosophy 
is  the  strengthening  and  the  help  of  death.  He  meant  by  this  that 
philosophy  helps  to  deaden  all  animal  desires  and  pleasures.  For 
by  being  thus  delivered  from  them,  a  man  will  reach  excellence  and 
the  higher  splendor,  and  wiU  enter  the  house  of  truth.  But  if  he 
indulges  his  animal  pleasures  and  desires  and  they  become  strength- 
ened, he  wUl  become  subject  to  agencies  which  will  lead  him  astray 
from  the  duties  he  owes  to  God,  from  fear  of  him  and  from  prayer 
at  the  prescribed  time. 

We  look  in  vain  in  Israeli's  two  treatises  for  a  discussion  of  the 
existence  and  nature  of  God.  Concerning  creation  he  tells  us  that 
when  God  wanted  to  show  his  wisdom  and  bring  everything  from 
potentiality  to  actuahty,  he  created  the  world  out  of  nothing,  not 
after  a  model  (this  in  opposition  to  Plato  and  Philo) ,  nor  for  the  pur- 
pose of  deriving  any  benefit  from  it  or  to  obviate  harm,  but  solely 
on  account  of  his  goodness. 

But  how  did  the  creation  proceed?  A  fragment  from  the  treatise 
of  IsraeU  entitled  "The  Book  of  Spirit  and  Soul"^^  wiU  give  us  in 
summary  fashion  an  idea  of  the  manner  in  which  IsraeH  conceived 
of  the  order  and  connection  of  things  in  the  world. 

In  the  name  of  the  ancients  he  gives  the  following  account.  God 
created  a  splendor.  This  having  come  to  a  standstill  and  real  per- 
manence, a  spark  of  light  proceeded  from  it,  from  which  arose  the 
power  of  the  rational  soul.  This  is  less  bright  than  the  splendor  of 
the  Intelligence  and  is  affected  with  shadow  and  darkness  by  reason 
of  its  greater  distance  from  its  origin,  and  the  intervening  Intelligence. 
The  rational  soul  again  becoming  permanent  and  fixed,  there  issued 
from  it  likewise  a  spark,  giving  rise  to  the  animal  soul.  This  latter 
is  endowed  with  a  cogitative  and  imaginative  faculty,  but  is  not  per- 
manent in  its  existence,  because  of  the  two  intervening  natures  be- 
tween it  and  the  pure  light  of  God.  From  the  animal  soul  there  like- 
wise issued  a  splendor,  which  produced  the  vegetative  soul.     This 


6  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

soul,  being  so  far  removed  from  the  original  light,  and  separated  from 
it  by  the  Intelligence  and  the  other  two  souls,  has  its  splendor  dimmed 
and  made  coarse,  and  is  endowed  only  with  the  motions  of  growth  and 
nourishment,  but  is  not  capable  of  change  of  place.  From  the  vege- 
tative soul  proceeds  again  a  splendor,  from  which  is  made  the  sphere 
(the  heaven).  This  becomes  thickened  and  materialized  so  that  it 
is  accessible  to  the  sight.  Motion  being  the  nature  of  the  sphere, 
one  part  of  it  pushes  the  other,  and  from  this  motion  results  fire. 
From  fire  proceeds  air;  from  air,  water;  from  water,  earth.  And 
from  these  elements  arise  minerals,  plants  and  animals. 

Here  we  recognize  the  Neo-Platonic  scheme  of  emanation  as  we 
saw  it  in  Plotinus,  a  gradual  and  successive  emanation  of  the  lower 
from  the  higher  in  the  manner  of  a  ray  of  light  radiating  from  a  lumi- 
nous body,  the  successive  radiations  diminishing  in  brightness  and 
spirituality  until  when  we  reach  the  Sphere  the  process  of  obscuration 
has  gone  so  far  as  to  make  the  product  material  and  visible  to  the 
physical  sense.  The  Intelligence  and  the  three  Souls  proceeding  from 
it  in  order  are  clearly  not  individual  but  cosmic,  just  as  in  Plotinus. 
The  relation  between  these  cosmic  hypostases,  to  use  a  Neo-Platonic 
term,  and  the  rational  and  psychic  faculties  in  man  Israeli  nowhere 
explains,  but  we  must  no  doubt  conceive  of  the  latter  as  somehow 
contained  in  the  former  and  temporarily  individualized,  returning 
again  to  their  source  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body. 

Let  us  follow  Israeh  further  in  his  account  of  the  nature  of  these 
substances.  The  Intelligence  is  that  which  proceeds  immediately  from 
the  divine  light  without  any  immediate  agency.  It  represents  the 
permanent  ideas  and  principles — species  in  Israeli's  terminology 
— which  are  not  subject  to  change  or  dissolution.  The  Intelhgence 
contains  them  all  in  herself  eternally  and  immediately,  and  requires 
no  searching  or  reflection  to  reach  them.  When  the  Intelligence 
wishes  to  know  anything  she  returns  into  herself  and  finds  it  there 
without  requiring  thought  or  reflection.  We  can  illustrate  this, 
he  continues,  in  the  case  of  a  skilful  artisan  who,  when  he  wishes  to 
make  anything,  retires  into  himself  and  finds  it  there.  There  is  a 
difference,  however,  in  the  two  cases,  because  Intelligence  always 
knows  its  ideas  without  thought  or  reflection,  for  it  exists  always  and 
its  ideas  are  not  subject  to  change  or  addition  or  diminution;  whereas 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  7 

in  the  smith  a  difficulty  may  arise,  and  then  his  soul  is  divided  and  he 
requires  searching  and  thinking  and  discrimination  before  he  can 
realize  what  he  desires. 

What  has  been  said  so  far  applies  very  well  to  the  cosmic  Intel- 
hgence,  the  vov^  of  the  Neo-Platonists.  It  represents  thought  as 
embracing  the  highest  and  most  fundamental  principles  of  existence, 
upon  which  all  mediate  and  discursive  and  inferential  thinking  de- 
pends. Its  content  corresponds  to  the  Ideas  of  Plato.  But  the  further 
account  of  the  Intelligence  must  at  least  in  a  part  of  it  refer  to  the 
individual  human  faculty  of  that  name,  though  Israeli  gives  us  no 
indication  where  the  one  stops  and  where  the  other  begins. 

He  appeals  to  the  authority  of  Aristotle  for  his  division  of  Intelli- 
gence into  three  kinds.  First,  the  Intelhgence  which  is  always  actual. 
This  is  what  has  just  been  described.  Second,  the  Intelligence  which  is 
in  the  soul  potentially  before  it  becomes  actual,  like  the  knowledge  of 
the  child  which  is  at  first  potential,  and  when  the  child  grows  up  and 
learns  and  acquires  knowledge,  becomes  actual.  Third,  that  which  is 
described  as  the  second  Intelligence.  It  represents  that  state  of  the 
soul  in  which  it  receives  things  from  the  senses.  The  senses  impress  the 
forms  of  objects  upon  the  imagination  {(j>avTaaia)  which  is  in  the 
front  part  of  the  head.  The  imagination,  or  phantasy,  takes  them  to 
the  rational  soul.  When  the  latter  knows  them,  she  becomes  identical 
with  them  spiritually  and  not  corporeally. 

We  have  seen  above  the  Aristotelian  distinction  between  the  active 
intellect  and  the  passive.  The  account  just  given  is  evidently  based 
upon  it,  though  it  modifies  Aristotle's  analysis,  or  rather  it  enlarges 
upon  it.  The  first  and  second  divisions  in  IsraeH's  account  correspond 
to  Aristotle's  active  and  passive  intellects  respectively.  The  third 
class  in  Israeh  represents  the  process  of  realization  of  the  potential  or 
passive  intellect  through  the  sense  stimuli  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
influence  of  the  active  intellect  on  the  other.  Aristotle  seems  to  have 
left  this  intermediate  state  between  the  potential  and  the  eternally 
actual  unnamed.  We  shall  see,  however,  in  our  further  study  of  this 
very  difficult  and  comphcated  subject  how  the  classification  of  the 
various  intellects  becomes  more  and  more  involved  from  Aristotle 
through  Alexander  and  Themistius  down  to  Averroes  and  Levi  ben 
Gerson.    It  is  sufficient  for  us  to  see  here  how  Israeli  combines  Aris- 


8  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

totelian  psychology,  as  later  Aristotelian  logic  and  physics,  with  Neo- 
Platonic  metaphysics  and  the  theistic  doctrine  of  creation.  But  more 
of  this  hereafter. 

From  the  Intelhgence,  as  we  have  seen,  proceeds  the  rational  soul. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  general  nature  of  the  three-fold  soul  (rational, 
animal  and  vegetative)  Israeli  makes  the  unhistoric  but  thoroughly 
mediaeval  attempt  to  reconcile  Aristotle's  definition  of  the  soul,  which 
we  discussed  above  (p.xxxv),  with  that  of  Plato.  The  two  conceptions 
are  in  reality  diametrically  opposed.  Plato's  is  an  anthropological 
dualism,  Aristotle's,  a  monism.  For  Plato  the  soul  is  in  its  origin  not  of 
this  world  and  not  in  essential  unity  with  the  body,  which  it  controls  as 
a  sailor  his  boat.  Aristotle  conceives  of  the  relation  between  soul  and 
body  as  one  of  form  and  matter;  and  there  is  no  union  more  perfect 
than  that  of  these  two  constituent  elements  of  all  natural  substances. 
Decomposition  is  impossible.  A  given  form  may  disappear,  but 
another  form  immediately  takes  its  place.  The  combination  of  matter 
and  form  is  the  essential  condition  of  sublunar  existence,  hence  there 
can  be  no  question  of  the  soul  entering  or  leaving  the  body,  or  of  its 
activity  apart  from  the  body. 

But  Israeli  does  not  seem  to  have  grasped  Aristotle's  meaning,  and 
ascribes  to  him  the  notion  that  the  soul  is  a  separate  substance  per- 
fecting the  natural  body,  which  has  life  potentially,  meaning  by  this 
that  bodies  have  life  potentially  before  the  soul  apprehends  them;  and 
when  the  soul  does  apprehend  them,  it  makes  them  perfect  and  living 
actually.  To  be  sure,  he  adds  in  the  immediate  sequel  that  he  does 
not  mean  temporal  before  and  after,  for  things  are  always  just  as  they 
were  created;  and  that  his  mode  of  expression  is  due  to  the  impossibil- 
ity of  conveying  spiritual  ideas  in  corporeal  terms  in  any  other  way. 
This  merely  signifies  that  the  human  body  and  its  soul  come  into  being 
simultaneously.  But  he  still  regards  them  as  distinct  substances 
forming  only  a  passing  combination.  And  with  this  pretended  Aris- 
totelian notion  he  seeks  to  harmonize  that  of  Plato,  which  he  under- 
stands to  mean  not  that  the  soul  enters  the  body,  being  clothed  with 
it  as  with  a  garment,  and  then  leaves  it,  but  that  the  soul  apprehends 
bodies  by  clothing  them  with  its  light  and  splendor,  and  thus  makes 
them  living  and  moving,  as  the  sun  clothes  the  world  with  its  light  and 
illuminates  it  so  that  sight  can  perceive  it.    The  difference  is  that  the 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  9 

light  of  the  sun  is  corporeal,  and  sight  perceives  it  in  the  air  by  which 
it  is  borne;  whereas  the  hght  of  the  soul  is  spiritual,  and  intelligence 
alone  can  perceive  it,  not  the  physical  sense. 

Among  the  conceptual  terms  in  the  Aristotehan  logic  few  play  a  more 
important  part  than  those  of  substance  and  accident.  Substance  is 
that  which  does  not  reside  in  anything  else  but  is  its  own  subject.  It 
is  an  independent  existence  and  is  the  subject  of  accidents.  The  latter 
have  no  existence  independent  of  the  substance  in  which  they  inhere. 
Thus  of  the  ten  categories,  in  which  Aristotle  embraces  all  existing 
things,  the  first  includes  all  substances,  as  for  example,  man,  city, 
stone.  The  other  nine  come  under  the  genus  accident.  Quantity,  qual- 
ity, relation,  time,  place,  position,  possession,  action,  passion — all 
these  represent  attributes  which  must  have  a  substantial  being  to  re- 
side in.  There  is  no  length  or  breadth,  or  color,  or  before  or  after,  or 
here  or  there,  and  so  on  except  in  a  real  object  or  thing.  This  then  is 
the  meaning  of  accident  as  a  logical  or  ontological  term,  and  in  this  sig- 
nification it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  idea  of  chance.  Clearly  sub- 
stance represents  the  higher  category,  and  accident  is  inferior,  because 
dependent  and  variable.  Thus  it  becomes  important  to  know  in  refer- 
ence to  any  object  of  investigation  what  is  its  status  in  this  respect, 
whether  it  is  substance  or  accident. 

The  nature  of  the  soul  has  been  a  puzzle  to  thinkers  and  philoso- 
phers from  time  immemorial.  Some  thought  it  was  a  material  sub- 
stance, some  regarded  it  as  spiritual.  It  was  identified  with  the 
essence  of  nxmiber  by  the  Pythagoreans.  And  there  have  not  been 
wanting  those  who,  arguing  from  its  dependence  upon  body,  said  it 
was  an  accident  and  not  a  substance.  Strange  to  say  the  Mutakalli- 
mun,  defenders  of  religion  and  faith,  held  to  this  very  opinion.  But 
it  is  really  no  stranger  than  the  maintenance  of  the  soul's  materiality 
equally  defended  by  other  religionists,  like  Tertulhan  for  example, 
and  the  opposition  to  Maimonides's  spiritualism  on  the  part  of  Abra- 
ham ben  David  of  Posquieres.  The  Mutakallimun  were  led  to  their 
idea  by  the  atomic  theory,  which  they  found  it  politic  to  adopt  as  more 
amenable  to  theological  treatment  than  Aristotle's  Matter  and  Form. 
It  followed  then  according  to  some  of  them  that  the  fimdamental 
unit  was  the  material  atom  which  is  without  quality,  and  any  power 
or  activity  in  any  atom  or  group  of  atoms  is  a  direct  creation  of  God, 


lo  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

which  must  be  re-created  every  moment  in  order  to  exist.  This  is 
the  nature  of  accident,  and  it  makes  more  manifest  the  ever  present 
activity  of  God  in  the  world.  Thus  the  "substantial"  or  "accidental" 
character  of  the  soul  is  one  that  is  touched  on  by  most  Jewish  writers 
on  the  subject.  And  Israeli  also  refers  to  the  matter  incidentally  in 
the  "Book  of  the  Elements."  ^^  Like  the  other  Jewish  philosophers 
he  defends  its  substantiality. 

The  fact  of  its  separability  from  the  body,  he  says,  is  no  proof  of  its 
being  an  accident.  For  it  is  not  the  separability  of  an  accident  from 
its  substance  that  makes  it  an  accident,  but  its  destruction  when 
separated.  Thus  when  a  white  substance  turns  green,  the  white  color 
is  not  merely  separated  from  its  substance  but  ceases  to  exist.  The 
soul  is  not  destroyed  when  it  leaves  the  body. 

Another  argmnent  to  prove  the  soul  a  substance  is  this.  If  the 
soul  were  an  accident  it  should  be  possible  for  it  to  pass  from  the 
animal  body  to  something  else,  as  blackness  is  found  in  the  Ethio- 
pian's skin,  in  ebony  wood  and  in  pitch.  But  the  soul  exists  only  in 
living  beings. 

We  find,  besides,  that  the  activity  of  the  soul  extends  far  beyond  the 
body,  and  acts  upon  distant  things  without  being  destroyed.  Hence 
it  follows  that  the  soul  itself,  the  agent  of  the  activity,  keeps  on  ex- 
isting without  the  body,  and  is  a  substance. 

Having  made  clear  the  conception  of  soul  generally  and  its  relation 
to  the  body,  he  next  proceeds  to  treat  of  the  three  kinds  of  soul.  The 
highest  of  these  is  the  rational  soul,  which  is  in  the  horizon  of  the 
Intelligence  and  arises  from  its  shadow.  It  is  in  virtue  of  this  soul 
that  man  is  a  rational  being,  discriminating,  receptive  of  wisdom, 
distinguishing  between  good  and  evil,  between  things  desirable  and 
undesirable,  approaching  the  meritorious  and  departing  from  wrong. 
For  this  he  receives  reward  and  punishment,  because  he  knows  what 
he  is  doing  and  that  retribution  follows  upon  his  conduct. 

Next  to  the  rational  soul  is  the  animal  soul,  which  arises  from  the 
shadow  of  the  former.  Being  far  removed  from  the  light  of  Intelli- 
gence, the  animal  soul  is  dark  and  obscure.  She  has  no  knowledge 
or  discrimination,  but  only  a  dim  notion  of  truth,  and  judges  by 
appearance  only  and  not  according  to  reality.  Of  its  properties  are 
sense  perception,  motion  and  change  in  place.    For  this  reason  the 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  II 

animals  are  fierce  and  violent,  endeavoring  to  rule,  but  without  clear 
knowledge  and  discrimination,  like  the  lion  who  wants  to  rule  over  the 
other  beasts,  without  having  a  clear  consciousness  of  what  he  is  doing. 
A  proof  that  the  animals  have  only  dim  notions  of  things  is  that 
a  thirsty  ass  coming  to  the  river  will  fly  from  his  own  shadow  in  the 
water,  though  he  needs  the  latter  for  preserving  his  life,  whereas  he  will 
not  hesitate  to  approach  a  lion,  who  will  devour  him.  Therefore  the 
animals  receive  no  reward  or  punishment  (this  in  opposition  to  the 
Mutakallimun)  because  they  do  not  know  what  to  do  so  as  to  be  re- 
warded, or  what  to  avoid,  in  order  not  to  be  punished. 

The  vegetative  soul  proceeds  from  the  shadow  of  the  animal  soul. 
She  is  still  further  removed  from  the  light  of  Intelligence,  and  still 
more  weighed  down  with  shadow.  She  has  no  sense  perception  or 
motion.  She  is  next  to  earth  and  is  characterized  by  the  powers  of 
reproduction,  growth,  nutrition,  and  the  production  of  buds  and 
flowers,  odors  and  tastes. 

Next  to  the  soul  comes  the  Sphere  (the  heaven),  which  arises  in  the 
horizon  and  shadow  of  the  vegetative  soul.  The  Sphere  is  superior 
to  corporeal  substances,  being  itself  not  body,  but  the  matter  of  body. 
Unlike  the  material  elements,  which  suffer  change  and  diminution 
through  the  things  which  arise  out  of  them  as  well  as  through  the 
return  of  the  bodies  of  plants  and  animals  back  to  them  as  their  ele- 
ments, the  spiritual  substances  (and  also  the  sphere)  do  not  suffer 
any  increase  or  diminution  through  the  production  of  things  out  of 
them.  For  plants  and  animals  are  produced  from  the  elements  through 
a  celestial  power  which  God  placed  in  nature  effecting  generation  and 
decay  in  order  that  this  world  of  genesis  and  dissolution  should  exist. 
But  the  splendor  of  the  higher  substances,  viz.,  the  three  souls,  suffers 
no  change  on  account  of  the  things  coming  from  them  because  that 
which  is  produced  by  them  issues  from  the  shadow  of  their  splendor 
and  not  from  the  essence  of  the  splendor  itself.  And  it  is  clear  that  the 
splendor  of  a  thing  in  its  essence  is  brighter  than  the  splendor  of  its 
shadow,  viz.,  that  which  comes  from  it.  Hence  the  splendor  of  the 
vegetative  soul  is  undoubtedly  brighter  than  that  of  the  sphere,  which 
comes  from  its  shadow.  The  latter  becomes  rigid  and  assumes  a  cov- 
ering, thickness  and  corporeality  so  that  it  can  be  perceived  by  sight. 
But  no  other  of  the  senses  can  perceive  it  because,  although  corporeal, 


12  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

it  is  near  to  the  higher  substances  in  form  and  nobihty,  and  is  moved  by 
a  perfect  and  complete  motion,  motion  in  a  circle,  which  is  more  per- 
fect than  other  motions  and  not  subject  to  influence  and  change. 
Hence  there  is  no  increase  or  diminution  in  it,  no  beginning  or  end,  and 
this  on  account  of  the  simplicity,  spirituality  and  permanence  of  that 
which  moves  it.  The  Intelligence  pours  of  her  splendor  upon  it,  and  of 
the  light  of  her  knowledge,  and  the  sphere  becomes  intelligent  and 
rational,  and  knows,  without  investigation  or  reflection,  the  lordship 
of  its  Creator,  and  that  he  should  be  praised  and  glorified  without 
intermission.  For  this  reason  the  Creator  assigned  to  the  Sphere 
a  high  degree  from  which  it  cannot  be  removed,  and  gave  it  charge 
of  the  production  of  time  and  the  four  seasons  of  the  year,  and  the 
month  and  the  day  and  the  hour,  and  made  it  ruler  of  the  production 
of  perishable  things  in  this  world  of  generation  and  dissolution,  so  that 
the  upper  souls  may  find  bodies  to  apprehend,  to  clothe  with  their 
light,  and  to  make  visible  in  them  their  activities  according  to  the 
determination  of  God. 

The  Sphere  by  its  motion  produces  the  four  elements,  fire,  air, 
water,  earth;  and  the  combinations  of  these  in  various  proportions 
give  rise  to  the  minerals,  plants  and  animals  of  this  world,  the  highest 
of  whom  is  man. 

That  the  elements  are  those  mentioned  above  and  nothing  else  is 
proved  by  the  definition  of  element  and  its  distinction  from  "prin- 
ciple." A  principle  is  something  which,  while  being  the  cause  of 
change,  and  even  possibly  at  the  basis  of  change,  is  not  itself  subject 
to  change.  Thus  God  is  undoubtedly  the  cause  of  everything  that 
happens  in  the  world.  He  may  therefore  be  called  a  principle  of  the 
world,  but  he  does  not  enter  with  his  essence  the  changing  things. 
Hence  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  God  as  an  element  of  the  sublunar  world. 
Matter,  i.  e.,  primary  formless  matter,  does  enter  all  changing  things 
and  is  at  the  basis  of  all  change;  but  it  does  not  itself  change.  Hence 
matter  also  is  a  principle  but  not  an  element.  An  element  is  some- 
thing which  is  itself  a  composite  of  matter  and  form,  and  changes  its 
form  to  become  something  else  in  which,  however,  it  is  contained 
potentially,  not  actually.  The  product  ultimately  goes  back  to  the 
element  or  elements  from  which  it  was  made.  When  we  follow  this 
resolution  of  a  given  composite  into  its  elements  back  as  far  as  we  can 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  15 

until  we  reach  a  first  which  is  no  longer  produced  out  of  anything  in 
the  same  way  as  things  were  produced  from  it,  we  have  the  element. 
Such  is  the  nature  of  fire,  air,  water,  earth.  All  things  are  made  from 
them  in  the  manner  above  indicated.  But  there  is  nothing  prior  to 
them  which  changes  its  form  to  become  fire,  continues  to  reside  po- 
tentially in  fire  and  returns  to  its  original  state  by  the  resolution  of 
fire.    The  same  applies  to  the  other  three. 

The  matter  is  now  clear.  The  elements  stand  at  the  head  of  physical 
change  and  take  part  in  it.  Prior  to  the  elements  are  indeed  matter 
and  form,  but  as  logical  principles,  not  as  physical  and  independent 
entities.  Hence  it  would  seem,  according  to  Israeli,  that  matter  and 
form  are  side-tracked  in  the  gradual  evolution  of  the  lower  from  the 
higher.  For  the  elements,  he  tells  us,  come  from  the  motion  of  the 
Sphere,  the  Sphere  from  the  shadow  of  the  Soul,  the  Soul  from  the 
shadow  of  the  Intelligence,  the  Intelligence  is  created  by  God.  To  be 
sure  he  tells  us  that  the  Sphere  is  not  body,  but  the  matter  of  body. 
Yet  the  Sphere  cannot  take  the  place  of  prime  matter  surely,  for  it  is 
undoubtedly  endowed  with  form,  nay  is  rational  and  intelligent,  as 
we  have  seen. 

When  Israeli  says  that  prior  to  the  four  elements  there  is  nothing 
but  the  Omnipotence  of  God,  he  means  that  the  sublunar  process  of 
change  and  becoming  stops  with  the  elements  as  its  upper  limit.  What 
is  above  the  elements  belongs  to  the  intelligible  world;  and  the  manner 
of  their  production  one  from  the  other  is  a  spiritual  one,  emanation. 
The  Sphere  stands  on  the  border  line  between  the  corporeal  and  the 
intelligible,  itself  a  product  of  emanation,  though  producing  the 
elements  by  its  motion — a  process  apparently  neither  like  emanation 
nor  like  sublunar  becoming  and  change. 

Creation  in  Israeli  seems  to  be  the  same  as  emanation,  for  on  the  one 
hand  he  tells  us  that  souls  are  created,  that  nothing  precedes  the  four 
elements  except  the  Omnipotence  of  God,  and  on  the  other  that  the 
elements  come  from  the  motion  of  the  Sphere,  and  the  souls  issue  from 
the  shadow  of  the  Intelligence.  For  matter  and  form  there  seems  to 
be  no  room  at  all  except  as  logical  principles.  This  is  evidently  due  to 
the  fact  that  Israeli  is  unwittingly  combining  Aristotehan  physics 
with  Neo-Platonic  emanationism.  For  Aristotle  matter  and  form 
stand  at  the  head  of  sublunar  change  and  are  ultimate.    There  is  no 


14  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

derivation  of  matter  or  form  from  anything.  The  celestial  world  has 
a  matter  of  its  own,  and  is  not  the  cause  of  the  being  of  this  one  except 
as  influencing  its  changes.  God  is  the  mover  of  the  Spheres,  but  not 
their  Creator,  hence  he  stands  outside  of  the  world.  This  is  Theism. 
In  Israeli  there  is  a  continuity  of  God,  the  intelligible  world  and  the 
corporeal,  all  being  ultimately  the  same  thing,  though  the  processes 
in  the  two  worlds  are  different.  And  yet  he  obviates  Pantheism  by 
declaring  that  God  is  a  principle  not  an  element. 

We  said  before  that  Israeli  takes  no  avowed  attitude  to  Jewish 
dogma  or  the  Bible.  He  never  quotes  any  Jewish  works,  and  there 
is  nothing  in  his  writings  to  indicate  that  he  is  a  Jew  and  is  making 
an  effort  to  harmonize  Judaism  with  philosophy  and  science.  In 
words  he  refers  to  creation  ex  nihilo,  which  is  not  necessarily  Jewish, 
it  might  be  just  as  well  Mohammedan  or  Christian.  But  in  reality, 
as  we  have  seen,  his  ideas  of  the  cosmic  process  are  far  enough  removed 
from  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  creation  as  it  appears  in  Bible  and 
Talmud. 

Incidentally  we  learn  also  something  of  Israeli's  ideas  of  God's 
relation  to  mankind,  of  his  commandments,  and  of  prophecy.  God 
created  the  world,  he  tells  us,  because  of  his  goodness.  He  wanted 
to  benefit  his  creatures.  This  could  not  be  without  their  knowing 
the  will  of  God  and  performing  it.  The  will  of  God  could  not  be 
revealed  directly  to  everybody  because  the  divine  wisdom  can  speak 
only  to  those  in  whom  the  rational  soul  is  mistress  and  is  enlightened 
by  the  Intelligence.  But  people  are  not  all  of  this  kind;  for  some  have 
the  animal  soul  predominating  in  them,  being  on  that  account  igno- 
rant, confused,  forward,  bold,  murderous,  vengeful,  unchaste  like  an- 
imals; others  are  mastered  by  the  vegetative  soul,  i.  e.,  the  appetitive, 
and  are  thus  stupid  and  dull,  and  given  over  to  their  appetites  like 
plants.  In  others  again  their  souls  are  variously  combined,  giving 
to  their  life  and  conduct  a  composite  character.  On  this  account  it 
was  necessary  for  God  to  select  a  person  in  whom  the  rational  soul  is 
separated,  and  illumined  by  the  Intelligence — a  man  who  is  spiritual 
in  his  nature  and  eager  to  imitate  the  angels  as  far  as  it  is  possible 
for  a  man  to  do  this.  This  man  he  made  a  messenger  to  mankind. 
He  gave  him  his  book  which  contains  two  kinds  of  teaching.  One 
kind  is  spiritual  in  its  nature,  and  needs  no  further  commentary  of 


ISAAC  ISRAELI  1$ 

interpretation.  This  is  meant  for  the  intellectual  and  discriminating. 
The  other  kind  is  corporeal,  and  requires  spiritual  interpretation. 
This  is  intended  for  the  various  grades  of  those  who  cannot  understand 
directly  the  spiritual  meaning,  but  who  can  grasp  the  corporeal  teach- 
ing, by  which  they  are  gradually  trained  and  prepared  for  the  recep- 
tion of  higher  truths.  These  people  therefore  need  instructors  and 
guides  because  a  book  alone  is  not  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  those 
who  cannot  understand. 

Dreams  and  prophecy  are  closely  related,  hence  an  explanation  of 
the  former  will  also  throw  light  on  the  latter.  A  dream  is  caused  by 
the  influence  of  the  Intelligence  on  the  soul  in  sleep.  The  Intelligence 
receives  its  knowledge  directly  from  God,  and  serves  as  a  mediator 
between  him  and  the  soul,  like  a  prophet  who  mediates  between 
God  and  his  creatures.  In  communicating  to  the  soul  the  spiritual 
forms  which  it  received  from  God,  the  Intelligence  translates  them 
into  forms  intermediate  between  corporeality  and  spirituality  in  order 
that  they  may  be  quickly  impressed  upon  the  common  sense,  which 
is  the  first  to  receive  them.  The  common  sense  stands  midway  be- 
tween the  corporeal  sense  of  sight  and  the  imagination,  which  is  in  the 
anterior  chamber  of  the  brain,  and  is  known  as  phantasy  (Aristotehan 
t^avTaaid). 

That  the  forms  thus  impressed  on  the  common  sense  in  sleep  are 
intermediate  between  corporeal  and  spiritual  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  they  are  different  from  the  corporeal  forms  of  things  seen  in  the 
waking  state.  The  latter  are  obscure  and  covered  up,  whereas  those 
seen  in  sleep  are  finer,  more  spiritual  and  brighter.  Proof  of  this  is 
that  a  person  sees  himself  in  sleep  endowed  with  wings  and  flying 
between  heaven  and  earth.  He  sees  the  heavens  opening  and  someone 
speaking  to  him  out  of  the  heaven,  and  so  on.  There  would  be  no  sense 
in  all  this  if  these  phenomena  had  no  spiritual  meaning,  for  they  are 
contrary  to  nature.  But  we  know  that  they  have  real  significance 
if  interpreted  by  a  really  thoughtful  person.  The  prophets  also  in 
wishing  to  separate  themselves  from  mankind  and  impress  the  latter 
with  their  qualities,  showed  them  spiritual  forms  of  similar  kind, 
which  were  preternatural.  Hence  all  who  believe  in  prophecy  admit 
that  dreams  are  a  part  of  prophecy. 

Now  these  intermediate  forms  which  are  impressed  upon  the  com- 


l6  MEDIJEFAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

mon  sense  in  sleep  are  turned  over  by  it  to  the  phantasy  and  by  the 
latter  to  the  memory.  When  the  person  awakes,  he  recovers  the 
forms  from  the  memory  just  as  they  were  deposited  there  by  the 
phantasy.  He  then  consults  his  thinking  power;  and  if  this  is  spiritual 
and  pure,  the  Intelligence  endows  him  with  its  light  and  splendor  and 
reveals  to  him  the  spiritual  forms  signified  by  the  visions  seen  in  sleep. 
He  is  then  able  to  interpret  the  dream  correctly.  But  if  his  powers  of 
thought  are  not  so  good  and  are  obscured  by  coverings,  he  cannot 
properly  remove  the  husk  from  the  kernel  in  the  forms  seen  in  sleep, 
is  not  able  to  penetrate  to  the  true  spirituality  beneath,  and  his  in- 
terpretation is  erroneous. 

This  explanation  does  not  really  explain,  but  it  is  noteworthy  as 
the  first  Jewish  attempt  to  reduce  prophecy  to  a  psychological  phenom- 
enon, which  was  carried  fiurther  by  subsequent  writers  until  it  received 
its  definitive  form  for  the  middle  ages  in  Maimonides  and  Levi  ben 
Gerson, 

To  sum  up,  Israeli  is  an  eclectic.  There  is  no  system  of  Jewish 
philosophy  to  be  found  in  his  writings.  He  had  no  such  ambitions. 
He  combines  Aristotelian  logic,  physics  and  psychology  with  Neo- 
Platonic  metaphysics,  and  puts  on  the  surface  a  veneer  of  theistic 
creationism.  His  merit  is  chiefly  that  of  a  pioneer  in  directing  the 
attention  of  Jews  to  the  science  and  philosophy  of  the  Greeks,  albeit 
in  Arab  dress.  There  is  no  trace  yet  of  the  Kalam  in  his  writings 
except  in  his  allusions  to  the  atomic  theory  and  the  denial  of  reward 
and  punishment  of  animals. 


CHAPTER  II 

DAVID   BEN  MERWAN  AL   MUKAMMAS 

Nothing  was  known  of  Al  Mukammas  until  recently  when  fragments 
of  his  philosophical  work  were  found  in  Judah  ben  Barzilai's  commen- 
tary on  the  Sefer  Yezirah.^^  The  latter  tells  us  that  David  Al  Mukam- 
mas is  said  to  have  associated  with  Saadia,  who  learned  a  good  deal 
from  him,  but  the  matter  is  not  certain.  If  this  account  be  true  we 
have  a  second  Jewish  philosopher  who  preceded  Saadia.  His  chief 
work  is  known  by  the  title  of  "Twenty  Chapters,"  fifteen  of  which 
were  discovered  in  the  original  Arabic  in  1898  by  Abraham  Harkavy 
of  St.  Petersburg. ^^  Unfortunately  they  have  not  yet  been  published, 
and  hence  our  account  will  have  to  be  incomplete,  based  as  it  is  on  the 
Hebrew  fragments  in  the  Yezirah  commentary  above  mentioned. 

These  fragments  are  sufficient  to  show  us  that  unlike  Israeh,  who 
shows  little  knowledge  of  the  Mu'taziHte  discussions,  Al  Mukammas  is 
a  real  Mu'taziHte  and  moves  in  the  path  laid  out  by  these  Moham- 
medan rationalists.  Whether  this  difference  is  due  to  their  places  of 
residence  (Israeli  having  lived  in  Egypt  and  Kairuan,  while  Al  Mu- 
kammas was  in  Babylon),  or  to  their  personal  predilections  for  Neo- 
Platonism  and  the  Kalam  respectively,  is  not  certain.  Saadia  knows 
the  Kalam;  but  though  coming  originally  from  Egypt,  he  spent  his 
most  fruitful  years  in  Babylonia,  in  the  city  of  Sura,  where  he  was 
gaon.  The  centres  of  Arabian  rationalism  were,  as  we  know,  the  cities 
of  Bagdad  and  Basra,  nearer  to  Babylon  and  Mesopotamia  than  to 
Egypt  or  Kairuan. 

The  first  quotation  in  Judah  ben  Barzilai  has  reference  to  science  and 
philosophy,  their  definition  and  classification.  Science  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  reahty  of  existing  things.  It  is  divided  into  two  parts, 
theoretical  and  practical.  Theoretical  science  aims  at  knowledge  for 
its  own  sake;  practical  seeks  an  end  beyond  knowledge,  viz.,  the  pro- 
duction of  something.  We  call  it  then  art.  Thus  geometry  is  a  science 
in  so  far  as  one  desires  to  know  the  nature  and  relations  to  each  other  of 

17 


l8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

solid,  surface,  line,  point,  square,  triangle,  circle.  But  if  his  purpose  is 
to  know  how  to  build  a  square  or  circular  house,  or  to  construct  a  mill, 
or  dig  a  well,  or  measure  land,  he  becomes  an  artisan.  Theoretical 
science  is  three-fold.  First  and  foremost  stands  theology,  which 
investigates  the  unity  of  God  and  his  laws  and  commandments.  This 
is  the  highest  and  most  important  of  all  the  sciences.  Next  comes 
logic  and  ethics,  which  help  men  in  forming  opinions  and  guide  them 
in  the  path  of  understanding.  The  last  is  physics,  the  knowledge  of 
created  things. 

In  the  ninth  and  tenth  chapters  of  his  book  Al  Mukammas  discusses 
the  divine  attributes.  This  was  a  very  important  problem  in  the 
Mu'tazilite  schools,  as  we  saw  in  the  Introduction,  and  was  treated  in 
Mu'tazilite  works  in  the  first  division,  which  went  by  the  title  of 
"Bab  al  Tauhid,"  the  chapter  on  the  unity. 

God  is  one — so  Al  Mukammas  sums  up  the  results  of  his  previous 
discussions — not  in  the  sense  in  which  a  genus  is  said  to  be  one,  nor  in 
that  in  which  a  species  is  one,  nor  as  the  number  one  is  one,  nor  as  an 
individual  creature  is  one,  but  as  a  simple  unity  in  which  there  is  no 
distinction  or  composition.  He  is  one  and  there  is  no  second  like  him. 
He  is  first  without  beginning,  and  last  without  end.  He  is  the  cause 
and  ground  of  everything  caused  and  effected. 

The  question  of  God's  essence  is  difificult.  Some  say  it  is  not  per- 
mitted to  ask  what  God  is.  For  to  answer  the  question  what  a  thing  is 
is  to  limit  it,  and  the  limited  is  the  created.  Others  again  say  that  it  is 
permitted  to  make  this  inquiry,  because  we  can  use  in  our  answer  the 
expressions  to  which  God  himself  testifies  in  his  revealed  book.  And 
this  would  not  be  limiting  or  defining  his  glory  because  his  being  is 
different  from  any  other,  and  there  is  nothing  that  bears  any  resem- 
blance to  him.  Accordingly  we  should  answer  the  question  what  God 
is,  by  saying,  he  is  the  first  and  the  last,  and  the  visible  and  the  hidden, 
without  begirming  or  end.  He  is  living,  but  not  through  life  acquired 
from  without.  His  life  is  not  sustained  and  prolonged  by  food.  He  is 
wise,  but  not  through  acquired  wisdom.  He  hears  without  ears,  sees 
without  eyes,  is  understanding  in  all  his  works,  and  a  true  judge  in  all 
his  judgments.  Such  would  be  our  answer  in  accordance  with  God's 
own  testimony  of  himself. 

We  must  on  no  account  suppose  that  the  expressions  living,  wise, 


DAVID  BEN  MERWAN  AL  MUKAMMAS  19 

seeing,  hearing,  and  so  on,  when  apphed  to  God  mean  the  same  thing 
as  when  we  ascribe  them  to  ourselves.  When  we  say  God  is  Hving  we 
do  not  mean  that  there  was  a  time  when  he  was  not  living,  or  that 
there  will  be  a  time  when  he  will  not  be  hving.  This  is  true  of  us  but 
not  of  God.  His  life  has  no  beginning  or  end.  The  same  thing  applies 
to  his  wisdom.  It  is  not  acquired  hke  ours,  it  has  no  beginning  or 
end,  and  is  not  subject  to  error,  forgetfulness,  addition  or  diminution. 
It  is  not  strange  that  his  attributes  should  be  so  imlike  ours,  for  it  is 
fitting  that  the  Creator  should  be  different  from  the  thing  created,  and 
the  Maker  from  the  thing  made. 

We  must,  however,  analyze  the  matter  of  divine  attributes  more 
closely.  When  we  say  God  is  living,  we  may  mean  he  is  living  with 
life  as  his  attribute,  i.  e.,  that  there  is  an  attribute  life  which  makes 
him  living,  or  we  may  deny  that  there  is  any  such  attribute  in  him  as 
life,  but  that  he  is  living  through  himself  and  not  through  life  as  an 
attribute.  To  make  this  subtle  distinction  clear  we  will  investigate 
further  what  is  involved  in  the  first  statement  that  God  is  living  with 
life.  It  may  mean  that  there  was  a  time  when  God  was  not  hving  and 
then  he  acquired  life  and  became  living.  This  is  clearly  a  wrong  and 
unworthy  conception.  We  must  therefore  adopt  the  other  alterna- 
tive, that  the  life  which  makes  him  living  is  eternal  like  him,  and 
hence  he  was  always  living  from  eternity  and  will  continue  to  be 
Hving  to  eternity.  But  the  matter  is  not  yet  settled.  The  question 
still  remains.  Is  this  life  through  which  he  hves  identical  with  his  be- 
ing, or  is  it  distinct  from  his  being,  or  is  it  a  part  of  it?  If  we  say  it 
is  distinct  from  his  being,  we  are  guilty  of  introducing  other  eternal 
beings  beside  God,  which  destroys  his  unity.  The  Christians  are 
guilty  of  this  very  thing  when  they  say  that  God's  eternal  life  is  the 
Holy  Ghost,  and  his  eternal  Wisdom  is  the  Son.  If  we  say  that  his 
life  is  a  part  of  his  being,  we  do  injury  to  the  other  aspect  of  his  unity, 
namely,  his  simphcity.  For  to  have  parts  in  one's  being  imphes  com- 
position. We  are  forced  therefore  to  conclude  that  God's  life  is 
identical  with  his  being.  But  this  is  really  tantamount  to  saying  that 
there  is  no  attribute  life  which  makes  him  living,  or  that  he  is  hving 
not  through  life.    The  difference  is  only  in  expression. 

We  may  make  this  conception  clearer  by  illustrations  from  other 
spheres,  inadequate  though  they  be.    The  soul  is  the  cause  of  life 


20  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

to  the  body,  i.  e.,  the  body  lives  through  the  soul,  and  when  the  latter 
leaves  it,  the  body  loses  its  Ufe  and  dies.  But  the  soul  itself  does 
not  live  through  anything  else,  say  through  another  soul.  For  if  this 
were  the  case  this  other  soul  would  need  again  another  soul  to  make  it 
live  and  this  again  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum,  which  is  absurd. 
The  soul  lives  through  itself.  The  same  thing  applies  to  angels.  They 
live  through  their  own  being;  and  that  is  why  souls  and  angels  are 
called  in  the  Sacred  Scriptures  spirits.  A  spirit  is  something  that  is 
fine  and  light  and  incomposite.  Hence  their  life  cannot  be  due  to 
anything  distinct  from  their  being,  for  this  would  make  them  compos- 
ite. 

This  statement,  however,  that  souls  and  angels  are  living  through 
their  own  being  must  not  be  understood  as  meaning  that  they  have  no 
creator  who  gave  them  being  and  life.  The  meaning  merely  is  that 
the  being  which  God  gave  them  is  different  from  the  being  he  gave 
to  bodies.  Bodies  need  a  soul  to  become  living,  the  soul  is  itself  living. 
So  in  material  things,  also,  the  sun  shines  with  its  own  light  and  not 
with  light  acquired.  The  odor  of  myrrh  is  fragrant  through  itself,  not 
through  anything  else.  The  eye  sees  with  its  own  power,  whereas  man 
sees  with  the  eye.  The  tongue  does  not  speak  with  another  tongue, 
man  speaks  with  a  tongue,  and  so  on.  So  we  say  of  God,  though 
in  a  manner  a  thousand-fold  more  sublime,  that  he  is  living,  but  not 
with  a  hfe  which  is  distinct  from  his  being;  and  so  of  the  other  attri- 
butes, hearing,  seeing,  and  so  on,  that  we  find  in  the  Scriptural  praises 
of  him. 

It  is  necessary  to  add  that  as  on  the  one  hand  we  have  seen  that 
God's  attributes  are  identical  with  his  being,  so  it  follows  on  the  other 
that  the  various  attributes,  such  as  wise,  seeing,  hearing,  knowing, 
and  so  on,  are  not  different  from  each  other  in  meaning,  though  dis- 
tinct in  expression.  Otherwise  it  would  make  God  composite.  The 
reason  we  employ  a  number  of  distinct  expressions  is  in  order  to  remove 
from  God  the  several  opposites  of  the  terms  used.  Thus  when  we  say 
God  is  living  we  mean  to  indicate  that  he  is  not  dead.  The  attribute 
wise  excludes  folly  and  ignorance;  hearing  and  seeing  remove  deafness 
and  blindness.  The  philosopher  Aristotle  says  that  it  is  truer  and  more 
appropriate  to  apply  negative  attributes  to  God  than  positive.  Others 
have  said  that  we  must  not  speak  of  the  Creator  in  positive  terms 


DAVID  BEN  MERWAN  AL  MUKAMMAS  21 

for  there  is  danger  of  endowing  him  with  form  and  resemblance  to 
other  things.  Speaking  of  him  negatively  we  imply  the  positive 
without  risking  offence. 

In  the  sequel  Al  Mukammas  refutes  the  views  of  the  dualists,  of 
the  Christians  and  those  who  maintain  that  God  has  form.  We 
cannot  afford  to  linger  over  these  arguments,  interesting  though  they 
be,  and  must  hurry  on  to  say  a  word  about  the  sixteenth  chapter, 
which  deals  with  reward  and  punishment.  This  no  doubt  forms 
part  of  the  second  Mu'tazilite  division,  namely,  the  "Bab  al  'Adl," 
or  section  concerning  God's  justice. 

He  defines  reward  as  the  soul's  tranquillity  and  infinite  joy  in  the 
world  to  come  in  compensation  for  the  sojourn  in  this  world  which 
she  endured  and  the  self-control  she  practiced  in  abstaining  from  the 
pleasures  of  the  world.  Punishment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  soul's 
disquietude  and  sorrow  to  the  end  of  days  as  retribution  for  indulging 
in  the  world's  evil  pleasures.  Both  are  imposed  by  God  with  justice 
and  fairness.  It  is  fitting  that  the  promises  of  reward  and  threats 
of  punishment  consequent  upon  obedience  and  disobedience  should 
be  specified  in  connection  with  the  commandments  and  prohibitions 
in  the  Scriptures,  because  this  is  the  only  way  to  train  the  soul  to 
practice  self-control.  A  child  who  does  not  fear  his  teacher's  punish- 
ment, or  has  no  confidence  in  his  good  will  will  not  be  amenable  to 
instruction.  The  same  is  true  of  the  majority  of  those  who  serve 
kings.  It  is  fear  alone  which  induces  them  to  obey  the  will  of  their 
masters.  So  God  in  commanding  us  to  do  what  is  worthy  and  pro- 
hibiting what  is  unworthy  saw  fit  in  his  wisdom  to  specify  the  accom- 
panying rewards  and  punishments  that  he  who  observes  may  find 
pleasure  and  joy  in  his  obedience,  and  the  unobservant  may  be  af- 
fected with  sorrow  and  fear. 

As  the  world  to  come  has  no  end,  so  it  is  proper  that  the  reward 
of  the  righteous  as  well  as  the  punishment  of  the  wicked  should  be 
without  end.  Arguments  have  been  advanced  to  show  that  unlike 
reward  which  is  properly  infinite  as  is  becoming  to  God's  goodness, 
punishment  should  have  a  limit,  for  God  is  merciful.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  claimed  on  the  basis  of  the  finiteness  of  human  action  that 
both  reward  and  punishment  should  be  finite.  But  in  reality  it  can 
be  shown  in  many  ways  that  reward  and  punishment  should  be  infinite. 


22  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Without  naming  all  the  arguments — as  many  as  ten  have  been  ad- 
vanced— in  favor  of  this  view,  we  may  urge  some  of  the  more  impor- 
tant. 

It  was  God's  own  goodness  that  prompted  him  to  benefit  mankind 
by  giving  them  laws  for  their  guidance,  and  not  any  prior  merits  on 
their  part  which  gave  them  a  claim  on  God's  protection.  God  himself 
is  not  in  any  way  benefited  by  man's  obedience  or  injured  by  his 
disobedience.  Man  knows  that  it  is  for  his  own  good  that  he  is  thus 
admonished;  and  if  he  were  asked  what  reward  he  would  like  to  have 
for  his  good  deeds  he  would  select  no  less  than  infinite  happiness. 
Justice  demands  that  punishment  be  commensurate  with  reward. 
The  greater  the  reward  and  the  punishment  the  more  effective  are 
the  laws  likely  to  be.  Besides  in  violating  God's  law  a  person  virtually 
denies  the  eternity  of  him  who  gave  it,  and  is  guilty  of  contempt; 
for  he  hides  himself  from  men,  fearing  their  displeasure,  whereas  the 
omnipresence  of  God  has  no  deterring  effect  upon  him.  For  such 
offence  infinite  punishment  is  the  only  fit  retribution. 

The  question  whether  the  soul  alone  is  rewarded  or  the  body  alone 
or  both  has  been  answered  variously.  In  favor  of  the  soul  alone  as 
the  subject  of  reward  and  punishment  it  has  been  urged  that  reward 
raises  man  to  the  grade  of  angels,  who  are  pure  spirits.  How  then 
can  the  body  take  part?  And  punishment  must  be  of  the  same  nature 
as  reward.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Bible  says  noth- 
ing of  man  being  raised  to  the  status  of  angels,  and  we  know  in  this 
world  of  physical  reward  and  punishment  only.  The  Garden  of  Eden 
of  which  the  Bible  speaks  is  not  peopled  with  angels,  and  that  is  where 
the  righteous  go  after  death. 

The  true  solution  is  that  as  man  is  composed  of  body  and  soul, 
and  both  share  in  his  conduct,  reward  and  pimishment  must  attach 
to  both.  As  we  do  not  understand  the  nature  of  spiritual  retribution 
so  the  composite  is  equally  inconceivable  to  us.  But  everyone  who 
believes  in  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  has  no  difficulty  in  holding 
that  the  body  has  a  share  in  future  reward  and  pimishment. 


CHAPTER  III 

SAADIA   BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI    (892-942) 

Saadia  was  the  first  important  Jewish  philosopher.  Philo  of  Alex- 
andria does  not  come  within  our  purview  as  he  was  not  mediaeval. 
Besides  his  work  is  not  systematic,  being  in  the  nature  of  a  commen- 
tary on  Holy  Writ,  Though  Philo  was  a  good  and  loyal  Jew,  he  stood, 
so  to  speak,  apart  from  the  real  centre  of  Jewish  intellectual  and 
spiritual  development.  He  was  on  the  one  hand  too  closely  dependent 
on  Greek  thought  and  on  the  other  had  only  a  Hmited  knowledge  of 
Jewish  thought  and  tradition.  The  Bible  he  knew  only  in  the  Greek 
translation,  not  in  the  original  Hebrew;  and  of  the  Halaka,  which 
was  still  in  the  making  in  Palestine,  he  knew  still  less. 

It  was  different  with  Saadia.  In  the  tenth  century  the  Mishna 
and  the  Talmud  had  been  long  completed  and  formed  theoretically 
as  well  as  practically  the  content  of  the  Jew's  life  and  thought.  Sura 
in  Babylonia,  where  Saadia  was  the  head  of  the  academy,  was  the 
chief  centre  of  Jewish  learning,  and  Saadia  was  the  heir  in  the  main 
line  of  Jewish  development  as  it  passed  through  the  hands  of  lawgiver 
and  prophet,  scribe  and  Pharisee,  Tanna  and  Amora,  Saburai  and 
Gaon.  As  the  head  of  the  Sura  academy  he  was  the  intellectual  rep- 
resentative of  the  Jewry  and  Judaism  of  his  day.  His  time  was  a 
period  of  agitation  and  strife,  not  only  in  Judaism  but  also  in  Islam, 
in  whose  lands  the  Jews  lived  and  to  whose  temporal  rulers  they  owed 
allegiance  in  the  East  as  well  as  in  Spain. 

In  Islam  we  saw  in  the  introduction  how  the  various  schools  of  the 
Kadariya,  the  Mu  tazila  and  the  Ashariya  arose  in  obedience  to  the 
demand  of  clarifying  the  chief  problems  of  faith,  science  and  life.  In 
Judaism  there  was  in  addition  to  this  more  general  demand  the  more 
local  and  internal  conflict  of  Karaite  and  Rabbanite  which  centred 
about  the  problem  of  tradition.  Saadia  found  himself  in  the  midst  of 
aU  this  and  proved  equal  to  the  occasion. 

We  are  not  here  concerned  with  the  vicissitudes  of  Saadia's  personal 

23 


24  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

life  or  of  his  literary  career  as  opponent  of  the  Karaite  sect.  Nor  can 
we  afford  more  than  merely  to  state  that  Jewish  science  in  the  larger 
sense  begins  with  Saadia.  Hebrew  grammar  and  lexicography  did 
not  exist  before  him.  The  Bible  had  been  translated  into  several 
languages  before  Saadia's  day,  but  he  was  the  first  to  translate  it 
into  Arabic,  and  the  first  to  write  a  commentary  on  it.  But  the  great- 
est work  of  Saadia,  that  which  did  the  most  important  service  to  the 
theory  of  Judaism,  and  by  which  he  will  be  best  remembered,  is  his 
endeavor  to  work  out  a  system  of  doctrine  which  should  be  in  harmony 
with  the  traditions  of  Judaism  on  the  one  hand  and  with  the  most  au- 
thoritative scientific  and  philosophic  opinion  of  the  time  on  the  other. 
Israeli,  we  have  seen,  was  interested  in  science  before  Saadia.  As  a 
physician  he  was  probably  more  at  home  in  purely  physical  discussions 
than  Saadia.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  had  the  larger  interest  of 
the  Gaon  of  Sura,  namely,  to  construct  a  system  of  Judaism  upon  the 
basis  of  scientific  doctrine.  Possibly  the  example  of  Islam  was  lacking 
in  Israeli's  environment,  as  he  does  not  seem  to  be  acquainted  with  the 
theories  and  discussions  of  the  Mutakallimun,  and  draws  his  informa- 
tion from  Aristotelian  and  Neo-Platonic  sources.  Saadia  was  in  the 
very  midst  of  Arab  speculation  as  is  evident  from  the  composition  of 
his  chef  d'ceuvre,  "  Emunot  ve-Deot,"  Beliefs  and  Opinions. ^^ 

The  work  is  arranged  on  the  Mu'taziHte  model.  The  two  main 
divisions  in  works  of  this  character  are  Unity  and  Justice.  The  first 
begins  with  some  preliminary  considerations  on  the  nature  and  sources 
of  knowledge.  It  proceeds  then  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  by 
showing  that  the  world  cannot  have  existed  from  eternity  and  must 
have  been  created  in  time.  Creation  implies  a  creator.  This  is  fol- 
lowed by  arguments  showing  that  God  is  one  and  incorporeal.  The 
rest  is  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  divine  attributes  with  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  God's  unity  and  simplicity  are  not  affected  by 
them.  The  section  on  unity  closes  with  a  refutation  of  opposing 
views,  such  as  those  of  the  duahsts  or  Trinitarians  or  infidels.  The 
section  on  Justice  centres  about  the  doctrine  of  free  will.  Hence 
psychology  and  ethics  are  treated  in  this  part  of  the  work.  To  this 
may  be  added  problems  of  a  more  dogmatic  nature,  eschatological 
and  otherwise.  We  shall  see  in  the  sequel  that  Saadia's  masterpiece 
is  modeled  on  the  same  plan. 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  25 

But  not  merely  the  plan  and  arrangement  of  his  work  give  evidence 
of  the  influence  upon  Saadia  of  Islamic  schools,  many  of  his  arguments, 
those  for  example  on  the  existence  of  God  and  the  creation  of  the  world, 
are  taken  directly  from  them.  Maimonides,  who  was  a  strong  op- 
ponent of  the  Mutakalhmun,  gives  an  outline  of  their  fundamental 
principles  and  their  arguments  for  the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeal- 
ity  of  God.^^  Some  of  these  are  identical  with  those  of  Saadia.  Saadia, 
however,  is  not  interested  in  pure  metaphysics  as  such.  His  purpose 
is  decidedly  apologetic  in  the  defence  of  Judaism  and  Jewish  dogma. 
Hence  we  look  in  vain  in  his  book  for  definite  views  on  the  constitu- 
tion of  existing  substances,  on  the  nature  of  motion,  on  the  meaning 
of  cause,  and  so  on.  We  get  a  glimpse  of  his  attitude  to  some  of  these 
questions  in  an  incidental  way. 

The  Mutakallimun  were  opposed  to  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  mat- 
ter and  form,  and  substituted  for  it  the  atomic  theory.  God  created 
atoms  without  magnitude  or  quality,  and  he  likewise  created  quali- 
ties to  inhere  in  groups  of  atoms.  These  qualities  they  called  acci- 
dents, and  one  of  their  important  discussions  was  whether  an  accident 
can  last  more  than  a  moment  of  time.  The  opinions  were  various  and 
the  accidents  were  classified  according  to  their  powers  of  duration. 
That  is,  there  were  some  accidents  which  once  created  continued  to 
exist  of  their  own  accord  some  length  of  time,  and  there  were  others 
which  had  to  be  re-created  anew  every  moment  in  order  to  continue 
to  exist.  Saadia  does  not  speak  of  matter  and  form  as  constituting  the 
essence  of  existing  things;  he  does  speak  of  substance  and  accident, ^^ 
which  might  lead  us  to  believe  that  he  held  to  the  atomic  theory, 
since  he  speaks  of  the  accidents  as  coming  and  going  one  after  the 
other,  which  suggests  the  constant  creation  spoken  of  by  the  Mutakalli- 
mun. On  the  other  hand,  when  he  answers  an  objection  against  mo- 
tion, which  is  as  old  as  Zeno,  namely,  how  can  we  traverse  an  infi- 
nitely divisible  distance,  since  it  is  necessary  to  pass  an  infinite  number 
of  parts,  he  tells  us  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the 
atomic  theory  or  other  theories  adopted  by  some  Mu  tazilites  to  meet 
this  objection.  We  may  believe  in  the  continuity  and  infinite  divisibil- 
ity of  matter,  but  as  long  as  this  divisibility  is  only  potentially  infinite, 
actually  always  finite,  our  ability  to  traverse  the  space  offers  no  difii- 
culty.^^    Finally,  in  refuting  the  second  theory  of  creation,  which  com- 


26  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

bines  Platonism  with  atomism,  he  argues  against  an  atomic  theory 
primarily  because  of  its  implications  of  eternity  of  the  atoms,  but 
partly  also  on  other  grounds,  which  would  also  affect  the  Kalamistic 
conceptions  of  the  atoms/^  These  points  are  not  treated  by  Saadia 
expressly  but  are  only  mentioned  incidentally  in  the  elucidation  of 
other  problems  dealing  with  the  creation  of  the  world  and  the  exist- 
ence of  God. 

Like  Israeli  Saadia  shows  considerable  familiarity  with  Aristotelian 
notions  as  found  in  the  Logic,  the  Physics  and  the  Psychology.  It  is 
doubtful,  however,  whether  he  really  knew  Aristotle's  more  important 
treatises  at  first  hand  and  in  detail.  The  "  Categories,"  a  small  treatise 
forming  the  first  book  of  Aristotle's  logic,  he  no  doubt  knew,  but  the 
other  Aristotelian  concepts  he  probably  derived  from  secondary 
sources.  For  while  he  passes  in  review  all  the  ten  categories  showing 
that  none  of  them  is  applicable  to  God,^^  we  scarcely  find  any  mention 
of  such  important  and  fundamental  AristoteHan  conceptions  as  matter 
and  form,  potentiality  and  actuality,  the  four  causes,  formal,  material, 
efl&cient  and  final — concepts  which  as  soon  as  Aristotle  began  to  be 
studied  by  Al  Farabi  and  Avicenna  became  familiar  to  all  who  wrote 
anything  at  all  bearing  on  philosophy,  theology,  or  Biblical  exegesis. 
Nay,  the  very  concepts  which  he  does  employ  seem  to  indicate  in  the 
way  he  uses  them  that  he  was  not  familiar  with  the  context  in  which 
they  are  found  in  the  AristoteHan  treatises,  or  with  the  relation  they 
bear  to  other  views  of  Aristotle.  Thus  no  one  who  knew  Aristotle  at 
first  hand  could  make  the  mistake  of  regarding  his  definition  of  the  soul 
as  making  the  latter  an  accident. ^^  When  Saadia  speaks  of  six  kinds 
of  motion  ^^  instead  of  three,  he  shows  clearly  that  his  knowledge  of  the 
AristoteHan  theory  of  motion  was  Hmited  to  the  little  of  it  that  is 
contained  in  the  '  Categories." 

We  are  thus  justified  in  saying,  that  Saadia's  sources  are  Jewish 
literature  and  tradition,  the  works  of  the  MutakaUimun,  particularly 
the  Mu'taziHtes,  and  Aristotle,  whose  book  on  the  ''Categories  "  he 
knew  at  first  hand. 

Saadia  tells  us  he  was  induced  to  write  his  book  because  he  found 
that  the  beHefs  and  opinions  of  men  were  in  an  unsatisfactory  state. 
While  there  are  some  persons  who  are  fortunate  enough  to  possess  the 
truth  and  to  know  that  they  have  it  and  rejoice  thereat,  this  is  not 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  27 

true  of  all.  For  there  are  others  who  when  they  have  the  truth  know 
it  not,  and  hence  let  it  shp;  others  are  still  less  fortunate  and  adopt 
false  and  erroneous  opinions,  which  they  regard  as  true;  while  still 
others  vacillate  continually,  going  from  one  opinion  and  belief  to 
another.  This  gave  him  pain  and  he  thought  it  his  duty  to  make  use 
of  his  limited  knowledge  to  help  them.  A  conscientious  study  of  his 
book  will  tend  to  remove  doubt  and  will  substitute  belief  through 
knowledge  for  belief  through  tradition.  Another  result  of  such  study, 
not  less  important,  will  be  improvement  of  character  and  disposition, 
which  will  affect  for  the  better  a  man's  life  in  every  respect,  in  relation 
to  God  as  well  as  to  his  fellow-men.'*^ 

One  may  ask  why  it  is  that  one  encounters  so  many  doubts  and 
difficulties  before  arriving  at  true  knowledge.  The  answer  is,  a  human 
being  is  a  creature,  i.  e.,  a  being  dependent  upon  another  for  its  exist- 
ence, and  it  is  in  the  nature  of  a  creature  as  such  that  it  must  labor  for 
the  truth  with  the  sweat  of  its  brow.  For  whatever  a  man  does  or  has 
to  do  with  is  subject  to  time;  each  work  must  be  accomplished  grad- 
ually, step  by  step,  part  by  part,  in  successive  portions  of  time.  And 
as  the  task  before  him  is  at  the  beginning  complex,  he  has  to  analyze 
and  simplify  it.  This  takes  time;  while  certainty  and  knowledge  can- 
not come  until  the  task  is  accompHshed.  Before  that  point  is  reached 
he  is  naturally  in  doubt.  "^^ 

The  sources  of  truth  are  three.  First  is  that  to  which  the  senses 
testify.  If  our  normal  sense  perceives  under  normal  conditions  which 
are  free  from  illusion,  we  are  certain  of  that  perception. 

The  judgment  is  another  source  of  truth.  There  are  certain  truths 
of  which  we  are  certain.  This  apphes  especially  to  such  judgments  of 
value,  as  that  truth  is  good  and  falsehood  is  bad.  In  addition  to  these 
two  sources  of  immediate  knowledge,  there  is  a  third  source  based  upon 
these  two.  This  is  logical  inference.  We  are  led  to  beUeve  what  we 
have  not  directly  perceived  or  a  matter  concerning  which  we  have  no 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  second  kind,  because  we  infer  it  from 
something  else  which  we  have  perceived  or  of  which  we  have  immediate 
certainty.  Thus  we  believe  man  has  a  soul  though  we  have  never  seen 
it  because  we  infer  its  presence  from  its  activity,  which  we  do  see. 

These  three  sources  are  universal.  They  are  not  peculiar  to  a  given 
race  or  religious  denomination,  though  there  are  some  persons  who 


28  MEDLEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

deny  the  validity  of  some  or  all  of  them.  We  Jews  believe  in  them  and 
in  still  another  source  of  truth,  namely,  authentic  tradition,  ^'^ 

Some  think  that  a  Jew  is  forbidden  to  speculate  or  philosophize 
about  the  truths  of  religion.  This  is  not  so.  Genuine  and  sincere 
reflection  and  speculation  is  not  prohibited.  What  is  forbidden  is  to 
leave  the  sacred  writings  aside  and  rely  on  any  opinions  that  occur  to 
one  concerning  the  beginnings  of  time  and  space.  For  one  may  find 
the  truth  or  one  may  miss  it.  In  any  case  until  a  person  finds  it,  he  is 
without  a  religious  guide;  and  if  he  does  find  what  seems  to  him  the 
truth  and  bases  his  belief  and  conduct  upon  it,  he  is  never  sure  that 
he  may  not  later  be  assailed  by  doubts,  which  will  lead  him  to  drop  his 
adopted  belief.  But  if  we  hold  fast  to  the  commandments  of  the  Bible, 
our  own  ratiocination  on  the  truths  of  religion  will  be  of  great  benefit  to 
us.^s 

Our  investigation  of  the  facts  of  our  religion  will  give  us  a  reasoned 
and  scientific  knowledge  of  those  things  which  the  Prophets  taught  us 
dogmatically,  and  will  enable  us  to  answer  the  arguments  and  crit- 
icisms of  our  opponents  directed  against  our  faith.  Hence  it  is  not 
merely  our  privilege  but  our  duty  to  confirm  the  truths  of  rehgion  by 
reason.  ^^ 

Here  a  question  presents  itself.  If  the  reason  can  discover  by  itself 
the  truths  communicated  to  us  by  divine  revelation,  why  was  it  neces- 
sary to  have  recourse  to  the  latter?  Why  was  it  not  left  to  the  reason 
alone  to  guide  us  in  our  beUef  and  in  our  conduct?  The  answer  is,  as 
was  suggested  before,  that  human  reason  proceeds  gradually  and  does 
not  reach  its  aim  until  the  end  of  the  process.  In  the  meantime  one  is 
left  without  a  guide.  Besides  not  everybody's  reason  is  adequate  to 
discover  truth.  Some  are  altogether  incapable  of  this  difificult  task, 
and  many  more  are  exposed  to  harassing  doubts  and  perplexities  which 
hinder  their  progress.  Hence  the  necessity  of  revelation,  because  in 
the  witness  of  the  senses  all  are  equally  at  home,  men  and  women, 
young  and  old.^° 

The  most  important  fact  of  religion  is  the  existence  of  God.  We 
know  it  from  the  Bible,  and  we  must  now  prove  it  by  reason.  The 
proof  is  necessarily  indirect  because  no  one  of  us  has  seen  God,  nor 
have  we  an  immediate  certainty  of  his  existence.  We  must  prove  it 
then  by  the  method  of  inference.    We  must  start  with  something  we 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  29 

do  know  with  certainty  and  proceed  from  it  through  as  many  steps  of 
logical  inference  as  may  be  necessary  until  we  reach  the  object  of  our 
search.  ^^ 

The  world  and  the  things  in  it  are  directly  accessible  to  our  senses 
and  our  judgment.  How  long  has  the  world  been  in  existence  and 
how  did  it  come  to  be?  The  answers  to  these  questions  also  we  do 
not  know  through  our  senses,  and  we  must  prove  them  by  a  chain  of 
reasoning.  There  are  several  possibilities.  The  world  just  as  it  is 
may  have  existed  from  eternity.  If  so  nobody  made  it;  it  just  existed, 
and  we  have  no  proof  of  God.  The  world  in  its  present  form  might 
have  proceeded  from  a  primitive  matter.  This  h3^othesis  only  re- 
moves the  problem  further  back.  For,  leaving  aside  the  question  how 
did  this  prime  matter  develop  into  the  complex  world  of  our  experi- 
ence, we  direct  our  attention  to  the  prime  matter  itself,  and  ask,  Has  it 
existed  from  eternity  or  did  it  come  to  be?  If  it  existed  from  eternity, 
then  nobody  made  it,  and  we  have  no  proof  of  a  God,  for  by  God  we 
mean  an  intelligent  being  acting  with  purpose  and  design,  and  the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  everything  in  creation.  The  third  alternative 
is  that  whether  the  world  was  developed  out  of  a  primitive  matter  or 
not,  it  at  any  rate,  or  the  primitive  matter,  as  the  case  may  be,  was 
made  in  time,  that  is,  it  was  created  out  of  nothing.  If  so  there  must 
have  been  someone  wlio  created  it,  as  nothing  can  create  itself.  Here 
we  have  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  It  follows  therefore  that  we 
must  first  show  that  the  world  is  not  eternal,  that  it  came  to  be  in 
time,  and  this  is  what  Saadia  does. 

Here  are  some  of  his  proofs.  The  world  is  finite  in  magnitude. 
For  the  world  consists  of  the  earth,  which  is  in  the  centre,  and  the 
heavens  surrounding  it  on  all  sides.  This  shows  that  the  earth  is 
finite,  for  an  infinite  body  cannot  be  surrounded.  But  the  heavens 
are  finite  too,  for  they  make  a  complete  revolution  in  twenty-four 
hours.  If  they  were  infinite  it  would  take  an  infinite  time  to  complete 
a  revolution.  A  finite  body  cannot  have  an  infinite  power.  This 
Saadia  regards  as  self-evident,  though  Aristotle,  from  whom  this 
statement  is  derived,  gives  the  proof.  Hence  the  force  or  power 
within  the  world  which  keeps  it  going  is  finite  and  must  one  day  be 
exhausted.  But  this  shows  also  that  it  could  not  have  gone  on  from 
eternity.    Hence  the  world  came  to  be  in  time.^^ 


30  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Another  proof  is  based  on  the  composite  character  of  all  things 
in  heaven  and  earth.  Minerals,  plants  and  animals  are  made  up  of 
parts  and  elements.  The  heavens  consist  of  spheres,  one  within  the 
other.  The  spheres  are  studded  with  stars.  But  composition  implies 
a  time  when  the  composition  took  place.  In  other  words,  the  parts 
must  have  been  there  first  and  somebody  put  them  together.  Hence 
the  world  as  we  see  it  now  is  not  eternal.  ^^ 

A  special  form  of  composition,  which  is  universal,  is  that  of  sub- 
stance and  accident.  Plants  and  animals  are  born  (or  sprout),  grow 
and  decay.  These  manifestations  are  the  accidents  of  the  plant  or 
animal's  substance.  The  heavenly  bodies  have  various  motions, 
lights  and  colors  as  their  accidents.  But  these  accidents  are  not 
eternal,  since  they  come  and  go.  Hence  the  substances  bearing  the 
accidents,  without  which  they  cannot  exist,  are  also  temporal  like 
them.    Hence  our  world  is  not  eternal. ^^ 

Finally,  past  time  itself  cannot  be  eternal.  For  this  would  mean 
that  an  infinite  time  has  actually  elapsed  down  to  our  day.  But  this 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  What  is  already  accomplished  cannot 
be  infinite.  Infinity  is  possible  only  as  a  potentiahty,  for  example, 
we  may  speak  of  a  given  length  as  infinitely  divisible.  This  merely 
means  that  one  may  mentally  continue  dividing  it  forever,  but  we 
can  never  say  that  one  has  actually  made  an  infinite  number  of  divi- 
sions. Therefore  not  merely  the  world,  but  even  time  must  have 
begun  to  be.^^ 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  first  three  argimients  prove  only  that  the 
world  in  the  form  which  it  has  now  is  not  eternal.  The  possibility 
is  not  yet  excluded  of  an  eternal  matter  out  of  which  the  world  pro- 
ceeded or  was  made.  The  fourth  argument  proves  a  great  deal.  It 
shows  that  nothing  which  is  subject  to  time  can  be  eternal,  hence  not 
even  prime  matter.  God  can  be  eternal  because  he  is  not  subject 
to  time.  Time,  as  we  shall  see  later,  cannot  exist  without  motion 
and  moving  things,  hence  before  the  world  there  was  no  time,  and 
the  fourth  argument  does  not  apply  to  premundane  existence. 

To  complete  the  first  three  arguments  Saadia  therefore  proceeds 
to  show  that  the  world,  which  we  now  know  came  to  be  in  time,  must 
have  been  made  by  someone  (since  nothing  can  make  itself),  and 
that  too  out  of  nothing,  and  not  out  of  a  pre-existing  eternal  matter. 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMJ  31 

If  an  eternal  matter  existed  before  the  world,  the  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  the  world  is  open  to  two  possibilities.  One  is  that  there 
is  nothing  outside  of  this  matter  and  the  world  which  came  from  it. 
This  is  absurd,  for  it  would  mean  that  an  unintelligent  dead  thing  is 
the  cause  of  intelligence  and  life  in  the  universe.  We  must  therefore 
have  recourse  to  the  other  alternative  that  someone,  an  intelligent 
being,  made  the  world  out  of  the  primitive,  eternal  matter.  This  is  also 
impossible.  For  if  the  matter  is  eternal  like  the  maker  of  the  world,  it 
is  independent  of  him,  and  would  not  be  obedient  to  his  will  to  adapt 
itself  to  his  purpose.    He  could  therefore  not  make  the  world  out  of  it. 

The  only  alternative  left  now  is  that  the  author  of  the  universe  is 
an  intelligent  being,  and  that  nothing  outside  of  him  is  eternal.  He 
alone  is  responsible  for  the  existence  of  the  world,  which  was  at  one 
time  nothing.  Whether  he  first  created  a  matter  and  then  from  it 
the  universe,  or  whether  he  made  the  world  outright,  is  of  secondary- 
importance.^^ 

There  is  still  a  possibility  that  instead  of  making  the  world  out  of 
nothing,  God  made  it  out  of  himself,  i.  e.,  that  it  emanated  from  him 
as  light  from  the  sun.  This,  as  we  know,  is  the  opinion  of  the  Neo- 
Platonists;  and  Israeli  comes  very  close  to  it  as  we  saw  before  (p.  6). 
Saadia  is  strongly  opposed  to  any  such  doctrine. 

It  is  unlikely,  he  says,  that  an  eternal  substance  having  neither 
form,  condition,  measure,  place  or  time,  should  change  into  a  body 
or  bodies  having  those  accidents;  or  that  a  wise  being,  not  subject 
to  change  or  influence,  or  comprehensibility  should  choose  to  make 
himself  into  a  body  subject  to  all  of  these.  What  could  have  induced 
a  just  being  who  does  no  wrong  to  decree  that  some  of  his  parts  should 
be  subject  to  such  evils  as  matter  and  material  beings  are  afflicted 
with?  It  is  conceivable  only  in  one  of  two  ways.  Either  they  deserved 
it  for  having  done  wrong,  or  they  did  not  deserve  it,  and  it  was  an  act 
of  violence  that  was  committed  against  them.  Both  suppositions 
are  absurd.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the  authors  of  this  opinion 
to  avoid  the  theory  of  creation  ex  nihilo  went  from  the  frying  pan 
into  the  fire.  To  be  sure,  creation  out  of  nothing  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive, but  this  is  the  reason  why  we  ascribe  this  power  to  God  alone. 
To  demand  that  we  show  how  this  can  be  done  is  to  demand  that  we 
ourselves  become  creators. ^'^ 


32  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

The  question  what  existed  in  place  of  the  earth  before  it  was  created 
evinces  ignorance  of  the  idea  of  place.  By  place  is  meant  simply 
the  contact  of  two  bodies  in  which  the  one  is  the  place  of  the  other. 
When  there  is  no  earth  and  no  bodies  there  is  no  such  thing  as  place. 

The  same  thing  apphes  to  time.  Time  means  the  persistence  of 
existing  things  in  heaven  and  earth  under  changing  conditions.  Where 
there  is  no  world,  there  is  no  time.  This  answers  the  objection  raised 
by  some,  namely,  how  is  it  possible  that  before  all  these  bodies  were 
made  time  existed  void  of  objects?  Or  the  other  difficulty  which  is 
closely  related,  viz.,  Why  did  not  God  create  the  world  before  he 
did?  The  answer  to  both  is,  there  was  no  before  and  there  was  no 
time,  when  the  world  was  not. 

The  following  question  is  a  legitimate  one.  Why  did  God  create  all 
things?  And  our  answer  is,  there  was  no  cause  which  made  him  create 
them,  and  yet  they  were  not  made  in  vain.  God  wished  to  exhibit 
his  wisdom;  and  his  goodness  prompted  him  to  benefit  his  creatures 
by  enabling  them  to  worship  him.^^ 

We  have  now  proved  the  existence  of  God  as  the  cause  of  the  exist- 
ence of  all  things.  We  must  now  try  to  arrive  at  some  notion  of  what 
God  is  as  far  as  this  is  in  our  power.  God  cannot  be  corporeal  or  body, 
for  in  our  proof  of  his  existence  we  began  with  the  world  which  is 
body  and  arrived  at  the  notion  of  God  as  the  cause  of  all  corporeal 
existence.  If  God  himself  is  corporeal  our  search  is  not  at  an  end,  for 
we  should  still  want  to  know  the  cause  of  him.  Being  the  cause  of  all 
body,  he  is  not  body  and  hence  is  for  our  knowledge  ultimate,  we 
cannot  go  beyond  him.  But  if  God  is  not  corporeal,  he  is  not  sub- 
ject to  motion  or  rest  or  anger  or  favor,  for  to  deny  the  corporeality 
of  God  and  still  look  for  these  accidents  in  him  is  to  change  the  ex- 
pression and  retain  the  idea.    Bodily  accidents  involve  body.^^ 

The  incorporeahty  of  God  proves  also  his  unity.  For  what  is  not 
body  cannot  have  the  corporeal  attributes  of  quantity  or  number, 
hence  God  cannot  be  more  than  one.^  And  there  are  many  powerful 
arguments  besides  against  a  duahstic  theory. 

A  unitary  efifect  cannot  be  the  result  of  two  independent  causes. 
For  if  one  is  responsible  for  the  whole,  there  is  nothing  left  for  the 
other,  and  the  assumption  of  his  existence  is  gratuitous.  If  the  effect 
consists  of  two  parts  of  which  each  does  one,  we  have  really  two  effects. 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  33 

But  the  universe  is  one  and  its  parts  cannot  be  separated.^^  Again, 
if  one  of  them  wishes  to  create  a  thing  and  cannot  without  the  help  of 
the  other,  neither  is  all-powerful,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  char- 
acter of  deity.  If  he  can  compel  the  other  to  help  him,  they  are  both 
under  necessity.  And  if  they  are  free  and  independent,  then  if  one 
should  desire  to  keep  a  body  alive  and  the  other  to  kill  it,  the  body 
would  have  to  be  at  the  same  time  alive  and  dead,  which  is  absurd. 
Again,  if  each  one  can  conceal  aught  from  the  other,  neither  is  all- 
knowing.    If  they  cannot,  they  are  not  all-powerful.^^ 

Having  proved  God's  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality,  he  pro- 
ceeds to  discuss  his  most  essential  attributes,  which  are.  Life,  Omnip- 
otence, and  Omniscience.  These  easily  follow  from  what  was  said  be- 
fore. We  cannot  conceive  a  creator  ex  nihilo  unless  he  is  all-powerful; 
power  implies  life;  and  the  thing  made  carmot  be  perfect  unless  its 
maker  knows  what  it  is  going  to  be  before  he  makes  it. 

These  three  concepts  our  reason  discovers  with  one  act  of  its  think- 
ing effort,  for  they  are  all  involved  in  the  concept.  Maker.  There  is  no 
gradual  inference  from  one  to  the  other.  The  reason  we  are  forced  to 
use  three  expressions  is  because  of  the  limitations  of  language.  Hence 
it  must  not  be  thought  that  they  involve  plurality  in  God.  They  are 
simply  the  implications  of  the  one  expression,  Maker,  and  as  that  does 
not  suggest  plurality  in  God's  essence,  but  signifies  only  that  there  is  a 
thing  made  by  the  maker,  so  the  three  derivative  terms,  Living, 
Omnipotent,  Omniscient,  imply  no  more. 

The  Christians  erred  in  this  matter  in  making  God  a  trinity.  They 
say  one  cannot  create  unless  he  is  living  and  wise,  hence  they  regard 
his  life  and  his  wisdom  as  two  other  things  outside  of  his  essence. 
But  this  is  a  mistake.  For  in  saying  there  are  several  attributes  in  him 
distinct  one  from  the  other,  they  say  in  effect  that  he  is  corporeal — an 
error  which  we  have  already  refuted.  Besides  they  do  not  understand 
what  constitutes  proof:  In  man  we  say  that  his  life  and  his  knowledge 
are  not  his  essence  because  we  see  that  he  sometimes  has  them  and 
sometimes  not.  In  God  this  is  not  the  case.  Again,  why  only  three? 
They  say  essence,  life,  wisdom;  why  do  they  not  add  power,  or  hearing 
and  seeing?  If  they  think  that  power  is  implied  in  life,  and  hearing  and 
seeing  in  wisdom,  so  is  life  implied  in  wisdom. 

They  quote  Scripture  in  their  support,  for  example,  the  verse  in 


34  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

II  Samuel  (23,  2),  "The  Spirit  of  the  Lord  spoke  through  me,  and  his 
Word  was  upon  my  tongue."  "Word"  denotes,  they  say,  his  attribute 
of  wisdom,  and  "Spirit"  his  life,  as  distinct  persons.  But  they  are 
mistaken.  The  expressions  in  question  denote  the  words  which  God 
puts  into  the  mouth  of  his  prophets.  There  are  other  similar  instances 
which  they  cite,  and  in  their  ignorance  of  Hebrew  take  metaphorical 
expressions  literally.  If  they  are  consistent,  they  should  add  many 
more  persons  in  the  Godhead,  in  accordance  with  the  many  phrases  of 
the  Bible  concerning  the  hand  of  God,  the  eye  of  God,  the  glory  of 
God,  the  anger  of  God,  the  mercy  of  God,  and  so  on.^^ 

The  above  discussion,  as  also  that  of  Al-Mukammas  (p.  19),  shows 
clearly  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  of  attributes  as  well  as  its  motive. 
Both  Al-Mukammas  and  Saadia  and  the  later  Jewish  philosophers 
owed  their  interest  in  this  problem  primarily  to  the  Mohammedan 
schools  in  which  we  know  it  played  an  important  role  (see  Introduc- 
tion, pp.  xxiii,  xxvi) .  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  problem  originated 
in  the  Christian  schools  in  the  Orient,  who  made  use  of  it  to  rationahze 
the  dogma  of  the  Trinity. 

There  is  extant  a  confession  of  faith  attributed  to  Jacob  Baradasus 
(sixth  century),  the  founder  of  the  Syrian  Church  of  the  Monophysites 
or  Jacobites,  in  which  the  phrase  occurs  that  the  Father  is  the  Intel- 
lect, the  Son  is  the  Word  and  the  Holy  Ghost  is  Life.  In  the  works  of 
Elias  of  Nisibis  of  the  Nestorian  Church,  who  lived  shortly  after 
Saadia  (975-1049),  we  also  find  a  passage  in  which  the  three  expres- 
sions essence,  life  and  wisdom  are  applied  to  the  three  persons  of  the 
Trinity.  The  passage  is  worth  quoting.  It  reads  as  follows:  "As  the 
essence  of  God  cannot  receive  accidents,  his  life  and  his  wisdom  can- 
not be  accidents.  But  whatever  is  not  accident  is  either  substance  or 
person.  Hence  as  the  essence  of  the  Creator  and  his  life  and  his 
wisdom  are  not  three  substances  or  three  accidents,  it  is  proved  that 
they  are  three  persons."  ^* 

Monotheism  was  a  fundamental  dogma  of  the  Mohammedan  faith. 
Hence  it  was  necessary  for  their  rationalizing  theologians  to  meet  the 
Trinitarians  with  their  own  weapons  and  show  that  the  multiplicity  of 
the  divine  attributes  which  they  could  not  deny,  since  the  Koran  was 
authority  for  it,  does  in  no  way  affect  God's  unity.  The  problem  was 
quite  as  important  for  Judaism  as  it  was  for  Islam,  and  for  the  same 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  35 

reason.  Hence  Saadia's  insistence  that  inadequacy  of  language  is 
alone  responsible  for  our  expressing  God's  essential  attributes  in  the 
three  words,  Living,  Omnipotent,  Omniscient;  that  in  reahty  they  are 
no  more  than  interpretations  of  the  expression  Maker. 

We  have  now  shown  that  God  is  one  in  the  two  important  senses  of 
the  word.  He  is  one  in  the  sense  that  there  is  no  second  God  beside 
him;  and  he  is  one  in  his  own  essence,  i.  e.,  he  is  simple  and  not  com- 
posed of  parts.  His  Life  and  his  Power  and  his  Wisdom  are  not  dis- 
tinct one  from  the  other  and  from  his  essence.  They  are  all  one. 
We  have  also  proved  God's  in  corporeality.  Nevertheless  Saadia  is  not 
satisfied  until  he  has  shown  in  detail  that  God  cannot  be  compared  to 
man  in  any  sense,  and  that  the  anthropomorphic  expressions  in  the 
Bible  must  not  be  taken  literally.  In  reference  to  Biblical  interpreta- 
tion Saadia  makes  the  general  remark  that  whenever  a  verse  of  Scrip- 
ture apparently  contradicts  the  truths  of  reason,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
it  is  figurative,  and  a  person  who  successfully  interprets  it  so  as  to 
reconcile  it  with  the  data  of  sense  or  reason  will  be  rewarded  for  it. 
For  not  the  Bible  alone  is  the  source  of  Judaism,  Reason  is  another 
source  preceding  the  Bible,  and  Tradition  is  a  third  source  coming 
after  the  Bible.^^ 

In  order  to  show  that  God  is  not  to  be  compared  to  any  other  thing 
in  creation  Saadia  finds  it  convenient  to  use  Aristotle's  classification 
of  all  existing  things  under  the  ten  categories.^^  Everything  that 
exists  is  either  a  substance,  or  it  is  an  accident,  i.  e.,  an  attribute  or 
quality  of  a  substance.  Substance  is  therefore  the  first  and  most 
important  of  the  categories  and  is  exemplified  by  such  terms  as  man, 
horse,  city.  Everything  that  is  not  substance  is  accident,  but  there 
are  nine  classes  of  accident,  and  with  substance  they  make  up  the 
ten  categories.  The  order  of  the  categories  as  Aristotle  gives  them  in 
his  treatise  of  the  same  name  is,  substance,  quantity,  quality,  relation, 
place,  time,  position,  possession,  action,  passion.  If  these  categories  in- 
clude all  existing  things  and  we  can  prove  that  God  is  not  any  of  them, 
our  object  is  accomplished.  The  one  general  argument  is  one  with 
which  we  are  already  familiar.  It  is  that  God  is  the  cause  of  all  sub- 
stance and  accident,  hence  he  is  himself  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 
Scriptm-e  supports  our  view,  as  in  Deuteronony  4,  15:  "Take  ye 
therefore  good  heed  of  yourselves;  for  ye  saw  no  manner  of  form  on 


36  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  day  that  the  Lord  spake  unto  you  in  Horeb  out  of  the  midst  of 
the  fire:  lest  ye  corrupt  yourselves,  and  make  you  a  graven  image 
in  the  form  of  any  figure,  the  likeness  of  male  or  female,  the  likeness  of 
any  beast  that  is  on  the  earth,  the  likeness  of  any  winged  fowl  that 
flieth  in  the  heaven;  the  likeness  of  anything  that  creepeth  on  the 
ground,  the  likeness  of  any  fish  that  is  in  the  water  under  the  earth: 
and  lest  thou  lift  up  thine  eyes  unto  heaven,  and  when  thou  seest 
the  sun  and  the  moon  and  the  stars,  even  all  the  host  of  heaven,  thou 
be  drawn  away,"  etc.  And  tradition  is  equally  emphatic  in  this  re- 
gard. Our  sages,  who  were  the  disciples  of  the  prophets,  render  the 
anthropomorphic  passages  in  the  Bible  so  as  to  avoid  an  objectionable 
understanding.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  Aramaic  translation 
of  the  Targum. 

Such  terms  as  head,  eye,  ear,  mouth,  lip,  face,  hand,  heart,  bowels, 
foot,  which  are  used  in  relation  to  God  in  the  Bible,  are  figurative.  For 
it  is  the  custom  of  language  to  apply  such  terms  metaphorically 
to  certain  ideas  like  elevation,  providence,  acceptance,  declaration, 
command,  favor,  anger,  power,  wisdom,  mercy,  dominion.  Language 
would  be  a  very  inadequate  instrument  if  it  confined  itself  to  the 
literal  meaning  of  the  words  it  uses;  and  in  the  case  of  God  we  should 
be  limited  to  the  statement  that  he  is. 

What  was  said  of  the  nouns  above  mentioned  applies  also  to  other 
parts  of  speech,  such  as  verbs  attributing  human  activity  to  God. 
Such  phrases  as  incline  thine  ear,"  open  thine  eyes,"  "he  saw," 
"  he  heard,"  "he  spoke"  are  figurative.  So  the  expression,  "the  Lord 
smelled,"  which  sounds  especially  objectionable,  denotes  acceptance. 

The  theophanies  in  the  Bible,  where  God  is  represented  under  a 
certain  form,  as  in  Ezekiel,  Isaiah  and  Kings,  do  not  argue  against  our 
view,  for  there  are  meant  specially  created  forms  for  the  benefit  and 
honor  of  the  prophet.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  Glory  of  the 
Lord,"  and  "Shekinah."  Sometimes  it  is  simply  a  created  light 
without  an  individual  form.  When  Moses  asked  to  see  God,  he  meant 
the  created  light.  God  cannot  be  seen  with  the  eye  nor  can  he  be 
grasped  in  thought  or  imagination.  Hence  Moses  could  not  have 
meant  to  see  God,  but  the  created  light.  His  face  was  covered  so 
that  he  should  not  be  dazzled  by  the  exceeding  splendor  of  the  begin- 
ning of  the  light,  which  is  too  much  for  a  mortal  to  endure;  but  later 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMl  37 

when  the  brightest  part  passed  by,  the  covering  was  taken  off  and 
Moses  saw  the  last  part  of  the  light.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  ex- 
pression in  Exodus  33,  23,  "And  I  will  take  away  mine  hand,  and  thou 
shalt  see  my  back:  but  my  face  shall  not  be  seen." 

Having  treated  of  God  as  the  creator  of  the  world  and  having 
learned  something  about  his  attributes,  we  must  now  proceed  to  the 
study  of  man,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  to  an  investigation  of  God's 
relations  to  the  rational  part  of  his  creation  in  the  sublunar  world. 
That  man  is  endowed  with  a  soul  cannot  be  doubted,  for  the  activities 
of  man's  soul  are  directly  visible.  The  problem  which  is  difficult  is 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  soul.^^  Here  opinions  differ,  and  some 
regard  the  soul  as  an  accident  of  the  body,  some  think  it  is  a  corporeal 
substance  like  air  or  fire,  while  others  believe  there  is  more  than  one 
soul  in  man.  It  will  be  our  task  to  vindicate  our  own  view  against 
these  erroneous  ideas.  The  soul  is  too  important  in  its  functions 
to  be  an  accident.  It  is  neither  air  nor  fire  because  it  has  not  the 
properties  of  these  bodies.  And  if  the  soul  consisted  of  two  or  more 
distinct  parts,  the  perceptions  of  sense  would  not  reach  the  reason,  and 
there  would  be  no  co-operation  between  these  two  powers.  The  true 
view  is  therefore  that  the  soul  of  man  is  a  substance  created  by  God 
at  the  time  when  the  human  body  is  completed.  The  soul  has  no 
eternal  existence  before  the  body  as  Plato  thought,  for  nothing  is 
eternal  outside  of  God,  as  we  saw  before.  Nor  does  it  enter  the  soul 
from  the  outside,  but  is  created  with  and  in  the  body.  Its  substance 
is  as  pure  as  that  of  the  celestial  spheres,  receiving  its  light  like  them, 
but  is  much  finer  than  the  substance  of  the  spheres,  for  the  latter  are 
not  rational,  whereas  the  soul  is.  The  soul  is  not  dependent  for  its 
knowledge  upon  the  body,  which  without  the  latter  has  neither  life 
nor  knowledge,  but  it  uses  the  body  as  an  instrument  for  its  functions. 
When  connected  with  the  body  the  soul  has  three  faculties,  reason, 
spirit  and  desire.  But  we  must  not  think  with  Plato  that  these  pow- 
ers form  so  many  divisions  or  parts  of  the  soul,  residing  in  different 
parts  of  the  body.  All  the  three  faculties  belong  to  the  one  soul  whose 
seat  is  in  the  heart;  for  from  the  heart  issue  the  arteries,  which  give 
the  body  sense  and  motion. 

The  soul  was  put  in  the  body  because  from  its  nature  it  cannot  act 
by  itself;  it  must  have  the  body  as  its  instrument  in  order  thereby  to 


38  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

attain  to  perfect  happiness,  for  the  soul's  functions  either  purify  or 
defile  it.  When  the  soul  leaves  the  body  she  can  no  longer  repent; 
all  this  must  be  done  while  she  is  in  the  body.  Being  placed  in  the 
body  is  therefore  a  good  for  the  soul.  If  she  were  left  alone,  there 
would  be  no  use  in  her  existence  or  in  that  of  the  body,  and  hence 
the  entire  creation  would  be  in  vain,  which  was  made  for  the  sake  of 
man.  To  ask  why  was  not  the  soul  made  so  as  to  be  independent  of 
the  body  is  foolish  and  tantamount  to  saying  why  was  not  the  soul 
made  something  else  than  soul.  The  soul  is  not  in  any  way  harmed 
by  being  with  the  body,  for  the  injury  of  sin  is  due  to  her  own  free 
will  and  not  to  the  body.  Moreover,  the  body  is  not  unclean,  nor  are 
the  fluids  of  the  body  unclean  while  in  the  body;  some  of  them  are 
declared  in  the  Bible  to  cause  uncleanness  when  they  leave  the  body, 
but  this  is  one  of  those  ordinances  which,  as  we  shall  see  later,  are  not 
demanded  by  the  reason  for  their  own  sake,  but  are  specially  com- 
manded for  a  different  purpose.  As  for  the  sufferings  which  the  soul 
undergoes  by  reason  of  her  connection  with  the  body,  some  are  due 
to  her  own  negligence,  such  as  cold,  heat,  and  so  on,  others  are  inflicted 
by  God  for  the  soul's  own  good  so  that  she  may  be  later  rewarded. 

We  see  here,  and  we  shall  learn  more  definitely  later,  that  Saadia 
is  opposed  to  the  view  of  the  ascetics — a  view  Neo-Platonic  in  its 
origin — that  matter  and  body  as  such  are  evil,  and  that  the  constant 
effort  of  man  must  be  to  free  the  soul  from  the  taint  of  the  body  in 
which  it  is  imprisoned,  and  by  which  it  is  dragged  down  from  its 
pristine  nobility  and  purity.  Saadia's  opposition  to  the  belief  in  the 
pre-existence  of  the  soul  at  once  does  away  with  the  Neo-Platonic 
view  that  the  soul  was  placed  in  the  body  as  a  punishment  for  wrong- 
doing. The  soul  was  created  at  the  same  time  with  the  body,  and  the 
two  form  a  natural  unit.  Hence  complete  life  involves  both  body  and 
soul. 

We  have  seen  that  God's  creation  of  the  world  is  due  to  his  good- 
ness. His  first  act  of  kindness  was  that  he  gave  being  to  the  things  of 
the  world.  He  showed  himself  especially  beneficent  to  man  in  enabling 
him  to  attain  perfect  happiness  by  means  of  the  commandments  and 
prohibitions  which  were  imposed  upon  him.  The  reward  consequent 
upon  obedience  was  the  real  purpose  of  the  commandments.^^ 

The  laws  which  God  gave  us  through  the  prophets  consist  of  two 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  39 

groups.  The  first  embraces  such  acts  as  our  reason  recognizes  to  be 
right  or  wrong,  good  or  bad,  through  a  feeling  of  approval  or  disap- 
proval which  God  planted  in  our  minds.  Thus  reason  demands  that  a 
benefactor  should  receive  in  return  for  his  goodness  either  a  kind  re- 
ward if  he  needs  it,  or  thanks  if  he  needs  no  reward.  As  this  is  a  gen- 
eral demand  of  the  reason,  God  could  not  have  neglected  it  in  his 
own  case,  and  hence  the  commandments  that  we  should  serve  him, 
that  we  should  not  offend  or  revile  him  and  the  other  laws  bearing 
on  the  same  subject. 

It  is  likewise  a  demand  of  the  reason  that  one  should  prevent  the 
creatures  from  sinning  against  one  another  in  any  way.  Murder  is 
prohibited  because  it  would  lead  to  the  destruction  of  the  race  and  the 
consequent  frustration  of  God's  purpose  in  creating  the  world.  Pro- 
miscuous association  of  the  sexes  is  prohibited  in  order  that  man 
may  be  different  from  the  lower  animals,  and  shall  know  his  father 
and  other  relatives  that  he  may  show  them  honor  and  kindness.  Uni- 
versal stealing  would  lead  to  indolence,  and  in  the  end  would  destroy 
itself  when  there  is  nothing  more  to  steal.  In  a  similar  way  we  can 
explain  all  laws  relating  to  social  dealings  among  mankind. 

The  second  group  of  laws  has  reference  to  acts  which  are  inherently 
neither  right  nor  wrong,  but  are  made  so  by  the  act  of  God's  command- 
ment or  prohibition.  This  class  may  be  called  Traditional  in  contrast 
to  the  first,  which  we  shall  name  Rational. 

The  traditional  laws  are  imposed  upon  us  primarily  so  that  we  may 
be  rewarded  for  obeying  them.  At  the  same  time  we  shall  find  on 
careful  examination  of  these  laws  that  they  also  have  a  rational  sig- 
nification, and  are  not  purely  arbitrary.  Thus  the  purpose  of  sanc- 
tifying certain  days  of  the  year,  like  Sabbaths  and  holy  days,  is  that 
by  resting  from  labor  we  may  devote  ourselves  to  prayer,  to  the  ac- 
quisition of  wisdom,  and  to  converse  with  our  fellows  in  the  interest 
of  religion.  Laws  of  ceremonial  purity  have  for  their  pm-pose  to  teach 
man  humihty,  and  to  make  prayer  and  the  visitation  of  holy  places 
more  precious  in  his  eyes  after  having  been  debarred  from  his  privileges 
during  the  period  of  his  uncleanness. 

It  is  clear  that  we  should  not  know  how  to  perform  the  traditional 
commandments  without  divine  revelation  since  our  own  reason  would 
not  have  suggested  them.    But  even  in  the  case  of  the  rational  laws 


40  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  general  principles  alone  are  known  to  us  from  our  own  reason  but 
not  the  details.  We  know  in  general  that  theft,  unchastity,  and  so  on, 
are  wrong,  but  the  details  of  these  matters  would  lead  to  disagreement 
among  mankind,  and  hence  it  was  necessary  that  the  rational  laws 
also  be  directly  communicated  tD  us  by  divine  messengers. 

The  divine  messengers  are  the  prophets.^^  They  knew  that  their 
revelations  came  from  God  through  a  sign  which  appeared  at  the 
beginning  of  the  communication  and  lasted  to  the  end.  The  sign 
was  a  pillar  of  cloud  or  of  fire,  or  an  extraordinary  bright  light,  as  we 
learn  in  the  case  of  Moses. 

The  genuineness  of  a  prophet's  message  is  tested  first  of  all  by  the 
nature  of  the  content,  and  then  by  his  ability  to  perform  miracles. 
The  Israelites  would  not  have  believed  Moses,  notwithstanding  his 
miracles,  if  he  had  commanded  them  to  commit  murder  or  adultery. 
It  is  because  his  teaching  was  found  acceptable  to  the  reason  that  the 
miracles  accompanying  it  were  regarded  as  a  confirmation  of  Moses's 
divine  mission. 

The  Jewish  Law^°  contains  three  elements,  all  of  which  are  necessary 
for  effective  teaching.  First,  the  commandments  and  prohibitions,  or 
the  laws  proper;  second,  the  reward  and  punishment  consequent  upon 
obedience  and  disobedience;  and  third,  examples  of  historical  char- 
acters in  which  the  laws  and  their  consequences  are  illustrated. 

But  the  written  law  would  not  accomplish  its  purpose  without  belief 
in  tradition.  This  is  fundamental,  for  without  it  no  individual  or 
society  can  exist.  No  one  can  live  by  what  he  perceives  with  his  own 
senses  alone.  He  must  depend  upon  the  information  he  receives  from 
others.  And  while  this  information  is  liable  to  error  either  by  reason 
of  the  informant  being  mistaken  or  his  possible  purpose  to  deceive, 
these  two  possibilities  are  ehminated  in  case  the  tradition  is  vouched 
for  not  by  an  individual,  but  by  a  whole  nation,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Jewish  revelation. 

As  Saadia's  emphasis  on  tradition,  apart  from  its  intrinsic  impor- 
tance for  Judaism,  has  its  additional  motive  in  refuting  Karaism,  so  the 
following  discussion  against  the  possibility  of  the  Law  being  abrogated 
is  directed  no  doubt  against  the  claims  of  the  two  sister  religions, 
Christianity  and  Mohammedanism.^^ 

Abrogation  of  the  law,  Saadia  says,  is  impossible.    For  in  the  first 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  41 

place  tradition  has  unanimously  held  to  this  view,  and  in  the  second 
place  the  Law  itself  assures  us  of  its  permanent  validity,  "Moses  com- 
manded us  a  law,  an  inheritance  for  the  assembly  of  Jacob"  (Deut. 
$T„  4).  The  law  constitutes  the  national  existence  of  our  people; 
hence  as  we  are  assured  by  the  Prophets  that  the  Jewish  nation  is 
eternal,  the  Law  must  be  likewise.  We  must  not  even  accept  the 
evidence  of  miracles  in  favor  of  a  new  law  abrogating  the  old.  For 
as  we  saw  before,  it  was  not  primarily  Moses's  miracles  that  served  to 
authenticate  his  teaching,  but  the  character  of  the  teaching  itself. 
Now  that  the  law  of  Moses  stood  the  test  of  internal  acceptability  and 
external  confirmation  by  the  performance  of  miracles,  its  declaration  of 
permanent  validity  cannot  be  upset  by  any  new  evidence  even  if  it  be 
miraculous. 

Man  ''^  alone  of  all  created  things  was  given  commandments  and 
prohibitions,  because  he  is  superior  to  all  other  creatures  by  reason  of 
the  rational  faculty  which  he  possesses,  and  the  world  was  created  for 
him.  Man's  body  is  small,  but  his  mind  is  great  and  comprehensive. 
His  life  is  short,  but  it  was  given  him  to  assist  him  to  the  eternal  life 
after  death.  The  diseases  and  other  dangers  to  which  he  is  subject  are 
intended  to  keep  him  humble  and  God-fearing.  The  appetites  and 
passions  have  their  uses  in  the  maintenance  of  the  individual  and  the 
race. 

If  it  is  true  that  God  gave  man  commandments  and  that  he  re- 
wards and  punishes  him  according  to  his  conduct,  it  follows  that  unless 
we  attribute  injustice  to  God  he  must  have  given  man  the  power  to  do 
and  to  refrain  in  the  matters  which  form  the  subject  of  the  command- 
ments. This  is  actually  the  case  and  can  be  proven  in  many  ways. 
Everyone  is  conscious  of  freedom  in  his  actions,  and  is  not  aware 
of  any  force  preventing  him  in  his  voluntary  acts.  The  Bible  testifies 
to  this  when  it  says  (Deut.  30,  19),  "I  have  set  before  you  life  and 
death  .  .  .  therefore  choose  thou  life,"  or  (Malachi  i,  9),  "From  your 
hand  has  this  thing  come."  Tradition  is  equally  explicit  in  the  state- 
ment of  the  Rabbis  (Berakot  33b),  "Everything  is  in  the  hands  of  God 
except  the  fear  of  God."  To  be  sure  God  is  omniscient  and  knows  how 
a  given  individual  will  act  in  a  given  case,  but  this  does  not  take  away 
from  the  freedom  of  the  individual  to  determine  his  own  conduct. 
For  God's  knowledge  is  not  the  cause  of  a  man's  act,  or  in  general  of  a 


42  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

thing's  being.  If  that  were  so,  all  things  would  be  eternal  since  God 
knows  all  things  from  eternity.  God  simply  knows  that  man  will 
choose  of  his  own  free  will  to  do  certain  things.  Man  as  a  matter  of 
fact  never  acts  contrary  to  God's  knowledge,  but  this  is  not  because 
God's  knowledge  determines  his  act,  but  only  because  God  knows  the 
final  outcome  of  a  man's  free  deliberation. 

Since  it  is  now  clear  from  every  point  of  view  that  God  does  not 
interfere  with  a  man's  freedom  of  action,  any  passages  in  the  Bible 
which  seem  to  indicate  the  contrary  are  not  properly  understood,  and 
must  needs  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  the  evidence  we  have 
adduced  from  various  sources  including  the  Bible  itself.  Thus  when 
God  says  (Exod.  7,  3)  "I  will  harden  the  heart  of  Pharaoh,"  it  does  not 
mean,  as  many  think,  that  God  forced  Pharaoh  to  refuse  to  let  Israel 
go.  The  meaning  rather  is  that  he  gave  Pharaoh  strength  to  with- 
stand the  plagues  without  succumbing  to  them,  as  many  of  the 
Egyptians  did.  The  same  method  should  be  followed  with  all 
the  other  expressions  in  the  Bible  which  appear  to  teach  determin- 
ism. 

A  man's  conduct  has  an  influence  upon  the  soul,  making  it  pure  or 
impure  as  the  case  may  be.^^  Though  man  cannot  see  this  effect, 
since  the  soul  is  an  intellectual  substance,  God  knows  it.  He  also 
keeps  a  record  of  our  deeds,  and  deals  out  reward  and  punishment  in 
the  world  to  come.  This  time  will  not  come  until  he  has  created  the 
number  of  souls  which  his  wisdom  dictates.  At  the  same  time  there 
are  also  rewards  and  punishments  in  this  world  as  an  earnest  of  what  is 
to  come  in  the  hereafter. 

A  man  is  called  righteous  or  wicked  according  as  his  good  or  bad 
deeds  predominate.  And  the  recompense  in  the  next  world  is  given  for 
this  predominating  element  in  his  character.  A  righteous  man  is 
punished  for  his  few  bad  deeds  in  this  world,  and  rewarded  for  his 
many  good  deeds  in  the  world  to  come.  Similarly  the  wicked  man  is 
paid  for  his  good  deeds  in  this  world,  while  the  punishment  for  his 
wickedness  is  reserved.  This  answers  the  old  problem  of  the  pros- 
perity of  the  wicked  and  the  misery  of  the  righteous  in  this  world. 

There  are  also  sufferings  of  the  righteous  which  are  not  in  the  nature 
of  punishment  for  past  conduct,  but  in  view  of  the  future  so  as  to 
increase  their  reward  in  the  world  to  come  for  the  trials  they  endured 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  43 

without  murmuring.  The  sufferings  of  little  children  come  under 
this  head. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  sinner  is  sometimes  well  treated  and  his  life 
prolonged  for  one  of  the  following  reasons:  To  give  him  time  to  repent, 
as  in  the  case  of  Manasseh;  that  he  may  beget  a  righteous  son,  hke 
Ahaz,  the  father  of  Hezekiah;  to  use  him  as  God's  tool  to  punish  others 
more  wicked  than  he — witness  the  role  of  Assyria  as  Isaiah  describes 
it  in  chapter  ten  of  his  prophecies;  for  the  sake  of  the  righteous  who 
is  closely  related  to  him,  as  Lot  was  saved  for  the  sake  of  Abraham; 
or  in  order  to  make  the  punishment  more  severe  later,  as  in  the  case 
of  Pharaoh. 

That  there  is  another  world  after  this  one  in  which  man  is  rewarded 
and  punished  can  be  proved  from  reason,  from  Scripture  and  from 
tradition.^'*  It  is  not  likely  from  what  we  know  of  God's  wisdom  and 
goodness  that  the  measure  of  happiness  intended  for  the  soul  is  what 
it  gets  in  this  world.  For  every  good  here  is  mixed  with  evil,  the  latter 
even  predominating.  No  one  is  really  content  and  at  peace  in  this 
world  even  if  he  has  reached  the  top  of  the  ladder  of  prosperity  and 
honor.  There  must  be  a  reason  for  this,  which  is  that  the  soul  has  an 
intuitional  longing  for  the  other  world  which  is  destined  for  it.  There 
are  many  things  from  which  the  soul  is  bidden  to  abstain,  such  as 
theft,  adultery,  and  so  on,  which  it  desires,  and  abstention  from  which 
causes  it  pain.  Surely  there  must  be  reward  awaiting  the  soul  for  this 
suffering.  Often  the  soul  suffers  hatred,  persecution  and  even  death 
for  pursuing  justice  as  she  is  bidden  to  do.  Surely  she  will  be  rewarded. 
Even  when  a  person  is  punished  with  death  for  a  crime  committed 
in  this  world,  the  same  death  is  inflicted  for  one  crime  as  for  ten  crimes. 
Hence  there  must  be  another  world  where  all  inequalities  are  adjusted. 

It  is  also  evident  that  the  men  of  the  Bible  beheved  in  a  hereafter. 
Else  why  should  Isaac  have  consented  to  be  sacrificed,  or  why  should 
God  have  expected  it?  The  same  applies  to  Hananiah,  Mishael, 
and  Azariah,  who  preferred  to  be  thrown  into  the  fiery  furnace  rather 
than  fall  down  in  worship  before  the  golden  image  of  Nebuchadnezzar; 
and  to  Daniel  who  was  thrown  into  the  den  of  lions  for  disobeying 
the  order  of  the  king  and  praying  to  God.  They  would  not  have 
done  this  if  they  did  not  believe  in  another  world,  where  they  would 
be  rewarded  for  their  sufferings  in  this  one. 


44  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Tradition  and  the  Rabbinical  literature  are  filled  with  reference  to  a 
future  world.  We  need  mention  only  one  or  two.  In  the  Ethics  of 
the  Fathers  (ch.  4)  we  read  that  this  world  is  like  the  vestibule  to  the 
other  world.  Another  statement  in  the  Talmudic  treatise  Berakot 
(p. 1 7a)  reads  that  "in  the  world  to  come  there  is  no  eating  and  drink- 
ing, nor  giving  in  marriage,  nor  buying  and  selling,  but  the  righteous 
sit  with  their  crowns  on  their  heads  and  enjoy  the  splendor  of  the 
Shekinah." 

With  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  soul  after  death  and  the  nature 
of  reward  and  punishment  in  the  next  world,  there  is  a  variety  of 
opinions.  Those  who  hold  that  the  soul  is  corporeal  or  that  it  is  an 
accident  of  the  body  believe  it  is  destroyed  with  the  death  of  the  body. 
We  have  already  refuted  their  opinion.  Others,  like  the  Platonists, 
the  Dualists  and  the  Pantheists,  who  believe  in  the  pre-existence 
of  the  soul  either  as  a  separate  entity  or  as  a  part  of  God,  hold  that 
after  the  death  of  the  body  the  soul  returns  to  its  original  condition. 
Our  belief  as  stated  above  (p.  37  )  is  opposed  to  this.  But  there  are 
some  calling  themselves  Jews  who  believe  in  metempsychosis,  that 
the  soul  migrates  from  one  person  to  another  and  even  from  man  to 
beast,  and  that  in  this  way  it  is  punished  for  its  sins  and  purged.  They 
see  a  confirmation  of  their  view  in  the  fact  that  some  persons  exhibit 
qualities  which  are  characteristic  of  lower  animals.  But  this  is  absurd. 
The  soul  and  the  body  form  a  natural  unit,  the  one  being  adapted 
to  the  other.  A  human  body  cannot  unite  with  the  soul  of  an  animal, 
nor  an  animal  body  with  a  human  soul.  They  try  to  account  by  their 
theory  for  the  suffering  of  little  children,  who  could  not  have  sinned  in 
their  own  person.  But  we  have  already  explained  that  the  suffering 
of  children  is  not  in  the  nature  of  punishment,  but  with  a  view  to 
subsequent  reward,  and  they  must  admit  that  the  first  placing  of  the 
soul  in  the  body  and  giving  it  commandments  is  not  in  the  nature  of 
compensation  for  any  past  merit,  but  with  a  view  to  later  reward. 
Why  not  then  explain  the  suffering  of  children  in  the  same  way?  ^^ 

As  the  body  and  the  soul  form  a  natural  unit  during  life  and  a  man's 
conduct  is  the  combined  effort  of  the  two  constituent  parts  of  his  being, 
it  stands  to  reason  that  future  reward  and  punishment  should  be  im- 
posed upon  body  and  soul  in  combination.  Hence  the  doctrine  of  the 
resurrection  of  the  body,  which  is  alluded  to  in  the  Bible  and  made  into 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  45 

a  religious  dogma  by  the  Rabbis,  has  support  also  in  the  reason.^^ 
Many  objections  have  been  advanced  against  it,  but  they  can  be  easily 
answered.  The  strongest  objection  might  seem  to  be  that  which  at- 
tempts to  show  that  resurrection  is  a  logical  contradiction.  The  argu- 
ment is  that  the  elements  making  up  a  given  body  during  life  find 
their  way  after  the  death  of  the  person  into  the  body  of  another,  to 
which  they  are  assimilated  and  of  which  they  form  a  part.  Hence  it 
is  impossible  to  resurrect  two  bodies  out  of  the  material  common  to 
both.  But  this  argument  is  untrue  to  fact.  Every  human  body 
has  its  own  matter,  which  never  enters  into  the  composition  of  any 
other  body.  When  the  person  dies  and  the  body  decomposes,  each 
element  returns  to  its  place  in  nature,  where  it  is  kept  until  the  resur- 
rection. 

But  there  is  another  event  which  will  happen  to  Israel  before  the 
time  of  the  resurrection.  In  accordance  with  the  promises  of  the 
Prophets  we  believe  that  Israel  will  be  delivered  from  exile  by  the 
Messiah.'^'^  Reason  also  supports  this  beUef,  for  God  is  righteous,  and 
since  he  has  placed  us  in  exile  partly  as  a  punishment  for  wrongdoing, 
partly  for  the  purpose  of  trying  us,  there  must  be  a  limit  to  both. 

Messiah  the  son  of  David  will  come,  will  deliver  Jerusalem  from  the 
enemy  and  settle  there  with  his  people.  When  all  the  beheving  Israel- 
ites have  been  gathered  from  all  the  nations  to  the  land  of  Palestine, 
then  will  come  the  resurrection.  The  Temple  will  be  rebuilt,  the  light 
of  the  Shekinah  will  rest  upon  it,  and  the  spirit  of  prophecy  will  be 
vouchsafed  to  all  Israel,  young  and  old,  master  and  servant.  This 
blessed  period  will  last  until  the  end  of  time,  i.  e.,  until  this  world  will 
give  place  to  the  next,  which  is  the  place  of  reward  and  punishment. 

We  describe  the  future  habitation  and  status  of  the  soul  as  Garden 
of  Eden  (Paradise)  and  Gehenna.''^  The  former  expression  is  intended 
to  suggest  happiness,  there  being  nothing  pleasanter  in  the  world  than 
a  garden.  The  term  Gehenna  is  associated  in  the  Bible  with  Tofteh, 
which  was  a  place  of  impurity  not  far  from  the  Temple.  In  reahty, 
however,  God  will  create  a  substance  which  will  combine  light  and 
heat  in  such  a  way  that  the  righteous  will  enjoy  the  hght  only,  while 
the  wicked  will  be  tortured  by  the  heat.  All  this  Saadia  infers  from 
Biblical  passages. 

There  will  be  no  eating  and  drinking  in  the  next  world,  and  hence  no 


46  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

need  of  a  heaven  and  an  earth  Uke  ours,  but  there  will  be  place  and 
time,  since  creatures  cannot  do  without  it.  There  will  be  no  suc- 
cession of  day  and  night,  for  these  are  of  use  only  for  our  present  life 
and  occupations,  but  will  be  unnecessary  there.  There  will,  however, 
be  a  special  period  for  worship. 

Reward  and  punishment  in  the  next  world  will  both  be  eternal. 
It  stands  to  reason  that  God  should  promise  eternal  reward  and  punish- 
ment so  as  to  inspire  mankind  with  the  highest  possible  degree  of  hope 
and  fear,  that  they  may  have  no  excuse  for  not  heeding  the  command- 
ments so  forcibly  impressed  upon  them.  Having  made  the  promise, 
his  justice  prompts  him  to  fulfil  it,  and  those  who  suffer  have  them- 
selves to  blame. 

We  have  now  completed  in  outline  Saadia's  system  of  Judaism. 
There  are  many  details  which  we  necessarily  had  to  leave  out,  espe- 
cially in  the  more  dogmatic  part  of  his  work,  that  dealing  with  specific 
Jewish  doctrines,  which  he  constructs  on  the  basis  of  Rabbinical 
literature  and  BibHcal  allusions  interpreted  so  as  to  harmonize  with 
the  statements  of  the  Rabbis.  Many  questions  specifically  theological 
and  eschatological  assumed  importance  in  his  mind  by  reason  of 
his  surroundings.  I  mean  the  Mohammedan  schools  and  sects, 
and  the  Karaite  discussions  which  were  closely  modelled  after  them. 
The  most  important  part  of  his  system  philosophically  is  that 
which  deals  with  creation  and  the  attributes  of  God.  His  discus- 
sions of  the  soul  and  of  free  will  are  less  thorough,  and  the  details 
of  his  doctrines  of  resurrection,  future  reward  and  punishment,  the 
redemption  of  Israel  and  the  Messiah  are  almost  purely  dogmatic. 
For  a  scientific  ethic  there  is  no  room  at  all  in  the  body  of  his  work. 
A  man's  conduct  is  prescribed  for  him  in  the  divine  commandments, 
though  in  a  general  way  the  reason  sees  the  right  and  the  wrong  of 
the  so-called  rational  group  of  laws.  Still  as  an  after  thought  Saadia 
added  a  chapter  to  the  "Emunot  ve-Deot"  in  which  he  attempts  to 
give  a  psychological  basis  for  human  conduct.  Noting  the  various 
tendencies  of  individuals  and  sects  in  his  environment  to  extremes  in 
human  behavior,  some  to  asceticism,  some  to  self-indulgence,  be  it 
the  lust  of  love  or  of  power,  he  lays  emphasis  on  the  inadequacy  of 
any  one  pursuit  for  the  demands  of  man's  complex  nature,  and  rec- 
ommends a  harmonious  blending  of  all  things  for  which  men  strive.^^ 


SAADIA  BEN  JOSEPH  AL-FAYYUMI  47 

God  alone,  he  says,  is  a  real  unity,  everything  else  is  by  the  very 
reason  of  its  being  a  creature  essentially  not  one  and  simple,  but 
composite  and  complex.  So  man  has  a  love  and  desire  for  many 
things,  and  also  aversion  for  many  things.  And  as  in  other  objects 
in  nature  it  takes  a  combination  of  several  elements  to  constitute  a 
given  thing,  so  in  man  it  is  by  a  proper  systematization  of  his  likes 
and  dislikes  that  he  can  reach  perfection  of  character  and  morals. 
It  cannot  be  that  God  intended  man  to  pursue  one  object  all  his  life 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  others,  for  in  that  case  he  would  have  implanted 
only  one  desire  in  man  instead  of  many.  You  cannot  build  a  house 
of  stones  alone  neither  can  you  develop  a  perfect  character  by  one 
pursuit  and  one  interest. 

Pursuit  of  one  thing  is  Hkely  to  result  in  harm,  for  example,  over- 
indulgence in  eating  brings  on  disease.  Wisdom  is  therefore  needed 
in  regulating  one's  conduct.  The  principle  here  is  control  of  one's 
likes  and  dislikes.  Of  the  three  faculties  of  the  soul,  reason,  spirit 
and  desire,  reason  must  be  the  master  of  the  other  two.  If  any  matter 
occurs  to  a  person's  imagination,  he  must  try  it  with  his  reason  to  see 
whether  it  is  likely  to  benefit  or  injure  him,  and  pursue  or  avoid  it 
accordingly.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  allows  the  lower  parts  of  his 
soul  to  rule  his  reason,  he  is  not  a  moral  man. 

The  reader  will  recognize  Plato  in  the  last  statement.  The  division 
of  the  soul  into  the  three  faculties  of  reason,  spirit  and  desire  is  Pla- 
tonic, as  we  have  already  seen,  and  the  attempt  to  base  an  ethic  on  the 
proper  relation  between  the  powers  of  the  soul  also  goes  back  to  Plato. 
But  Saadia  tries  to  show  that  the  Bible  too  favors  this  conception. 

When  Ecclesiastes  tells  us  (i,  14),  "I  have  seen  aU  the  works  that 
are  done  under  the  sun;  and,  behold,  all  is  vanity  and  a  striving  after 
wind,"  he  does  not  mean  that  there  is  nothing  worth  striving  after, 
for  he  would  then  be  condemning  the  objects  of  God's  creation.  His 
meaning  is  that  it  is  vain  to  pursue  any  one  thing  to  the  exclusion  of 
every  other.  He  then  proceeds  to  name  three  prominent  objects  of 
pursuit,  wisdom,  pleasure  and  worldly  gain — all  is  vain  when  taken 
by  itseK.  A  proper  combination  of  all  is  to  be  recommended  as  is 
delicately  hinted  in  the  same  book  (2,  3),  "I  searched  in  mine  heart 
how  to  cheer  my  flesh  with  wine,  mine  heart  yet  guiding  me  with 
wisdom,  and  how  to  lay  hold  on  folly." 


CHAPTER  IV 

JOSEPH  AL-BASIR   AND  JESHUA   BEN  JUDAH 

I.  Joseph  Al-Basir  {nth  century)  ^ 

Joseph  ben  Abraham,  euphemistically  surnamed  on  account  of  his 
bUndness,  al-Basir  (the  seer),  was  a  Karaite  and  lived  in  Babylonia 
or  Persia  in  the  beginning  of  the  eleventh  century.  His  philosophical 
work  is  closely  modelled  on  the  writings  of  the  Arabian  Mutakallimun, 
the  Mu  tazilites.  Unlike  Saadia,  who  tacitly  accepts  some  of  their 
methods  and  views,  al-Basir  is  an  avowed  follower  of  the  Kalam  and 
treats  only  of  those  questions  which  are  common  to  Jew  and  Moham- 
medan, avoiding,  for  example,  so  important  an  issue  as  whether  it  is 
possible  that  the  law  of  God  may  be  abrogated — a  question  which 
meant  so  much  to  Saadia.  The  division  of  his  investigation  into  the 
two  parts.  Unity  and  Justice,  is  a  serious  matter  with  him;  and  he 
finds  it  necessary  to  tell  us  in  several  instances  why  he  chose  to  treat  a 
given  topic  under  the  one  or  the  other  heading.  In  spirit  and  tem- 
perament he  is  a  thoroughgoing  rationalist.  Brief  and  succinct  to  the 
point  of  obscurity,  he  betrays  neither  partiality  nor  emotion,  but 
fearlessly  pushes  the  argument  to  its  last  conclusion  and  reduces  it  to 
its  lowest  terms. 

Saadia  (above  p.  28)  puts  revelation  as  a  fourth  source  of  truth 
parallel  to  sense,  judgment  and  logical  inference.  To  be  sure  he,  in 
one  instance  (p.  35),  speaks  of  the  reason  as  preceding  the  Bible  even 
as  tradition  follows  it,  but  this  is  only  a  passing  observation,  and  is 
properly  corrected  by  the  view  expressed  elsewhere  (p.  28)  that  while 
a  Jew  is  not  forbidden  to  speculate,  he  must  not  set  the  Bible  aside 
and  adopt  opinions  as  they  occur  to  him.  Al-Basir  does  not  leave  the 
matter  in  this  unsettled  condition.  He  definitely  gives  priority — 
logical  priority,  to  reason.  Knowledge,  he  says,  must  precede  revela- 
tion. The  prophet  as  the  messenger  of  God  cannot  be  believed  on  his 
word,  for  the  opponent  may  have  the  same  claim.    Not  only  must  the 


JOSEPH  AL-BASIR  AND  JESHUA  BEN  JUDAH  49 

prophet  authenticate  his  mission  by  the  performance  of  a  miracle 
which  cannot  be  explained  by  natural  means,  but  we  must  know 
besides  that  he  who  sent  him  has  our  good  at  heart  and  would  not  de- 
ceive us.  A  knowledge  of  the  existence,  power  and  wisdom  of  the 
creator  must  therefore  precede  our  belief  in  the  prophet's  mission. 
To  take  these  truths  from  the  words  of  the  prophet  and  then  give 
him  credence  because  God  sent  him  would  be  reasoning  in  a  circle. 
The  minimum  of  knowledge  therefore  which  is  indispensable  before 
we  can  make  any  appeal  to  the  words  of  the  prophet  is  rational  proof 
of  the  existence,  power  and  wisdom  of  God.  Having  this  minimum 
the  person  who  is  not  practiced  in  speculative  investigation  may  rely 
for  the  rest  of  the  creed,  for  example,  the  unity  of  God  and  his  other 
attributes,  upon  the  words  of  the  Bible.  For  if  we  know  independently 
that  God  is  Omnipotent  and  Omniscient,  and  the  prophet  can  sub- 
stantiate his  claim  to  be  a  divine  messenger  by  the  performance  of 
genuine  miracles,  his  reliability  is  established  and  we  are  safe  in  ac- 
cepting all  that  he  has  to  say  without  proof;  but  the  fundamental 
thing  to  do  is  to  establish  the  prophet's  reUabihty,  and  for  this  an 
independent  source  of  evidence  is  necessary.    This  is  the  reason. 

Our  problem  therefore  is  to  prove  the  power  and  wisdom  of  God, 
which  will  imply  his  existence.  We  cannot  do  this  directly,  for  we 
cannot  see  God.  Hence  the  only  method  is  to  prove  the  existence  of  a 
powerful  and  wise  creator  through  his  creation.  We  must  prove  his 
power  in  doing  things  which  we  cannot  do,  such  as  the  ability  to  create 
our  bodies.  But  for  this  it  is  necessary  to  show  that  our  bodies — 
and  the  same  will  apply  to  the  other  bodies  of  the  world,  and  hence  to 
the  world  as  a  whole — were  created,  i.  e.,  that  there  was  a  time  when 
they  were  not.  This  leads  us  to  an  analysis  of  the  constituents  of 
body.  All  bodies  consist  of  atoms  and  their  "accidents,"  or  condi- 
tions and  qualities.  The  primary  accidents,  which  are  presupposed 
by  all  the  rest,  are  the  following  four,  combination,  separation,  mo- 
tion and  rest.  Without  these  no  body  can  exist,  for  body  is  the  result 
of  a  combination  and  separation  of  atoms  at  rest  or  in  motion.  But 
combination  and  separation  are  the  acts  of  a  combiner  and  sepa- 
rater,  as  we  can  infer  from  the  analogy  of  our  own  acts.  Our  acts  have 
ourselves  as  their  creators,  hence  the  acts  visible  in  the  combinations 
and  separations  of  atoms  to  form  bodies  must  also  have  their  creator. 


50  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

The  attributes  of  the  creator  we  infer  from  the  nature  of  his  work. 
So  we  call  God  "Powerful,"  meaning  that  he  had  the  power  to  create 
the  world.  As  creation  denotes  power,  so  the  success  and  harmony 
of  the  product  argues  wisdom;  and  this  power  and  wisdom  thus 
established  are  not  disproved  by  an  occasional  production  or  event 
which  is  not  perfect,  a  monstrosity  for  example,  or  disease  and  suffer- 
ing. We  say  in  reference  to  these  that  God  must  have  a  deeper  object 
in  view,  to  inspire  mankind  with  the  fear  of  God,  and  in  order  to  in- 
crease their  reward  in  the  next  world. 

The  attribute  of  Life  follows  from  the  other  two,  for  life  denotes  the 
possession  or  capacity  of  power  and  knowledge. 

Thus  al-Basir  has  the  same  three  essential  attributes  as  Saadia. 
His  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  is  also  identical  with  one  of  the  proofs 
of  Saadia.  But  he  shows  himself  a  more  loyal  follower  of  the  Kalam 
by  frankly  adopting  the  atomic  theory,  whereas  Saadia  opposes  it 

(P-  25). 

Other  predicates  of  God  are  perception,  will,  unity,  incorporeahty 
and  eternity. 

Perception  is  one  of  the  most  important  expressions  of  Hfe,  but  it 
must  not  be  confused  with  knowledge  or  wisdom.  The  latter  em- 
braces the  non-existent  as  well  as  the  existent,  the  former  the  exist- 
ent only.  It  is  in  virtue  of  the  former  attribute  that  we  speak  of 
God  as  "hearing"  and  "seeing." 

"WiUing"  is  another  attribute  of  God,  and  those  are  wrong  who 
identify  God's  will  with  his  knowledge,  and  define  God's  wiUing  to 
mean  that  his  works  take  place  in  accordance  with  his  knowledge. 
God's  will  must  be  a  special  attribute  since  we  see  in  creation  traces  of 
free  will.  To  be  the  will  of  God  it  must  not  reside  in  anything  different 
from  God,  and  yet  it  cannot  inhere  in  God  as  the  subject,  for  only 
body  is  capable  of  being  the  subject  of  accidents.  The  only  solution, 
therefore,  is  that  God  exercises  his  voluntary  activity  through  a  will 
which  he  creates,  a  will  not  residing  in  any  subject. 

This  discussion  of  the  nature  of  God's  will  seems  a  case  of  hair 
splitting  with  a  vengeance,  and  al-Basir  is  not  the  author  of  it.  As  in 
his  other  doctrines  so  in  this  also  he  is  a  faithful  follower  of  the 
Mu'tazila,  and  we  shall  see  more  of  this  method  in  his  discussion  of 
the  unity  of  God  despite  the  plurality  of  his  attributes. 


JOSEPH  AL-BASIR  AND  JESHUA  BEN  JUDAH  51 

But  we  shall  first  take  up  the  attributes  of  incorporeality  and  eter- 
nity, which  can  be  dismissed  in  a  few  words. 

God  is  eternal  because  the  only  other  alternative  is  that  he  is 
created.  But  if  so  there  is  a  creator,  and  if  the  latter  is  again  created, 
he  must  Hkewise  have  a  creator,  and  so  we  are  led  to  infinity,  which 
cannot  be,  the  infinite  regress  being  in  all  cases  an  impossibility  ac- 
cording to  an  axiom  of  the  Kalam.  We  must,  therefore,  have  an  eter- 
nal creator  somewhere,  and  he  is  God. 

From  God's  eternity  follows  his  incorporeality,  for  we  have  shown 
before  that  all  body  is  created,  since  it  presupposes  combination  and 
separation,  and  the  latter  a  combiner  and  separater. 

When  we  speak  of  the  unity  of  God  we  mean  first  that  there  is  no 
second  God,  and  then  that  his  own  essence  has  no  composition  or 
plurality  in  it.  Two  Gods  is  an  absurdity,  for  the  one  might  desire 
what  the  other  does  not,  and  he  whose  will  predominates  is  the  real 
God.  It  is  no  objection  to  say  that  in  their  wisdom  they  would  never 
disagree,  because  the  possibility  is  there,  and  this  makes  the  above 
argument  valid.  Again,  if  there  were  two  Gods  they  would  have  to 
be  completely  alike  in  their  essential  attributes,  and  as  space  cannot 
hold  them  apart,  since  they  are  not  bodies,  what  is  there  to  constitute 
them  two? 

The  other  problem,  of  God's  simplicity,  is  more  difficult.  Does  not 
the  multipKcity  of  attributes  make  God's  essence  multiple  and 
composite?  The  form  which  this  question  took  was  this.  Shall  we 
say  that  God  is  omnipotent  through  Power,  omniscient  through 
Knowledge,  and  so  on?  If  so,  this  Power,  Knowledge,  etc.,  are  created 
or  eternal.  If  the  Power,  say,  is  created,  then  God  must  have  had 
power  in  order  to  create  it,  hence  was  powerful  not  through  Power. 
If  the  Power  is  eternal,  we  have  more  than  one  God,  and  Power"  as 
an  eternal  would  also  be  Wise  and  Living,  etc.;  Wisdom  would  also 
be  powerful,  living,  etc.,  and  so  on  with  the  other  attributes,  a  doc- 
trine closely  bordering  on  Christianity  and  reminding  one  of  Au- 
gustine. The  principle  of  monotheism  could  not  allow  such  a  concep- 
tion as  this.  If  Power  is  neither  created  nor  eternal,  it  follows  that 
God  is  omnipotent  not  through  Power  as  an  external  cause  or  a  dis- 
tinct entity,  but  through  his  own  essence.  The  attributes  Power, 
Wisdom,  Life,  are  not  anything  distinguishable  from  each  other  and 


52  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

from  God's  essence.    They  are  modes  or  conditions  of  God's  essence, 
and  are  known  along  with  it. 

The  same  considerations  which  prompted  us  to  conceive  God  as 
one  and  simple,  make  impossible  the  belief  in  the  eternity  of  God's 
word.  This  was  a  point  much  discussed  in  the  Mohammedan  schools, 
and  was  evidently  directed  against  Christianity,  where  the  Word  or 
Logos  was  identified  with  the  second  person  in  the  Trinity.  Eternity, 
Al-Basir  says,  is  incompatible  with  the  idea  and  purpose  of  speech. 
God  speaks  with  a  word  which  he  creates.  This  adds  no  new  predi- 
cate to  God,  but  is  impHed  in  his  Power.  The  attribute  omnipotent 
implies  that  when  he  wills  he  can  make  himseK  understood  by  us 
as  we  do  through  speech. 

We  notice  that  Al-Basir  is  more  elaborate  in  his  discussion  of  the 
attributes  than  Saadia,  and  like  Al-Mukammas  he  makes  use  of  the 
formulae  of  the  Kalam,  "  omnipotent  not  with  Power,  omniscient  not 
with  Wisdom."  Saadia  does  not  follow  the  Kalam  so  closely,  but  is 
just  as  emphatic  in  his  endeavor  to  show  that  the  three  essential 
attributes  are  only  verbally  three;  conceptually  and  really  they  are 
one. 

The  doctrine  of  the  attributes  brmgs  to  a  close  the  section  on  unity, 
and  the  second  division  of  the  investigation  is  entitled  Justice  and 
Fairness.  The  main  problems  here  are  the  nature  of  good  and  evil 
and  the  relation  of  God  to  them,  the  question  of  free  will  and  other 
subordinate  topics,  theological  and  eschatological. 

With  regard  to  the  first  question  two  extreme  positions  are  possible, 
which  were  actually  held  by  Mohammedan  schools  of  Al-Basir's  day. 
One  is  that  nothing  is  good  or  bad  in  itself,  our  reason  not  recognizing 
it  as  such;  that  the  divine  command  or  prohibition  makes  the  thing 
good  or  bad.  Hence,  the  representatives  of  this  opinion  say,  God, 
who  stands  above  his  commands  and  prohibitions,  is  not  bound  by 
them.  Good  and  bad  hold  for  the  subject,  not  for  the  author.  The 
acts  of  God  do  not  come  within  the  classification,  and  hence  it  is 
possible  that  God  may  do  what  we  regard  as  injustice.  Some,  in 
their  endeavor  to  be  consistent  and  to  carry  the  argument  to  its  last 
conclusion,  did  not  even  shrink  from  the  redudio  ad  absurdum  that 
it  is  possible  God  may  lie;  for,  said  they,  if  I  promise  a  boy  sweet- 
meats and  fail  to  keep  my  promise,  it  is  no  worse  than  if  I  beat  him. 


JOSEPH  AL-BASIR  AND  JESHUA  BEN  JUDAH  53 

For  this  school  there  is  no  problem  of  evil,  because  ethical  dis- 
tinctions do  not  apply  to  God's  doings.  Whatever  God  does  is  good. 
The  other  school  came  under  the  influence  of  Greek  thought  and 
identified  the  idea  of  God  with  the  idea  of  the  Good.  They  maintained 
that  from  the  nature  of  God's  essence  it  was  not  only  his  duty  to  do 
the  good,  but  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  do  anything  else.  Do- 
ing good  is  a  necessity  of  his  nature,  and  our  good  and  evil  are  also 
his  good  and  evil.    Ethical  values  are  absolute  and  not  relative. 

Neither  of  these  radical  views  can  be  maintained.  The  first  is 
refuted  by  its  own  consequences  which  only  very  few  of  its  advocates 
were  bold  enough  to  adopt.  The  possibility  of  God  telling  a  falsehood, 
which  is  imphed  in  the  purely  human  validity  of  good  and  evil,  is 
subversive  of  all  religion.  God  would  then  cease  to  be  trustworthy, 
and  there  would  be  no  reason  for  giving  him  obedience.  Besides,  if 
revelation  alone  determines  right  and  wrong,  it  would  follow  that  if 
God  chose  to  reverse  his  orders,  our  moral  judgments  would  be  turned 
the  other  way  around,  good  would  be  evil,  and  evil  good.  Finally, 
if  good  and  bad  are  determined  by  the  will  of  God  only,  those  who 
do  not  believe  in  revelation  would  be  without  an  idea  of  right  and 
wrong,  but  this  is  manifestly  not  true. 

But  the  other  opinion,  that  God  is  compelled  by  the  necessity  of  his 
nature  to  do  the  good,  is  also  erroneous.  In  the  first  place  it  detracts 
from  God's  omnipotence  to  say  he  cannot  do  wrong.  Besides,  if  he  is 
compelled  by  an  iimer  necessity  to  do  the  good,  he  must  always  have 
done  this,  and  the  world  would  have  existed  from  eternity.  It  is  just 
as  wrong  to  say  that  it  is  the  duty  of  God  to  do  what  is  good  and  useful 
for  man.  For  this  is  due  to  a  confusion  of  the  good  or  generous  with 
the  obhgatory.  Any  deed  to  which  no  blame  attaches  may  be  called 
good.  If  no  praise  attaches  to  it  either,  it  is  indifferent.  If  it  is  deserv- 
ing of  praise  and  its  omission  does  not  call  forth  blame,  it  is  a  generous 
act.    A  duty  is  an  act  the  omission  of  which  deserves  blame. 

Now  the  truth  in  the  question  under  discussion  is  midway  between 
the  two  extremes.  God  is  able  to  do  good  as  well  as  evil,  and  is  under 
no  necessity.  The  notions  of  right  and  wrong  are  absolute  and  not 
merely  relative.  God  never  does  wrong  because  evil  has  no  attractive 
power  per  se.  Wrong  is  committed  always  as  a  means  to  an  end, 
namely,  to  gain  an  advantage  or  avoid  an  injury.     God  is  not  de- 


54  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

pendent  upon  anything;  he  needs  no  advantages  and  fears  no  injuries. 
Hence  there  is  nothing  to  prompt  him  to  do  wrong.  The  good  on  the 
other  hand  attracts  us  by  its  inherent  goodness,  not  for  an  ulterior  end. 
If  the  good  were  done  only  for  the  sake  of  deriving  some  benefit  ex- 
ternal to  the  good  itself,  God,  who  is  self-sufficient,  would  not  do 
anything  either  good  or  evil.  God  does  the  good  always  and  not  the 
bad,  because  in  his  wisdom  he  sees  the  difference  between  them.  It 
was  a  deed  of  generosity  in  God  to  have  created  the  world  and  given 
life  to  his  creatures,  but  it  was  not  a  duty. 

This  conception  of  the  nature  of  good  and  evil  leaves  on  our  hands 
the  problem  of  evil.  Why  does  a  good  God  permit  disease  and  suffering 
to  exist  in  the  world?  In  particular,  how  explain  the  suffering  and 
death  of  innocent  children  and  harmless  animals? 

The  answer  of  Al-Basir  is  that  infliction  of  pain  may  under  certain 
circumstances  be  a  good  instead  of  an  evil.  In  human  relations  a 
person  is  permitted  to  inflict  pain  on  another  in  self-defence,  or  to 
prevent  the  pain  from  becoming  worse,  as,  for  example,  when  a  finger 
is  amputated  to  save  the  hand.  The  infliction  of  pain  is  not  only  per- 
mitted, it  becomes  a  duty  in  case  of  retribution,  as  in  a  court  of  justice; 
and  finally  it  is  permitted  to  inflict  temporary  pain  if  it  will  result  in  a 
greater  advantage  in  the  future.  The  last  two  cases  apply  also  to  God's 
treatment  of  his  creatures.  Disease  and  suffering  are  either  punish- 
ment for  offences  committed,  or  are  imposed  with  a  view  to  later 
reward.  In  the  case  of  children  the  last  explanation  alone  is  applicable. 
They  will  be  rewarded  in  the  next  world.  At  the  same  time  the 
parents  are  admonished  to  repentance  and  good  conduct. 

The  most  difficult  question  of  the  section  on  justice  is  that  of  free 
will  and  foreknowledge.  Is  man  master  of  his  actions?  If  so,  how  can 
we  reconcile  this  with  God's  omniscience,  who  knows  beforehand  how 
the  person  will  act  at  a  given  moment?  Is  man  free  to  decide  at  the 
last  moment  in  a  manner  contrary  to  God's  knowledge?  If  so,  we 
defend  freedom  at  the  expense  of  God's  omniscience.  If  man  is  bound 
to  act  as  God  foreknew  he  would  act,  divine  knowledge  is  saved,  man's 
freedom  lost.  Al-Basir  has  no  doubt  man  is  free.  Our  own  con- 
sciousness testifies  to  this.  When  we  cut  off  our  finger  bitten  by  a 
snake,  we  know  that  we  ourselves  did  it  for  a  purpose,  and  distinguish 
it  from  a  case  of  our  finger  being  cut  off  by  order  of  an  official,  before 


JOSEPH  AL-BASIR  AND  JESHUA  BEN  JUDAH  55 

whom  we  have  been  accused  or  maligned.  One  and  the  same  act  can 
have  only  one  author  and  not  two,  and  we  know  that  we  are  the 
authors  of  our  acts.  There  is  a  much  closer  connection  between  an 
agent  and  his  act  than  between  a  knower  and  his  knowledge,  which 
may  be  the  common  property  of  many,  and  no  one  doubts  that  a  man's 
knowledge  is  his  own. 

The  dilemma  above  mentioned  with  its  two  horns,  of  which  one 
denies  God's  knowledge,  the  other  man's  freedom,  is  puzzling  enough, 
to  be  sure.  But  we  are  not  bound  to  answer  it  since  it  is  purely  hy- 
pothetical. We  do  not  know  of  a  real  instance  in  which  a  man's 
decision  tended  to  be  contrary  to  God's  foreknowledge  of  its  outcome. 
Just  as  we  should  refuse  to  answer  the  question  whether  an  actual  case 
of  injustice  on  the  part  of  God  would  prove  his  ignorance  or  depend- 
ence, because  we  know  through  irrefutable  proofs  that  God  is  wise 
and  without  need;  so  here  we  say  man  has  freedom  though  God 
knows  he  will  act  thus  and  so,  and  refuse  to  say  whether  in  case  the 
unbeliever  turned  believer  it  would  prove  God's  ignorance  or  change  in 
his  knowledge. 

God's  creation  was  a  pure  act  of  grace.  But  once  having  done  this 
and  communicated  to  us  a  knowledge  of  himself  and  his  will,  it  is  now 
his  duty  to  guide  us  in  the  right  path,  by  sending  us  his  prophets.  The 
commandments  and  prohibitions  must  never  be  contrary  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  reason.  We  must  see  in  the  commandments  means  of  guidance, 
in  the  prohibitions  a  protection  against  destructive  influences.  If 
they  had  not  this  rational  basis,  we  do  not  see  why  God  should  have 
imposed  them  upon  us. 

Having  given  us  reason  to  know  his  being,  and  having  announced 
his  truth  through  the  prophets,  it  is  his  duty  to  reward  those  who 
knew  him  and  were  obedient,  eternally  in  the  next  world,  and  to  pun- 
ish eternally  the  unbeliever.  If  one  has  merits  and  sins,  they  are  bal- 
anced against  each  other.  If  the  sinner  repents  of  his  evil  deeds,  it  is 
the  duty  of  God  to  accept  his  repentance  and  remit  his  punishment. 

2.  Jeshua  hen  Jiidah  ^^ 

Jeshua  ben  Judah  or,  as  he  is  known  by  his  Arabic  name,  Abu  al- 
Faraj  Furkan  ibn  Asad,  was  likewise  a  Karaite,  a  pupil  of  Joseph 


56  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Al-Basir,  and  flourished  in  Palestine  in  the  second  half  of  the  eleventh 
century.  His  point  of  view  is  essentially  the  same  as  that  of  his 
teacher,  Al-Basir.  He  is  also  a  follower  of  the  Mu'tazilite  Kalam  and 
as  strong  a  rationalist  as  his  master.  He  agrees  with  Al-Basir  that  we 
cannot  get  certain  knowledge  of  the  creation  of  the  world  and  the 
existence  of  God  from  the  Bible,  This  information  must  come  origi- 
nally from  rational  speculation.  It  should  then  be  applied  to  the  mir- 
acles of  the  prophets  so  as  to  prove  the  authenticity  of  their  mission 
and  the  truth  of  their  announcements. 

He  adopts  the  atomic  theory,  though  he  is  opposed  to  the  view  that 
atoms  are  created  ever  anew  by  God  from  moment  to  moment,  and 
that  there  is  no  natural  and  necessary  sequence  or  continuity  in  the 
phenomena  of  the  world  or  qualities  of  bodies,  all  being  due  to  habit 
and  custom  induced  in  us  by  God's  uninterrupted  creations.  As  in  his 
philosophical  discussions  he  is  a  follower  of  the  Kalam,  so  in  his  legalis- 
tic works  he  is  indebted  to  the  Mohammedan  schools  of  religious  law. 

LikeAl-Basir,  Jeshua  ben  Judah  regards  as  the  corner  stone  of  his 
religious  philosophy  the  proof  that  the  world  was  created,  i.  e.,  that  it 
is  not  eternal.  His  arguments  are  in  essence  the  same,  though  differ- 
ently formulated.  In  their  simplest  form  they  are  somewhat  as 
follows.  The  world  and  its  bodies  consist  of  atoms  and  their  accidents. 
Taking  a  given  atom  for  the  sake  of  argument  we  know  that  it  is 
immaterial  to  it,  so  far  as  its  own  essence  is  concerned,  whether  it 
occupy  one  place  or  another.  As  a  fact,  however,  it  does  occupy  a 
definite  place  at  a  given  moment.  This  must  be  due  to  a  cause.  And 
as  the  atom  in  question  in  the  course  of  time  changes  its  place,  this 
shows  that  the  cause  which  kept  it  in  the  former  place  has  disappeared 
and  given  way  to  a  new  cause,  and  so  on.  In  other  words,  the  succes- 
sive causes  which  determine  the  positions  and  motions  of  the  atoms  are 
not  permanent,  hence  not  eternal  but  created.  The  necessary  inference 
is  that  the  atoms  or  the  bodies,  which  cannot  exist  without  these 
created  causes  (else  they  couJd  not  occupy  one  place  rather  than 
another),  must  also  be  created. 

Another  form  of  the  argument  for  creation  is  this.  The  eternal 
has  no  cause.  It  exists  by  virtue  of  its  own  essence,  and  is  not  depend- 
ent on  anything  else.  If  now  the  atoms  were  eternal,  they  would  have 
to  persist  in  the  same  condition  all  the  time;  for  any  change  would 


JOSEPH  AL-BASIR  AND  JESHUA  BEN  JUDAH  57 

imply  a  cause  upon  which  the  atom  is  dependent,  and  this  is  fatal  to 
its  eternity.  But  the  atoms  do  constantly  change  their  condition  and 
place.    Hence  they  are  created. 

If  the  things  of  the  world  are  created,  someone  must  have  created 
them.  This  is  clear.  But  there  may  be  room  for  the  supposition  that 
this  creative  agency  is  a  '^  cause,"  i.  e.,  an  impersonal  entity,  which  by 
necessity  produces  other  things  from  itself.  Hence  we  must  hasten 
to  say  that  this  conception  of  the  Creator  is  impossible  because  in- 
compatible with  our  results  so  far.  A  necessarily  producing  cause 
cannot  be  without  creating,  hence  an  eternal  cause  implies  an  eternal 
effect — which  contradicts  our  idea  of  a  created  world  proved  above. 
We  say,  therefore,  that  the  Creator  is  not  a  "cause  "  but  an  "agent," 
i.  e.,  one  acting  with  will  and  choice. 

God  is  incorporeal  because  body  consists  of  atoms,  and  atoms,  we 
have  shown,  are  created.  Besides,  if  he  were  corporeal,  he  could  not 
create  bodies  any  more  than  we  can.  He  would  furthermore  be  limited 
to  a  definite  place,  and  the  same  arguments  cited  above  to  prove  that 
atoms  are  dependent  on  a  cause  would  apply  to  him.  Finally  we  as 
corporeal  beings  cannot  exert  an  influence  on  objects  except  by  com- 
ing in  contact  with  them.  God  causes  the  seed  to  grow  without  being 
in  contact  with  it.  Hence  he  is  not  body,  and  the  scriptural  passages 
apparently  teaching  the  contrary  must  be  explained  otherwise. 

Jeshua  ben  Judah  likewise  agrees  with  Al-Basir  in  regarding  the 
nature  of  good  and  evil  as  absolute,  not  relative.  Like  his  master  he 
opposes  those  who  make  God's  command  and  prohibition  the  sole 
creators  of  good  and  evil  respectively,  as  on  the  other  hand  he  refuses 
to  agree  with  the  view  that  God  is  bound  by  necessity  to  do  the  good. 
Our  reason  distinguishes  between  good  and  evil  as  our  senses  between 
white  and  black. 

Among  other  arguments  in  favor  of  the  absolute  character  of  right 
and  wrong,  which  we  have  already  found  in  Al-Basir,  appears  the 
following.  If  good  and  evil  mean  simply  that  which  God  commands 
and  prohibits  respectively,  and  the  distinction  holds  only  for  us  but 
not  for  God,  it  follows  that  God  may  do  what  we  think  is  evil.  If 
this  be  so,  we  have  no  ground  for  believing  in  the  good  faith  of  the 
prophet — God  might  have  sent  him  to  deceive  us — and  the  alleged 
basis  of  right  and  wrong  is  removed. 


58  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

We  conclude  therefore  that  good  and  evil  are  absolute  and  are  bind- 
ing upon  God  as  well.  God  can  do  evil  as  well  as  good,  but  being 
omnipotent  he  can  accomplish  his  purpose  just  as  easily  by  doing 
good  as  by  doing  evil,  and  hence  surely  prefers  to  do  good.  Besides, 
all  evil  doing  is  the  result  of  some  need,  but  God  has  no  needs,  being 
self-sufficient,  hence  he  does  not  do  evil. 

It  follows  from  the  above  that  God  had  a  purpose  in  creating  the 
world.  For  an  act  without  a  purpose  is  vain  and  hence  bad.  This 
purpose  cannot  have  been  egoistic,  since  God  is  without  need,  being 
above  pleasure  and  pain.  The  purpose  must  therefore  have  been  the 
well-being  of  his  creatures. 


CHAPTER  V 


SOLOMON  IBN   GABIROL 


With  Gabirol  the  scene  of  Jewish  intellectual  activity  changes  from 
the  east  to  the  west.  Prior  to  the  middle  of  the  tenth  century  the 
centre  of  Jewish  learning  was  in  Babylonia.  The  succession  of  Geonim 
in  the  Talmudical  schools  of  Sura  and  Pumbadita,  and  particularly  the 
great  fame  of  Saadia,  made  all  the  other  Jewish  communities  of  the 
world  look  to  Babylonia  as  the  spiritual  centre.  They  considered  it  a 
privilege  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  the  great  eastern  academies 
and  appealed  to  their  spiritual  heads  in  cases  of  doubt  in  religious 
matters.  Some  of  this  glory  was  reflected  also  upon  the  neighboring 
countries  under  Mohammedan  domination,  Palestine,  Egypt,  and 
Kairuan  or  northern  Africa  to  the  west  of  Egypt.  Thus  all  the  men, 
Rabbanites  as  well  as  Karaites,  whom  we  treated  so  far  Hved  and 
flourished  in  the  east  in  one  of  the  four  countries  mentioned.  Christian 
Europe  was  intellectually  on  a  low  level,  and  as  far  as  scientific  studies 
were  concerned,  the  Jews  under  Christian  rule  were  no  better  than 
their  temporal  rulers. 

But  a  new  era  dawned  for  Jewish  literature  with  the  accession  to 
power  of  the  Umayyad  caliph  Abd  al  Rahman  III,  as  head  of  Moham- 
medan Spain  or  Andalusia.  He  was  a  liberal  man  and  a  patron  of 
learning.  Hasdai  ibn  Shaprut,  a  cultured  and  high-minded  Jew,  was 
his  trusted  adviser,  and  like  his  royal  patron  he  protected  and  en- 
couraged Jewish  learning,  Talmudical  as  well  as  scientific.  When 
Moses  ben  Enoch,  a  learned  emissary  from  the  Babylonian  Academy, 
was  ransomed  by  the  Jewish  community  of  Cordova  and  made  the 
head  of  a  Talmudical  school  in  that  city,  the  beginning  of  the  end  of 
Babylonian  Jewish  supremacy  was  at  hand.  Moses  ben  Enoch  the 
Talmudist,  Menahem  ben  Saruk,  the  grammarian  and  lexicographer, 
and  Dunash  ben  Labrat,  the  poet — all  three  under  the  distinguished 
patronage  of  Hasdai  ibn  Shaprut — inaugurated  the  long  line  of  Spanish 
Jewish  worthies,  which  continued  almost  five  centuries,  constituting 

59 


6o  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  golden  era  of  Jewish  hterature  and  making  of  Spain  the  intellectual 
centre  of  all  Jewry. 

Solomon  ibn  Gabirol  was  not  merely  the  first  Jewish  philosopher  in 
Spain,  he  was  the  first  Spanish  philosopher,  that  is,  he  was  the  first 
philosophical  writer  in  Andalusia.  Ibn  Badja,  the  first  Mohammedan 
philosopher  in  Spain,  was  born  at  least  a  half  century  after  Gabirol. 
The  birth  of  Gabirol  is  generally  placed  in  102 1  and  his  death  in  1058, 
though  some  have  put  it  as  late  as  1070. 

The  fate  of  Gabirol  in  the  history  of  Jewish  Hterature  was  a  peculiar 
one.  Highly  celebrated  as  a  synagogal  poet  in  the  Sephardic  as  well 
as  Ashkenazic  community,  his  fame  as  a  great  philosopher  was  early 
overshadowed  by  his  successors,  and  his  chief  work,  the  "Fountain  of 
Life,"  was  in  the  course  of  time  quite  forgotten.  The  Arabic  original 
was  lost  and  there  was  no  Hebrew  translation.  The  Tibbonides, 
Judah,  Samuel  and  Moses,  who  translated  everything  worth  while  in 
Jewish  philology,  science  and  philosophy  from  Arabic  into  Hebrew, 
either  did  not  know  of  Gabirol's  masterpiece  or  did  not  think  it  im- 
portant enough  to  translate.  To  judge  from  the  extant  fragments  of 
the  correspondence  between  Samuel  ibn  Tibbon  and  Maimonides,  it 
would  seem  that  both  were  true;  that  is  that  Samuel  ibn  Tibbon  had 
no  access  to  Gabirol's  "Fons  Vitae,"  and  that  if  he  had  had  such 
access,  Maimonides  would  have  dissuaded  him  from  translating  it. 
Maimonides  actually  tells  his  translator  ^^  that  the  only  books  worth 
studying  are  those  of  Aristotle  and  his  true  commentators,  Alexander 
of  Aphrodisias,  Themistius,  Averroes.  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna  are  also 
important,  but  other  writings,  such  as  those  of  Empedocles,  Pythago- 
ras, Hermes,  Porphyry,  represent  a  pre-Aristotelian  philosophy  which 
is  obsolete,  and  are  a  waste  of  time.  The  books  of  Isaac  Israeli  on  the 
"Elements"  and  on  "Definitions,"  are  no  better,  seeing  that  Israeli 
was  only  a  physician  and  no  philosopher.  He  is  not  familiar  with  the 
"Microcosmus"  of  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik,  but  infers  from  a  knowledge  of 
the  man  that  his  work  is  based  upon  the  writings  of  the  "Brothers  of 
Purity";  and  hence,  we  may  add,  not  strictly  Aristotelian,  and  not 
particularly  important.  Not  a  word  is  here  said  about  Gabirol, 
apparently  because  Samuel  ibn  Tibbon  had  not  inquired  about  him. 
But  from  Maimonides's  judgment  concerning  the  works  of  "Em- 
pedocles," we  may  legitimately  infer  that  he  would  have  been  no  more 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  6l 

favorable  to  Gabirol;  for,  as  we  shall  see,  Gabirol's  system  is  also 
based  upon  a  point  of  view  similar  to  that  of  the  so-called  "Empedo- 
cles."  What  the  Tibbonides  left  undone  was,  however,  partially 
accomplished  about  a  half  century  later  by  the  commentator  and  critic 
Shem  Tob  Falaquera  (1225-1290).  Apparently  in  agreement  with 
Abraham  ibn  Daud  that  Gabirol's  profuseness  in  his  philosophic 
masterpiece  made  it  possible  to  reduce  it  to  a  tenth  part  of  its  size, 
Falaquera  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  translate  the  whole  of  the 
"Mekor  Hayim"  into  Hebrew,  giving  us  instead  a  translation  of 
selected  parts,  which  in  his  estimation  contained  the  gist  of  Gabirol's 
teaching.  The  absence  of  a  complete  Hebrew  translation  of  Gabirol's 
philosophical  work  meant  of  course  that  no  one  who  did  not  know 
Arabic  could  have  access  to  Gabirol's  "Mekor  Hayim,"  and  this 
practically  excluded  the  majority  of  learned  Jews  after  the  first  half 
of  the  thirteenth  century.  But  the  selections  of  Falaquera  did  not 
seem  to  find  many  readers  either,  as  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
so  far  only  one  single  manuscript  of  this  translation  is  known. 

En  revanche,  as  the  French  would  say,  the  Christian  Scholastics 
of  the  thirteenth  century  made  Gabirol  their  own  and  studied  him 
diligently.  His  fundamental  thesis  of  a  universal  matter  underlying 
all  existence  outside  of  God  was  made  a  bone  of  contention  between 
the  two  dominant  schools;  the  Dominicans,  led  by  Thomas  Aquinas, 
opposing  this  un-Aristotelian  principle,  the  Franciscans  with  Duns 
Scotus  at  their  head,  adopting  it  as  their  own.  Ego  autem  redeo  ad 
sententiam  Avicembronis,"  is  a  formula  in  Duns  Scotus's  discussion 
of  the  principle  of  matter.^^ 

The  translation  of  Gabirol's  philosophy  into  an  accessible  language, 
which  was  not  considered  desirable  by  Jews,  was  actually  accomplished 
by  Christians.  About  a  century  before  Falaquera  a  complete  transla- 
tion into  Latin  was  made  in  Toledo  of  Gabirol's  "Fountain  of  Life," 
under  the  title  "Fons  Vitas."  This  translation  was  made  at  the  in- 
stance of  Raymond,  Archbishop  of  Toledo  in  the  middle  of  the  twelfth 
centmy,  by  Dominicus  Gundissalinus,  archdeacon  of  Segovia,  with  the 
assistance  of  a  converted  Jewish  physician,  Ibn  Daud  (Avendehut, 
Avendeath),  whose  name  after  conversion  became  Johannes  Hispanus 
or  Hispalensis.  Unlike  the  Hebrew  epitome  of  Falaquera  this  trans- 
lation was  not  neglected,  as  is  clear  from  the  role  Gabirol's  philosophy 


62  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

plays  in  the  disputations  of  the  schools,  and  from  the  fact  that  there 
are  still  extant  four  manuscripts  of  the  complete  translation,  one  of 
an  epitome  thereof,  and  there  is  evidence  that  a  fifth  manuscript 
existed  in  1375  in  the  Papal  library .^^  As  Ibn  Sina  was  corrupted  by 
the  Latin  writers  into  Avicenna,  and  Ibn  Roshd  into  Averroes,  so 
Ibn  Gabirol  became  in  turn,  Avencebrol,  Avicembron,  Avicebron; 
and  the  Scholastics  who  fought  about  his  philosophy  had  no  idea  he 
was  a  Jew  and  celebrated  as  a  writer  of  religious  hymns  used  in  the 
synagogue.  He  was  regarded  now  as  a  Mohammedan,  now  as  a 
Christian. 

This  peculiar  circumstance  will  help  us  to  get  an  inkling  of  the  rea- 
son for  the  neglect  of  Gabirol's  philosophy  in  the  Jewish  community. 
It  is  clear  that  a  work  which,  like  the  "Fons  Vitae,"  made  it  possible 
for  its  author  to  be  regarded  as  a  Mohammedan  or  even  a  Christian, 
cannot  have  had  the  Jewish  imprint  very  deeply  stamped  upon  its 
face.  Nay  more,  while  the  knowledge  of  its  having  been  translated 
from  the  Arabic  may  have  been  sufficient  in  itself  to  stamp  the  author 
as  a  Mohammedan,  there  must  have  been  additional  indications  for 
his  Scholastic  admirers  to  make  them  regard  him  as  a  Christian.  An 
examination  of  the  work  lends  some  semblance  of  truth  to  these  con- 
siderations. 

Gabirol  nowhere  betrays  his  Jewishness  in  the  '  Fons  Vitae."  He 
never  quotes  a  BibHcal  verse  or  a  Talmudic  dictmn.  He  does  not 
make  any  overt  attempt  to  reconcile  his  philosophical  views  with 
religious  faith.  The  treatise  is  purely  speculative  as  if  religious  dogma 
nowhere  existed  to  block  one's  way  or  direct  one's  search.  Abraham 
Ibn  Daud,  the  author  of  the  philosophical  treatise  "Emunah  Ramah" 
(The  Exalted  Faith),  and  the  predecessor  of  Maimonides,  criticises 
Gabirol  very  severely,  and  that  not  merely  because  he  disagrees  with 
him  in  the  conception  of  matter  and  finds  Gabirol's  reasoning  devoid 
of  cogency  and  logical  force — many  bad  arguments,  he  says,  seem  in 
the  mind  of  Gabirol  to  be  equivalent  to  one  good  one — ^but  principally 
because  Gabirol  failed  to  take  a  Jewish  attitude  in  his  philosophizing, 
and  actually,  as  Ibn  Daud  tells  us,  maintains  views  dangerous  to 
Judaism  (below,  p.  198). 

This  will  easily  account  for  the  fact  that  Gabirol,  celebrated  as  he 
was  as  a  poet,  was  lost  sight  of  generally  as  a  philosopher.    The  matter 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  63 

is  made  clearer  still  if  we  add  that  his  style  in  the  Mekor  Hayim" 
is  against  him.  It  is  devoid  of  all  merit  whether  of  literary  beauty  or  of 
logical  conciseness  and  brevity.  It  is  diffuse  to  a  degree  and  frequently 
very  wearisome  and  tedious.  One  has  to  wade  through  pages  upon 
pages  of  bare  syllogisms,  one  more  flimsy  than  another. 

Finally,  the  point  of  view  of  Gabirol  was  that  of  a  philosophy  that 
was  rapidly  becoming  obsolete,  and  Maunonides,  the  ground  having 
been  made  ready  by  Ibn  Daud,  gave  this  philosophy  its  death-blow 
by  substituting  for  it  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

We  now  understand  why  it  is  that,  with  few  exceptions  here  and 
there,  Gabirol's  philosophical  work  was  in  the  course  of  time  forgotten 
among  the  Jews,  though  his  name  Avicebron  as  well  as  some  of  his 
chief  doctrines  were  well  known  to  the  Scholastic  writers.  To  be  sure, 
even  students  of  Scholastic  literature  had  no  direct  access  to  Gabirol's 
treatise  as  it  was  never  printed  and  no  one  knew  whether  there  were 
still  any  manuscripts  of  it  extant  or  not.  The  only  sources  of  informa- 
tion concerning  Avicebron's  philosophy  were  Aquinas's  refutations, 
and  Duns  Scotus's  defence,  and  other  second-hand  references  in  the 
writings  of  the  Scholastics.  Who  Avicebron  was  no  one  knew.  It  was 
not  until  1819  that  Amable  Jourdain,^^  in  tracing  the  history  of  the 
Latin  translations  of  Aristotle,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  more  must 
be  known  about  the  philosophy  of  Avicebron's  "Fons  Vitae"  if  we 
intended  to  understand  the  Scholastics.  In  1845  Solomon  Munk  dis- 
covered in  the  national  library  at  Paris  the  epitome  of  Falaquera 
mentioned  above,  and  comparing  it  with  the  views  of  Avicebron  as 
found  in  the  discussions  of  the  Scholastics,  made  the  important  dis- 
covery that  the  mysterious  Avicebron  was  neither  a  Mohammedan 
nor  a  Christian  but  a  Jew,  and  none  other  than  the  famous  poet 
Solomon  ibn  Gabirol.  Then  began  a  search  for  copies  of  a  Latin  trans- 
lation, which  was  rewarded  amply.  Both  Munk  and  Seyerlen  dis- 
covered manuscript  copies  of  the  '  Fons  Vitss,"  and  now  both  the 
Hebrew  epitome  of  Falaquera  and  the  Latin  translation  of  Gundissali- 
nus  are  accessible  in  print.^^  So  much  for  the  interesting  history  of 
Gabirol.    Now  a  word  as  to  his  views. 

Shem  Tob  ibn  Falaquera,  in  the  brief  introduction  which  he  ap- 
pends to  his  epitome  of  the  "Mekor  Hayim"  says,  "It  seems  to  me 
that  Solomon  ibn  Gabirol  follows  in  his  book  the  views  of  the  ancient 


64  •      MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophers  as  we  find  them  in  a  book  composed  by  Empedocles  con- 
cerning the  'Five  Substances.'  ^^  This  book  is  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  all  spiritual  substances  have  a  spiritual  matter;  that  the  form 
comes  from  above  and  the  matter  receives  it  from  below,  i.  e.,  that  the 
matter  is  a  substratum  and  bears  the  form  upon  it."  He  then  adds 
that  Aristotle  attributes  a  similar  view  to  his  predecessors,  but  that 
this  view  is  inconsistent  with  Aristotle's  own  thinking.  For  in  his 
opinion  what  is  material  is  composite  and  possessed  of  potentiality. 
Hence  only  those  things  have  matter  which  are  subject  to  generation 
and  decay,  and  in  general  change  from  one  state  to  another. 

Without  going  into  detail  as  to  the  nature  of  this  work  of  Empedo- 
cles named  by  Falaquera  as  the  source  of  Gabirol's  views — expositions 
of  these  so-called  Empedoclean  views  and  fragments  from  Empedocles's 
book  have  been  found  in  Arabian  and  Hebrew  writers  ^^ — it  is  sufficient 
for  us  to  know  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  real  Empedocles, 
the  ancient  Greek  philosopher;  that  it  was  another  of  the  many  spur- 
ious writings  which  circulated  in  the  middle  ages  under  famous  names 
of  antiquity;  and  that  like  the  "Theology  of  Aristotle,"  and  the 
"Liber  de  Causis,"  mentioned  in  the  Introduction  (p.  xx),  it  was  Neo- 
Platonic  in  character. 

Thus  Gabirol  was  a  Neo-Platonist.  This  does  not  mean  that  he  did 
not  adopt  many  important  Aristotelian  conceptions.  Neo-Platonism 
itself  could  not  have  arisen  without  Aristotle.  The  ideas  of  matter 
and  form,  and  potentiality  and  actuality,  and  the  categories,  and  so 
on,  had  become  the  fixed  elements  of  philosophical  thinking,  and  no 
new  system  could  do  without  them.  In  this  sense  Plotinus  himself, 
the  founder  of  Neo-Platonism,  is  an  Aristotelian.  When  we  speak  of 
Gabirol  as  a  Neo-Platonist,  we  mean  that  the  essence  of  his  system  is 
Neo-Platonic.  He  is  not  a  dualist,  but  a  monist.  God  and  matter  are 
not  opposed  as  two  ultimate  principles,  as  they  are  in  Aristotle. 
Matter  in  Gabirol  is  ultimately  identified  with  God.  In  this  he  goes 
,  even  beyond  Plotinus.  For  whereas  in  Plotinus  matter  occupies  the 
lowest  scale  in  the  gradation  of  being  as  it  flows  from  the  One  or  the 
Good  (cf.  Introduction,  p.  xxxviii),  and  becomes  equivalent  to  the  non- 
existent, and  is  the  cause  of  evil,  in  Gabirol  matter  is  the  underlying 
substance  for  all  being  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  with  the  one 
exception  of  the  Creator  himself.^^  It  emanates  from  the  essence  of  the 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  65 

Creator,  forming  the  basis  of  all  subsequent  emanations.^"  Hence  the  '■ 
spiritual  substances  of  the  celestial  world,  or,  to  use  a  more  technical 
and  more  precise  term — since  spirit  is  not  located  in  heaven  or  any- 
where spatially — the  intelligible  world,  have  matter  underlying  their 
form.^^  In  fact,  matter  itself  is  intelligible  or  spiritual,  not  corporeal.^^  ' 
Corporeahty  and  materiality  are  two  different  things.  There  are 
various  gradations  of  matter,  to  be  sure;  for  the  prime  matter  as  it 
emerges  from  the  essence  of  the  Creator  pervades  all  existence  from 
highest  to  lowest,  and  the  further  it  extends  from  its  origin  the  less 
spiritual  and  the  more  corporeal  it  becomes  until  in  the  sublunar 
world  we  have  in  the  matters  of  its  particular  objects,  corporeal  mat- 
ter, i.  e.,  matter  affected  with  quantity  and  magnitude  and  figure  and 
color.^^  Like  Plotinus,  Gabirol  conceives  of  the  universe  as  a  process 
of  a  gradually  descending  series  of  existences  or  worlds,  as  the  Kab- 
balistic  writers  term  them;  these  cosmic  existences  radiating  or  flowing 
out  of  the  superabundant  light  and  goodness  of  the  Creator.  The  ' 
two  extremes  of  this  graded  universe  are  God  at  the  one  end,  and  the 
corporeal  world  at  the  other.  Intermediate  between  these  are  the 
spiritual  substances,  Intelligence,  Soul  and  Nature.^^  Man  as  a  ' 
microcosm,  a  universe  in  little,  partakes  of  both  the  corporeal  and 
intermediate  worlds,  and  hence  may  serve  as  a  model  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  macrocosm,  or  great  universe.  His  body  is  typical 
of  the  corporeal  world,  which  consists  of  the  lowest  matter,  viz.,  that 
which  has  no  other  form  except  that  of  corporeality,  or  extension,  and 
the  forms  of  figure,  color,  and  so  on,  borne  on  top  of  the  extension.^' 
Body  as  such  is  at  rest  and  is  not  capable  of  action.  To  act  it  needs 
an  agent.  Hence  it  needs  an  agency  to  compose  its  parts  and  hold 
them  together.  We  call  this  agency  Nature.  Man's  body  also  grows, 
is  nourished  and  propagates  its  kind  as  do  plants.  This  likewise  must 
have  its  non-corporeal  cause.  This  we  call  vegetative  soul.  Man  has 
also  sense  perception  and  local  motion  like  the  animals.  The  principle 
or  substance  causing  this  is  the  animal  soul.  Man  also  thinks  and 
reasons  and  reflects.  This  is  brought  about  by  the  rational  soul. 
Finally,  man  has  a  still  higher  function  than  discursive  thought.  The 
latter  has  to  search  and  to  pass  from  premise  to  conclusion,  whereas 
the  apprehension  of  the  intelligence  takes  place  "without  seeking, 
without  effort,  and  without  any  other  cause  except  its  own  essence, 


66  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

because  it  is  full  of  perfection."  In  other  words,  it  is  immediate  in- 
tellectual intuition  of  which  Gabirol  speaks  here.  The  Intelligence  is 
capable  of  this  because  it  has  in  itself,  constituting  its  essence,  all  the 
forms  of  existence,  and  knowledge  means  possession  of  the  forms  of 
the  things  known. 

As  man  is  typical  of  the  universe,  it  follows  that  there  are  cosmic 
existences  corresponding  to  the  principles  or  powers  just  enumerated 
in  man,  and  the  relation  of  the  latter  to  the  former  is  that  of  the 
particular  to  the  general.  Hence  there  is  a  cosmic  Intelligence,  a 
cosmic  soul  embracing  the  rational,  the  animal  and  the  vegetative 
parts,  and  a  cosmic  nature.  Of  these  the  more  perfect  is  the  cause  of 
the  less  perfect;  hence  the  order  in  which  we  named  them  represents 
the  order  of  causation  or  of  emanation  from  the  prime  source. 
The  lowest  of  these  emanations  is  the  matter  which  sustains  exten- 

'  sion  or  magnitude,  and  with  it  the  process  ceases.  This  matter  is  no 
longer  the  source  of  an  additional  form  of  existence.  The  various 
qualities  and  attributes  which  inhere  in  this  corporeal  matter  are 

-  caused  by  the  spiritual  substances  above.  For  like  the  prototype  of 
all  generosity  and  goodness  the  First  Essence  or  God,  every  one  of 
the  spiritual  substances  proceeding  from  him  has  the  same  tendency 
of  imparting  its  form  or  forms  to  the  substance  next  below  it.    But 

.  the  forms  thus  bestowed  are  no  longer  the  same  as  they  are  in  the 
essence  of  the  bestowing  substance,  as  it  depends  upon  the  recipient 
what  sort  of  form  it  will  receive.  An  inferior  receiving  substance  will 
receive  a  superior  form  in  an  inferior  way.  That  is,  the  form  which 
in  the  substance  above  the  one  in  question  is  contained  in  a  spiritual 
and  unitary  manner,  will  be  transformed  in  the  substance  below  it 
into  something  less  spiritual,  less  unified,  and  more  nearly  corporeal, 
i.  e.,  visible  and  tangible.  Hence  the  visible  and  tangible,  and  in 
general  the  sensible  qualities  of  particular  things  in  the  sublunar 
world,  are  in  reality  descended  from  a  line  of  spiritual  ancestors  in 
the  forms  of  the  simple  substances.  Intelligence,  Soul  and  Nature. 
But  it  is  their  distance  from  the  prime  source,  which  increases  with 
every  transmission  of  influence,  together  with  the  cruder  nature  of  the 
receiving  substance,  that  makes  the  resulting  forms  corporeal  and 
sensible.  The  matter  may  be  made  clear  if  we  use  the  analogy  of 
light,  which  is  invisible  as  long  as  it  is  in  air  because  it  penetrates  it, 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  67 

but  becomes  visible  when  it  comes  in  contact  with  a  gross  body  which 
it  cannot  penetrate.  It  then  remains  on  the  surface  condensed,  and 
becomes  visible  to  the  senses. 

We  thus  see  that  the  higher  substance  acts  upon  the  lower  and  con- 
tains all  that  is  found  in  the  latter,  though  in  a  more  perfect  and  simple 
manner.  The  lower  substances  flow  from  the  higher  and  yet  the 
latter  are  not  diminished  in  their  essence  and  power.^^ 

That  ordinary  material  objects  are  composed  of  matter  and  form 
is  admitted  and  we  need  not  now  prove  it,  as  we  have  already  discussed 
the  subject  in  the  Introduction,  where  wx  gave  an  outline  of  the  Aris- 
totelian philosophy.  The  principle  peculiar  to  Gabirol  is  that  not 
merely  the  material  objects  of  the  sublimar  world,  but  that  the  intelli- 
gible or  spiritual  substances  also  are  composed  of  matter  and  form.®^ 
Whenever  two  things  have  something  in  common  anc^omething  in 
which  they  differ,  that  which  they  have  in  common  is  the  matter, 
that  in  which  they  differ  is  the  form.  Two  things  absolutely  simple 
must  be  prime  to  each  other,  i.  e.,  they  must  have  nothing  in  common, 
for  if  they  have  anything  in  common  they  have  everything  in  common, 
and  they  are  no  longer  two  things  but  one.  Hence  a  spiritual  substance 
must  be  composite,  for  it  must  have  something  by  which  it  differs 
from  a  corporeal  substance,  and  something,  viz.,  substantiality,  which 
it  has  in  common  with  it.  In  the  same  way  the  intelligible  substances, 
Intelligence  and  Soul,  have  their  substantiality  in  common,  and  they 
differ  in  form.  Hence  they  are  composed  of  matter  and  form,  and  the 
matter  must  be  the  same  in  all  the  intelligible  substances;  for  their 
differences  are  due  to  their  forms,  hence  if  their  matters  also  differed, 
they  would  have  to  differ  in  form,  but  matter  as  such  has  no  form. 
Hence  matter  in  itself  is  everywhere  the  same. 

As  the  Intelligence  is  the  highest  existence  next  to  God,  and  is 
composed  of  matter  and  form,  these  are  respectively  the  universal 
matter  and  universal  form,  embracing  all  subsequent  matters  and 
forms.^^  Hence  the  Intelligence  in  knowing  itself  knows  everything, 
as  everything  is  contained  in  it.  And  as  it  is  prior  to  everything  and 
the  cause  of  everything  it  has  an  immediate  knowledge  of  all  things 
without  effort  or  searching. 

But  what  is  the  origin  of  universal  matter  and  universal  form  which, 
in  constituting  Intelligence,  are  the  fundamental  principles  of  all 


68  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

existence?  ^^  The  answer  is  they  come  from  the  First  Essence,  God. 
Unity  comes  before  duaHty  or  plurality,  and  there  is  no  true  unity 
except  in  God.  Whatever  issues  from  him  is  ipso  facto,  as  a  product 
which  is  not  God,  afifected  with  duality.  Matter  and  Form  is  this 
duality.  Their  union  is  necessary  and  real,  and  it  is  only  in  thought 
that  we  can  keep  them  apart.  In  reality  they  form  a  unit,  their  union 
varying  in  perfection  according  as  they  are  nearer  or  further  away 
from  their  origin.  Hence  the  union  is  closest  in  Intelligence,  the  first 
divine  emanation,  and  least  close  in  corporeal  objects  of  the  sublunar 
world,  where  plurality  is  the  order  of  the  day. 

This  process  by  which  universal  matter  and  form  issue  from  God 
may  be  called  creation.^"''  But  we  must  conceive  of  it  on  the  analogy 
of  water  flowing  from  a  fountain  in  continued  and  uninterrupted  suc- 
cession. The  only  difference  is  that  the  emanation  from  God  takes 
place  without  motion  and  without  time. 

The  union  of  universal  form  and  universal  matter  must  be  thought 
of  as  a  stamping  of  the  form  upon  the  matter.  Matter  has  in  itself 
no  actual  or  definable  existence.  It  serves  merely  as  a  tabula  rasa, 
as  a  potential  background,  as  an  empty  receptacle,  as  a  reflecting 
mirror  for  form  to  be  written,  filled  out,  impressed  or  reflected  therein 
or  upon.  Hence  we  may  view  God  as  the  spectator,  universal  matter 
as  the  mirror,  and  universal  form  as  the  reflection  of  the  spectator  in 
the  glass.  God  himself  does  not  enter  the  glass,  only  his  reflection  is 
outlined  therein.  And  as  matter  and  form  are  really  the  whole  world, 
it  would  follow  that  the  universe  is  a  reflection  of  God,  though  God 
remains  in  himself  and  does  not  enter  the  world  with  his  essence. 

We  may  also  picture  to  ourselves  this  impression  of  form  upon  matter 
on  the  analogy  of  speech.  The  speaker's  words  impress  ideas  upon 
the  soul  of  the  listener.  So  God  speaks  and  his  Word  or  Will  impresses 
form  upon  matter.  The  world  is  created  by  the  Word  or  the  Will  ^"^ 
of  God. 

In  all  these  similes  matter  appears  as  something  external  to  God, 
upon  which  he  impresses  form.  But  this  is  not  strictly  true,  since 
matter  has  no  real  existence  without  form,  and  has  never  so  existed. 
The  existence  of  matter  and  form  is  simultaneous,  and  both  come  from 
God,  matter  from  his  essence,  form  from  his  attribute,  or  his  Wisdom, 
or  his  Word,  or  his  Will.    And  yet  in  God,  who  is  a  perfect  unity,  es- 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  69 

sence  and  attribute  are  one.  It  is  the  Will  of  God,  not  God  himself, 
that  must  be  regarded  as  the  spectator,  whose  outline  is  reflected 
in  the  mirror  of  matter  in  the  above  simile.  It  is  the  Will  of  God  that 
writes  form  upon  the  chart  of  matter,  and  thereby  produces  a  world. 
It  is  in  virtue  of  the  Will  that  God  is  said  to  be  in  everything. 

But  what  is  this  will  of  God  as  distinguished  from  God  himself, 
since  in  God  there  can  be  no  duality  of  any  kind?  Gabirol's  answer 
is  not  clear  or  satisfactory.  The  will,  he  says,  is  identical  with  God 
if  we  consider  it  apart  from  its  activity;  considered  as  active  it  is 
difi"erent  from  the  divine  essence.  Exactly  to  describe  it  is  impossible, 
but  the  following  is  an  approximation.  It  is  a  divine  power  producing 
matter  and  form,  binding  them  together,  pervading  them  throughout 
their  extent  above  and  below,  as  the  soul  pervades  the  body,  and  mov- 
ing and  ordering  everything. 

God  himself,  or  the  First  Essence,  can  be  known  only  through  the 
Will  as  pervading  everything,  i.  e.,  through  his  effects  in  the  world. 
And  in  this  way  too  only  his  existence  can  be  known  but  not  his  es- 
sence as  he  is  in  himself,  because  God  is  above  everything  and  infinite. 
The  soul  may  know  Intelligence  because  though  the  latter  is  above  the 
soul  there  is  some  similarity  between  them.  But  the  First  Essence 
has  no  similarity  to  Intelligence,  therefore  no  intelHgence  can  know  it. 

There  is  a  kind  of  mystic  knowledge  by  which  man  may  come  in 
touch  with  the  spiritual  substances  and  rise  even  to  universal  matter, 
which  is  above  Intelligence.  "If  you  wish  to  form  a  picture  of  these 
substances,"  the  master  says  to  the  disciple  in  the  "Fons  Vitse," 
*'you  must  raise  your  intellect  to  the  last  intelligible,  you  must  purify 
it  from  all  sordid  sensibility,  free  it  from  the  captivity  of  nature  and 
approach  with  the  force  of  your  intelligence  to  the  last  limit  of  intel- 
ligible substance  that  it  is  possible  for  you  to  comprehend,  until  you 
are  entirely  divorced  from  sensible  substance  and  lose  all  knowledge 
thereof.  Then  you  will  embrace,  so  to  speak,  the  whole  corporeal 
world  in  your  being,  and  will  place  it  in  one  corner  of  your  soul.  When 
you  have  done  this  you  will  understand  the  insignificance  of  the 
sensible  in  comparison  with  the  greatness  of  the  intelligible.  Then 
the  spiritual  substances  will  be  before  your  eyes,  comprehending 
you  and  superior  to  you,  and  you  will  see  your  own  being  as  though 
you  were  those  substances.    Sometimes  it  will  seem  to  you  that  you 


70  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

are  a  part  of  them  by  reason  of  your  connection  with  corporeal  sub- 
stance; and  sometimes  you  will  think  you  are  all  of  them,  and  that 
there  is  no  difference  between  you  and  them,  on  account  of  the  union 
of  your  being  with  their  being,  and  the  attachment  of  your  form  to 
their  forms."  The  pupil  assures  the  teacher  that  he  has  followed  this 
advice  and  seen  the  whole  corporeal  world  floating  in  the  spiritual  sub- 
stances as  a  small  boat  in  the  sea,  or  a  bird  in  the  air.  "When  you 
have  raised  yourself  to  the  first  universal  matter,"  replies  the 
teacher,  "and  illumined  its  shadow,  you  will  see  there  the  wonder  of 
wonders.  Pursue  this  therefore  diligently  and  with  love,  because  this 
is  the  purpose  of  the  existence  of  the  human  soul,  and  in  this  is  great 
delight  and  extreme  happiness."  ^°^ 

But  Gabirol  does  not  promise  a  knowledge  of  the  Most  High  even 
through  this  royal  road  of  ecstasy,  unless  we  suppose  that  in  the  prom- 
ise of  seeing  in  universal  matter  the  wonder  of  all  wonders  there  may 
be  a  covert  allusion  to  a  glimpse  of  the  deepest  secret  of  all,  the  essence 
of  God. 

All  knowledge  is  according  to  Gabirol  embraced  in  the  following 
three  topics,  (i)  Matter  and  Form,  (2)  the  Active  Word  or  Will,  (3)  the 
First  Essence  or  God.  By  far  the  larger  part  of  the  "Fons  Vitae"  is 
devoted  to  the  first  subject.  Only  brief  hints  are  given  of  the  second 
and  third,  and  Gabirol  refers  us  to  a  special  work  of  his  on  the  Will, 
which  he  says  he  wrote.  There  is  no  trace  of  any  such  treatise.  At 
any  rate  it  is  clear  from  the  little  that  is  contained  on  the  Divine  Will 
in  the  "Fons  Vitse"  that  the  Will  forms  an  important  element  in 
Gabirol 's  philosophy.  This  is  the  more  remarkable  because  it  is  not 
an  essential  element  in  Neo-Platonism,  upon  which  Gabirol's  system 
is  based.  Nay,  the  doctrine  of  a  divine  will  scarcely  has  any  place 
in  the  form  of  emanation  taught  by  Plotinus.  The  cosmic  process  is 
conceived  there  as  necessary  and  impersonal.  And  but  for  the  in- 
troduction of  the  Will  in  the  "  Fons  Vitae"  we  should  be  forced  to 
understand  Gabirol  in  the  same  way.  The  diflSculty  in  Neo-Platonism 
is  that  God  is  at  the  same  time  transcendent  and,  through  his  powers 
or  emanations,  immanent  in  the  world.  God  is  above  all  being  and 
at  the  same  time  is  the  cause  of  and  pervades  all  existence.  Gabirol 
must  have  felt  not  merely  this  purely  philosophical  difficulty,  but  as 
a  Jew,  Pantheism  as  well  as  impersonalism  must  have  been  objection- 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  71 

able  to  him.  Hence  he  mitigates  both  by  introducing  the  divine  will 
as  mediating  between  God  and  the  world.  This  brings  God  in  closer 
and  more  personal  touch  with  his  creation.  The  cosmic  process  is 
not  a  necessary  and  impersonal  flow  or  radiation  but  a  voluntary 
activity  having  a  purpose.  The  solution  is  unsatisfactory,  as  all  such 
solutions  are  bound  to  be,  because  it  introduces  as  many  diflSculties 
as  it  solves.  The  nature  of  this  divine  Will  is  ambiguous.  If  it  is  God's 
will,  and  God  is  the  One  in  whom  there  can  be  no  distinctions,  we  have 
only  a  new  word,  and  nothing  is  solved.  If  on  human  analogy  we 
are  inclined  to  take  the  will  seriously,  we  are  endangering  God's 
unity.  This  dilemma  Gabirol  does  not  succeed  in  removing.  His 
system  still  has  a  strong  flavor  of  Pantheism,  and  moreover  his  identi- 
fication of  the  Will  of  God  with  the  Wisdom  and  the  Word  of  God, 
and  his  hypostatization  of  the  latter  as  in  a  sense  a  being  distinct 
from  God,  reminds  us  strongly  of  Philo's  Logos,  which  became  the 
Logos  of  Christianity,  the  second  person  in  the  Trinity.  This  is  the 
reason  why  William  of  Auvergne,  bishop  of  Paris  in  the  thirteenth 
century,  regarded  Avicebron  as  a  Christian.  And  these  same  reasons 
were  no  doubt  adequate  to  estrange  Jewish  readers,  as  Abraham  ibn 
Daud  expressly  tells  us  about  himself,  though  his  terms  are  general 
(see  above,  p.  62). 

Gabirol  is  also  the  author  of  an  ethical  work  which  he  composed 
in  1045.  Though  of  little  importance  philosophically,  or  perhaps 
because  of  this,  the  "Tikkun  Middot  ha-Nefesh"  (Improvement  of 
the  Qualities  of  the  Soul)  fared  much  better  than  its  more  important 
companion,  the  "Mekor  Hayim."  Not  only  did  it  have  the  privilege 
of  a  Hebrew  translation  at  the  hands  of  the  father  of  translators, 
Judah  ibn  Tibbon,  but  the  original  Arabic  itself  is  still  extant  and 
was  recently  published  with  an  English  translation  by  Stephen  S. 
Wise  (1901).-^'^^  The  Hebrew  translation  also  had  the  good  fortune  of 
being  reprinted  several  times.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Tikkun 
Middot  ha-Nefesh"  is  a  popular  work,  dealing  with  morals,  and  does 
not  go  into  metaphysical  questions.  It  is  full  of  Biblical  citations, 
which  stamps  it  as  Jewish;  and  there  are  also  in  it  quotations  from 
Arabic  writers  serving  to  illustrate  the  argument  and  lending  variety 
and  interest  to  the  style. 

The  larger  question  of  the  aim  of  human  Hfe  is  touched  on  in  the 


72  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

"  Fons  Vitae."  We  are  told  there  that  the  ultimate  aim  of  man's 
existence  is  that  the  soul  should  unite  with  the  upper  world  to  which 
it  belongs. -^^^  The  particular  human  soul  is  according  to  Gabirol  a 
part,  though  not  in  a  physical  sense,  of  the  cosmic  soul,  which  is  one 
of  the  universal  spiritual  substances  (see  above,  p.  66).  Hence  its 
own  real  existence  is  spiritual  and  eternal,  and  independent  of  the 
body.  Its  entrance  into  the  body  obscures  its  spiritual  vision,  though 
it  does  not  lose  all  touch  with  the  higher  world  from  which  it  came. 
The  senses  and  the  data  of  sense  perception  are  not  an  end  in  them- 
selves; they  are  only  a  means  for  the  soul  through  them  to  recall  the 
higher  knowledge  which  was  its  own  in  its  spiritual  existence,  and 
thereby  win  its  return  to  the  inteUigible  world.  Man's  duty  therefore 
in  this  world  is  to  strive  to  attain  this  higher  life  for  his  soul.  This 
is  brought  about  by  means  of  knowledge  and  practice.  This  knowledge 
has  to  do  with  knowing  all  things  as  they  really  are,  and  particularly 
the  intelligible  substances  and  the  Prime  Essence.  Practice  signifies 
to  keep  away  as  far  as  possible  from  things  of  sense,  which  are  foreign 
to  the  soul  and  might  injure  it.  What  more  particularly  the  things 
are  which  are  beneficial  to  the  soul,  and  what  are  injurious,  we  learn 
from  Gabirol's  ethical  treatise.  Man's  soul  has  a  higher  and  a  lower 
nature.  The  higher  power  is  the  reason  or  rational  soul,  the  lower  is 
the  animal  or  vegetative  soul;  and  man's  business  is  to  see  that  the 
reason  rules  over  the  lower  nature. 

Gabirol  does  not  give  us  any  test  by  which  we  can  tell  whether  a 
given  act  or  feeling  belongs  to  the  lower  or  higher  nature  except  to 
say  that  the  appetites  are  diseases  of  the  body  which  must  be  cured; 
that  they  do  not  belong  to  the  rational  soul,  and  to  satisfy  them  is 
not  the  attainment  of  a  good.  Gabirol's  method  of  treating  virtue 
and  vice,  or  rather  the  virtues  and  the  vices,  is  to  relate  them  to  the 
five  senses  and  the  four  humors  in  man,  which  in  turn  correspond 
to  the  four  elements,  fire,  air,  water,  earth,  and  the  four  primitive 
quahties,  hot,  cold,  moist,  dry.  This  division  of  the  elements,  the 
humors,  the  qualities  and  the  senses  was  a  commonplace  of  the  phys- 
iological and  medical  science  of  the  time.  We  have  met  it  in  Isaac 
Israeli  (see  above,  p.  3),  and  it  goes  back  to  Aristotle  and  Galen 
and  Hippocrates.  The  originality,  though  a  queer  one  to  be  sure,  of 
Gabirol  is  to  bring  the  ethical  qualities  of  man  into  relation  with  all 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  73 

these.  The  approximations  are  forced  in  every  instance  and  often 
ludicrous.  Instead  of  attempting  to  give  a  psychological  analysis 
of  the  qualities  in  question,  he  lays  stress  on  their  physical  basis  in 
one  of  the  five  senses,  as  we  shall  see  presently. 

The  great  world,  we  are  told,  was  created  out  of  the  four  elements, 
and  similarly  man,  the  microcosm,  also  consists  of  four  natures  corre- 
sponding to  the  elements.  Thus  the  four  humors,  upon  the  harmonious 
combination  of  which  the  health  of  man's  body  depends,  viz.,  blood, 
phelgm,  black  gall,  and  red  gall,  correspond  respectively  to  air,  water, 
earth,  fire.  Man  is  endowed  besides  with  five  senses.  If  he  is  wise 
he  will  use  his  senses  properly  and  in  the  right  measure,  like  a  skilful 
physician  who  calculates  carefully  what  proportion  of  each  drug 
should  be  prescribed. 

The  sense  of  sight  is  the  noblest  of  the  senses,  and  is  related  to  the 
body  as  the  sun  to  the  world.  The  philosophers  have  a  wonderful 
saying  concerning  the  eye  that  there  are  spiritual  tints  in  the  soul 
which  are  visible  in  the  movements  of  the  eyelids — ^pride  and  haugh- 
tiness, humility  and  meekness.  Accordingly  the  ethical  qualities 
due  to  the  sense  of  sight  are  pride,  meekness,  modesty  and  impu- 
dence, besides  the  subordinate  qualities  derived  from  these. 

Pride  is  common  in  a  person  of  a  warm  disposition  in  whom  the  red 
gall  predominates.  Many  wise  men  exhibit  this  quality  out  of  place, 
fools  adopt  it  until  they  are  mastered  by  it,  and  it  is  prevalent  in  youth. 
It  may  be  useful  when  it  keeps  a  man  away  from  vice  and  unworthy 
things,  inspiring  him  to  rise  to  nobility  of  character  and  the  service  of 
God.  But  generally  it  is  useless  and  leads  to  many  evils,  especially 
if  it  causes  one  to  be  self-opinionated,  refusing  to  seek  the  advice  of 
anyone.  When  a  man  sees  this  quahty  gaining  mastery  over  him, 
he  should  consider  the  origin  and  end  of  existing  things.  When  he 
sees  that  all  things  are  destined  to  pass  away,  and  himself  likewise, 
his  pride  will  change  to  humility. 

Meekness  is  closer  to  virtue  than  the  quality  mentioned  before, 
because  he  who  possesses  it  withholds  his  desire  from  seeking  grati- 
fication. It  is  a  quality  manifested  by  the  prophets  and  leads  to 
honor.  "The  fruits  of  lowliness,"  a  philosopher  has  said,  "are  love  and 
tranquillity."  Contentment  is  of  a  kind  with  meekness.  The  greatest 
riches  are  contentment  and  patience.    He  who  esteems  his  rank  but 


74  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

lightly  enhances  man's  estimation  of  his  dignity.  A  wise  man  has 
said,  "Be  humble  without  cringing,  and  manly  without  being  arro- 
gant. Arrogance  is  a  wilderness  and  haughtiness  a  taking  refuge 
therein,  and  altogether  a  going  astray." 

Modesty  is  connected  with  humiHty  but  is  superior  to  it,  for  it  is  a 
sister  of  reason,  and  reason,  as  everybody  knows,  is  the  most  important 
quality,  which  separates  man  from  beast  and  brings  him  near  to  the 
angels.  You  never  see  a  modest  person  without  sense,  or  a  person  of 
good  sense  who  is  not  modest.  A  man  must  be  modest  not  only  before 
others  but  also  to  himself.  Modesty  and  faithfulness,  it  is  said,  are 
closely  related,  and  the  one  cannot  be  had  truly  without  the  other. 

The  impudent  man  is  disliked  by  God  and  by  man,  even  if  he  be 
wise  and  learned.  If  one  has  this  quality  it  is  the  duty  of  his  friend 
and  associate  to  break  him  of  it  by  reproving  him.  It  is  of  value  only 
when  used  in  defence  of  the  Torah  and  in  behalf  of  God  and  the  truth. 

Space  will  not  permit  us  to  treat  in  detail  of  the  other  senses  and  the 
virtues  and  vices  depending  upon  them,  but  we  shall  indicate  briefly 
Gabirol's  method  of  relating  the  ethical  qualities  to  the  physical 
senses. 

Thus  the  sense  of  hearing,  which  is  next  in  importance  to  sight  has 
as  its  quahties  hate,  love,  mercy  and  cruelty.  It  takes  some  fine 
insight,  he  says,  to  see  the  connection  of  these  qualities  with  the  sense 
of  hearing,  but  the  intelligent  and  discerning  reader  wiU  find  this 
hint  sufficient.  I  hope  he  will  not  blame  me,  Gabirol  continues,  if  I 
do  not  bring  together  all  the  reasons  and  the  scriptural  passages  to 
prove  this,  for  human  flesh  is  weak,  especially  in  my  case  on  account 
of  my  vexatious  experiences  and  disappointments.  We  find  in  the 
Bible  love  associated  with  hearing:  Hear,  O  Israel  .  .  .  and  thou 
shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God"  (Deut.  6,  4).  Hate  follows  hearing  in 
the  phrase:  "When  Esau  heard  the  words  of  his  father  .  .  .  and  Esau 
hated  Jacob"  (Gen.  27,  34-41).  Mercy  is  related  to  hearing  in  Exod. 
(22,  26),  "And  I  will  hear  for  I  am  merciful."  Finally  cruelty  is  to 
refuse  to  Hsten,  as  we  find  in  the  case  of  Pharaoh  (Ex.  9,  12),  "And 
the  Lord  hardened  the  heart  of  Pharaoh,  and  he  hearkened  not  unto 
them." 

In  a  similar  manner  Gabirol  proves  that  the  sense  of  smell  has 
four  quahties,  anger,  favor,  envy,  wide-awakeness;  the  sense  of  taste, 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL 


75 


the  four  qualities,  joy,  sorrow,  regret,  calmness;  while  liberality, 
niggardliness,  courage  and  cowardice  are  related  to  the  sense  of  touch. 
The  relation  of  the  ethical  qualities  to  the  senses,  humors,  elements 
and  primitive  physical  qualities  is  exhibited  in  the  following  table, 
as  it  appears  in  the  Arabic  text  of  the  "Aslah  al-Ahlak,"  the  original 
title  of  Gabirol's  ethical  work. 

Alike  in  Respect  of  Dryness 


Anger,  Jealousy,  ^Niggatdliness^  Grief, 

Ciiueltjr 

■yo^ 

^ 

SB 

3 

g 

►t3 

5" 

"I 

n 

•d 

c 

n 

n 

0 

a 

o 

n 

n> 

n 

% 

w 

n 

B 

n 

^ 

fT 

s 

'^ 

a 

k 

o  /               \ 

re 

!B 

o 

m 

re 

H 

/               \ 

a 
n 

m 

n 

'< 

Courage,  Joy,  I<ove,  I<iberality, 
Good-Will 

\ 

Q'\ 

Alike  in  Respect  of  Moistness 


Among  Gabirol's  religious  poems  there  is  one  which  interests  us 
particularly  because  it  bears  traces  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Fons 
Vitae."  It  is  the  most  important  of  his  hymns  and  is  found  in  the 
prayer-book  of  the  Sephardic  ritual  for  the  Day  of  Atonement.  "The 
Royal  Crown,"  as  the  poem  is  entitled,  is  an  appeal  to  God  for  mercy 
and  forgiveness,  and  is  based  upon  the  contrast  between  the  greatness 
of  God  and  the  insignificance  of  man.     The  first  part  is  therefore 


76  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

devoted  to  a  poetical  description  of  God's  attributes  and  the  wonders 
of  the  cosmic  system,  as  conceived  in  the  astronomical  science  of  the 
day.  A  few  quotations  will  give  us  an  idea  of  the  style  and  character 
of  the  hymn  and  its  relation  to  the  "Fons  Vitse." 

"Thine  are  the  mysteries,  which  neither  fancy  nor  imagination  can 
comprehend ;  and  the  life,  over  which  dissolution  hath  no  power.  Thine 
is  the  Throne  exalted  above  all  height;  and  the  habitation  concealed 
in  the  eminence  of  its  recess.  Thine  is  the  existence,  from  the  shadow 
of  whose  light  sprung  every  existing  thing;  of  which  we  said,  under  its 
protecting  shadow  shall  we  live.  .  .  , 

"Thou  art  One,  the  first  of  every  number,  and  the  foundation  of  all 
structure.  Thou  art  One,  and  in  the  mystery  of  the  Unity  all  the 
wise  in  heart  are  astonished;  for  they  cannot  define  it.  Thou  art  One, 
and  thy  Unity  can  neither  be  lessened  nor  augmented;  for  nothing 
is  there  wanting  or  superfluous.  Thou  art  One,  but  not  such  a  one  as 
is  estimated  or  numbered;  for  neither  plurality,  nor  change,  form,  nor 
physical  attribute,  nor  name  expressive  of  thy  quality,  can  reach 
thee.  .  .  ." 

In  the  same  way  he  treats  God's  other  attributes,  existent,  living, 
great,  mighty.    Then  he  continues: 

"Thou  art  light,  and  the  eyes  of  every  pure  soul  shall  see  thee;  for 
the  clouds  of  iniquity  alone  hide  thee  from  her  sight.  .  .  .  Thou  art 
most  high,  and  the  eye  of  the  intellect  desireth  and  longeth  for  thee; 
but  it  can  only  see  a  part,  it  cannot  see  the  whole  of  thy  greatness.  .  .  . 

"Thou  art  God,  who  by  thy  Divinity  supportest  all  things  formed; 
and  upholdest  all  creatures  by  thy  Unity.  Thou  art  God,  and  there  is 
no  distinction  between  thy  godhead,  unity,  eternity  or  existence;  for 
all  is  one  mystery;  and  although  each  of  these  attributes  is  variously 
named,  yet  the  whole  point  to  one  end. 

"Thou  art  wise,  and  wisdom,  which  is  the  fountain  of  life,  floweth 
from  thee;  and  compared  with  thy  wisdom,  the  knowledge  of  all  man- 
kind is  folly.  Thou  art  wise;  and  didst  exist  prior  to  all  the  most 
ancient  things;  and  wisdom  was  reared  by  thee.  Thou  art  wise;  and 
hast  not  learned  aught  from  another,  nor  acquired  thy  wisdom  from 
anyone  else.  Thou  art  wise;  and  from  thy  wisdom  thou  didst  cause  to 
emanate  a  ready  will,  an  agent  and  artist  as  it  were,  to  draw  existence 
out  of  non-existence,  as  light  proceeds  from  the  eye.    Thou  drawest 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  77/ 

i 
from  the  source  of  light  without  a  vessel,  and  producest  everything 
without  a  tool." 

Then  follows  a  description  of  the  constitution  of  the  sublunar 
world,  the  terrestrial  sphere  consisting  of  part  earth,  part  water,  and 
being  surrounded  by  the  successive  spheres  of  air  and  fire.  Then 
follow  in  order  the  spheres  of  the  Moon,  Mercury,  Venus,  Sun,  Mars, 
Jupiter,  Saturn,  the  spheres  of  the  fixed  stars,  and  the  outermost 
sphere  embracing  all  and  giving  to  the  entire  heaven  the  diurnal  mo- 
tion from  east  to  west.    He  then  continues: 

"Who  can  understand  thy  tremendous  mysteries,  when  thou  didst 
exalt  above  the  ninth  orb,  the  sphere  of  the  Intelligence;  that  is  the 
inner  temple;  for  the  tenth  shall  be  holy  to  the  Lord.  This  is  the 
sphere  which  is  exalted  above  all  the  highest,  and  which  no  imagination 
can  reach;  and  there  is  the  hiding-place,  wherein  is  the  canopy  for 
thy  glory.  .  .  . 

"O  Lord!  who  can  come  near  thy  understanding,  when  thou  didst 
place  on  high  above  the  sphere  of  the  Intelligence  the  Throne  of  thy 
glory,  where  is  the  glorious  dwelling  of  the  hiding-place;  there  also  is 
the  mystery  and  the  foundation  (matter) ;  so  far  the  intellect  may 
reach  and  no  further;  for  above  this  art  thou  greatly  exalted  upon  thy 
mighty  throne,  where  no  man  may  come  up  to  thee.  .  .  . 

"Who  can  comprehend  thy  power,  when  thou  didst  create  from  the 
splendor  of  thy  glory  a  pure  lustre?  From  the  rock  of  rocks  was  it 
hewn,  and  dug  from  the  hollow  of  the  cave.  Thou  also  didst  bestow 
on  it  the  spirit  of  wisdom,  and  didst  call  it  soul.  Thou  didst  form  it 
hewn  from  the  flames  of  intellectual  fire,  so  that  its  spirit  burneth 
as  fire  within  it.  Thou  didst  send  it  forth  to  the  body  to  serve  and 
guard  it;  it  is  as  fire  in  the  midst  of  it,  and  yet  doth  not  consume  it; 
for  from  the  fire  of  the  soul  the  body  was  created,  and  called  into  existence 
from  nothing,  because  the  Lord  descended  thereto  in  fire." 

Here  we  see  the  Intelligence  spoken  of  as  standing  above  the  heav- 
enly spheres.  This  clearly  represents  the  cosmic  Intelligence  as  a 
creation  of  God,  "which  is  exalted  above  all  the  highest,"  hence  the 
first  product  of  God's  light.  And  yet  the  Throne  of  Glory  is  said  to  be 
placed  even  above  the  sphere  of  the  Intelligence.  He  speaks  of  it  as 
the  mystery  and  the  foundation  (Yesod),  beyond  which  the  intellect 
cannot  reach.    This  is  apparently  a  contradiction,  but  becomes  clear 


78  •  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

when  we  learn  what  is  meant  by  the  Throne  of  Glory,  and  by  "founda- 
tion." In  the  "Fons  Vitse"  Gabirol  tells  us  that  matter  receives  form 
from  the  First  Essence  through  the  medium  of  the  Will,  which  latter 
therefore,  as  it  bestows  form  upon  matter,  sits  in  it  and  rests  upon  it. 
And  hence,  he  says,  matter  is  as  it  were  the  stool  (cathedra)  of  the 
One.  The  word  "yesod"  (foundation)  which  Gabirol  applies  in  the 
"Keter  Malkut"  (Royal  Crown)  to  the  Throne  of  Glory  is  the  same 
that  Falaquera  uses  for  matter  throughout  in  his  epitome  of  the 
"Mekor  Hayim."  Hence  it  is  clear  that  the  Throne  of  Glory  which  is 
above  the  Intelligence  is  nothing  else  than  Gabirol's  matter.  And 
we  know  from  the  "Fons  Vitse"  that  matter  is  really  prior  to  Intelli- 
gence as  it  exists  in  the  knowledge  of  God,  but  that  in  reality  it  never 
was,  as  a  creation,  without  form;  and  that  with  form  it  constitutes  the 
IntelUgence.  Finally  there  is  also  a  reference  in  the  poem  to  the  will 
as  emanating  from  God's  wisdom,  and  like  an  ''agent  and  artist  draw- 
ing existence  out  of  non-existence  as  light  proceeds  from  the  eye." 
The  process  of  creation  is  thus  compared  with  the  radiation  of  hght  in 
the  sentence  just  quoted,  and  likewise  in  the  following:  "Thou  drawest 
from  the  source  of  light  without  a  vessel,  and  producest  everything 
without  a  tool." 

We  do  not  know  whether  Gabirol  wrote  any  commentaries  on  the 
Bible — none  are  extant,  nor  are  there  any  references  to  such  works — 
but  from  his  exegetical  attempts  in  his  ethical  work  discussed  above 
(p.  71  ff.)  and  from  citations  by  Abraham  ibn  Ezra  of  Gabirol's  ex- 
planations of  certain  passages  in  Scripture,  we  gather  that  like  Philo  of 
Alexandria  before  him  and  Maimonides  and  a  host  of  philosophical 
commentators  after  him,  he  used  the  allegorical  method  to  reconcile 
his  philosophical  views  with  the  Bible,  and  read  the  former  into  the 
latter.  ^"^^ 

Thus  we  are  told  that  Eden  represents  the  presence  of  God,  the 
garden  planted  in  Eden  stands  for  the  angehc  beings  or,  according 
to  another  interpretation,  for  the  world  of  sense.  By  the  river  which 
flows  out  of  Eden  is  meant  prime  matter  which  issues  from  the  essence 
of  God  according  to  the  "  Fons  Vitae."  The  four  divisions  of  the 
river  are  the  four  elements;  Adam  is  the  rational  soul,  Eve,  as  the 
Hebrew  name  indicates,  the  animal  soul,  and  the  serpent  is  the  vege- 
tative or  appetitive  soul.    The  serpent  entices  Adam  to  eat  of  the 


SOLOMON  IBN  GABIROL  79 

forbidden  tree.  This  means  that  when  the  lower  soul  succeeds  in 
controUing  the  reason,  the  result  is  evil  and  sin,  and  man  is  driven 
out  of  the  Garden,  i.  e.,  is  excluded  from  his  angeUc  purity  and  be- 
comes a  corporeal  being. 

It  is  clear  from  all  this  that  Gabirol's  omission  of  all  reference  to 
Jewish  dogma  in  the  "  Fons  Vitse"  was  purely  methodological.  Phi- 
losophy, and  religion  or  theology  should  be  kept  apart  in  a  purely 
philosophical  work.  Apologetics  or  harmonization  has  its  rights,  but 
it  is  a  different  department  of  study,  and  should  be  treated  by  itself, 
or  in  connection  with  exegesis  of  the  Bible. 

While  it  is  true  that  Gabirol's  influence  on  subsequent  Jewish 
philosophy  is  slight — at  most  we  find  it  in  Moses  and  Abraham  ibn 
Ezra,  Abraham  ibn  Daud  and  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik — traces  of  his  ideas 
are  met  with  in  the  mysticism  of  the  Kabbala.  Gabirol's  Fons 
Vitae"  is  a  peculiar  combination  of  logical  formalism  with  mystic 
obscurity,  or  profundity,  according  to  one's  point  of  view.  The  latter 
did  not  appeal  to  pure  rationahsts  like  Ibn  Daud  or  Maimonides,  and 
the  former  seemed  unconvincing,  as  it  was  employed  in  a  lost  cause. 
For  Neo-Platonism  was  giving  way  to  Aristotelianism,  which  was 
adopted  by  Maimonides  and  made  the  authoritative  and  standard 
philosophy.  It  was  different  with  the  Kabbala.  Those  who  were 
responsible  for  its  spread  in  the  thirteenth  century  must  have  been 
attracted  by  the  seemingly  esoteric  character  of  a  philosophy  which 
sees  the  invisible  in  the  visible,  the  spiritual  in  the  corporeal,  and  the 
reflection  of  the  unknowable  God  in  everything.  There  are  certain 
details  also  which  are  common  to  both,  such  as  the  analogies  of  irradi- 
ation of  light  or  flowing  of  water  used  to  represent  the  process  of  crea- 
tion, the  position  of  the  Will,  the  existence  of  matter  in  spiritual  beings, 
and  so  on,  though  some  of  these  ideas  are  common  to  all  Neo-Platonic 
systems,  and  the  Kabbala  may  have  had  access  to  the  same  sources 
as  Gabirol. 


CHAPTER  VI 


BAHYA  IBN   PAKUDA 


All  that  is  known  of  the  life  of  Bahya  ben  Joseph  ibn  Pakuda  is 
that  he  lived  in  Spain  and  had  the  office  of  "Dayyan,"  or  judge  of 
the  Jewish  community.  Not  even  the  exact  time  in  which  he  lived 
is  yet  determined,  though  the  most  reliable  recent  investigations  make 
it  probable  that  he  lived  after  Gabirol  and  was  indebted  to  the  latter 
for  some  of  his  views  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  Ethics.  ^''^  So  far  as 
traditional  data  are  concerned  we  have  equally  reliable,  or  rather 
equally  unreliable  statements  for  regarding  Bahya  as  an  older  contem- 
porary of  Gabirol  (eleventh  century),  or  of  Abraham  ibn  Ezra  (1088- 
1167).  Neither  of  these  two  data  being  vouched  for  by  any  but  their 
respective  authors,  who  lived  a  long  time  after  Bahya,  we  are  left  to 
such  indirect  evidence  as  may  be  gathered  from  the  content  of  Bahya's 
ethical  work,  the  "  Duties  of  the  Hearts."  And  here  the  recent  in- 
vestigations of  Yahuda,  the  latest  authority  on  this  subject  and  the 
editor  of  the  Arabic  text  of  Bahya's  masterpiece  (191 2),  force  upon  us 
the  conclusion  that  Bahya  wrote  after  Gabirol.  Yahuda  has  shown 
that  many  passages  in  the  "Duties  of  the  Hearts"  are  practically 
identical  in  content  and  expression  with  similar  ideas  found  in  a 
work  of  the  Arab  philosopher  Gazali  (1059-1111).  This  leaves  very 
Httle  doubt  that  Bahya  borrowed  from  Gazali  and  hence  could  not 
have  written  before  the  twelfth  century. 

To  be  sure,  there  are  arguments  on  the  other  side,  which  would 
give  chronological  priority  to  Bahya  over  Gabirol, ^'^'^  but  without 
going  into  the  details  of  this  minute  and  difficult  discussion,  it  may 
be  said  generally  that  many  of  the  similarities  in  thought  and  expres- 
sion between  the  two  ethical  works  of  Gabirol  and  Bahya  rather 
point  in  favor  of  the  view  here  adopted,  namely,  that  Bahya  borrowed 
from  Gabirol,  while  the  rest  prove  nothing  for  either  side.  In  so  far 
as  a  reader  of  the  "Duties  of  the  Hearts"  recognizes  here  and  there 
an  idea  met  with  in  Gabirol's  "Fons  Vitae,"  there  can  scarcely  be 

80 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  8i 

any  doubt  that  the  latter  is  the  more  original  of  the  two.  Gabirol  did 
not  borrow  his  philosophy  or  any  part  thereof  from  Bahya.  Despite 
its  Neo-Platonic  character  the  Fons  Vitae"  of  Gabirol  is  the  most 
independent  and  original  of  Jewish  mediaeval  productions.  The 
"Duties  of  the  Hearts"  owes  what  originality  it  has  to  its  ethics, 
which  is  the  chief  aim  of  the  work,  and  not  at  all  to  the  introductory 
philosophical  chapter.  As  we  shall  see  later,  the  entire  chapter  on  the 
existence  and  unity  of  God,  which  introduces  the  ethical  teachings 
of  Bahya,  moves  in  the  familiar  lines  of  Saadia,  Al  Mukammas,  Joseph 
al  Basir  and  the  other  Jewish  Mutakallimun,  There  is  besides  a 
touch  of  Neo-Platonism  in  Bahya,  which  may  be  due  to  Gabirol 
as  well  as  to  Arabic  sources.  That  Bahya  did  not  borrow  more  from 
the  "  Fons  Vitae"  than  he  did  is  due  no  doubt  to  the  difference  in  tem- 
perament between  the  two  men.  Bahya  is  not  a  mystic.  Filled  as 
he  is  with  the  spirit  of  piety  and  warmth  of  heart — an  attitude  re- 
flected in  his  style,  which  helped  to  make  his  work  the  most  popu- 
lar moral-religious  book  in  Jewish  Hterature — there  is  no  trace  of 
pantheism  or  metaphysical  mysticism  in  his  nature.  His  ideas  are 
sane  and  rational,  and  their  expression  clear  and  transparent.  Gabi- 
rol's  high  flights  in  the  "Fons  Vitae"  have  little  in  common  with 
Bahya's  modest  and  brief  outline  of  the  familiar  doctrines  of  the  exis- 
tence, unity  and  attributes  of  God,  for  which  he  claims  no  originahty, 
and  which  serve  merely  as  the  background  for  his  contribution  to  reli- 
gious ethics.  That  Bahya  should  have  taken  a  few  leading  notions 
from  the  Fons  Vitae,"  such  as  did  not  antagonize  his  temperament 
and  mode  of  thinking,  is  quite  possible,  and  we  shall  best  explain  such 
resemblances  in  this  manner. 

As  Abraham  ibn  Ezra  in  1156  makes  mention  of  Bahya  and  his 
views, ^"^^  we  are  safe  in  concluding  that  the  '  Duties  of  the  Hearts" 
was  written  between  iioo  and  1156. 

As  the  title  of  the  work  indicates,  Bahya  saw  the  great  significance 
of  a  distinction  made  by  Mohammedan  theologians  and  familiar  in 
their  ascetic  hterature,  between  outward  ceremonial  or  observance, 
known  as  "  visible  wisdom"  and  "duties  of  the  limbs,"  and  inward 
intention,  attitude  and  feeling,  called  hidden  wisdom"  and  "duties 
of  the  hearts."  ^"^  The  prophet  Isaiah  complains  that  the  people  are 
diligent  in  bringing  sacrifices,  celebrating  the  festivals  and  offering 


82  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

prayer  while  their  hands  are  full  of  blood.  He  informs  them  that 
such  conduct  is  an  abomination  to  the  Lord,  and  admonishes  them  to 
wash  themselves,  to  make  themselves  clean,  to  put  away  the  evil 
of  their  deeds  from  before  God's  eyes;  to  cease  to  do  evil;  to  learn  to 
do  well,  to  seek  for  justice,  to  relieve  the  oppressed,  to  do  justice  to 
the  fatherless,  to  plead  for  the  widow  (Isa.  1,11-17).  This  is  a  distinc- 
tion between  duties  to  God  and  duties  to  one's  fellow  man,  between 
religious  ceremony  and  ethical  practice.  Saadia  makes  a  further 
distinction — also  found  in  Arabic  theology  before  him — between  those 
commandments  and  prohibitions  in  the  Bible  which  the  reason  itself 
approves  as  right  or  condemns  as  wrong — the  rational  commandments 
— and  those  which  to  the  reason  seem  indifferent,  and  which  revelation 
alone  characterizes  as  obligatory,  permitted  or  forbidden — the  so- 
called  "  traditional  commandments." 

Bahya's  division  is  identical  with  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 
Ethical  practice  may  be  purely  external  and  a  matter  of  the  limbs, 
quite  as  much  as  sacrifice  and  ceremonial  ritual.  On  the  other  hand, 
one  may  feel  profoundly  moved  with  the  spirit  of  true  piety,  love  of 
God  and  loyalty  to  his  commandments  in  the  performance  of  a  so- 
called  "traditional  commandment,"  like  the  fastening  of  a  "mezuzah" 
to  the  door-post.  Bahya  finds  room  for  Saadia's  classification  but 
it  is  with  him  of  subordinate  importance,  and  is  apphcable  only  to  the 
"duties  of  the  limbs."  Among  these  alone  are  there  some  which  the 
reason  unaided  by  revelation  would  not  have  prescribed.  The  "duties 
of  the  heart "  are  all  rational.  Like  all  precepts  they  are  both  positive 
and  negative.  Examples  of  positive  duties  of  the  heart  are,  belief 
in  a  creator  who  made  the  world  out  of  nothing;  belief  in  his  unity 
and  incomparability;  the  duty  to  serve  him  with  all  our  heart,  to  trust 
in  him,  to  submit  to  him,  to  fear  him,  to  feel  that  he  is  watching  our 
open  and  secret  actions,  to  long  for  his  favor  and  direct  our  actions 
for  his  name's  sake;  to  love  those  who  love  him  so  as  to  be  near  unto 
him,  and  to  hate  those  who  hate  him.  Negative  precepts  of  this  class 
are  the  opposites  of  those  mentioned,  and  others  besides,  such  as  that 
we  should  not  covet,  or  bear  a  grudge,  or  think  of  forbidden  things,  or 
desire  them  or  consent  to  do  them.  The  common  characteristic  of  all 
'  duties  of  the  heart  is  that  they  are  not  visible  to  others.  God  alone  can 
judge  whether  a  person's  feeling  and  >notives  are  pure  or  the  reverse. 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  83 

That  these  duties  are  incumbent  upon  us  is  clear  from  every  point 
of  view.  Like  Saadia  Bahya  finds  the  sources  of  knowledge,  particu- 
larly of  the  knowledge  of  God's  law  and  rehgion,  in  sense,  reason, 
written  law  and  tradition.  Leaving  out  the  senses  which  are  not 
competent  in  this  particular  case,  the  obligatory  character  of  the 
duties  of  the  heart  is  vouched  for  by  the  other  three,  reason,  law, 
tradition. 

From  reason  we  know  that  man  is  composed  of  soul  and  body,  and 
that  both  are  due  to  God's  goodness.  One  is  visible,  the  other  is  not.  • 
Hence  we  are  obhged  to  worship  God  in  a  two-fold  manner;  with, 
visible  worship  and  invisible.  Visible  worship  represents  the  duties 
of  the  limbs,  such  as  prayer,  fasting,  charity,  and  so  on,  which  are 
carried  out  by  the  visible  organs.  The  hidden  worship  includes  the 
duties  of  the  heart,  for  example,  to  think  of  God's  unity,  to  believe 
in  him  and  his  Law,  to  accept  his  worship,  etc.,  all  of  which  are  ac- 
complished by  the  thought  of  the  mind,  without  the  assistance  of  the 
visible  limbs. 

Besides,  the  duties  of  the  limbs,  the  obligation  of  which  no  one 
doubts,  are  incomplete  without  the  will  of  the  heart  to  do  them. 
Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  a  duty  upon  our  souls  to  worship  God 
to  the  extent  of  our  powers. 

The  Bible  is  just  as  emphatic  in  teaching  these  duties  as  the  reason. 
The  love  of  God  and  the  fear  of  God  are  constantly  inculcated;  and 
in  the  sphere  of  negative  precepts  we  have  such  prohibitions  as,  "Thou 
shalt  not  covet"  (Exod.  20,  17);  "Thou  shalt  not  take  vengeance, 
nor  bear  any  grudge"  (Lev.  19,  18);  "Thou  shalt  not  hate  thy  brother 
in  thy  heart"  (ib.  17);  "You  shalt  not  go  astray  after  your  own  heart" 
(Num.  15,  39);  "Thou  shalt  not  harden  thy  heart  nor  shut  thy  hand 
from  thy  needy  brother"  (Deut.  15,  7),  and  many  others. 

Rabbinical  literature  is  just  as  full  of  such  precepts  as  the  Bible, 
and  is  if  possible  even  more  emphatic  in  their  inculcation.  Witness 
such  sayings  as  the  following:  "  Heaven  regards  the  intention " 
(Sanh.  io6b):  "The  heart  and  the  eye  are  two  procurers  of  sin"  (Jer. 
Berak.  i),  and  many  others,  particularly  in  the  treatise  Abot. 

The  great  importance  of  these  duties  is  also  made  manifest  by  the 
fact  that  the  punishment  in  the  Bible  for  unintentional  misdeeds  is 
more  lenient  than  for  intentional,  proving  that  for  punishment  the 


84  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

mind  must  share  with  the  body  in  the  performance  of  the  deed.  The 
same  is  true  of  reward,  that  none  is  received  for  performing  a  good 
deed  if  it  is  not  done  "in  the  name  of  heaven." 

They  are  even  more  important  than  the  duties  of  the  Umbs,  for 
unUke  the  latter  the  obhgation  of  the  duties  of  the  heart  is  always  in 
force,  and  is  independent  of  periods  or  circumstances.  Their  number, 
too,  is  infinite,  and  not  limited,  as  are  the  duties  of  the  limbs,  to  six 
hundred  and  thirteen. 

And  yet,  Bahya  complains,  despite  the  great  importance  of  these 
duties,  very  few  are  the  men  who  observed  them  even  in  the  generations 
preceding  ours,  not  to  speak  of  our  own  days  when  even  the  external 
ceremonies  are  neglected,  much  more  so  the  class  of  precepts  under 
discussion.  The  majority  of  students  of  the  Torah  are  actuated  by 
desire  for  fame  and  honor,  and  devote  their  time  to  the  intricacies  of 
legalistic  discussion  in  Rabbinic  literature,  and  matters  unessential, 
which  are  of  no  account  in  the  improvement  of  the  soul;  but  they  neg- 
lect such  important  subjects  of  study  as  the  unity  of  God,  which  we 
ought  to  understand  and  distinguish  from  other  unities,  and  not  merely 
receive  parrot  fashion  from  tradition.  We  are  expressly  commanded 
(Deut.  4,  39),  "Know  therefore  this  day,  and  reflect  in  thy  heart, 
that  the  Eternal  is  the  God  in  the  heavens  above,  and  upon  the  earth 
beneath:  there  is  none  else."  Only  he  is  exempt  from  studying  these 
matters  whose  powers  are  not  adequate  to  grasp  them,  such  as  women, 
children  and  simpletons. 

Moreover  Bahya  is  the  first,  he  tells  us,  among  the  post-Talmudical 
writers,  to  treat  systematically  and  ex  professo  this  branch  of  our 
religious  duties.  When  I  looked,  he  says,  into  the  works  composed  by 
the  early  writers  after  the  Talmud  on  the  commandments,  I  found 
that  their  writings  can  be  classified  under  three  heads.  First,  exposi- 
tion of  the  Torah  and  the  Prophets,  like  the  grammatical  and  lexi- 
cographical treatises  of  Ibn  Janah,  or  the  exegetical  works  of  Saadia. 
Second,  brief  compilations  of  precepts,  like  the  works  of  Hefez  ben 
Yazliah  and  the  responsa  of  some  geonim.  Third,  works  of  a 
philosophico-apologetic  character,  like  those  of  Saadia,  Al  Mukammas 
and  others,  whose  purpose  it  was  to  present  in  an  acceptable 
manner  the  doctrines  of  the  Torah,  to  prove  them  by  logical 
demonstration,  and  to  refute  the  criticisms  and  erroneous  views  of 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  85 

unbelievers.    But  I  have  not  seen  any  book  dealing  with  the  "hidden 
wisdom."  ^^0 

Here  we  see  clearly  the  purpose  of  Bahya.  It  is  not  the  rationah- 
zation  of  Jewish  dogma  that  he  is  interested  in,  nor  the  reconciliation 
of  religion  and  philosophy.  It  is  the  purification  of  rehgion  itseh  from 
within  which  he  seeks  to  accomplish.  Sincerity  and  consistency  in 
our  words  and  our  thoughts,  so  far  as  the  service  of  God  is  concerned, 
is  the  fundamental  requirement  and  essential  value  of  the  duties  of  the 
heart.  To  be  sure  this  cannot  be  attained  without  intelligence. 
The  knowledge  of  God  and  of  his  unity  is  a  prerequisite  for  a  proper 
understanding  and  an  adequate  appreciation  of  our  rehgious  duties. 
Philosophy  therefore  becomes  a  necessity  in  the  interest  of  a  purer, 
and  truer  religion,  without  reference  to  the  dangers  threatening  it 
from  without. 

Having  found,  he  continues  in  the  introduction  to  the  "Duties  of 
the  Hearts,"  that  all  the  three  sources,  reason,  Bible  and  tradition, 
command  this  branch  of  our  religious  duties,  I  tried  to  think  about 
them  and  to  learn  them,  being  led  from  one  topic  to  another  until  the 
subject  became  so  large  that  I  feared  I  could  not  contain  it  all  in  my 
memory.  I  then  determined  to  write  the  subject  down  systematically 
in  a  book  for  my  own  benefit  as  well  as  for  the  benefit  of  others.  But 
I  hesitated  about  writing  it  on  account  of  my  limitations,  the  difficulty 
of  the  subject  and  my  limited  knowledge  of  Arabic,  the  language  in 
which  I  intended  writing  it  because  the  majority  of  our  people  are  best 
familiar  with  it.  But  I  thought  better  of  it  and  realized  that  it  was 
my  duty  to  do  what  I  could  even  if  it  was  not  perfect;  that  I  must , 
not  yield  to  the  argument  springing  from  a  love  of  ease  and  disincli- 
nation to  effort;  for  if  everyone  were  to  abstain  from  doing  a  small 
good  because  he  cannot  do  as  much  as  he  would  like,  nothing  would 
ever  be  done  at  all. 

Having  decided  to  compose  the  work,  he  continues,  I  divided  the 
subject  into  ten  fundamental  principles,  and  devoted  a  section  of  the 
book  to  each  principle.  I  endeavored  to  write  in  a  plain  and  easy  style, 
omitting  difficult  expressions,  technical  terms  and  demonstrations  in 
the  manner  of  the  dialecticians.  I  had  to  make  an  exception  in  the  first 
section  deahng  with  the  existence  and  unity  of  God,  where  the  sublety 
of  the  subject  required  the  employment  of  logical  and  mathematical 


86  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

proofs.  For  the  rest  I  made  use  of  comparisons  or  similes,  adduced 
support  from  the  Bible  and  tradition,  and  also  quoted  the  sages  of 
other  nations. ^^^ 

We  have  already  seen  in  the  introduction  that  Bahya  was  indebted 
for  his  ideas  to  the  ascetic  and  Sufic  literature  of  the  Arabs,  and 
Yahuda,  who  is  the  authority  in  this  matter  of  Bahya's  sources,  has 
shown  recently  that  among  the  quotations  of  the  wise  men  of  other  na- 
tions in  Bahya's  work  are  such  as  are  attributed  by  the  Arabs  to  Jesus 
and  the  gospels,  to  Mohammed  and  his  companions,  to  the  early 
caliphs,  in  particular  the  caliph  Ali,  to  Mohammedan  ascetics  and 

In  selecting  the  ten  general  and  inclusive  principles,  Bahya  lays 
down  as  the  first  and  most  fundamental  the  doctrine  of  the  deity, 
or  as  it  is  called  in  the  works  of  the  Kalam,  the  Unity.  As  God  is  a 
true  imity,  being  neither  substance  nor  accident,  and  our  thought 
cannot  grasp  anything  except  substance  or  accident,  it  follows  that 
we  cannot  know  God  as  he  is  in  himself,  and  that  we  can  get  a  con- 
ception of  him  and  of  his  existence  from  his  creatures  only.  The  second 
section  is  therefore  devoted  to  an  examination  of  creation.  Then 
follow  in  order  sections  treating  of  the  service  of  God,  trust  in  God, 
action  for  the  sake  of  God  alone,  submission  to  God,  repentance,  self- 
examination,  separation  from  the  pleasures  of  the  world,  love  of  God. 

In  his  discussion  of  the  vmity  of  God,  Bahya  follows  the  same 
method  as  Saadia,  and  the  Kalam  generally,  i.  e.,  he  first  proves  that 
the  world  must  have  been  created;  hence  there  must  be  a  creator, 
and  this  is  followed  by  a  demonstration  of  God's  unity.  The  partic- 
ular arguments,  too,  are  for  the  most  part  the  same,  as  we  shall  see, 
though  differently  expressed  and  in  a  different  order.  The  important 
addition  in  Bahya  is  his  distinction  between  God's  unity  and  other 
unities,  which  is  not  fovmd  so  strictly  formulated  in  any  of  his  pred- 
ecessors, and  goes  back  to  Pseudo-Pythagorean  sources  in  Arabian 
literature  of  Neo-Platonic  origin. 

In  order  to  prove  that  there  is  a  creator  who  created  the  world  out 
of  nothing  we  assume  three  principles.  First,  nothing  can  make  itself. 
Second,  principles  are  finite  in  number,  hence  there  must  be  a  first 
before  which  there  is  no  other.  Third,  every  composite  is  "new," 
i.  e.,  came  to  be  in  time,  and  did  not  exist  from  eternity. 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  87 

Making  use  of  these  principles,  which  will  be  proved  later,  we  pro- 
ceed as  follows:  The  world  is  composite  in  all  its  parts.  Sky,  earth, 
stars  and  man  form  a  sort  of  house  which  the  latter  manages.  Plants 
and  animals  are  composed  of  the  four  elements,  fire,  air,  water,  earth. 
The  elements  again  are  composed  of  matter  and  form,  or  substance 
and  accident.  Their  matter  is  the  primitive  "hyle,"  and  their  form 
is  the  primitive  form,  which  is  the  root  of  all  forms,  essential  as  well 
as  accidental.  It  is  clear  therefore  that  the  world  is  composite,  and 
hence,  according  to  the  third  principle,  had  its  origin  in  time.  As, 
according  to  the  first  principle,  a  thing  cannot  make  itself,  it  must 
have  been  made  by  some  one.  But  as,  in  accordance  with  the  second 
principle,  the  number  of  causes  cannot  be  infinite,  we  must  finally 
reach  a  first  cause  of  the  world  before  which  there  is  no  other,  and  this 
first  made  the  world  out  of  nothing. 

Before  criticising  this  proof,  from  which  Bahya  infers  more  than  is 
legitimate,  we  must  prove  the  three  original  assumptions. 

The  proof  of  the  first  principle  that  a  thing  cannot  make  itself  is 
identical  in  Bahya  with  the  second  of  the  three  demonstrations  em- 
ployed by  Saadia  for  the  same  purpose.  It  is  that  the  thing  must 
either  have  made  itself  before  it  existed  or  after  it  existed.  But  both 
are  impossible.  Before  it  existed  it  was  not  there  to  make  itself; 
after  it  existed  there  was  no  longer  anything  to  make.  Hence  the 
first  proposition  is  proved  that  a  thing  cannot  make  itself. 

The  proof  of  the  second  proposition  that  the  number  of  causes  can- 
not be  infinite  is  also  based  upon  the  same  principle  as  the  fourth 
proof  in  Saadia  for  the  creation  of  the  world.  The  principle  is  this. 
Whatever  has  no  limit  in  the  direction  of  the  past,  i.  e.,  had  no  begin- 
ning, but  is  eternal  a  parte  ante,  cannot  have  any  stopping  point  any- 
where else.  In  other  words,  we  as  the  spectators  could  not  point  to 
any  definite  spot  or  link  in  this  eternally  infinite  chain,  because  the 
chain  must  have  traversed  infinite  time  to  reach  us,  but  the  infinite 
can  never  be  traversed.  Since,  however,  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  can 
and  do  direct  our  attention  to  parts  of  the  changing  world,  this  shows 
that  the  world  must  have  had  a  beginning. 

A  second  proof  of  the  same  principle  is  not  found  in  Saadia.  It  is 
as  follows:  If  we  imagine  an  actual  infinite  and  take  away  a  part, 
the  remainder  is  less  than  before.    Now  if  this  remainder  is  still  in- 


88  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

finite,  we  have  one  infinite  larger  than  another,  which  is  impossible. 
If  we  say  the  remainder  is  finite,  then  by  adding  to  it  the  finite  part 
which  was  taken  away,  the  result  must  be  finite;  but  this  is  contrary 
to  h5^othesis,  for  we  assumed  it  infinite  at  the  start.  Hence  it  follows 
that  the  infinite  cannot  have  a  part.  But  we  can  separate  in  thought 
out  of  all  the  generations  of  men  from  the  beginning  those  that  lived 
between  the  time  of  Noah  and  that  of  Moses.  This  will  be  a  finite 
number  and  a  part  of  all  the  men  in  the  world.  Hence,  as  the  infinite 
can  have  no  part,  this  shows  that  the  whole  number  of  men  is  finite, 
and  hence  that  the  world  had  a  beginning. 

This  proof  is  not  in  Saadia,  but  we  learn  from  Maimonides  ("Guide 
of  the  Perplexed,"  I,  ch.  75)  that  it  was  one  of  the  proofs  used  by  the 
Mutakallimun  to  prove  the  absurdity  of  the  behef  in  the  eternity  of 
the  world. 

The  third  principle  is  that  the  composite  is  new."  This  is  proved 
simply  by  pointing  out  that  the  elements  forming  the  composite  are 
prior  to  it  by  nature,  and  hence  the  latter  cannot  be  eternal,  for 
nothing  is  prior  to  the  eternal.  This  principle  also  is  found  in  Saadia 
as  the  second  of  the  four  proofs  in  favor  of  creation. ^^^ 

We  have  now  justified  our  assumptions  and  hence  have  proved — 
what?  Clearly  we  have  only  proved  that  this  composite  world  cannot 
have  existed  as  such  from  eternity;  but  that  it  must  have  been  com- 
posed of  its  elements  at  some  point  in  time  past,  and  that  hence  there 
must  be  a  cause  or  agency  which  did  the  composing.  But  there  is 
nothing  in  the  principles  or  in  the  demonstration  based  upon  them 
which  gives  us  a  right  to  go  back  of  the  composite  world  and  say  of 
the  elements,  the  simple  elements  at  the  basis  of  all  composition,  viz., 
matter  and  form,  that  they  too  must  have  come  to  be  in  time,  and 
hence  were  created  out  of  nothing.  It  is  only  the  composite  that 
argues  an  act  of  composition  and  elements  preceding  in  time  and  by 
nature  the  object  composed  of  them.  The  simple  needs  not  to  be  made, 
hence  the  question  of  its  having  made  itself  does  not  arise.  It  was  not 
made  at  all,  we  may  say,  it  just  existed  from  eternity. 

The  only  way  to  solve  this  diflficulty  from  Bahya's  premises  is  by 
saying  that  if  we  suppose  matter  (or  matter  and  form  as  separate 
entities)  to  have  existed  from  eternity,  we  are  liable  to  the  difl&culty 
involved  in  the  idea  of  anything  having  traversed  infinite  time  and 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  89 

reached  us;  though  it  is  doubtful  whether  unformed  matter  would 
lend  itself  to  the  experiment  of  abstracting  a  part  as  in  generations 
of  men. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  interesting  to  know  that  Saadia  having  ar- 
rived as  far  as  Bahya  in  his  argument  was  not  yet  satisfied  that  he 
proved  creation  ex  nihilo,  and  added  special  arguments  for  this  pur- 
pose. 

Before  proceeding  to  prove  the  unity  of  God,  Bahya  takes  occasion 
to  dismiss  briefly  a  notion  which  scarcely  deserves  consideration  in 
his  eyes.  That  the  world  could  have  come  by  accident,  he  says,  is 
too  absurd  to  speak  of,  in  view  of  the  evidence  of  harmony  and  plan 
and  wisdom  which  we  see  in  nature.  As  well  imagine  ink  spilled  by 
accident  forming  itself  into  a  written  book.^^^  Saadia  also  discusses 
this  view  as  the  ninth  of  the  twelve  theories  of  creation  treated  by 
him,  and  refutes  it  more  elaborately  than  Bahya,  whose  one  argument 
is  the  last  of  Saadia's  eight. 

In  the  treatment  of  creation  Saadia  is  decidedly  richer  and  more 
comprehensive  in  discussion,  review  and  argumentation.  This  was 
to  be  expected  since  such  problems  are  the  prime  purpose  of  the 
"Emunot  ve-Deot,"  whereas  they  are  only  preparatory,  though 
none  the  less  fundamental,  in  the  "Hobot  ha-Lebabot,"  and  Bahya 
must  have  felt  that  the  subject  had  been  adequately  treated  by  his 
distinguished  predecessor.  It  is  the  more  surprising  therefore  to  find 
that  in  the  treatment  of  the  unity  of  God  Bahya  is  more  elaborate, 
and  offers  a  greater  variety  of  arguments  for  unity  as  such.  Moreover, 
as  has  already  been  said  before,  he  takes  greater  care  than  anyone 
before  him  to  guard  against  the  identification  of  God's  unity  with 
any  of  the  unities,  theoretical  or  actual,  in  our  experience.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  this  emphasis  is  due  to  Neo-Platonic  influence,  some  of 
which  may  have  come  to  Bahya  from  Gabirol,  the  rest  probably  from 
their  common  sources. 

We  see,  Bahya  begins  his  discussion  of  the  unity  of  God,  that  the 
causes  are  fewer  than  their  effects,  the  causes  of  the  causes  still  fewer, 
and  so  on,  imtil  when  we  reach  the  top  there  is  only  one.  Thus,  the 
nimiber  of  individuals  is  infinite,  the  number  of  species  is  finite;  the 
number  of  genera  is  less  than  the  number  of  species,  until  we  get  to 
the  highest  genera,  which  according  to  Aristotle  are  ten  (the  ten! 


90  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

categories).  Again,  the  causes  of  the  individuals  under  the  categories 
are  five,  motion  and  the  four  elements.  The  causes  of  the  elements 
are  two,  matter  and  form.  The  cause  of  these  must  therefore  be 
one,  the  will  of  God.  (The  will  of  God  as  immediately  preceding 
universal  matter  and  form  sounds  like  a  reminiscence  of  the  "Fons 
Vitffi".) 

God's  unity  is  moreover  seen  in  the  unity  of  plan  and  wisdom  that 
is  evident  in  the  world.  Everything  is  related  to,  connected  with  and 
dependent  upon  everything  else,  showing  that  there  is  a  unitary 
principle  at  the  basis. 

If  anyone  maintains  that  there  is  more  than  one  God,  the  burden 
of  proof  lies  upon  him.  Our  observation  of  the  world  has  shown  us 
that  there  is  a  God  who  made  it;  hence  one,  since  we  cannot  conceive 
of  less  than  one;  but  why  more  than  one,  unless  there  are  special 
reasons  to  prove  it? 

Euclid  defines  unity  as  that  in  virtue  of  which  we  call  a  thing  one. 
This  means  to  signify  that  unity  precedes  the  unitary  thing  by  nature, 
just  as  heat  precedes  the  hot  object.  Plurality  is  the  sum  of  ones, 
hence  plurahty  cannot  be  prior  to  unity,  from  which  it  proceeds. 
Hence  whatever  plurality  we  find  in  our  minds  we  know  that  unity 
precedes  it;  and  even  if  it  occurs  to  anyone  that  there  is  more  than 
one  creator,  unity  must  after  all  precede  them  all.  Hence  God  is  one. 
'  This  argument  is  strictly  Neo-Platonic  and  is  based  upon  the  ideal- 
ism of  Plato,  the  notion  that  whatever  reality  or  attributes  particular 
things  in  our  world  of  sense  possess  they  owe  to  the  real  and  eternal 
types  of  these  realities  and  attributes  in  a  higher  and  intelligible 
(using  the  term  in  contradistinction  to  sensible)  world  in  which  they 
participate.  In  so  far  as  this  conception  is  applied  to  the  essences 
of  things,  it  leads  to  the  hypostatization  of  the  class  concepts  or 
universals.  Not  the  particular  individual  whom  we  perceive  is  the 
real  man,  but  the  typical  man,  the  ideal  man  as  the  mind  conceives 
him.  He  is  not  a  concept  but  a  real  existent  in  the  intelligible  world. 
If  we  apply  it  also  to  qualities  of  things,  we  hypostatize  the  abstract 
quality.  Heat  becomes  really  distinct  from  the  hot  object,  existence 
from  the  existent  thing,  goodness  from  the  good  person,  unity  from 
the  one  object.  And  a  thing  is  existent  and  one  and  good,  because 
it  participates  in  Existence,  Unity  and  Goodness.     These  are  real 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  91 

entities,  intelligible  and  not  sensible,  and  they  give  to  our  world  what 
reality  it  possesses. 

Plotinus  improved  upon  Plato,  and  instead  of  leaving  these  Ideas 
as  distinct  and  ultimate  entities,  he  adopted  the  suggestion  of  Philo 
and  gathered  up  all  these  intelligible  existences  in  the  lap  of  the  uni- 
versal Reason,  as  his  ideas  or  thoughts.  This  universal  Reason  is 
in  Philo  the  Logos,  whose  mode  of  existence  is  still  ambiguous,  and  is 
rather  to  be  understood  as  the  divine  mind.  In  Plotinus  it  is  the 
first  stage  in  the  unfoldment  of  the  Godhead,  and  is  a  distinct  hy- 
postasis, though  not  a  person.  In  Christianity  it  is  the  second  person 
in  the  Trinity,  incarnated  in  Jesus.  In  Israeli,  Gabirol  and  the  other 
Jewish  Neo-Platonists,  it  occupies  the  same  place  as  the  Nous  in 
Plotinus.  In  Bahya,  whose  taint  of  Neo-Platonism  is  not  even  skin 
deep,  there  is  no  universal  Reason  spoken  of.  But  we  do  not  really 
know  what  his  ideas  may  have  been  on  the  subject,  as  he  does  not 
develop  them  in  this  direction. 

To  return  to  Bahya's  arguments  in  favor  of  the  unity  of  God,  we 
proceed  to  show  that  duahsm  would  lead  to  absurd  conclusions.  Thus 
if  there  is  more  than  one  creator,  they  are  either  of  the  same  substance 
or  they  are  not.  If  they  are,  then  the  common  substance  is  the  real 
creator,  and  we  have  unity  once  more.  If  their  substances  are  differ- 
ent, they  are  distinct,  hence  Hmited,  finite,  composite,  and  hence  not 
eternal,  which  is  absurd. 

Besides,  plurahty  is  an  attribute  of  substance,  and  belongs  to  the 
category  of  quantity.  But  the  creator  is  neither  substance  nor  acci- 
dent (attribute),  hence  plurahty  cannot  pertain  to  him.  But  if  he 
cannot  be  described  as  multiple,  he  must  be  one. 

If  the  creator  is  more  than  one,  it  follows  that  either  each  one  of  them 
could  create  the  world  alone,  or  he  could  not  except  with  the  help  of 
the  other.  If  we  adopt  the  first  alternative,  there  is  no  need  of  more 
than  one  creator.  If  we  adopt  the  second,  it  follows  that  the  creator 
is  limited  in  his  power,  hence,  as  above,  composite,  and  not  eternal,' 
which  is  impossible.  Besides,  if  there  were  more  than  one  creator,  it  is 
possible  that  a  dispute  might  arise  between  them  in  reference  to  the 
creation.  But  all  this  time  no  such  thing  has  happened,  nature  being 
always  the  same.  Hence  God  is  one.  Aristotle  also  agrees  with  us,  for 
he  appUes  in  this  connection  the  Homeric  expression,  "It  is  not  good 


92  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

to  have  many  rulers,  let  the  ruler  be  one  "  (Iliad,  II,  204;  Arist., 
Metaphysics,  XII,  ch.  10,  p.  1076a  4).^^^ 

So  far  as  Bahya  proves  the  unity  of  God  he  does  not  go  beyond 
Saadia,  some  of  whose  arguments  are  reproduced  by  him,  and  one  or 
two  of  a  Neo-Platonic  character  added  besides.  But  there  is  a  decided 
advance  in  the  analysis  which  follows,  in  which  Bahya  shows  that 
there  are  various  kinds  of  imity  in  our  experience,  and  that  the  unity  of 
God  is  unique. 

We  apply  the  term  one  to  a  class,  a  genus,  a  species,  or  an  individ- 
ual. In  all  of  these  the  multiplicity  of  parts  is  visible.  The  genus  ani- 
mal contains  many  animals;  the  species  man  embraces  a  great  many 
individual  men;  and  the  individual  man  consists  of  many  parts  and 
organs  and  faculties.  Things  of  this  sort  are  one  in  a  sense  and  many  in 
a  sense. 

We  also  apply  the  term  one  to  an  object  in  which  the  multiplicity  of 
parts  is  not  as  readily  visible  as  in  the  previous  case.  Take  for  example 
a  body  of  water  which  is  homogeneous  throughout  and  one  part  is 
like  another.  This  too  is  in  reality  composed  of  parts,  matter  and 
form,  substance  and  accident.  It  is  in  virtue  of  this  composition  that 
it  is  subject  to  genesis  and  decay,  composition  and  division,  union  and 
separation,  motion  and  change.  But  all  this  implies  plurality.  Hence 
in  both  the  above  cases  the  unity  is  not  essential  but  accidental.  It  is 
because  of  a  certain  appearance  or  similarity  that  we  call  a  thing  or  a 
class  one,  which  is  in  reality  many. 

Another  application  of  the  term  one  is  when  we  designate  by  it  the 
basis  of  mmiber,  the  numerical  one.  This  is  a  true  one,  essential  as 
distinguished  from  the  accidental  referred  to  above.  But  it  is  mental 
and  not  actual.  It  is  a  symbol  of  a  beginning  which  has  no  other  be- 
fore it. 

Finally  there  is  the  real  and  actual  one.  This  is  something  that  does 
not  change  or  multiply;  that  cannot  be  described  by  any  material 
attribute,  that  is  not  subject  to  generation  and  decay;  that  does  not 
move  and  is  not  similar  to  anything.  It  is  one  in  all  respects  and  the 
cause  of  multiplicity.  It  has  no  beginning  or  end,  for  that  which  has 
is  subject  to  change,  and  change  is  opposed  to  unity,  the  thing  being 
different  before  and  after  the  change.  For  the  same  reason  the  real 
one  does  not  resemble  anything,  for  resemblance  is  an  accident  in  the 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  93 

resembling  thing,  and  to  be  possessed  of  accidents  is  to  be  multiple. 
Hence  the  true  one  resembles  nothing.  Its  oneness  is  no  accident  in 
it,  for  it  is  a  purely  negative  term  in  this  appHcation.  It  means  not 
multiple.  ^^^ 

We  have  now  shown  that  there  is  a  creator  who  is  one,  and  on  the 
other  hand  we  have  analyzed  the  various  meanings  of  the  term  one,  the 
last  of  which  is  the  most  real  and  the  purest.  It  remains  now  to  show 
that  this  pure  one  is  identical  with  the  one  creator.  This  can  be  proved 
in  the  following  way.  The  world  being  everywhere  composite  contains 
the  one  as  well  as  the  many — unity  of  composition,  plurahty  of  the 
parts  composed.  As  unity  is  prior  by  nature  to  plurality,  and  causes 
do  not  run  on  to  infinity  (see  above,  p.  87),  the  causes  of  the  world's 
unity  and  multiplicity  cannot  be  again  unity  and  multiphcity  of  the 
same  kind  forever.  Hence  as  multiphcity  cannot  be  the  first,  it  must 
be  unity — the  absolute  and  true  unity  before  which  there  is  no  other, 
and  in  which  there  is  no  manner  of  multiplicity.  But  God  is  the  one 
cause  of  the  universe,  as  we  have  shown,  hence  God  and  this  true 
imity  are  the  same. 

We  can  show  this  also  in  another  way.  Whatever  is  an  accidental 
attribute  in  one  thing  is  an  essential  element  in  some  other  thing. 
Thus  heat  is  an  accidental  attribute  in  hot  water.  For  water  may  lose 
its  heat  and  remain  water  as  before.  It  is  different  with  fire.  Fire  can- 
not lose  its  heat  without  ceasing  to  be  fire.  Hence  heat  in  fire  is  an 
essential  element;  and  it  is  from  fire  that  hot  water  and  all  other  hot 
things  receive  their  heat.  The  same  thing  apphes  to  the  attribute  of 
imity.  It  is  accidental  in  all  creatures.  They  are  called  one  because 
they  combine  a  nmnber  of  elements  in  one  group  or  concept.  But  they 
are  really  multiple  since  they  are  liable  to  change  and  division  and 
motion,  and  so  on.  Hence  there  must  be  something  in  which  unity 
is  essential,  and  which  is  the  cause  of  whatsoever  imity  all  other  things 
possess.  But  God  is  the  cause  of  the  universe,  hence  he  is  this  true 
and  absolute  imity,  and  all  change  and  accident  and  multiplicity  are 
foreign  to  him.^^'^ 

This  unity  of  God  is  not  in  any  way  derogated  from  by  the  ascription 
to  him  of  attributes.  For  the  latter  are  of  two  kinds,  "essential"  and 
"active."  We  call  the  first  essential  because  they  are  permanent  attri- 
butes of  God,  which  he  had  before  creation  and  will  continue  to  have 


94  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

when  the  world  has  ceased  to  be.  These  attributes  are  three  in  number, 
Existing,  One,  Eternal.    We  have  already  proved  every  one  of  them. 

Now  these  attributes  do  not  imply  change  in  the  essence  of  God. 
They  are  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  of  denying  their  opposites, 
i.  e.,  that  he  is  not  multiple,  non-existent  or  newly  come  into  being. 
They  also  imply  each  other  as  can  easily  be  shown,  i.  e.,  every  one  of 
the  three  implies  the  other  two.  We  must  understand  therefore  that 
they  are  really  one  in  idea,  and  if  we  could  find  one  term  to  express  the 
thought  fully,  we  should  not  use  three.  But  the  three  do  not  imply 
multiplicity  in  God. 

The  "active"  are  those  attributes  which  are  ascribed  to  God  by 
reason  of  his  actions  or  effects  on  us.  We  are  permitted  to  apply 
them  to  him  because  of  the  necessity  which  compels  us  to  get  to  know 
of  his  existence  so  that  we  may  worship  him.  The  Biblical  writers 
use  them  very  frequently.  We  may  divide  these  into  two  kinds: 
First,  those  which  ascribe  to  God  a  corporeal  form,  such  as  (Gen.  i,  27), 
"And  God  created  man  in  his  image,"  and  others  of  the  same  character. 
Second,  those  attributes  which  refer  to  corporeal  movements  and 
actions.  These  have  been  so  interpreted  by  our  ancient  sages  as  to 
remove  the  corporeality  from  God  by  substituting  the  "Glory  of  God" 
for  God  as  the  subject  of  the  movement  or  act  in  question.  Thus, 
(Gen.  28,  13)  "And  behold  the  Lord  stood  above  it,"  is  rendered  by  the 
Aramaic  translator,  "and  behold  the  glory  of  God  was  present  above 
it."  Saadia  deals  with  this  matter  at  length  in  his  Emunot  ve- 
Deot,"  in  his  commentary  on  Genesis,  and  on  the  book  "Yezirah." 
So  there  is  no  need  of  going  into  detail  here.  We  are  all  agreed  that 
necessity  compels  us  to  speak  of  God  in  corporeal  terms  so  that  all 
may  be  made  to  know  of  God's  existence.  This  they  could  not  do  if 
the  prophets  had  spoken  in  metaphysical  terms,  for  not  everyone 
can  follow  such  profound  matters.  But  having  come  to  the  knowledge 
of  God  in  this  simpler  though  imperfect  way,  we  can  then  advance  to  a 
more  perfect  knowledge  of  him.  The  intelligent  and  philosophical 
reader  will  lose  nothing  by  the  anthropomorphic  form  of  the  Bible, 
for  he  can  remove  the  husk  and  penetrate  to  the  kernel.  But  the  simple 
reader  would  miss  a  very  great  deal  indeed  if  the  Bible  were  written 
in  the  language  of  philosophy,  as  he  would  not  imderstand  it  and 
would  remain  without  a  knowledge  of  God. 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  95 

Despite  its  predominant  anthropomorphism,  however,  the  Bible 
does  give  us  hints  of  God's  spirituality  so  that  the  thoughtful  reader 
may  also  have  food  for  his  thought.  For  example,  such  expressions 
as  (Deut.  4,  15),  "Take  ye  therefore  good  heed  unto  yourselves;  for 
ye  saw  no  manner  of  form  on  the  day  that  the  Lord  spake  unto  you  in 
Horeb  out  of  the  midst  of  the  fire,"  and  many  others  are  meant  to 
spur  on  the  discriminating  reader  to  further  thought.  The  same 
applies  to  all  those  passages  in  which  the  word  "name"  is  inserted 
before  the  word  God  as  the  object  of  praise  to  indicate  that  we  do  not 
know  God  in  his  essence.  An  example  of  this  is,  "And  they  shall  bless 
the  name  of  thy  glory"  (Neh.  9,  5).  For  the  same  reason  the  name  of 
God  is  joined  in  the  Bible  to  heaven,  earth,  the  Patriarchs,  in  such 
phrases  as  the  God  of  the  heavens,  the  God  of  Abraham,  and  so  on, 
to  show  that  we  do  not  know  God's  essence  but  only  his  revelation  in 
nature  and  in  history.  This  is  the  reason  why  after  saying  to  Moses, 
"I  am  sent  me  unto  you"  (Ex.  3,  14),  he  adds  (ib.  15),  tell  them,  "the 
God  of  your  fathers,  the  God  of  Abraham,  the  God  of  Isaac  and  the 
God  of  Jacob  sent  me  unto  you."  The  meaning  is,  if  they  cannot 
imderstand  God  with  their  reason,  let  them  know  me  from  history 
and  tradition.  ^^^ 

In  Bahya's  treatment  of  the  divine  attributes  we  already  have  in 
brief  the  main  elements  which  Maimonides  almost  a  century  later 
made  classic,  namely,  the  distinction  between  essential  and  active 
attributes,  and  the  idea  that  the  former  are  to  be  imderstood  as  deny- 
ing their  opposites,  i.  e.,  as  being  in  their  nature  not  positive  but 
negative.  The  outcome  therefore  is  that  only  two  kinds  of  attributes 
are  applicable  to  God,  negative  and  those  which  are  transferred  or 
projected  from  the  effects  of  God's  activity  as  they  are  visible  in  na- 
ture. Saadia  had  already  made  the  distinction  between  essentia] 
and  active  attributes,  but  it  was  quite  incidental  with  him,  and  not 
laid  down  at  the  basis  of  his  discussion,  but  casually  referred  to  in  a 
different  connection.  Al  Mukammas  speaks  of  negative  attributes 
as  being  more  applicable  to  God  than  positive,  as  Philo  had  already 
said  long  before.  But  the  combination  of  these  two,  negative  and 
active,  as  the  only  kinds  of  divine  attributes  is  not  found  in  Jewish 
literature  before  Bahya. 

It  is  worth  noting  also  that  Bahya  does  not  lay  down  the  three 


96  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

attributes,  Power,  Wisdom  and  Life  as  fundamental  or  essential  in 
the  manner  of  the  Christians,  the  Arab  Mutakallimun,  and  the  Jewish 
Saadia.  Bahya,  as  we  have  seen,  regards  as  God's  essential  attributes, 
existence,  imity,  eternity.  Herein,  too,  he  seems  to  anticipate  Mai- 
monides  who  insists  against  the  believers  in  essential  attributes  that 
the  attributes,  living,  omnipotent,  omniscient,  having  a  will,  are  no 
more  essential  than  any  other,  but  like  the  rest  of  the  qualities  as- 
cribed to  God  have  reference  to  his  activity  in  nature.  ^^^ 

We  have  now  gone  through  Bahya's  philosophical  chapter  giving 
us  the  metaphysical  basis  of  his  ethico-religious  views.  That  his 
purpose  is  practical  and  not  theoretical  is  clear  from  his  definition  of 
what  he  calls  the  "acknowledgment  of  the  unity  of  God  with  full 
heart,"  not  to  speak  of  the  title  of  the  book  itself,  the  meaning  of 
which  we  explained  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  and  the  nine 
chapters  in  Bahya's  work  following  upon  the  first,  which  constitute  its 
real  essence  and  purpose.  To  acknowledge  the  unity  of  God  with 
full  heart  means,  he  tells  us,  that  one  must  first  know  how  to  prove 
the  existence  and  unity  of  God,  to  distinguish  God's  unity  from  every 
other,  and  then  to  make  his  heart  and  his  tongue  unite  in  this  concep- 
tion.^^" It  is  not  a  matter  of  the  intellect  merely,  but  of  the  heart  as 
affecting  one's  practical  conduct.  The  adequacy  of  the  conception 
is  destroyed  not  merely  by  thinking  of  God  as  multiple,  or  by  worship- 
ing images,  sun,  moon  and  stars;  it  is  made  null  and  void  likewise 
by  hypocrisy  and  pretence,  as  when  one  affects  piety  before  others  to 
gain  their  favor  or  acquire  a  reputation.  The  same  disastrous  result 
is  brought  about  by  indulging  the  low  physical  appetites.  Here  the 
worship  of  the  appetites  is  brought  into  competition  and  rivalry  with 
devotion  to  the  one  God.^"^ 

Our  object  being  to  trace  the  philosophical  conceptions  in  mediaeval 
Jewish  hterature,  we  cannot  linger  long  in  the  study  of  the  rest  of 
Bahya's  masterpiece,  which  is  homiletical  and  practical  rather  than 
theoretic,  and  must  content  ourselves  with  a  very  brief  resume  of  its 
principal  contents. 

In  studying  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God  we  reached  the  con- 
clusion that  while  a  knowledge  of  him  is  absolutely  necessary  for  a 
proper  mode  of  life,  we  cannot  form  an  idea  of  him  as  he  is  in  himself, 
.  and  are  left  to  such  evidence  as  we  can  gather  from  the  world  of  which 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  97 

he  is  the  author.  It  becomes  our  duty,  therefore,  to  study  nature,  as 
a  whole  and  in  its  parts,  conscientiously  and  minutely,  in  order  to 
reaUze  clearly  the  goodness  and  wisdom  of  God  as  exhibited  therein. 
For  various  reasons  we  are  apt  to  neglect  this  study  and  miss  the  in- 
sight and  benefits  arising  therefrom.  Chief  among  these  hindering 
circumstances  are  our  excessive  occupations  with  the  pleasures  of 
this  world,  and  the  accidents  and  misfortunes  to  which  mortal  is  heir, 
which  blind  him  to  his  real  good,  and  prevent  him  from  seeing  the 
blessing  in  disguise  lurking  in  these  very  misfortunes. 

But  it  is  clear  that  man  has  a  duty  to  study  the  divine  goodness 
and  wisdom  as  exhibited  in  nature,  else  of  what  use  is  his  faculty  of 
reason  and  intelligence,  which  raises  him  above  the  beast.  If  he  neg- 
lects it,  he  places  himself  below  the  latter,  which  realizes  all  the  func- 
tions of  which  it  is  capable.  Bible  and  Talmud  are  equally  emphatic 
in  urging  us  to  study  the  wonders  of  nature. 

The  variety  of  natural  phenomena  and  the  laws  they  exhibit  give 
evidence  of  the  personality  of  God  and  the  existence  of  his  will.  A 
being  without  will,  acting  by  necessity  of  nature,  acts  with  unswerv- 
ing uniformity. 

Heaven  and  earth,  plant  and  animal,  all  creatures  great  and  smaU, 
bear  witness,  in  their  structure  and  relations,  in  their  functions  and 
mutual  service  and  helpfulness,  to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God. 
Above  all  is  this  visible  in  man,  the  highest  of  earthly  beings,  the 
microcosm,  the  rational  creature,  the  discoverer  and  inventor  of  arts 
and  sciences.  In  the  laws  and  statutes  which  were  given  to  him  for 
the  service  of  God,  and  in  the  customs  of  other  nations  which  take 
the  place  of  our  divine  law,  we  see  God's  kindness  to  man  in  securing 
his  comfort  in  this  world  and  reward  in  the  next. 

Pride  is  the  great  enemy  of  man,  because  it  prevents  him  from  ap- 
preciating what  he  owes  to  God's  goodness.  Pride  makes  him  feel 
that  he  deserves  more  than  he  gets,  and  bhnds  him  to  the  truth.  ^-- 

We  all  recognize  the  duty  of  gratitude  to  a  fellow  man  who  has  done 
us  a  favor,  although  all  such  cases  of  benefit  and  service  between  man 
and  man,  not  excepting  even  the  kindness  of  a  father  to  his  child,  will 
be  found  on  examination  to  be  of  a  selfish  nature.  The  benefit  to 
self  may  not  in  all  cases  be  conscious,  but  it  is  always  there.  It  is  a 
father's  natxure  to  love  his  child  as  part  of  himself.    Moreover,  these 


98  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

human  favors  are  not  constant,  and  the  person  benefited  stands 
comparatively  on  the  same  level  of  existence  and  worth  as  his  bene- 
factor. How  much  greater  then  is  the  duty  incumbent  upon  us  to 
appreciate  God's  favors  which  are  not  selfish,  which  are  constant, 
and  which  are  bestowed  by  the  greatest  of  all  beings  upon  the  smallest 
of  all  in  respect  of  physical  strength. 

The  only  way  in  which  man  can  repay  God  for  his  kindness,  and 
show  an  appreciation  thereof  is  by  submitting  to  him  and  doing  those 
things  which  will  bring  him  nearer  to  God.  In  order  to  realize  this  it 
is  necessary  to  abandon  the  bad  qualities,  which  are  in  principle  two, 
.  love  of  pleasure  and  love  of  power.  The  means  enabling  one  to  obtain 
this  freedom  are  to  abstain  from  too  much  eating,  drinking,  idling, 
and  so  on,  for  the  first,  and  from  too  much  gossip,  social  intercourse, 
and  love  of  glory  for  the  second.  It  may  be  difficult  to  do  this,  but 
one  must  make  up  one's  mind  to  it,  like  the  invalid  who  is  ready  to 
lose  a  limb  in  order  to  save  his  life. 

The  problem  of  free  will  is  perplexing  indeed  and  interferes  with  the 
proper  attitude  toward  God  and  his  worship.  The  best  way  out  of  the 
difficulty  is  to  act  as  if  we  were  free,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  have 
confidence  in  God  as  the  author  of  everything. 

We  have  seen  that  the  reason  bids  us  recognize  our  duty  to  God  in 
return  for  his  goodness  to  us.  At  the  same  time  we  are  not  left  to  the 
suggestions  and  promptings  of  the  reason  alone.  We  have  a  positive 
law  prescribing  our  conduct  and  the  manner  and  measure  of  expressing 
our  gratitude  to  God.  This  is  made  necessary  by  the  constitution  of 
man's  nature.  He  is  a  composite  of  body  and  spirit.  The  former  is  at 
home  in  this  lower  world  and  is  endowed  with  powers  and  qualities 
which  tend  to  strengthen  it  at  the  expense  of  the  spirit,  a  stranger  in 
this  world.  Hence  the  necessity  of  a  positive  law  to  cure  the  spirit 
from  the  ills  of  the  body  by  forbidding  certain  kinds  of  food,  clothing, 
sexual  indulgence,  and  so  on,  which  strengthen  the  appetites,  and 
commanding  such  actions  as  prayer,  fasting,  charity,  benevolence, 
which  have  the  opposite  tendency  of  strengthening  the  reason. 

The  positive  law  is  necessary  and  useful  besides  because  it  prescribes 
the  middle  way,  discouraging  equally  the  extremes  of  asceticism  and 
of  self-indulgence.  It  regulates  and  defines  conduct,  and  makes  it 
imiform  for  old  and  young,  intelligent  and  unintelligent.    It  insti- 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  99 

tutes  new  occasions  of  worship  and  thanksgiving  as  history  reveals  new 
benefactions  of  God  to  his  people  in  various  generations.  The  law 
also  contains  matters  which  the  reason  alone  would  not  dictate,  and 
of  which  it  does  not  understand  the  meaning.  Such  are  the  "tradi- 
tional commandments."  The  reason  why  the  law  prescribes  also 
some  of  the  principles  of  the  "rational  commandments"  is  because 
at  that  time  the  people  were  so  sunk  in  their  animal  desires  that 
their  minds  were  weakened,  and  there  was  need  of  putting  both 
classes  of  commandments  on  the  same  level  of  positive  prescrip- 
tion. But  now  the  intelligent  person  observes  them  in  accordance 
with  their  distinct  origin,  whereas  the  masses  simply  follow  the  law 
in  both. 

The  admonition  of  the  positive  law  serves  as  an  introduction  to  the 
suggestions  of  our  own  reason  and  prepares  the  way  for  the  latter. 
The  first  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  young,  the  women  and  those  . 
of  weak  intellectual  power.  To  worship  God  not  merely  because  ^ 
the  law  prescribes  it,  but  because  reason  itself  demands  it  denotes  a 
spiritual  advance,  and  puts  one  in  the  grade  of  prophets  and  pious 
men  chosen  of  God.  In  this  world  their  reward  is  the  joy  they  feel  in 
the  sweetness  of  divine  service;  in  the  next  world  they  attain  to  the 
spiritual  light  which  we  cannot  declare  or  imagine/^^ 

One  of  the  duties  of  the  heart  is  to  trust  in  God.  Apart  from  the 
Bible  which  commands  us  to  have  trust  in  God,  we  can  come  to  the 
same  conclusion  as  a  result  of  our  own  reflection.  For  in  God  alone 
are  combined  all  the  conditions  necessary  to  confidence.  He  has  the 
power  to  protect  and  help  us,  and  the  knowledge  of  our  needs.  He  is 
kind  and  generous  and  has  a  love  for  us  and  an  interest  in  our  welfare, 
as  we  have  shown  in  a  previous  discussion.  Trust  in  God  is  of  advan- 
tage religiously  in  giving  a  person  peace  of  mind,  independence  and 
freedom  to  devote  himself  to  the  service  of  God  without  being  worried 
by  the  cares  of  the  world.  He  is  like  the  alchemist  who  changes  lead 
into  silver,  and  silver  into  gold.  If  he  has  money  he  can  make  good  use 
of  it  in  fulfilling  his  duties  to  God  and  man.  If  he  has  not,  he  is  grate- 
ful for  the  freedom  from  care  which  this  gives  him.  He  is  secure 
against  material  worries.  He  does  not  have  to  go  to  distant  lands  to 
look  for  support,  or  to  engage  in  hard  and  fatiguing  labor,  or  to  exploit 
other  people.     He  chooses  the  work  that  is  in  consonance  with  his 


lOO  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

mode  of  life,  and  gives  him  leisure  and  strength  to  do  his  duty  to  God 
and  man. 

The  suffering  of  the  good  and  the  prosperity  of  the  bad,  which  ap- 
parently contradicts  our  conclusion,  is  a  problem  as  old  as  the  world, 
and  is  discussed  in  the  Bible.  There  is  no  one  explanation  to  cover  all 
cases,  hence  no  solution  is  given  in  the  Bible.  But  several  reasons 
may  be  brought  forward  for  this  anomaly.  The  righteous  man  may 
suffer  by  way  of  punishment  for  a  sin  he  has  committed.  He  may 
suffer  in  this  world  in  order  that  he  may  be  rewarded  in  the  next. 
His  suffering  may  be  an  example  of  patience  and  goodness  to  other 
people;  especially  in  a  bad  generation,  to  show  off  their  wickedness 
by  contrast  with  his  goodness.  Or  finally  the  good  man  may  be 
punished  for  not  rebuking  his  generation  of  evil  doers.  In  a  similar 
way  we  may  explain  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked. 

Trust  in  God  does  not  signify  that  one  should  neglect  one's  work, 
be  careless  of  one's  life,  health  and  well-being,  or  abandon  one's  effort 
to  provide  for  one's  family  and  dependents.  No,  one  must  do  all  these 
things  conscientiously,  at  the  same  time  feeling  that  if  not  for  the  help 
of  God  all  effort  would  be  in  vain.  In  the  matter  of  doing  one's  duty 
and  observing  the  commandments,  whether  of  the  limbs  or  the  heart, 
trust  in  God  can  apply  only  to  the  last  step  in  the  process,  namely,  the 
realization  in  practice.  He  must  trust  that  God  will  put  out  of  the 
way  all  obstacles  and  hindrances  which  may  prevent  him  from  carry- 
ing out  his  resolutions.  The  choice  and  consent  must  come  from  a 
man's  own  will,  which  is  free.  The  most  he  may  do  is  to  trust  that 
God  may  remove  temptations. 

While  it  is  true  that  good  deeds  are  rewarded  in  this  world  as  well 
as  in  the  next,  a  man  must  not  trust  in  his  deeds,  but  in  God.  It  may 
seem  strange  that  there  is  no  reference  in  the  Bible  to  reward  in  the 
hereafter.  The  reasons  may  be  the  following.  Not  knowing  what  the 
state  of  the  soul  is  without  the  body,  we  could  not  understand  the 
nature  of  future  reward,  and  the  statement  of  it  in  the  Bible  would 
not  have  been  a  sufficient  inducement  for  the  people  of  that  time  to 
follow  the  commandments.  Or  it  is  possible  that  the  people  knew  by 
tradition  of  reward  after  death,  hence  it  was  not  necessary  to 
specify  it. 

As  knowledge  of  nature  and  of  God  leads  to  trust  in  him,  so  igno- 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  lOl 

ranee  leads  away  from  it.  It  is  as  with  a  child,  who  develops  in  his 
manner  of  trusting  in  things;  beginning  with  his  mother's  breast  and 
rising  gradually  as  he  grows  older  and  knows  more,  until  he  embraces 
other  persons  and  attains  to  trust  in  God.^^'* 

We  said  before  (p.  83)  that  the  duties  of  the  limbs  are  imperfect 
unless  accompanied  by  the  intention  of  the  heart.  A  man's  motive 
must  be  sincere.  It  must  not  be  his  aim  to  gain  the  favor  of  his  fellow- 
men  or  to  acquire  honor  and  fame.  The  observance  of  the  prescribed 
laws  must  be  motived  by  the  sole  regard  for  God  and  his  service. 
This  we  call  the  "unity  of  conduct."  The  meaning  is  that  a  man's 
act  and  intention  must  coincide  in  aiming  at  the  fulfilment  of  God's 
will.  In  order  to  realize  this  properly  one  must  have  an  adequate  and 
sincere  conception  of  God's  unity  as  shown  above;  he  must  have  an 
appreciation  of  God's  goodness  as  exhibited  in  nature;  he  must  submit 
to  God's  service;  he  must  have  trust  in  God  alone  as  the  sole  author 
of  good  and  evil;  and  correspondingly  he  must  abstain  from  flattering 
mankind,  and  must  be  indifferent  to  their  praise  and  blame;  he  must 
fear  God,  and  have  respect  and  awe  for  him.  When  he  is  in  the  act 
of  fulfiUing  his  spiritual  obligations,  he  must  not  be  preoccupied  with 
the  affairs  of  this  world;  and  finally  he  must  always  consult  his  reason, 
and  make  it  control  his  desires  and  inclinations.  ^^^ 

Humility  and  lowliness  is  an  important  element  conducive  to  "  unity 
of  conduct."  By  this  is  not  meant  that  general  helplessness  in  the 
face  of  conditions,  dangers  and  injuries  because  of  ignorance  of  the 
methods  of  averting  them.  This  is  not  humility  but  weakness.  Nor 
do  we  mean  that  timidity  and  loss  of  countenance  which  one  suffers 
before  a  superior  in  physical  power  or  wealth.  The  true  himiility 
with  which  we  are  here  concerned  is  that  which  one  feels  constantly 
before  God,  though  it  shows  itself  also  in  such  a  person's  conduct  in 
the  presence  of  others,  in  soft  speech,  low  voice,  and  modest  behavior 
generally,  in  prosperity  as  well  as  adversity.  The  truly  humble  man 
practices  patience  and  forgiveness;  he  does  good  to  mankind  and 
judges  them  favorably;  he  is  contented  with  little  in  respect  to  food 
and  drink  and  the  needs  of  the  body  generally;  he  endures  misfortune 
with  resignation;  is  not  spoiled  by  praise,  nor  irritated  by  blame, 
but  realizes  how  far  he  is  from  perfection  in  the  one  case,  and  appre- 
ciates the  truth  of  the  criticism  in  the  other.    He  is  not  spoiled  by 


I02  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

prosperity  and  success,  and  always  holds  himself  under  strict  account. 
God  knows  it,  even  if  his  fellowmen  do  not. 

Humility,  as  we  have  described  it,  is  not,  however,  incompatible 
with  a  certain  kind  of  pride;  not  that  form  of  it  which  boasts  of  physi- 
cal excellence,  nor  that  arrogance  which  leads  a  man  to  look  down 
upon  others  and  belittle  their  achievements.  These  forms  of  pride 
are  bad  and  diametrically  opposed  to  true  humility.  Legitimate 
mental  pride  is  that  which  leads  a  person  blessed  with  intellectual 
gifts  to  feel  grateful  to  God  for  his  favor,  and  to  strive  to  improve 
his  talents  and  share  their  benefits  with  others.  ^"^ 

Humility  is  a  necessary  forerunner  of  repentance  and  we  must 
treat  of  this  duty  of  the  heart  next.  It  is  clear  from  reason  as  well 
as  from  the  Law  that  man  does  not  do  all  that  is  incumbent  upon  him 
in  the  service  of  God.  For  man  is  composed  of  opposite  principles 
warring  with  each  other,  and  is  subject  to  change  on  account  of  the 
change  of  his  mental  qualities.  For  this  reason  he  needs  a  law  and 
traditional  custom  to  keep  him  from  going  astray.  The  Bible  also 
tells  us  that  "the  imagination  of  the  heart  of  man  is  evil  from  his 
youth"  (Gen.  8,  21).  Therefore  God  was  gracious  and  gave  man  the 
ability  and  opportunity  to  correct  his  mistakes.    This  is  repentance. 

True  repentance  means  return  to  God's  service  after  having  suc- 
ceeded in  making  the  reason  the  master  of  the  desires.  The  elements 
in  repentance  are,  (i)  regret;  (2)  discontinuance  of  the  wrong  act;  (3) 
confession  and  request  for  pardon;  (4)  promise  not  to  repeat  the 
offence. 

In  respect  to  gravity  of  offence,  sins  may  be  divided  into  three 
classes:  (i)  Violation  of  a  positive  commandment  in  the  Bible  which 
is  not  punished  by  "cutting  off  from  the  community."  For  example, 
dwelling  in  booths,  wearing  fringes,  and  shaking  the  palm  branch. 
(2)  Violation  of  a  negative  commandment  not  so  punished.  (3) 
Violation  of  a  negative  conmiandment  the  penalty  for  which  is  death 
at  the  hands  of  the  court,  and  being  "cut  off"  by  divine  agency;  for 
example,  profanation  of  the  divine  name  or  false  oath.  In  cases  of 
the  first  class  a  penitent  is  as  good  as  one  who  never  sinned.  In  the 
second  class  he  is  even  superior,  because  the  latter  has  not  the  same 
prophylactic  against  pride.  In  the  third  class  the  penitent  is  inferior 
to  the  one  who  never  sinned. 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  103 

Another  classification  of  offences  is  in  two  divisions  according  to 
the  subject  against  whom  the  offence  is  committed.  This  may  be 
a  human  being,  and  the  crime  is  social;  or  it  may  be  God,  and  we  have 
sin  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term.  Penitence  is  sufficient  for  forgive- 
ness in  the  latter  class,  but  not  in  the  former.  When  one  robs  another 
or  insults  him,  he  must  make  restoration  or  secure  the  pardon  of  the 
offended  party  before  his  repentance  can  be  accepted.  And  if  the  per- 
son cannot  be  found,  or  if  he  died,  or  is  alive  but  refuses  to  forgive  his 
offender,  or  if  the  sinner  lost  the  money  which  he  took,  or  if  he  does  not 
know  whom  he  robbed,  or  how  much,  it  may  be  impossible  for  him  to 
atone  for  the  evil  he  has  done.  Still  if  he  is  really  sincere  in  his 
repentance,  God  will  help  him  to  make  reparation  to  the  person 
wronged.  ^^^ 

Self-examination  is  conducive  to  repentance.  By  this  term  is  meant 
taking  stock  of  one's  spiritual  condition  so  as  to  know  the  merits  one 
has  as  well  the  duties  one  owes.  In  order  to  do  this  conscientiously 
a  man  must  reflect  on  the  unity  of  God,  on  his  wisdom  and  goodness, 
on  the  obedience  which  all  nature  pays  to  the  laws  imposed  upon  it, 
disregard  of  which  would  result  in  the  annihilation  of  all  things,  in- 
cluding himself.  A  man  should  review  his  past  conduct,  and  provide 
for  his  future  life,  as  one  provides  for  a  long  journey,  bearing  in  mind 
that  life  is  short,  and  that  he  is  a  stranger  in  this  world  with  no  one 
to  help  him  except  the  goodness  and  grace  of  his  maker.  He  should 
cultivate  the  habit  of  being  alone  and  not  seek  the  society  of  idlers,  for 
that  leads  to  gossip  and  slander,  to  sin  and  wrong,  to  vanity  and 
neglect  of  God.  This  does  not  apply  to  the  company  of  the  pious 
and  the  learned,  which  should  be  sought.  He  should  be  honest  and 
helpful  to  his  friends,  and  he  will  get  along  well  in  this  world.  All  the 
evils  and  complaints  of  life  are  due  to  the  fact  that  people  are  not 
considerate  of  one  another,  and  everyone  grabs  for  himself  all  that 
he  can,  more  than  he  needs.  One  should  examine  anew  the  ideas 
one  has  from  childhood  to  be  sure  that  he  understands  them  in  the 
light  of  his  riper  intellect.  He  should  also  study  again  the  books 
of  the  Bible  and  the  prayers  which  he  learned  as  a  child,  for  he  would 
see  them  now  in  a  different  light.  He  must  try  to  make  his  soul  control 
his  body,  strengthening  it  with  intellectual  and  spiritual  food  for  the 
world  to  come.    These  efforts  and  reflections  and  many  others  of  a 


I04  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

similar  kind  tend  to  perfect  the  soul  and  prepare  it  to  attain  to  the 
highest  degree  of  purity,  where  the  evil  desire  can  have  no  power  over 
her.  128 

In  self-examination  temperance  or  abstemiousness  plays  an  impor- 
tant role.  Let  us  examine  this  concept  more  closely.  By  abstemious- 
ness in  the  special  sense  in  which  we  use  it  here  we  do  not  mean  that 
general  temperance  or  moderation  which  we  practice  to  keep  our  body 
in  good  order,  or  such  as  physicians  prescribe  for  the  healthy  and  the 
sick,  bidding  them  abstain  from  certain  articles  of  food,  drink,  and  so 
on.  We  mean  rather  a  more  stringent  abstemiousness,  which  may  be 
called  separation  from  the  world,  or  asceticism.  We  may  define  this 
to  mean  abstention  from  all  corporeal  satisfactions  except  such  as  are 
indispensable  for  the  maintenance  of  life. 

Not  everyone  is  required  to  practice  this  special  form  of  temperance, 
nor  is  it  desirable  that  he  should,  for  it  would  lead  to  extinction  of  the 
himian  race.  At  the  same  time  it  is  proper  that  there  shall  be  a  few 
select  individuals,  ascetic  in  their  habits  of  life,  and  completely  sep- 
arated from  the  world,  to  serve  as  an  example  for  the  generality  of 
mankind,  in  order  that  temperance  of  the  more  general  kind  shall  be 
the  habit  of  the  many. 

The  object  of  God  in  creating  man  was  to  try  the  soul  in  order  to 
purify  it  and  make  it  like  the  angels.  It  is  tried  by  being  put  in  an 
earthy  body,  which  grows  and  becomes  larger  by  means  of  food. 
Hence  God  put  into  the  soul  the  desire  for  food,  and  the  desire  for 
sexual  union  to  perpetuate  the  species;  and  he  made  the  reward  for 
the  satisfaction  of  these  desires  the  pleasure  which  they  give.  He 
also  appointed  the  "evil  inclination"  to  incite  to  all  these  bodily 
pleasures.  Now  if  this  "evil  incUnation"  gets  the  upper  hand  of  the 
reason,  the  result  is  excess  and  ruin.  Hence  the  need  of  general  ab- 
stemiousness. And  the  ascetic  class  serve  the  purpose  of  reinforcing 
general  temperance  by  their  example. 

But  in  the  asceticism  of  the  few  there  is  also  a  limit  beyond  which 
one  should  not  go.  Here  too  the  middle  way  is  the  best.  Those 
extremists  who  leave  the  world  entirely  and  hve  the  life  of  a  recluse 
in  the  desert,  subsisting  on  grass  and  herbs,  are  farthest  from  the 
middle  way,  and  the  Bible  does  not  approve  of  their  mode  of  life,  as 
we  read  in  Isaiah  (45,  18)  "The  God  that  formed  the  earth  and  made 


BAHYA  IBN  PAKUDA  105 

it;  he  that  hath  estabUshed  it, — not  in  vain  did  he  create  it,  he  formed 
it  to  be  inhabited."  Those  are  much  better  who  without  leaving  for 
the  desert  pass  sohtary  hves  in  their  homes,  not  associating  with  other 
people,  and  abstaining  from  superfluities  of  all  kinds.  But  the  best 
of  all  are  those  who  adopt  the  mildest  form  of  asceticism,  who  separate 
from  the  world  inwardly  while  taking  part  in  it  outwardly,  and  assist- 
ing in  the  ordinary  occupations  of  mankind.  These  are  commended 
in  the  Bible.  Witness  the  prayer  of  Jacob  (Gen.  28,  20),  the  fasting 
of  Moses  forty  days  and  forty  nights  on  the  mount,  the  fasting  of 
Elijah,  the  laws  of  the  Nazirite,  Jonadab  ben  Rechab,  Elisha,  prescrip- 
tions of  fasting  on  various  occasions,  and  so  on.^^^ 

The  highest  stage  a  man  can  reach  spiritually  is  the  love  of  God, 
and  all  that  preceded  has  this  as  its  aim.  True  loA^e  of  God  is  that 
felt  toward  him  for  his  own  sake  because  of  his  greatness  and  exalta- 
tion, and  not  for  any  ulterior  purpose. 

The  soul  is  a  simple  spiritual  substance  which  inclines  to  that 
which  is  like  it,  and  departs  from  what  is  material  and  corporeal. 
But  when  God  put  the  soul  into  the  body,  he  implanted  in  it  the 
desire  to  maintain  it,  and  it  was  thus  affected  by  the  feelings  and  de- 
sires which  concern  the  health  and  growth  of  the  body,  thus  becoming 
estranged  from  the  spiritual. 

In  order  that  the  soul  shall  attain  to  the  true  love  of  God,  the  reason 
must  get  the  upper  hand  of  the  desires,  all  the  topics  treated  in  the 
preceding  sections  must  be  taken  to  heart  and  sincerely  and  con- 
scientiously acted  upon.  Then  the  eyes  of  the  soul  will  be  opened,  and 
it  will  be  filled  with  the  fear  and  the  love  of  God.^^" 


CHAPTER  VII 


PSEUDO-BAHYA 


It  had  been  known  for  a  number  of  years  that  there  was  a  manu- 
script treatise  in  Arabic  on  the  soul,  which  was  attributed  on  the  title 
page  to  Bahya.  In  1896  Isaac  Broyde  published  a  Hebrew  translation 
of  this  work  under  the  title  "Torot  ha-Nefesh,"  ("Reflections  on  the 
Soul").^^^  The  original  Arabic  was  edited  by  Goldziher  in  1907.^^^ 
The  Arabic  title  is  "Ma'ani  al-Nafs,"  and  should  be  translated  "Con- 
cepts of  the  soul,"  or  "Attributes  of  the  soul." 

There  seems  little  doubt  now  that  despite  the  ascription  on  the 
title  page  of  the  manuscript,  the  treatise  is  not  a  work  of  Bahya. 
It  is  very  unlikely  that  anything  written  by  so  distinguished  an  au- 
thor as  Bahya,  whose  "  Duties  of  the  Hearts"  was  the  most  popular 
book  in  the  middle  ages,  should  have  been  so  thoroughly  forgotten 
as  to  have  left  no  trace  in  Jewish  literature.  Bahya  as  well  as  the 
anonymous  author  refer,  in  the  introductions  to  their  respective  works, 
to  their  sources  or  to  their  own  previous  writings.  But  there  is  no 
reference  either  in  the  "Duties  of  the  Hearts"  to  the  "Attributes  of 
the  Soul,"  or  in  the  latter  to  the  former.  A  still  stronger  argument 
against  Bahya  as  the  author  of  our  treatise  is  that  derived  from  the 
content  of  the  work,  which  moves  in  a  different  circle  of  ideas  from 
the  "Duties  of  the  Hearts."  Our  anonymous  author  is  an  outspoken 
Neo-Platonist.  He  believes  in  the  doctrine  of  emanation,  and  arranges 
the  created  universe,  spiritual  and  material,  in  a  descending  series  of 
such  emanations,  ten  in  number.  The  Mutakallimun  he  opposes  as 
being  followers  of  the  "  Naturahsts, "  who  disagree  with  the  philoso- 
phers as  well  as  the  Bible.  Bahya,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  strict  fol- 
lower of  the  Kalam  in  his  chapter  on  the  "Unity,"  as  we  have  seen 
(p.  86),  and  the  Neo-Platonic  influence  is  very  sUght.  There  is  no 
trace  of  a  graded  series  of  emanations  in  the  "Duties  of  the 
Hearts."  1^3 

The  sources  of  the  "Attributes  of  the  Soul"  are  no  doubt  the  various 

106 


PSEUDO-BAHYA  107 

Neo-Platonic  writings  current  among  the  Arabs  in  the  tenth  and 
eleventh  centuries,  of  which  we  spoke  in  the  Introduction  (p.  xx) 
and  in  the  chapter  on  Gabirol  (p.  63  f.).  Gabirol  himself  can  scarcely 
have  had  much  influence  on  our  author,  as  the  distinctive  doctrine  of 
the  "Fons  Vitae"  is  absent  in  our  treatise.  The  reader  will  remember 
that  matter  and  form,  according  to  Gabirol,  are  at  the  basis  not  merely 
of  the  corporeal  world,  but  that  they  constitute  the  essence  of  the 
spiritual  world  as  well,  the  very  first  emanation,  the  Universal  In- 
telhgence,  being  composed  of  universal  matter  and  universal  form. 
As  we  shall  see  this  is  not  the  view  of  the  "Attributes  of  the  Soul." 
Matter  here  occupies  the  position  which  it  has  in  Plotinus  and  in  the 
encyclopaedia  of  the  Brethren  of  Purity.  It  is  the  fourth  in  order  of 
emanations,  and  the  composition  of  matter  and  form  begins  with  the 
celestial  sphere,  which  is  the  fifth  in  order.  Everything  that  pre- 
cedes matter  is  absolutely  simple.  At  the  same  time  it  seems  clear 
that  he  was  familiar  with  Gabirol's  doctrine  of  the  will.  For  in  at 
least  two  passages  in  the  "Attributes  of  the  Soul"  (chs.  11  and  13)  ^^^ 
we  have  the  series,  vegetative  soul,  spheral  impression,  [psychic 
power — omitted  in  ch.  13],  universal  soul,  intellect,  will. 

The  "Categories"  of  Aristotle  is  also  clearly  evident  in  the  "At- 
tributes of  the  Soul."  It  is  the  ultimate  source  of  the  definition  of 
accident  as  that  which  resides  in  substance  without  being  a  part  of  it, 
but  yet  in  such  a  way  that  without  substance  it  cannot  exist.  ^^^  The 
number  of  the  species  of  motion  as  six  ^^®  points  in  the  same  direction. 
This,  however,  does  not  prove  that  the  author  read  the  Categories." 
He  might  have  derived  these  notions,  as  well  as  the  list  of  the  ten 
categories,  from  the  writings  of  the  Brethren  of  Purity.  The  same 
thing  appHes  to  the  statement  that  a  spiritual  substance  is  distin- 
guished from  a  corporeal  in  its  capacity  of  receiving  its  qualities  or 
accidents  without  limits.  ^^^  This  probably  goes  back  to  the  De  Anima 
of  Aristotle  where  a  similar  contrast  between  the  senses  and  the  reason 
is  used  as  an  argument  for  the  "separate"  character  of  the  latter. 
The  doctrine  of  the  mean  in  conduct  ^^^  comes  from  the  ethics  of 
Aristotle.  The  doctrine  of  the  four  virtues  and  the  manner  of  their 
derivation  is  Platonic, ^^^  and  so  is  the  doctrine  of  reminiscence,  viz., 
that  the  soul  recalls  the  knowledge  it  had  in  its  previous  life.^^" 

Ibn  Sina  is  one  of  the  latest  authors  mentioned  in  our  work;  hence 


io8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

it  could  not  have  been  written  much  before  1037,  the  date  of  Ibn 
Sina's  death.    The  terminus  ad  quern  cannot  be  determined. 

As  the  title  indicates,  the  anonymous  treatise  is  concerned  primarily 
with  the  nature  of  the  soul.  Whatever  other  topics  are  found  therein 
are  introduced  for  the  bearing  they  have  on  the  central  problem.  A 
study  of  the  soul  means  psychology  as  well  as  ethics,  for  a  complete 
determination  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  necessarily  must  throw  light 
not  only  upon  the  origin  and  activity  of  the  soul,  but  also  upon  its 
purpose  and  destiny. 

The  first  error,  we  are  told,  that  we  must  remove  concerning  the  soul, 
is  the  doctrine  of  the  ''naturalists,"  with  whom  the  Mu  tazilites 
among  the  Arabs  and  the  Karaites  among  the  Jews  are  in  agreement, 
that  the  soul  is  not  an  independent  and  self-subsistent  entity,  but  only 
an  "accident"  of  the  body.  Their  view  is  that  as  the  soul  is  a  cor- 
poreal quality  it  is  dependent  for  its  existence  upon  the  body  and  dis- 
appears with  the  latter.  Those  of  the  Mu  tazilites  who  beUeve  in 
"Mahad"  (return  of  the  soul  to  its  origin),  hold  that  at  the  time  of 
the  resurrection  God  will  bring  the  parts  of  the  body  together  with  its 
accident,  the  soul,  and  will  reward  and  punish  them.  But  the  resur- 
rection is  a  distinct  problem,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  nature 
of  the  soul  and  its  qualities. 

The  true  opinion,  which  is  that  of  the  Bible  and  the  true  philoso- 
phers, is  that  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  substance  independent  of  the 
body;  that  it  existed  before  the  body  and  will  continue  to  exist  after 
the  dissolution  of  the  latter.  The  existence  of  a  spiritual  substance 
is  proved  from  the  presence  of  such  qualities  as  knowledge  and  ig- 
norance. These  are  opposed  to  each  other,  and  cannot  be  the  quali- 
ties of  body  as  such,  for  body  cannot  contain  two  opposite  forms  at 
the  same  time.  Moreover,  the  substance,  whatever  it  be,  which  bears 
the  attributes  of  knowledge  and  ignorance,  can  receive  them  without 
hmit.  The  more  knowledge  a  person  has,  the  more  capable  he  is  of 
acquiring  more.  No  corporeal  substance  behaves  in  this  way.  There 
is  always  a  limit  to  a  body's  power  of  receiving  a  given  accident.  We 
legitimately  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  substance  which  bears  the 
attributes  of  knowledge  and  ignorance  is  not  corporeal  but  spiritual. ^^^ 

To  understand  the  position  of  the  soul  and  its  relation  to  the  body, 
we  must  have  an  idea  of  the  structure  and  origin  of  the  universe. 


PSEUDO-BAHYA  109 

The  entire  world,  upper  as  well  as  lower,  is  divided  into  two  parts, 
simple  and  composite.  The  simple  essences,  which  are  pure  and  bright, 
are  nearer  to  their  Creator  than  the  less  simple  substances  which 
come  after.  There  are  ten  such  creations  with  varying  simplicity, 
following  each  other  in  order  according  to  the  arrangement  dictated 
by  God's  wisdom.  As  numbers  are  simple  up  to  ten,  and  then  they 
begin  to  be  compound,  so  in  the  universe  the  ten  simple  substances 
are  followed  by  composite. 

The  first  of  these  simple  creations,  which  is  nearest  to  God,  is  called 
in  Hebrew  "Shekinah."  The  Torah  and  the  Prophets  call  it  "Name" 
(Exod.  23,  21),  also  "Kabod,"  Glory  (Is.  59,  19).  God  gave  his  name 
to  the  nearest  and  first  of  his  creations,  which  is  the  first  light,  and 
interpreter  and  servant  nearest  to  him.  Solomon  calls  it  "Wisdom  " 
(Prov.  8,  22);  the  Greeks,  Active  Intellect.  The  second  creation  is 
called  by  the  Prophets,  "the  Glory  of  the  God  of  Israel  "  (Ezek.  8,  9); 
by  the  Greeks,  Universal  Soul,  for  it  moves  the  spheres  through  a 
natural  power  as  the  individual  soul  moves  the  body.  The  soul 
partakes  of  the  Intelligence  or  Intellect  on  the  side  which  is  near  to  it; 
it  partakes  of  Nature  on  the  side  adjoining  the  latter.  Nature  is  the 
third  creation.  It  also  is  an  angel,  being  the  first  of  the  powers  of  the 
universal  soul,  and  constituting  the  life  of  this  world  and  its  motion. 

These  three  are  simple  essences  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word. 
They  are  obedient  to  their  Creator,  and  transmit  in  order  his  emana- 
tion and  the  will,  and  the  laws  of  his  wisdom  to  all  the  worlds.  The 
fourth  creation  is  an  essence  which  has  no  activity  or  Ufe  or  motion 
originally,  but  only  a  power  of  receiving  whatever  is  formed  and  created 
out  of  it.  This  is  the  Matter  of  the  world.  From  it  come  the  bodies 
which  possess  accidents.  In  being  formed  some  of  its  non-existence 
is  diminished,  and  its  matter  moves.  It  is  called  "hyle, "  and  is  the 
same  as  the  darkness  of  the  first  chapter  in  Genesis.  For  it  is  a  mis- 
take to  suppose  that  by  darkness  in  the  second  verse  of  the  first  chapter 
is  meant  the  absence  of  the  light  of  the  sun.  This  is  accidental  dark- 
ness, whereas  in  the  creation  story  the  word  darkness  signifies  some- 
thing elemental  at  the  basis  of  corporeal  things.  This  is  what  is  known 
as  matter,  which  on  account  of  its  darkness,  i.  e.,  its  imperfection  and 
motionlessness,  is  the  cause  of  all  the  blemishes  and  evils  in  the  world. 
In  receiving  forms,  however,  it  acquires  motion;  its  darkness  is  some- 


no  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

what  diminished,  and  it  appears  to  the  eye  through  the  forms  which 
it  receives. 

The  fifth  creation  is  the  celestial  Sphere,  where  for  the  first  time  we 
have  motion  in  its  revolutions.  Here  too  we  have  the  first  composition 
of  matter  and  form;  and  the  beginning  of  time  as  the  measure  of  the 
Sphere's  motion;  and  place.  The  sixth  creation  is  represented  by  the 
bodies  of  the  stars,  which  are  moved  by  the  spheres  in  which  they  are 
set.  They  are  bright  and  luminous  because  they  are  near  the  first 
simple  bodies,  which  were  produced  before  time  and  place.  The  last 
four  of  the  ten  creations  are  the  four  elements,  fire,  air,  water,  earth. 
The  element  earth  is  the  end  of  creation."  What  follows  thereafter 
is  "formation"  and  "composition."  By  creation  is  meant  that  which 
results  through  the  will  of  God  from  his  emanation  alone,  and  not  out 
of  anything,  or  in  time  or  place.  It  applies  in  the  strictest  sense  to 
the  first  three  only.  The  fifth,  namely  the  Sphere,  already  comes  from 
matter  and  form,  and  is  in  time  and  place.  The  fourth,  too,  enters 
into  the  fifth  and  all  subsequent  creations  and  formations.  Still, 
the  term  creation  is  applicable  to  the  first  ten,  though  in  varying  de- 
grees, until  when  we  reach  the  element  earth,  creation  proper  is  at  an 
end.  This  is  why  in  the  first  verse  in  Genesis,  which  speaks  of  heaven 
and  earth,  the  term  used  is  bara"  (created),  and  not  any  of  the  other 
terms,  such  as  "yazar,"  '"asah,"  "kanah,"  "paal,"  and  so  on,  which 
denote  formation. 

From  earth  and  the  other  elements  were  formed  all  kinds  of  miner- 
als, like  rocks,  mountains,  stones,  and  so  on.  Then  plants  and  animals, 
and  finally  man. 

Man  who  was  formed  last  bears  traces  of  all  that  preceded  him. 
He  is  formed  of  the  four  elements,  of  the  motions  of  the  spheres,  of 
the  mixtures  of  the  stars  and  their  rays,  of  Nature,  of  the  Universal 
Soul,  the  mother  of  all,  of  the  Intellect,  the  father  of  all,  and  finally 
of  the  will  of  God.  But  the  order  in  man  is  reversed.  The  first  two 
creations,  Intellect  and  Soul,  appear  in  man  last. 

The  soul  of  man,  embracing  reason  and  intellect,  is  thus  seen  to  be 
a  divine  emanation,  being  related  to  the  universal  soul  and  Intellect. 
On  its  way  from  God  to  man  it  passes  through  all  spheres,  and  every 
one  leaves  an  impression  upon  her,  and  covers  her  with  a  wrapper, 
so  to  speak.    The  brightness  of  the  star  determines  the  ornament  or 


PSEUDO-BAHYA  iii 

"wrapper"  which  the  soul  gets  from  it.  This  is  known  to  the  Creator, 
who  determines  the  measure  of  influence  and  the  accidents  attaching 
to  the  soul  until  she  reaches  the  body  destined  for  her  by  his  will. 
The  longer  the  stay  in  a  given  sphere  the  stronger  the  influence  of  the 
sphere  in  question;  and  hence  the  various  temperaments  we  observe 
in  persons,  which  determine  their  character  and  conduct.  For  at 
bottom  the  soul  is  the  same  in  essence  and  unchangeable  in  all  men, 
because  she  is  an  emanation  from  the  Unchangeable.  All  individual 
differences  are  due  to  the  spheral  impressions.  These  impressions, 
however,  do  not  take  away  from  the  soul  its  freedom  of  will.^^- 

In  the  rest  of  his  psychology  and  ethics  the  anonymous  author 
follows  Platonic  theories,  modified  now  and  then  in  the  manner  of 
Aristotle.  Thus  we  are  told  that  the  soul  consists  of  three  powers, 
or  three  souls,  the  vegetative,  the  animal  and  the  rational.  We  learn 
of  the  existence  of  the  vegetative  soul  from  the  nourishment,  growth 
and  reproduction  evidenced  by  the  individual.  The  animal  soul  shows 
its  presence  in  the  motions  of  the  body.  The  existence  of  the  rational 
soul  we  have  already  shown  from  the  attributes  of  knowledge  and 
ignorance. 

The  vegetative  soul  comes  from  certain  spheral  influences,  them- 
selves due  to  the  universal  soul,  and  ultimately  to  the  will  of  God. 
It  is  the  first  of  the  three  to  make  its  appearance  in  the  body.  It  is 
already  found  in  the  embryo,  to  which  it  gives  the  power  of  motion 
in  its  own  place  like  the  motion  of  a  plant  or  tree.  Its  seat  is  in  the 
liver,  where  the  growth  of  the  embryo  begins.  Its  function  ceases 
about  the  twentieth  year,  when  the  growth  of  the  body  reaches  its 
limit. 

The  animal  soul  springs  from  the  heart.  Its  functioning  appears 
after  birth  when  the  child  begins  to  crawl,  and  continues  until  the 
person  loses  the  power  of  locomotion  in  old  age.  The  rational  soul 
resides  in  the  middle  of  the  brain.  She  knows  all  things  before  joining 
the  body,  but  her  knowledge  is  obscured  on  account  of  the  material 
coverings  which  she  receives  on  her  way  down  from  her  divine 
source.  ^^^ 

The  virtue  of  the  vegetative  soul  is  temperance;  of  the  animal  soul, 
courage;  of  the  rational  soul,  wisdom.  When  these  are  harmoniously 
combined  in  the  individual,  and  the  two  lower  souls  are  controlled 


112  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

by  the  higher,  there  results  the  fourth  virtue,  which  is  justice,  and 
which  gives  its  possessor  the  privilege  of  being  a  teacher  and  a  leader 
of  his  people.  In  Moses  all  these  qualities  were  exemplified,  and 
Isaiah  (ii,  1-4)  in  describing  the  quahties  of  the  Messianic  King  also 
enumerates  these  four  cardinal  virtues.  "The  spirit  of  wisdom 
and  understanding  "  represents  wisdom,  "  the  spirit  of  coimsel  and 
strength"  stands  for  courage;  "the  spirit  of  knowledge  and  fear  of 
the  Lord  "  denotes  temperance;  and  justice  is  represented  in  the 
phrase,  "and  he  will  judge  the  poor  with  righteousness."  ^^^ 

Virtue  is  a  mean  between  the  two  extremes  of  excess  and  defect, 
each  of  which  is  a  vice.  Thus  an  excess  of  wisdom  becomes  shrewd- 
ness and  cunning  and  deceit;  while  a  defect  means  ignorance.  The 
true  wisdom  consists  in  the  middle  way  between  the  two  extremes. 
Similarly  courage  is  a  mean  between  foolhardiness  and  rashness  on 
the  side  of  excess,  and  cowardice  on  the  side  of  defect.  Temperance  is 
a  mean  between  excessive  indulgence  of  the  appetites  on  one  side  and 
utter  insensibility  on  the  other.  The  mean  of  justice  is  the  result  of 
the  harmonious  combination  of  the  means  of  the  last  three.  If  the 
rational  soul  has  wisdom  and  the  two  other  souls  are  obedient  to  it 
through  modesty  and  courage,  their  substance  changes  into  the  sub- 
stance of  the  rational  soul,  i.  e.,  their  bad  qualities  are  transformed  into 
the  four  virtues  just  mentioned.  Then  the  two  lower  souls  unite 
with  the  rational  soul  and  enjoy  eternal  happiness  with  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  rational  soul  follows  the  senses,  its  wisdom  changes 
into  their  folly,  its  virtues  into  their  vices,  and  it  perishes  with  them.^'*^ 

The  immortality  of  the  soul  is  proved  as  follows.  Things  composed 
of  elements  return  back  to  their  elements,  hence  the  soul  also  returns 
to  its  own  origin.  The  soul  is  independent  of  the  body,  for  its  quali- 
ties, thought  and  knowledge,  are  not  bodily  qualities,  hence  they 
become  clearer  and  more  certain  after  the  soul  is  separated  from  the 
body  than  before,  when  the  body  obscured  its  vision  like  a  curtain. 
The  fact  that  a  person's  mind  is  affected  when  his  body  is  ill  does  not 
show  that  the  soul  is  dependent  in  its  nature  upon  the  body;  but  that 
acting  as  it  does  in  the  body  by  means  of  corporeal  organs,  it  cannot 
perform  its  functions  properly  when  these  organs  are  injured. 

Since  death  is  a  decree  of  God,  it  is  clear  that  he  has  a  purpose  in 
changing  the  relations  of  body  and  soul.    But  if  the  soul  comes  to  an 


PSEUDO-BAHYA  1 13 

end,  this  change  would  be  a  vain  piece  of  work  of  which  he  cannot 
be  guilty.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  destruction  of  the  body  is  in 
order  that  we  may  exist  in  another  similar  form,  similar  to  the 
angels.  ^^^ 

The  purpose  of  the  soul's  coming  into  this  world  is  in  order  that  she 
may  purify  the  two  lower  souls;  also  that  she  may  know  the  value  of 
her  own  world  in  comparison  with  this  one,  and  in  grieving  for  having 
left  it  may  observe  God's  commandments,  and  thus  achieve  her  re- 
turn to  her  own  world. 

In  the  matter  of  returning  to  their  own  world  after  separation  from 
the  body,  souls  are  graded  according  to  the  measure  of  their  knowledge 
and  the  value  of  their  conduct.  These  two  conditions,  ethical  and 
spiritual  or  intellectual,  are  requisite  of  fulfilment  before  the  soul  can 
regain  its  original  home.  The  soul  on  leaving  this  world  is  like  a  clean, 
white  garment  soaked  in  water.  If  the  water  is  clean,  it  is  easy  to 
dry  the  garment,  and  it  becomes  even  cleaner  than  it  was  before. 
But  if  the  water  is  dirty,  no  amount  of  dr3ang  will  make  the  garment 
clean. 

Those  souls  which  instead  of  elevating  the  two  lower  souls,  vege- 
tative and  animal,  were  misled  by  them,  will  perish  with  the  latter. 
Between  the  two  extremes  of  perfection  and  wickedness  there  are 
intermediate  stages,  and  the  souls  are  treated  accordingly.  Those 
of  the  proud  will  rise  in  the  air  and  flying  hither  and  thither  will  not 
find  a  resting  place.  Those  which  have  knowledge,  but  no  good  deeds, 
will  rise  to  the  sphere  of  the  ether,  but  will  be  prevented  from  rising 
higher  by  the  weight  of  their  evil  deeds,  and  the  pure  angels  will  rain 
down  upon  them  arrows  of  fire,  thus  causing  them  to  return  below  in 
shame  and  disgrace.  The  souls  of  the  dishonest  will  be  driven  from 
place  to  place  without  finding  any  rest.  Other  bad  souls  will  be 
punished  in  various  ways.  Those  souls  which  have  good  deeds  but 
no  knowledge  will  be  placed  in  the  terrestrial  paradise  until  their  souls 
recall  the  knowledge  they  had  in  their  original  state,  and  they  will 
then  return  to  the  Garden  of  Eden  among  the  angels.  ^^^ 


CHAPTER  VIII 


ABRAHAM   BAR   HIYYA 


Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  the  Prince,  as  he  is  called,  lived  in  Spain  in 
the  first  half  of  the  twelfth  century.  He  also  seems  to  have  stayed 
some  time  in  southern  France,  though  we  do  not  know  when  or  how 
long.  His  greatest  merit  lies  not  in  his  philosophical  achievement 
which,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  only  work  of  a  philosophical  character 
that  has  come  down  to  us,  is  not  very  great.  He  is  best  known  as  a 
writer  on  mathematics,  astronomy  and  the  calendar;  though  there,  too, 
his  most  important  service  lay  not  so  much  in  the  original  ideas  he 
propounded,  as  in  the  fact  that  he  was  among  the  first,  if  not  the 
first,  to  introduce  the  scientific  thought  current  in  the  Orient  and  in 
Moorish  Spain  into  Christian  Europe,  and  especially  among  the  Jews 
of  France  and  Germany,  who  devoted  all  their  energies  to  the  Rab- 
binical literature,  and  to  whom  the  Arabic  works  of  their  Spanish 
brethren  were  a  sealed  book. 

So  we  find  Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  or  Abraham  Savasorda  (a  corrup- 
tion of  the  Arabic  title  Sahib  al-Shorta),  associated  with  Plato  of  Tivoli 
in  the  translation  into  Latin  of  Arabic  scientific  works.  And  he  him- 
self wrote  a  number  of  books  on  mathematics  and  astronomy  in  He- 
brew at  the  request  of  his  friends  in  France  who  could  not  read  Arabic. 
Abraham  bar  Hiyya  is  the  first  of  the  writers  we  have  treated  so  far 
who  composed  a  scientific  work  in  the  Hebrew  language.  All  the 
others,  with  the  exception  of  Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  wrote  in  Arabic,  as 
they  continued  to  do  until  and  including  Maimonides. 

The  only  one  of  his  extant  works  which  is  philosophical  in  content 
is  the  small  treatise  "Hegyon  ha-Nefesh,"  Meditation  of  the  Soul.^'*^ 
It  is  a  popular  work,  written  with  a  practical  purpose,  ethical  and 
homiletic  in  tone  and  style.  The  idea  of  repentance  plays  an  impor- 
tant role  in  the  book,  and  what  theoretical  philosophy  finds  place 
therein  is  introduced  merely  as  a  background  and  basis  for  the  ethical 
and  religious  considerations  which  follow.    It  may  be  called  a  minia- 

"4 


ABRAHAM  BAR  HIYYA  115 

ture  "Duties  of  the  Hearts."  As  in  all  homiletical  compositions  in 
Jewish  hterature,  exegesis  of  Bibhcal  passages  takes  up  a  good  deal 
of  the  discussions,  and  for  the  history  of  the  philosophic  movement 
in  mediaeval  Judaism  the  methods  of  reading  metaphysical  and  ethical 
ideas  into  the  Bible  are  quite  as  important  as  these  ideas  themselves. 

The  general  philosophical  standpoint  of  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  may 
be  characterized  as  an  uncertain  Neo-Platonism,  or  a  combination  of 
fundamental  Aristotehan  ideas  with  a  Neo-Platonic  coloring.  Thus 
matter  and  form  are  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  world.  They 
existed  potentially  apart  in  the  wisdom  of  God  before  they  were  com- 
bined and  thus  realized  in  actuahty.^^^  Time  being  a  measure  of 
motion,  came  into  being  together  with  the  motion  which  followed  upon 
this  combination.  Hence  neither  the  world  nor  time  is  eternal.  This 
is  Platonic,  not  Aristotehan,  who  believes  in  the  eternity  of  motion 
as  well  as  of  time.  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  also  speaks  of  the  purest 
form  as  light  and  as  looking  at  and  illuminating  the  form  inferior  to 
it  and  thus  giving  rise  to  the  heavens,  minerals  and  plants.  ^^^  This 
is  all  Neo-Platonic.  And  yet  the  most  distinctive  doctrine  of  Plotinus 
and  the  later  Neo-Platonists  among  the  Arabs,  the  series  of  emanating 
hypostases.  Intellect,  Universal  Soul,  Nature,  Matter,  and  so  on, 
is  wanting  in  the  "Hegyon  ha-Nefesh."  ^^^  Form  is  the  highest  thing 
he  knows  outside  of  God;  and  the  purest  form,  which  is  too  exalted  to 
combine  with  matter,  embraces  angels,  seraphim,  souls,  and  all  forms 
related  to  the  upper  world.  ^^^  With  the  exception  of  the  names  angel, 
seraphim,  souls,  this  is  good  Aristotehan  doctrine,  who  also  beheves 
in  the  movers  of  the  spheres  and  the  active  intellect  in  man  as  being 
pure  forms. 

To  proceed  now  to  give  a  brief  account  of  Abraham  bar  Hiyya's 
teaching,  he  thinks  it  is  the  duty  of  rational  man  to  know  how  it  is 
that  man  who  is  so  insignificant  was  given  control  of  the  other  animals, 
and  endowed  with  the  power  of  wisdom  and  knowledge.  In  order  to 
gain  this  knowledge  we  must  investigate  the  origins  and  principles 
of  existing  things,  so  that  we  may  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  things 
as  they  are.  This  the  wise  men  of  other  nations  have  realized,  though 
they  were  not  privileged  to  receive  a  divine  Torah,  and  have  busied 
themselves  with  philosophical  investigations.  Our  Bible  recommends 
to  us  the  same  method  in  the  words  of  Deuteronomy  (4,  39),  "Know 


ii6  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

therefore  this  day,  and  reflect  in  thy  heart,  that  the  Lord  is  God  in 
the  heavens  above,  and  upon  the  earth  beneath:  there  is  none  else." 
This  means  that  if  you  understand  thoroughly  the  order  of  things  in 
heaven  above  and  the  earth  beneath,  you  will  at  once  see  that  God 
made  it  in  his  wisdom,  and  that  he  is  the  only  one  and  there  is  no  one 
beside  him.  The  book  of  Job  teaches  the  same  thing,  when  it  says 
(19,  26)  "And  from  my  flesh  I  shall  behold  God."  This  signifies  that 
from  the  structure  of  the  body  and  the  form  of  its  members  we  can 
understand  the  wisdom  of  the  Creator.  We  need  not  hesitate  there- 
fore to  study  the  works  of  the  ancients  and  the  wise  men  of  other 
nations  in  order  to  learn  from  them  the  nature  of  existence.  We  have 
the  permission  and  recommendation  of  Scripture.  ^^^ 

Starting  from  a  consideration  of  man  we  see  that  he  is  the  last  of 
created  things  because  we  find  in  him  additional  composition  over  and 
above  that  found  in  other  creatures.  Man  is  a  ^^ rational  animal." 
"Animal"  means  a  body  that  grows  and  moves  and  at  last  is  dissolved. 
"Rational"  refers  to  the  power  of  knowledge,  of  inferring  one  thing 
from  another,  and  discriminating  between  good  and  evil.  In  this  man 
differs  from  other  animals.  Descending  in  the  scale  of  existence  we 
find  that  the  plant  also  grows  and  dies  like  the  animal,  but  it  does  not 
move.  Stones,  metals  and  other  inanimate  bodies  on  the  earth,  change 
their  forms  and  shapes,  but  unlike  plants  they  have  no  power  of  grow- 
ing or  increasing.  They  are  the  simplest  of  the  things  on  the  earth. 
They  differ  from  the  heavenly  bodies  in  that  the  latter  never  change 
their  forms.  Proceeding  further  in  our  analysis,  we  find  that  body, 
the  simplest  thing  so  far,  means  length,  breadth  and  depth  attached 
to  something  capable  of  being  measured.  This  definition  shows  that 
body  is  also  composed  of  two  elements,  which  are  theoretically  distinct 
until  God's  will  joins  them  together.  These  are  "hyle"  (matter) — • 
what  has  no  likeness  or  form,  but  has  the  capacity  of  receiving  form 
— and  form,  which  is  defined  as  that  which  has  power  to  clothe  the 
hyle  with  any  form.  Matter  alone  is  too  weak  to  sustain  itself,  unless 
form  comes  to  its  aid.  Form,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  perceptible 
to  sense  unless  it  clothes  matter,  which  bears  it.  One  needs  the  other. 
Matter  cannot  exist  without  form;  form  cannot  be  seen  without  matter. 
Form  is  superior  to  matter,  because  it  needs  the  latter  only  to  be  seen 
but  can  exist  by  itself  though  not  seen;  whereas  matter  cannot  exist 


ABRAHAM  BAR  HIYYA  117 

without  form.  These  two,  matter  and  form,  were  hidden  in  God, 
where  they  existed  potentially  until  the  time  came  to  produce  them 
and  reahze  them  in  actu. 

Matter  is  further  divided  into  two  kinds.  There  is  pure  matter, 
which  enters  into  the  composition  of  the  heavens,  and  impure  matter, 
forming  the  substance  of  terrestrial  bodies.  Similarly  form  may  be 
divided  at  first  into  two  kinds;  closed  and  sealed  form,  too  pure  and 
holy  to  be  combined  with  matter;  and  open  and  penetrable  form,  which 
is  fit  to  unite  with  matter.  The  pure,  self-subsistent  form  gazes  at 
and  illuminates  the  penetrable  form,  and  helps  it  to  clothe  matter 
with  all  the  forms  of  which  the  latter  is  capable. 

Now  when  God  determined  to  realize  matter  and  form  in  actu,  he 
caused  the  pure  form  to  be  clothed  with  its  splendor,  which  no  hyle 
can  touch.  This  gave  rise  to  angels,  seraphim,  souls,  and  all  other 
forms  of  the  upper  world.  Not  all  men  can  see  these  forms  or  conceive 
them  in  the  mind,  because  they  do  not  unite  with  anything  which  the 
eye  can  perceive,  and  the  majority  of  people  cannot  understand  what 
they  cannot  perceive  with  their  corporeal  senses.  Only  those  who 
are  given  to  profound  scientific  investigations  can  understand  the 
essence  of  these  forms. 

The  light  of  this  pure  form  then  emanated  upon  the  second  form, 
and  by  the  word  of  God  the  latter  united  with  the  pure  matter  firmly 
and  permanently,  so  that  there  is  never  a  change  as  long  as  they  are 
united.  This  union  gave  rise  to  the  bodies  of  the  heavens  (spheres  and 
fixed  stars)  which  never  change  their  forms.  Then  the  form  united 
with  the  impure  matter,  and  this  gave  rise  to  all  the  bodies  in  the 
sublunar  world,  which  change  their  forms.  These  are  the  four  ele- 
ments, and  the  products  of  their  composition,  including  plants.  ^^^ 

So  far  we  have  bodies  which  do  not  change  their  places.  Then  a 
light  emanated  from  the  self-subsisting  form  by  the  order  of  God,  the 
splendor  of  which  spread  upon  the  heaven,  moving  from  point  to 
point,  and  caused  the  material  form  (i.  e.,  the  inferior,  so-called  pen- 
etrable form)  to  change  its  place.  This  produced  the  stars  which 
change  their  position  but  not  their  forms  (planets).  From  this  light 
extending  over  the  heaven  emanated  another  splendor  which  reached 
the  body  with  changing  form,  giving  rise  to  the  three  species  of  living 
beings,  aquatic,  aerial  and  terrestial  animals,  corresponding  to  the 


Ii8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

three  elements,  water,  air,  earth;  as  there  is  no  animal  life  in 
fire. 

We  have  so  far  therefore  three  kinds  of  forms,  (i)  The  pure  self- 
subsistent  form  which  never  combines  with  matter.  This  embraces 
all  the  forms  of  the  spiritual  world.  (2)  Form  which  unites  with  body 
firmly  and  inseparably.  These  are  the  forms  of  the  heavens  and  the 
stars.  (3)  Form  which  unites  with  body  temporarily.  Such  are  the 
forms  of  the  bodies  on  the  earth.  The  forms  of  the  second  and  third 
classes  cannot  exist  without  bodies.  The  form  of  class  number  one 
cannot  exist  with  body.  To  make  the  scheme  complete,  there  ought 
to  be  a  fourth  kind  of  form  which  can  exist  with  as  well  as  without 
body.  In  other  words,  a  form  which  unites  with  body  for  a  time  and 
then  returns  to  its  original  state  and  continues  to  exist  without  body. 
Reason  demands  that  the  classification  should  be  complete,  hence 
there  must  be  such  a  form,  and  the  only  one  worthy  of  this  condition 
is  the  soul  of  man.  We  thus  have  a  proof  of  the  immortaHty  of  the 
soul.^^^ 

These  are  the  ideas  of  the  ancient  sages,  and  we  shall  find  that  they 
are  drawn  from  the  Torah.  Thus  matter  and  form  are  indicated  in  the 
second  verse  of  Genesis,  "And  the  earth  was  without  form  (Heb.  Tohu) 
and  void  (Heb.  Bohu)."  "Tohu  "  is  matter;  "  Bohu"  (inn  =Ninu) 
signifies  that  through  which  matter  gains  existence,  hence  form. 
"Water  "  (Heb.  Mayim)  is  also  a  general  word  for  any  of  the  various 
forms,  whereas  "light"  (Heb.  Or)  stands  for  the  pure  subsistent  form. 
By  "firmament"  (Heb.  Rakia')  is  meant  the  second  kind  of  form 
which  unites  with  the  pure  matter  in  a  permanent  and  unchangeable 
maimer.  "Let  there  be  a  firmanent  in  the  midst  of  the  waters'^ 
(Gen.  I,  6)  indicates  that  the  "firmament"  is  embraced  by  the  bright 
light  of  the  first  day,  that  is  the  universal  form,  from  which  all  the 
other  forms  come.  "And  let  it  divide  between  water  and  water  "  {ib.) 
signifies  that  the  "firmament"  stands  between  the  self-subsistent  form 
and  the  third  kind  of  form  above  mentioned,  namely,  that  which  unites 
with  body  and  gives  rise  to  substances  changing  their  forms,  hke 
minerals  and  plants.  The  "luminaries  "  (Heb.  Meorot)  correspond  to 
the  second  light  mentioned  above.  We  shall  find  also  that  the  order  of 
creation  as  given  in  Genesis  coincides  with  the  account  given  above  in 
the  name  of  the  ancient  sages.  ^^^ 


ABRAHAM  BAR  HIYYA  119 

It  would  seem  as  if  the  self-subsisting  form  and  the  two  lights 
emanating  from  it  are  meant  to  represent  the  Intellect,  Soul  and 
Nature  of  the  Neo-Platonic  trinity  respectively,  and  that  Abraham 
bar  Hiyya  purposely  changed  the  names  and  partly  their  functions 
in  order  to  make  the  philosophical  account  agree  with  the  story  of 
creation  in  Genesis. 

With  regard  to  the  intellectual  and  ethical  condition  of  the  soul  and 
its  destiny,  the  speculative  thinkers  of  other  nations,  arguing  from  rea- 
son alone  and  having  no  divine  revelation  to  guide  or  confirm  their 
speculations,  are  agreed  that  the  only  way  in  which  the  soul,  which 
belongs  to  a  higher  world,  can  be  freed  from  this  world  of  body  and 
change  is  through  intellectual  excellence  and  right  conduct.  Accordingly 
they  classify  souls  into  four  kinds.  The  soul,  they  say,  may  have 
health,  sickness,  life,  death.  Health  signifies  wisdom  or  knowledge; 
sickness  denotes  ignorance.  Life  means  the  fear  of  God  and  right 
conduct;  death  is  neglect  of  God  and  evil  practice.  Every  person  com- 
bines in  himself  one  of  the  two  intellectual  qualities  with  one  of  the 
two  ethical  quahties.  Thus  we  have  four  classes  of  persons.  A  man 
may  be  wise  and  pious,  wise  and  wicked,  ignorant  and  pious,  ignorant 
and  wicked.  And  his  destiny  after  death  is  determined  by  the  class  to 
which  he  belongs.  Thus  when  a  man  who  is  wise  and  pious  departs 
this  world,  his  soul  by  reason  of  its  wisdom  separates  from  the  body 
and  exists  in  its  own  form  as  before.  Owing  to  its  piety  it  will  rise  to 
the  upper  world  until  it  reaches  the  pure,  eternal  form,  with  which 
it  will  unite  for  ever.  If  the  man  is  wise  and  wicked,  the  wisdom  of 
the  soul  will  enable  it  to  exist  without  body;  but  on  account  of  its 
wickedness  and  indulgence  in  the  desires  of  this  world,  it  cannot 
become  completely  free  from  the  creatures  of  this  world,  and  the  best 
it  can  do  is  to  rise  above  the  sublunar  world  of  change  to  the  world 
of  the  planets  where  the  forms  do  not  change,  and  move  about  beneath 
the  light  of  the  sun,  the  heat  of  which  will  seem  to  it  like  a  fire  burning 
it  continually,  and  preventing  it  from  rising  to  the  upper  light. 

If  the  man  is  ignorant  and  pious,  his  soul  will  be  saved  from  body  in 
order  that  it  may  exist  by  itself,  but  his  ignorance  will  prevent  his 
soul  from  leaving  the  atmosphere  of  the  lower  world.  Hence  the 
soul  will  have  to  be  united  with  body  a  second,  and  a  third  time,  if 
necessary,  until  it  finally  acquires  knowledge  and  wisdom,  which  will 


I20  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

enable  it  to  rise  above  the  lower  world,  its  degree  and  station  depend- 
ing upon  the  measure  of  intellect  and  virtue  it  possesses  at  the  time 
of  the  last  separation  from  the  body.  The  soul  of  the  man  who  is 
both  ignorant  and  wicked  cannot  be  saved  from  the  body  entirely, 
and  dies  like  a  beast. 

These  are  the  views  of  speculative  thinkers  which  we  may  adopt, 
but  they  cannot  tell  us  what  is  the  content  of  the  terms  wisdom  and 
right  conduct.  Not  having  been  privileged  to  receive  the  sacred  Law, 
which  is  the  source  of  all  wisdom  and  the  origin  of  rectitude,  they 
cannot  tell  us  in  concrete  fashion  just  what  a  man  must  know  and 
what  he  must  do  in  order  to  raise  his  soul  to  the  highest  degree  possible 
for  it  to  attain.  And  if  they  were  to  tell  us  what  they  understand  by 
wisdom  and  right  conduct,  we  should  not  listen  to  them.  Our  author- 
ity is  the  Bible,  and  we  must  test  the  views  of  the  philosophers  by  the 
teaching  of  the  Bible. 

If  we  do  this  we  find  authority  in  Scripture  also  for  belief  in  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  Thus  if  we  study  carefully  the  expressions 
used  of  the  various  creations  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis,  we  notice 
that  in  some  cases  the  divine  command  is  expressed  by  the  phrase, 
"Let  there  be  .  .  . ,"  followed  by  the  name  of  the  thing  to  be  created; 
and  the  execution  of  the  command  is  expressed  by  the  words,  "And 
there  was  .  .  .  ,"  the  name  of  the  created  object  being  repeated;  or 
the  phrase  may  be  simply,  "And  it  was  so,"  without  naming  the 
object.  In  other  cases  the  expression  "Let  there  be"  is  not  used,  nor 
the  corresponding  "And  there  was." 

This  variation  in  expression  is  not  accidental.  It  is  deliberate  and 
must  be  understood.  Upon  a  careful  examination  we  cannot  fail  to 
see  that  where  the  expression  "Let  there  be"  is  used,  the  object  so 
created  exists  in  this  world  permanently  and  without  change.  Thus, 
"Let  there  be  light"  (Gen.  i,  3).  If  in  addition  we  have  the  corre- 
sponding expression,  "And  there  was,"  in  connection  with  the  same 
object  and  followed  by  its  name,  it  means  that  the  object  will  continue 
its  everlasting  existence  in  the  next  world  also.  Hence,  "And  there 
was  light"  {ib.).  In  the  creation  of  the  firmament  and  the  luminaries 
we  have  the  expression,  "Let  there  be";  the  corresponding  expression 
at  the  end  is  in  each  case  not,  "And  there  was  .  .  .  ,"  but,  "And 
it  was  so."    This  signifies  that  in  this  world,  as  long  as  it  lasts,  the 


ABRAHAM  BAR  HIYYA  121 

firmament  and  luminaries  are  permanent  and  without  change;  but 
they  will  have  no  continuance  in  the  next  world.  In  the  creation  of 
the  sublunar  world  we  do  not  find  the  phrase,  "Let  there  be,"  at  all, 
but  such  expressions  as,  "Let  the  waters  be  gathered  together"  {ib.  9), 
"Let  the  earth  produce  grass"  {ib.  11),  and  so  on.  This  means  that 
these  things  change  their  forms  and  have  no  permanent  existence  in 
this  world.  The  phrase,  "And  it  was  so,"  recording  the  realization 
of  the  divine  command,  signifies  that  they  do  not  exist  at  all  in  the 
next  world. 

The  case  is  different  in  man.  We  do  not  find  the  expression,  "Let 
there  be,"  in  the  command  introducing  his  formation;  hence  he  has 
no  permanence  in  this  world.  But  we  do  find  the  expression,  "  And 
the  man  became  (lit.  was)  a  Hving  soul  "  {ib.  2,  7),  which  means  that 
he  will  have  permanent  existence  in  the  next  world.  The  article 
before  the  word  man  in  the  verse  just  quoted  indicates  that  not  every 
man  lives  forever  in  the  next  world,  but  only  the  good.  What  manner 
of  man  he  must  be  in  order  to  have  this  privilege,  /.  e.,  of  what  nation 
he  must  be  a  member,  we  shall  see  later.  This  phase  of  the  question 
the  speculative  thinkers  cannot  understand,  hence  they  did  not 
investigate  it.  Reason  alone  cannot  decide  this  question;  it  needs  the 
guidance  of  the  Torah,  which  is  divine. 

Consulting  the  Torah  on  this  problem,  we  notice  that  man  is  dis- 
tinguished above  other  animals  in  the  manner  of  his  creation  in  three 
respects,  (i)  All  other  living  beings  were  created  by  means  of  some- 
thing else.  The  water  or  the  earth  was  ordered  to  produce  them. 
Man  alone  was  made  directly  by  God.  (2)  There  are  three  expressions 
used  for  the  creation  of  living  things,  "create"  (Heb.  bara),  "form" 
(Heb.  yazar),  and  "make"  (Heb.  'asah).  The  water  animals  have 
only  the  first  {ib.  i,  21),  as  being  the  lowest  in  the  scale  of  animal  life. 
Land  animals  have  the  second  and  the  third,  "formed"  and  "made" 
{ib.  I,  25;  2,  19).  Man,  who  is  superior  to  all  the  others,  has  all  the 
three  expressions  {ib.  26,  27;  2,  7).  (3)  Man  was  given  dominion  over 
the  other  animals  {ib.  i,  28). 

As  man  is  distinguished  above  the  other  animals,  so  is  one  nation 
distinguished  above  other  men.  In  Isaiah  (43,  7)  we  read:  "Every 
one  that  is  called  by  my  name,  and  whom  I  have  created  for  my  glory; 
I  ha-ve  formed  him;  yea,  I  have  made  him."    The  three  terms,  created, 


122  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

formed,  made,  signify  that  the  reference  is  to  man;  and  we  learn  from 
this  verse  that  those  men  were  created  for  his  glory  who  are  called 
by  his  name.  But  if  we  inquire  in  the  Bible  we  find  that  the  nation 
called  by  God's  name  is  Israel,  as  we  read  {ih.  i),  "Thus  said  the  Lord 
that  created  thee,  O  Israel,  Fear  not;  for  I  have  redeemed  thee,  I  have 
called  thee  by  thy  name;  thou  art  mine,"  and  in  many  other  passages 
besides.  The  reason  for  this  is  their  belief  in  the  unity  of  God  and 
their  reception  of  the  Law.  At  the  same  time  others  who  are  not 
Israelites  are  not  excluded  from  reaching  the  same  degree  through 
repentance.  ■^^'^ 

There  is  no  system  of  ethics  in  Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  and  we  shall 
in  the  sequel  select  some  of  his  remarks  bearing  on  ethics  and  pick 
out  the  ethical  kernel  from  its  homiletical  and  exegetical  husk. 

Man  alone,  he  tells  us,  of  all  animal  creation  receives  reward  and 
punishment.  The  other  animals  have  neither  merit  nor  guilt.  To  be 
sure,  their  fortune  in  life  depends  upon  the  manner  in  which  they 
respond  to  their  environment,  but  this  is  not  in  the  way  of  reward  and 
punishment,  but  a  natural  consequence  of  their  natural  constitution. 
With  man  it  is  different,  and  this  is  because  of  the  responsible  position 
man  occupies,  having  been  given  the  privilege  and  the  ability  to  con- 
trol all  animal  creation.  ^^^ 

The  psychological  basis  of  virtue  in  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  is  Platonic 
in  origin,  as  it  is  in  Pseudo-Bahya,  though  we  do  not  find  the  four 
cardinal  virtues  and  the  derivation  of  justice  from  a  harmonious 
combination  of  the  other  three  as  in  the  Republic  of  Plato,  to  which 
Pseudo-Bahya  is  ultimately  indebted. 

Man  has  three  powers,  we  are  told,  which  some  call  three  souls. 
One  is  the  power  by  which  he  grows  and  multiplies  like  the  plants  of 
the  field.  The  second  is  that  by  which  he  moves  from  place  to  place. 
These  two  powers  he  has  in  common  with  the  animal.  The  third  is 
that  by  which  he  distinguishes  between  good  and  evil,  between  truth 
and  falsehood,  between  a  thing  and  its  opposite,  and  by  which  he 
acquires  wisdom  and  knowledge.  This  is  the  soul  which  distinguishes 
him  from  the  other  animals.  If  this  soul  prevails  over  the  lower  two 
powers,  the  man  is  called  meritorious  and  perfect.  If  on  the  other 
hand  the  latter  prevail  over  the  soul,  the  man  is  accounted  like  a 
beast,  and  is  called  wicked  and  an  evil  doer.    God  gives  merit  to  the 


ABRAHAM  BAR  HIYYA  123 

animal  soul  for  the  sake  of  the  rational  soul  if  the  former  is  obedient 
to  the  latter;  and  on  the  other  hand  imputes  guilt  to  the  rational  soul 
and  punishes  her  for  the  guilt  of  the  animal  soul  because  she  did  not 
succeed  in  overcoming  the  latter.  ^^^ 

The  question  of  the  relative  superiority  of  the  naturally  good  who 
feels  no  temptation  to  do  wrong,  and  the  temperamental  person  who 
has  to  sustain  a  constant  struggle  with  his  passions  and  desires  in  or- 
der to  overcome  them  is  decided  by  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  in  favor  of  the 
former  on  the  ground  that  the  latter  is  never  free  from  evil  thought, 
whereas  the  former  is.  And  he  quotes  the  Rabbis  of  the  Talmud, 
according  to  whom  the  reward  in  the  future  world  is  not  the  same 
for  the  two  types  of  men.  He  who  must  overcome  temptation  before 
he  can  subject  his  lower  nature  to  his  reason  is  rewarded  in  the  next 
world  in  a  manner  bearing  resemblance  to  the  goods  and  pleasures 
of  this  world,  and  described  as  precious  stones  and  tables  of  gold 
laden  with  good  things  to  eat.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reward  of  the 
naturally  perfect  who  is  free  from  temptation  is  purely  spiritual,  and 
bears  no  earthly  traces.  These  men  are  represented  as  "  sitting  under 
the  Throne  of  Glory  with  their  crowns  on  their  heads  and  delighting 
in  the  splendor  of  the  Shekinah,"  ^^^ 

His  theodicy  offers  nothing  remarkable.  He  cites  and  opposes  a 
solution  frequently  given  in  the  middle  ages  of  the  problem  of  evil. 
This  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  God  cannot  be  the  cause  of  evil. 
How  then  explain  the  presence  of  evil  in  the  world?  There  is  no 
analysis  or  classification  or  definition  of  what  is  meant  by  evil.  Ap- 
parently it  is  physical  evil  which  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  has  in  mind. 
Why  do  some  people  suffer  who  do  not  seem  to  deserve  it?  is  the 
aspect  of  the  problem  which  interests  him.  One  solution  that  is 
offered,  he  tells  us,  is  that  evil  is  not  anything  positive  or  substantial. 
It  is  something  negative,  absence  of  the  good,  as  blindness  is  absence 
of  vision;  deafness,  absence  of  hearing;  nakedness,  absence  of  clothing. 
Hence  it  has  no  cause.  God  produces  the  positive  forms  which  are 
good,  and  determines  them  to  stay  a  definite  length  of  time.  When 
this  time  comes  to  an  end,  the  forms  disappear  and  their  negatives 
take  their  place  automatically  without  the  necessity  of  any  cause. 

Abraham  bar  Hiyya  is  opposed  to  this  solution  of  the  problem, 
though  he  gives  us  no  philosophic  reason  for  it.    His  arguments  are 


124  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Biblical.  God  is  the  cause  of  evil  as  well  as  good,  and  this  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  "judgment"  (Heb.  Mishpat)  that  occurs  so  often  in 
the  Bible  in  connection  with  God's  attributes.  The  same  idea  is 
expressed  in  Jeremiah  (9,  23)  "I  am  the  Lord  which  exercise  loving 
kindness,  judgment  and  righteousness  in  the  earth."  Loving  kindness 
refers  to  the  creation  of  the  world,  which  was  an  act  of  pure  grace 
on  the  part  of  God.  It  was  not  a  necessity.  His  purpose  was  purely 
to  do  kindness  to  his  creatures  and  to  show  them  his  wisdom  and 
p)ower.  Righteousness  refers  to  the  kindness  of  God,  his  charity 
so  to  speak,  which  every  one  needs  when  he  dies  and  wishes  to  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  next  world.  For  the  majority  of  men  have  more  guilt 
than  merit.  Judgment  denotes  the  good  and  evil  distributed  in  the 
world  according  to  the  law  of  justice.  Thus  he  rewards  the  righteous 
in  the  next  world,  and  makes  them  suffer  sometimes  in  this  world  in 
order  to  try  them  and  to  double  their  ultimate  reward.  He  punishes 
the  wicked  in  this  world  for  their  evil  deeds,  and  sometimes  he  gives 
them  wealth  and  prosperity  that  they  may  have  no  claim  or  defence 
in  the  next  world.  Thus  evil  in  this  world  is  not  always  the  result 
of  misconduct  which  it  punishes;  it  may  be  inflicted  as  a  trial,  as  in 
the  case  of  Job.  Abraham  bar  Hiyya's  solution  is  therefore  that  there 
is  no  reason  why  God  should  not  be  the  author  of  physical  evil,  since 
everything  is  done  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  justice.  ^^^ 


CHAPTER  IX 

JOSEPH   IBN   ZADDIK 

Little  is  known  of  the  life  of  Joseph  ben  Jacob  ibn  Zaddik.  He  lived 
in  Cordova;  he  was  appointed  Dayyan,  or  Judge  of  the  Jewish  commu- 
nity of  that  city  in  1138;  and  he  died  in  1149.  He  is  praised  as  a  Tal- 
mudic  scholar  by  his  countryman  Moses  ibn  Ezra,  and  as  a  poet  by 
Abraham  ibn  Daud  and  Harizi,  though  we  have  no  Talmudic  composi- 
tion from  his  pen,  and  but  few  poems,  whether  liturgical  or  other- 
wise. ^^^  His  fame  rests  on  his  philosophical  work,  and  it  is  this  phase  of 
his  career  in  which  we  are  interested  here.  "  01am  Katon  "  or  "  Micro- 
cosm" is  the  Hebrew  name  of  the  philosophical  treatise  which  he  wrote 
in  Arabic,  but  which  we  no  longer  possess  in  the  original,  being  in- 
debted for  our  knowledge  of  it  to  a  Hebrew  translation  of  unknown 
authorship.  ^^^  Maimonides  knew  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik  favorably,  but 
he  was  not  familiar  with  the  "Microcosm."  In  a  letter  to  Samuel 
Ibn  Tibbon,  the  translator  of  his  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed,"  Mai- 
monides tells  us  that  though  he  has  not  seen  the  "01am  Katon"  of 
Ibn  Zaddik,  he  knows  that  its  tendency  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
Brothers  of  Purity  {cf.  above,  p.  60).^^^  This  signifies  that  its  trend 
of  thought  is  Neo-Platonic,  which  combines  Aristotehan  physics  with 
Platonic  and  Plotinian  metaphysics,  ethics  and  psychology. 

An  examination  of  the  book  itself  confirms  Maimonides's  judgment. 
In  accordance  with  the  trend  of  the  times  there  is  noticeable  in  Ibn 
Zaddik  an  increase  of  Aristotelian  influence,  though  of  a  turbid  kind; 
a  decided  decrease,  if  not  a  complete  abandonment,  of  the  ideas  of  the 
Kalam,  and  a  strong  saturation  of  Neo-Platonic  doctrine  and  point 
of  view.  It  was  the  fashion  to  set  the  Kalam  over  against  the  philoso- 
phers to  the  disadvantage  of  the  former,  as  being  deficient  in  logical 
knowledge  and  prejudiced  by  theological  prepossessions.  This  is 
attested  by  the  attitude  towards  the  Mutakallimun  of  Judah  Halevi, 
Maimonides,  Averroes.  And  Ibn  Zaddik  forms  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
The  circumstance  that  it  was  most  likely  from  Karaite  writings,  which 

125 


126  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

found  their  way  into  Spain,  that  Ibn  Zaddik  gained  his  knowledge 
of  Kalamistic  ideas,  was  not  exactly  calculated  to  prepossess  him, 
a  Rabbanite,  in  their  favor.  And  thus  while  we  see  him  in  the  manner 
of  Saadia  and  Bahya  follow  the  good  old  method,  credited  by  Mai- 
monides  to  the  Mutakallimun,  of  starting  his  metaphysics  with  proofs 
of  the  world's  creation,  and  basing  the  existence  of  God,  his  unity, 
incorporeahty  and  other  attributes  on  the  creation  of  the  world  as  a 
foundation,  he  turns  into  an  uncompromising  opponent  of  these  much 
despised  apologetes  when  he  comes  to  discuss  the  nature  of  God's 
attributes,  of  the  divine  will,  and  of  the  nature  of  evil.  And  in  all 
these  cases  the  target  of  his  attack  seems  to  be  their  Karaite  represen- 
tative Joseph  al-Basir,  whose  acquaintance  we  made  before  (p.  48  ff.). 

He  laid  under  contribution  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries, 
Saadia,  Bahya,  Pseudo-Bahya,  Gabirol;  and  his  sympathies  clearly 
lay  with  the  general  point  of  view  represented  by  the  last,  and  his 
Mohammedan  sources;  though  he  was  enough  of  an  eclectic  to  refuse 
to  follow  Gabirol,  or  the  Brethren  of  Purity  and  the  other  Neo-Platonic 
writings,  in  all  the  details  of  their  doctrine;  and  there  is  evidence  of  an 
attempt  on  his  part  to  tone  down  the  extremes  of  Neo-Platonic 
tendency  and  create  a  kind  of  level  in  which  Aristotehanism  and 
Platonism  meet  by  compromising.  Thus  he  beheves  with  Gabirol 
that  all  things  corporeal  as  well  as  spiritual  are  composed  of  matter 
and  form;  ^^^  but  when  it  comes  to  defining  what  the  matter  of  spiritual 
things  may  be,  he  tells  us  that  we  may  speak  of  the  genus  as  the  matter 
of  the  species — a  doctrine  which  is  not  so  Neo-Platonic  after  all.  For 
we  do  not  have  to  go  beyond  Aristotle  to  hear  that  in  the  definition 
of  an  object,  which  represents  its  intelligible  (opposed  to  sensible) 
essence,  the  genus  is  like  the  matter,  the  difference  hke  the  form. 
Of  the  universal  and  prime  matter  underlying  all  created  things  outside 
of  God,  of  which  Gabirol  says  that  it  is  the  immediate  emanation  of 
God's  essence  and  constitutes  with  universal  form  the  Universal 
Intelligence,  Ibn  Zaddik  knows  nothing.  Nor  do  we  find  any  out- 
spoken scheme  of  emanation,  such  as  we  see  in  Plotinus  or  with  a 
slight  modification  in  the  cyclopoedia  of  the  Brethren  of  Purity,  or  as 
it  is  presupposed  in  the  "Fons  Vitae"  of  Gabirol.  Ibn  Zaddik  does 
refer  to  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  Will,  which  plays  such  an  important 
role  in  the  philosophy  of  Gabirol  and  of  the  Pseudo-Empedoclean 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  127 

writings,  which  are  supposed  to  have  been  Gabirol's  source.  ^^^  But 
here,  too,  the  negative  side  of  Ibn  Zaddik's  doctrine  is  developed  at 
length,  while  the  positive  side  is  barely  aUuded  to  in  a  hint.  He  takes 
pains  to  show  the  absurdity  of  the  view  that  the  divine  will  is  a  mo- 
mentary entity  created  from  time  to  time  to  make  possible  the  coming 
into  being  of  the  things  and  processes  of  our  world — a  view  held  by  the 
Mutakallimun  as  represented  by  their  spokesman  al-Basir,  but  when 
it  comes  to  explaining  his  own  view  of  the  nature  of  the  divine  will, 
and  whether  it  is  identical  with  God  or  not,  he  suddenly  becomes 
reticent,  refers  us  to  the  writings  of  Empedocles,  and  intimates  that 
the  matter  is  involved  in  mystery,  and  it  is  not  safe  to  talk  about  it 
too  plainly  and  openly.  Evidently  Ibn  Zaddik  was  not  ready  to  go 
all  the  length  of  Gabirol's  emanationism  and  Neo-Platonic  mysticism. 

The  Aristotelian  ideas,  of  which  there  are  many  in  the  "Microcosm," 
are  probably  not  derived  from  a  study  of  Aristotle's  works,  but  from 
secondary  sources.  This  we  may  safely  infer  from  the  way  in  which 
he  uses  or  interprets  them.  An  Aristotelian  definition  is  a  highly 
technical  proposition  in  which  every  word  counts,  and  requires  a 
definition  in  turn  to  be  understood.  In  the  Aristotelian  context  the 
reader  sees  the  methodical  derivation  of  the  concept;  and  the  several 
technical  terms  making  up  the  definition  are  made  clear  by  illustrative 
examples.  Aside  from  the  context  the  proposition  is  obscure  even  in 
the  original  Greek.  Now  conceive  an  Arabic  translation  of  an  Aris- 
totelian definition  taken  out  of  its  context,  and  you  do  not  wonder 
that  it  is  misunderstood;  particularly  when  the  interpreter's  point  of 
viev\^  is  taken  from  a  school  of  thought  at  variance  with  that  of  Aris- 
totle. This  is  exactly  what  happens  to  Ibn  Zaddik.  He  quotes  ap- 
provingly Aristotle's  definition  of  the  soul,  and  proceeds  to  interpret 
it  in  a  manner  not  intended  by  the  author  of  the  "  De  Anima."^®' 
If  he  had  read  the  context  he  could  not  have  misunderstood  the  def- 
inition as  he  did. 

Unlike  his  predecessors,  Ibn  Zaddik  did  not  confine  himself  to  a  1 
special  topic  in  philosophy  or  to  the  metaphysical  aspects  of  Judaism. 
Isaac  Israeli  and  Gabirol  discuss  special  questions  in  Physics  and  Meta- 
physics without  bringing  them  into  relation  with  Judaism  or  the  text 
of  the  Bible.  Saadia  takes  cognizance  of  philosophical  doctrine  solely 
with  a  view  to  establishing  and  rationalizing  Jewish  dogma,  and  only 


128  MEDI/EVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

in  so  far  as  it  may  thus  be  utilized.  Bahya  and  Abraham  bar  Hiyya 
confine  their  philosophical  outlook  within  still  narrower  limits,  having 
Jewish  ethics  as  their  primary  concern.  All  of  the  latter  make  a  feature 
of  BibHcal  interpretation,  which  lends  to  their  work  the  Jewish  stamp 
and  to  their  style  the  element  of  homeliness  and  variety.  To  this 
they  owe  in  a  measure  their  popularity,  which,  however,  cannot  be 
said  for  Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  whose  "Hegyon  ha-Nefesh"  was  not 
printed  until  the  second  half  of  last  century.  The  "  Microcosm  "  of  Ibn 
Zaddik  is  the  first  compendium  of  science,  philosophy  and  theology 
in  Jewish  hterature.  And  yet  it  is  a  small  book;  for  Ibn  Zaddik  does 
not  enter  into  lengthy  discussions,  nor  does  he  adorn  his  style  with 
rhetorical  flourishes  or  copious  quotations  from  Bible  and  Talmud. 
The  "01am  Katon"  is  clearly  meant  for  beginners,  who  require  a 
summary  and  compendious  view  of  so  much  of  physics,  psychology, 
metaphysics  and  ethics  as  will  give  them  an  idea  of  the  position  of  man 
in  the  world,  and  his  duties,  theoretical  and  practical,  in  this  life,  that 
he  may  fulfil  his  destiny  for  which  he  was  created.  It  is  very  possible 
that  Ibn  Zaddik  modelled  his  work  on  the  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Breth- 
ren of  Purity,  leaving  out  all  that  he  regarded  as  imessential  or  ob- 
jectional  and  abridging  the  rest. 

-  Accordingly,  the  ''Microcosm"  is  divided  into  four  parts.  The 
first  part  treats  of  what  is  called  in  the  Aristotelian  classification  of 
the  sciences  Physics,  i.  e.,  the  principles  and  constitution  of  the  cor- 
poreal world  and  its  processes.  The  second  treats  of  man,  including 
anthropology  and  psychology.  The  third  is  devoted  to  a  discussion 
of  the  existence,  unity,  incorporeality  and  other  attributes  of  God, 
based  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  creation  of  the  world.  This  bears  the 
stamp  of  the  Kalam,  and  is  indebted  to  the  writings  of  Saadia,  Bahya 
and  Joseph  al-Basir.  It  covers  the  topics  usually  treated  by  the 
Mutakallimun  in  the  division  of  their  works,  known  by  the  name  of 
"Bab  al  Tauhid,"  treatise  on  Unity,  The  fourth  part  corresponds 
to  the  "Bab  al  Adl"  of  the  Kalam,  i.  e.,  the  second  division  of  Kala- 
mistic  works  devoted  to  theodicy,  or  vindication  of  God's  justice 
in  his  dealings  with  mankind.  Hence  it  includes  theological  questions 
of  an  ethical  nature,  like  freedom  of  the  will,  reasons  for  divine  wor- 
ship, the  nature  of  reward  and  punishment,  and  so  on. 

The  book  was  written,  Ibn  Zaddik  tells  us,  in  answer  to  the  question 


JOSEPH  IBN  Z  ADD  IK  129 

of  a  pupil  concerning  the  meaning  of  such  terms  as  perfection"  and 
"permanent  good, "  used  by  philosophers.  They  are  not  of  this  world 
these  men  say,  and  yet  every  man  of  intelligence  should  seek  them. 
This  is  a  very  difficult  subject,  made  more  so  by  the  small  number  of 
persons  engaged  in  its  study.  Particularly  in  our  own  generation  is 
this  true,  that  the  value  of  knowledge  and  investigation  is  not  recog- 
nized. People  are  Jews  in  name  only,  and  men  only  in  outward  ap- 
pearance.   Former  ages  were  much  superior  in  this  regard. 

Two  fundamental  requisites  are  necessary  for  the  knowledge  of  our 
subject.  They  are  the  knowledge  of  God,  and  performance  of  his 
wiU.  For  this  purpose  we  must  understand  tlie  works  of  the  philoso- 
phers. But  these  in  turn  require  a  knowledge  of  the  preliminary 
sciences  of  arithmetic,  geometry,  music,  astronomy,  and  logic.  This 
takes  a  long  time  and  is  likely  to  weary  the  student,  especially  the 
beginner.  I  have  therefore  made  it  my  purpose  to  show  how  a  man 
can  know  himself,  for  from  a  knowledge  of  self  he  will  com.e  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  all.  Man  is  called  "Microcosm,"  a  world  in  miniature, 
because  he  has  in  him  represented  all  the  elements  of  the  universe. 
His  body  resembles  the  corporeal  world;  his  rational  soul  the  spiritual 
world.  Hence  the  importance  of  knowing  himself,  and  hence  the  defi- 
nition of  philosophy  as  a  man's  knowledge  of  himself.  Philosophy  is 
the  science  of  sciences  and  the  end  thereof,  because  it  is  the  path  to  a 
knowledge  of  the  Creator.  ^^ 

Here  we  see  at  the  outset  Ibn  Zaddik's  Neo-Platonic  tendency  to 
make  a  short  cut  to  knowledge  through  the  study  of  man  instead  of 
the  painful  and  laborious  mastery  of  the  prehminary  sciences.  And 
so  it  was  that  the  Neo-Platonists  added  little  to  Aristotle's  study  of 
nature,  concentrating  their  attention  upon  the  intelligible  or  spiritual 
world. 

The  first  thing  we  must  do  then  is  to  show  that  the  human  body  is 
similar  to  the  corporeal  world.  This  will  require  an  analysis  of  the 
structure  of  the  latter.  But  before  examining  the  objects  of  knowledge, 
we  must  say  a  word  about  the  process  of  knowing.  Man  perceives 
things  in  two  ways — through  sense  and  through  intellect.  His  senses 
give  him  the  accidents  of  things,  the  sheU  or  husk,  so  to  speak.  He 
perceives  color  through  sight,  sound  through  hearing,  odor  through 
smell,  and  so  on.    It  takes  reason  to  penetrate  to  the  essence  of  an 


I30  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

object.  Take  as  an  example  a  book.  The  sense  of  sight  perceives  its 
color,  and  through  the  color  its  form.  This  is  then  apprehended  by 
the  power  of  imagination  or  representation.  The  latter  in  turn  hands 
it  over  to  the  cogitative  power  of  the  rational  soul,  from  the  reflection 
of  which  results  the  spiritual  reality  of  the  object,  which  is  its  knowl- 
edge. So  we  see  that  the  reason  knows  the  essence  and  reality  of  a 
thing,  whereas  the  senses  know  only  its  husk  and  its  accidents.  This 
same  thing  is  stated  by  the  philosopher  in  another  form.  The  senses, 
he  says,  know  only  the  particular,  the  universal  can  be  known  by  the 
intellect  only.  This  is  because  the  soul  is  fine  and  penetrating,  while 
the  body  is  gross,  and  can  reach  the  surface  only. 

We  may  also  classify  knowledge  from  another  point  of  view  as 
necessary  (or  immediate),  and  demonstrated  (or  mediate).  Necessary 
knowledge  is  that  which  no  sane  man  can  deny.  Such  knowledge 
may  be  of  the  senses,  as  the  sight  of  the  sun  or  the  sound  of  thunder; 
or  it  may  be  of  the  reason,  such  as  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its 
parts.  We  may  then  enumerate  four  kinds  of  things  known  directly 
without  the  help  of  other  knowledge,  (i)  The  percepts  of  the  senses. 
(2)  Truths  generally  admitted  by  reason  of  their  self-evidence.  (3) 
Traditional  truths,  i.  e.,  truths  handed  down  by  a  rehable  and  wise 
man,  or  by  a  community  worthy  of  credence.  (4)  First  principles 
or  axioms.  These  four  can  be  easily  reduced  to  two;  for  traditional 
truths  ultimately  go  back  to  the  testimony  of  the  senses;  while  first 
principles  or  axioms  are  included  in  self-evident  propositions.  We 
thus  have  two  kinds  of  necessary  or  immediate  knowledge,  the  data 
of  sense,  and  self-evident  propositions.  The  latter  kind  is  superior 
to  the  former,  because  man  shares  sense  knowledge  with  the  lower 
animals;  whereas  rational  propositions  are  peculiar  to  him  alone. 

Demonstrated  knowledge  is  built  upon  necessary  knowledge,  and 
is  derived  from  it  by  means  of  logical  inference.  ^^^ 

We  may  now  proceed  to  discuss  the  principles  of  the  corporeal 
world.  Matter  is  the  foundation  and  principle  of  a  thing.  All  things, 
natural  as  well  as  artificial,  are  composed  of  matter  and  form.  Wood 
is  the  common  matter  of  chair  and  bed.  Their  forms  are  different. 
So  the  common  matter  of  the  four  elements  is  the  prime  matter  en- 
dowed with  the  form  of  corporeality,  i.  e.,  with  the  capacity  of 
filling  place.    This  form  of  corporeality  makes  the  prime  matter 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  13 1 

corporeal  substance.  Matter  is  relative  to  form,  form  is  relative  to 
matter. 

Spiritual  things  also  have  matter  and  form.  In  corporeal  artificial 
things  like  ring  or  bracelet,  the  matter  is  gold,  the  form  is  the  form  of 
ring  or  bracelet,  the  efficient  cause  is  the  art  of  the  goldsmith,  the 
final  cause  or  purpose  is  the  adornment.  In  spiritual  things  we  may 
compare  genus  to  matter,  species  to  form,  specific  difference  to  effi- 
cient cause,  the  individual  to  the  final  cause. 

Everything  exists  either  by  itself  {per  se)  or  in  something  else. 
Matter  exists  by  itself,  form  exists  in  something  else,  in  matter.  Mat- 
ter is  potentially  substance;  after  it  assumes  a  form  it  becomes  actual 
substance.  In  reahty  there  is  no  matter  without  form,  but  in  thought 
we  can  remove  the  form  and  leave  the  matter. 

Substance  may  be  described  as  that  which  bears  opposite  and  chang- 
ing qualities.  No  substance  can  be  the  opposite  of  another  substance 
through  its  substantiality,  but  through  its  accidents;  for  opposition 
resides  in  quality.  Matter  receiving  form  is  substance.  Absolute 
substance  is  simple  and  spiritual,  for  it  cannot  be  perceived  through 
the  five  senses.  When  the  philosophers  say  that  all  body  is  substance, 
and  that  the  individual  is  a  substance,  they  use  substance  in  contra- 
distinction to  accident,  meaning  that  the  individual  exists  by  itself, 
and  needs  not  another  for  its  existence,  unlike  accidents,  which  must 
have  something  to  exist  in. 

This  absolute  substance,  which  is  simple  and  spiritual,  seems  to  be 
identical  with  Gabirol's  "substantia  quae  sustinet  decem  praedica- 
menta,"  the  substance  which  supports  the  ten  categories.  Gabirol 
means  by  it  that  which  remains  of  a  corporeal  substance  when  we  take 
away  from  it  everything  that  qualifies  it  as  being  here  or  there,  of  a 
particular  nature  or  size,  in  a  given  relation,  and  so  on. 

The  expression  corporeal  world  includes  the  celestial  spheres  and 
all  which  is  under  them.  To  be  sure,  the  body  of  the  sphere  is  different 
from  the  other  bodies  in  matter  and  form  and  qualities.  It  consists 
of  a  fifth  nature,  different  from  the  four  elements.  It  is  not  cold,  or 
it  would  move  downward  like  earth  and  water.  It  is  not  warm,  or 
it  would  move  upward  like  air  and  fire.  It  is  not  wet,  for  it  would  then 
roll  Hke  the  waves  of  the  sea.  Nor  is  it  dry,  for  it  would  condense  and 
not  move  at  all.    Not  being  any  one  of  these  qualities,  which  constitute 


132  MEDimVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

our  four  elements,  the  sphere  is  not  a  composite  of  them  either;  for 
the  simple  is  prior  to  the  composite,  and  we  cannot  regard  the  elements 
of  the  sublunar  world  as  prior  and  superior  to  the  spheres. 

The  sphere  is  neither  Hght  nor  heavy.  For  light  and  heavy  are 
relative  terms.  An  object  is  heavy  when  out  of  its  natural  place,  light 
when  in  its  natural  place.  Thus  a  stone  is  heavy  when  it  is  away 
from  the  earth,  which  is  its  natural  place,  but  is  light  when  it  comes 
to  rest  where  it  belongs.  The  sphere  is  never  out  of  its  place  or  in  its 
place,  as  it  moves  constantly  in  a  circle.  Hence  it  is  neither  light  nor 
heavy. 

Ibn  Zaddik's  definition  of  light  and  heavy  as  being  relative,  and 
dependent  on  the  relation  of  the  object  to  its  natural  place  is  pecuhar, 
and  would  lead  him  to  say  that  fire  and  air  are  also  heavy  when  out 
of  their  natural  place,  which  is  outside  of,  and  above  earth  and  water. 
But  this  does  not  seem  in  consonance  with  the  Aristotelian  use  of 
these  terms.  According  to  Aristotle  an  object  is  heavy  if  its  tendency 
is  to  move  to  the  centre  of  the  world;  it  is  light  if  it  moves  away  from 
the  centre  to  the  circumference.  Hence  earth  and  water  are  heavy, 
fire  and  air  are  light.  The  natural  place  of  a  body  or  element  is  that 
to  which  it  has  a  tendency  to  move,  or  in  which  it  has  a  tendency  to 
rest,  when  left  to  itself.  Hence  a  body  will  always  move  to  its  natural 
place  when  away  from  it  and  under  no  restriction;  and  its  heaviness 
or  lightness  does  not  change  with  its  position. 

To  continue,  the  sphere  moves  in  a  circle,  the  most  perfect  of  all 
motions,  having  neither  beginning  nor  end.  It  is  more  perfect  than 
all  bodies,  and  the  knowledge  of  God  is  not  hidden  from  it  as  it  is 
hidden  from  us.  Whatever  moves  in  a  circle  must  move  around  a 
body  at  rest;  for  if  it  moves  around  another  moving  body,  this  second 
body  must  have  another  body  around  which  it  moves,  and  this  third 
body  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum,  which  is  impossible.  Hence 
the  sphere  moves  around  a  body  at  rest.    This  is  the  earth. 

The  four  elements  of  the  sublunar  world  are,  fire,  air,  water,  earth. 
In  their  purity  these  elements  have  neither  color  nor  taste,  nor  odor 
nor  any  other  sensible  property.  For  the  elements  are  simple  bodies, 
whereas  the  sensible  qualities  are  the  result  of  the  composition  of  the 
elements.  If  air  had  color,  we  should  see  it  as  we  see  all  colored  things; 
and  all  other  things  would  appear  to  us  in  the  color  of  air,  as  is  the 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  133 

case  when  we  look  through  a  colored  glass.  The  same  argument  ap- 
plies to  water. 

The  elements  change  into  each  other.  We  see  water  changing  under 
the  effect  of  heat  into  vapor,  and  the  vapor  condenses  again  under 
the  influence  of  cold  and  changes  back  to  water,  namely,  rain.  Air 
changes  into  fire  when  flint  strikes  iron.  Fire  cannot  exist  here  unless 
it  has  something  to  take  hold  of;  otherwise  it  changes  into  air.  Earth 
and  water  change  into  each  other  very  slowly,  because  earth  is  hard 
to  change. 

The  basis  of  the  four  elements  is  a  substance  filling  place  as  a  result 
of  its  assuming  the  form  of  corporeality,  i.  e.,  extension  in  three  direc- 
tions. Filling  place,  it  moves;  moving,  it  becomes  warm.  When  its 
motion  is  completed,  it  necessarily  comes  to  rest  and  becomes  cold. 
Heat  and  cold  are  the  active  powers,  wet  and  dry  are  the  passive 
quahties,  wet  being  associated  with  heat,  dry  with  cold.  The  mixture 
of  these  qualities  with  the  corporeal  basis  results  in  the  four  elements. 

The  three  natures,  mineral,  plant,  animal  are  composed  of  the  four 
elements.  When  a  seed  is  put  in  the  ground  it  cannot  grow  without 
water,  and  sunshine  and  air.  These  form  its  food,  and  food  is  assimi- 
lated to  the  thing  fed.  Our  bodies  are  composed  of  the  four  elements, 
because  they  are  nourished  by  plants.  The  general  process  of  the  sub- 
lunar world  is  that  of  genesis  and  dissolution.  The  genesis  of  one 
thing  is  the  dissolution  of  another.  The  dissolution  of  the  egg  is  the 
genesis  of  the  chicken;  the  dissolution  of  the  chicken  is  the  genesis 
of  the  four  elements;  for  in  the  living  being  the  elements  are  poten- 
tial, and  they  become  actual  when  the  animal  dies.  This  continuous 
process  of  genesis  and  dissolution  proves  that  this  world  is  not  perma- 
nent, for  the  basis  of  its  processes  is  change.^*'" 

The  human  body  corresponds  to  the  corporeal  world,  and  is  similar 
to  it  in  its  nature  and  matter.  Man's  body  is  subject  to  genesis  and 
decay  like  other  objects.  It  is  composed  of  the  elements  and  returns 
to  them.  It  has  in  it  the  nature  of  minerals,  plants  and  animals.  It 
has  the  power  of  growth,  sustenance  and  reproduction  like  plants. 
Man  is  like  animal  in  having  motion  and  sensation.  He  has  the  spir- 
ited power  and  the  appetitive  like  other  animals.  His  body  is  perfect 
because  it  has  resemblances  to  all  kinds  of  plants  and  animals.  His 
body  as  a  whole  resembles  great  trees,  his  hair  is  like  grass  and  shrubs. 


134  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Animals  have  various  qualities  according  to  the  relation  of  the  animal 
soul  to  the  body.  Thus  the  lion  has  strength,  the  lamb  meekness,  the 
fox  shrewdness,  and  so  on.  Mankind  includes  all  of  these  qualities. 
In  the  same  way  various  animals  have  various  instincts  resembling 
arts,  such  as  the  weaving  of  the  spider,  the  building  of  the  bird  and 
the  bee,  and  so  on.  They  also  subsist  on  various  foods.  Man  alone 
combines  all  arts  and  all  kinds  of  food. 

The  human  body  has  three  dimensions  like  inanimate  bodies.  It 
is  also  similar  to  the  bodies  of  plants  and  animals,  and  at  the  same 
time  is  distinguished  alone  among  animals  by  its  erect  position.  This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  man's  nature  is  proportionate,  and  his  body  is 
purer  and  finer  than  other  bodies.  Thus  we  see  when  oil  is  pure,  its 
flame  rises  in  a  straight  line;  when  the  oil  is  impure  the  flame  is  not 
straight.  Another  thing  proving  that  man's  nature  is  superior  to  that 
of  other  animals  is  that  the  latter  live  in  that  element  which  is  akin  to 
their  constitution — fish  in  water,  birds  in  air,  quadrupeds  on  land. 
Man  alone  can  inhabit  all  three.  Another  reason  for  man's  erect 
position  is  that  he  is  a  plant  originating  in  heaven.  Hence  his  head, 
which  is  the  root,  faces  heaven.  ^'^^ 

Man  has  three  souls,  a  plant  soul,  an  animal  soul  and  a  rational 
soul.  He  must  have  a  plant  soul  to  account  for  the  fact  that  man 
grows  like  other  plants  and  dies  like  them.  For  if  he  can  grow  without 
a  plant  soul,  plants  can  do  the  same.  And  if  this  too  is  granted,  then 
there  is  no  reason  why  mountains  and  stones  should  not  grow  also. 
Again,  if  man  can  grow  without  a  plant  soul,  he  can  live  without  an 
animal  soul,  and  know  without  a  rational  soul,  which  is  absurd. 

The  faculty  of  the  vegetative  soul  is  the  appetitive  power,  whose 
seat  is  in  the  liver.  Its  subordinate  powers  are  those  of  nutrition  and 
growth.  Through  it  man  feels  the  need  of  food  and  other  natural 
desires.  He  has  this  in  common  with  the  lower  animals.  It  is  the 
first  power  that  appears  in  man  while  he  is  still  in  his  mother's  womb. 
First  comes  the  power  which  forms  the  combined  seed  of  the  male 
and  the  female  into  a  human  being  in  its  proper  form  and  nature. 
In  doing  this  it  requires  the  assistance  of  the  "growing"  power,  which 
begins  its  activity  as  soon  as  the  first  member  is  formed,  and  continues 
until  the  period  of  youth  is  completed.  This  power  in  turn  needs  the 
assistance  of  the  nourishing  power,  which  accompanies  the  other  two 


JOSEPH  IBM  ZADDIK  135 

from  the  beginning  of  their  activity  to  the  end  of  the  person's  life. 
All  this  constitutes  the  plant  soul,  and  it  must  not  be  supposed  that 
these  powers  are  separated  from  one  another,  and  that  one  is  in  one 
place  and  another  in  another  place.  They  are  all  spiritual  powers 
derived  from  the  universal  powers  in  the  upper  world. 

When  the  form  of  the  being  is  complete,  the  animal  soul  makes  its 
appearance.  This  soul  is  carried  in  the  spirit  of  the  animal  or  man, 
which  is  found  in  the  pure  blood  of  the  arteries.  There  are  two  mem- 
branes in  every  artery,  making  two  passages,  one  for  blood  and  the 
other  for  the  spirit  or  wind.  The  seat  of  the  animal  soul  is  in  the  heart, 
and  it  is  borne  in  the  pure  red  blood.  This  is  why  we  see  in  the  heart 
two  receptacles;  in  one  is  spirit,  in  the  other,  blood.  Hence  after 
death  we  find  congealed  blood  in  the  one,  while  the  other  is  empty. 
Death  happens  on  account  of  the  defective  "mixture"  of  the  heart. 
This  means  that  the  four  humors  of  which  the  body  is  composed, 
namely,  blood,  yellow  and  black  gall  and  phlegm,  lose  the  proper 
proportionality  in  their  composition,  and  one  or  other  of  them  pre- 
dominates. An  animal  does  not  die  unless  the  mixture  of  the  heart 
is  injured,  or  the  heart  is  wounded  seriously.  Death  is  also  caused 
by  disease  or  injury  of  the  brain.  For  the  brain  is  the  origin  of  the 
nerves  which  control  the  voluntary  activities  by  means  of  contraction 
and  expansion.  If  the  chest  does  not  contract,  the  warm  air  does  not 
come  out;  if  it  does  not  expand,  the  cold  air  does  not  come  in;  and  if 
the  air  does  not  come  in  or  out,  the  heart  loses  its  proportionality, 
and  the  animal  dies.  The  functions  of  the  animal  soul  are  sensation 
and  motion.  This  motion  may  be  active  as  well  as  passive.  The 
active  motions  are  those  of  the  arteries,  and  the  expansion  and  con- 
traction of  the  chest  which  results  in  respiration.  The  passive  motions 
give  rise  to  the  emotions  of  anger,  fear,  shame,  joy,  sorrow. 

Anger  is  the  motion  of  the  spirit  within  the  body  toward  the  outside, 
together  with  the  blood  and  the  humors.  This  is  found  in  animals 
also.  Fear  is  the  entrance  of  the  soul  within,  leaving  the  surface  of 
the  body,  and  causing  the  extremities  to  become  cold.  Shame  is  a 
motion  inward,  and  forthwith  again  outward.  Sorrow  is  caused  in 
the  same  way  as  fear,  except  that  fear  is  sudden,  while  sorrow  is 
gradual.  This  is  why  fear  sometimes  kills  when  the  body  is  weak. 
Joy  is  motion  outward.    Joy  may  kill  too,  when  it  is  very  great,  and 


136  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  person  is  weak  and  without  control.  Joy  is  of  the  nature  of  pleas- 
ure, except  that  pleasure  is  gradual,  while  joy  is  sudden. 

Pain  is  that  feeling  we  have  when  we  are  taken  out  of  our  natural 
state  and  put  into  an  unnatural.  Pleasure  is  felt  when  we  are  restored 
to  the  natural.  Take,  for  example,  the  heat  of  the  sun.  When  a 
person  is  exposed  to  it,  the  sun  takes  him  out  of  his  natural  state. 
Heat  is  then  painful,  and  pleasure  is  produced  by  the  thing  which 
restores  him  to  his  natural  state;  in  this  case  a  cold  spring  and  a  drink 
of  cold  water.  Similarly  a  person  walking  in  the  snow  and  cold  air 
feels  pain  by  reason  of  the  cold  taking  him  out  of  his  natural  state. 
Heat  then  gives  him  pleasure  by  restoring  him.  The  same  thing 
applies  to  hunger  and  thirst,  sleeping  and  waking,  and  other  things 
which  give  us  pleasure  and  pain.  Without  pain  there  is  no  pleasure, 
and  the  pleasure  varies  in  accordance  with  the  antecedent  pain. 

Life  is  the  effect  of  the  animal  soul.  The  disappearance  of  the 
effect  does  not  necessarily  involve  the  disappearance  of  the  cause, 
as  the  disappearance  of  the  smoke  does  not  require  the  cessation  of 
the  fire.  Death  means  simply  the  separation  of  the  soul,  not  the  de- 
struction thereof.  It  does  not  follow  because  the  human  soul  remains 
after  the  death  of  the  body,  that  the  soul  of  the  ox  and  the  ass  con- 
tinues likewise,  for  the  two  souls  are  different.  Animals  were  created 
for  the  sake  of  man,  whereas  man  exists  for  his  own  sake.  Moreover, 
man's  life  is  ultimately  derived  from  his  rational  soul.  For  if  the 
animal  soul  of  man  were  the  ultimate  source  of  life,  the  rational  soul 
too  would  be  dependent  for  its  life  upon  the  former,  and  hence  would 
be  inferior  to  it,  which  is  absurd.  It  remains  then  that  the  rational 
soul  gives  existence  to  the  animal  soul  in  man. 

Sleep  is  the  rest  of  the  senses,  as  death  is  their  entire  cessation. 
The  purpose  of  sleep  is  to  give  the  brain  rest  so  that  the  "spirit" 
of  the  soul  should  not  be  dissolved  and  the  mixture  "  of  the  body 
injured  suddenly  and  cause  death.  The  heart  rests  continually  be- 
tween contraction  and  expansion,  hence  it  needs  no  special  rest  at 
night.  Waking  is  the  activity  of  the  senses  and  the  exercise  of  their 
functions  to  satisfy  the  desires  of  the  body.  The  motions  of  the  soul 
in  the  waking  state  are  in  the  interest  of  the  needs  of  the  body.  Dur- 
ing sleep  the  soul  looks  out  for  itself,  for  its  better  world,  being  then 
free  from  the  business  of  the  body.    If  it  is  pure  and  bright,  and  the 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  137 

body  is  free  from  the  remnant  of  food,  and  the  thought  is  not  de- 
pressed by  sorrow  and  grief — then  the  soul  is  aroused  in  its  desire 
for  the  future,  and  beholds  wonderful  things.  ^^^ 

No  one  can  deny  that  man  has  a  rational  soul  because  speech  is  an 
attribute  which  man  has  above  all  other  animals.  The  soul  is  not  a 
corporeal  thing,  for  if  it  were  it  would  have  to  occupy  place  like  body, 
and  would  have  color  and  form  and  other  qualities  like  body.  More- 
over, it  would  require  something  else  to  give  it  life  like  body.  In  other 
words,  the  soul  would  require  another  soul,  and  that  soul  another 
soul,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum,  which  is  impossible.  Hence  the  soul  is 
not  a  corporeal  thing. 

Nor  can  we  say  that  the  soul  is  in  the  body.  For  if  it  were,  it  would 
itself  be  body;  since  only  body  can  fiU  the  empty  place  in  another 
body,  as  water  fills  a  jar. 

The  soul  is  a  substance  and  not  an  accident.  An  accident  is  a 
quality  which  makes  its  appearance  in  something  else,  and  has  no 
permanence.  If  then  the  rational  soul  is  an  accident  of  the  body, 
it  has  no  permanence,  and  man  is  sometimes  rational  and  some- 
times not.  This  is  absurd,  for  in  that  case  there  could  be  no  purpose 
in  giving  him  commandments  and  statutes. 

There  are  inseparable  accidents  to  be  sure,  like  the  color  of  the 
Ethiopian's  skin.  But  in  that  case  we  know  the  color  is  an  accident 
despite  its  inseparability,  from  the  fact  that  in  other  things  color 
is  an  accident  and  may  be  removed.  This  will  not  apply  to  the  reason. 
For  we  do  not  find  anything  in  which  reason  is  a  removable  accident. 
The  moment  you  remove  reason,  you  remove  man,  for  reason  is 
essential  to  man.  The  fact  that  as  a  result  of  an  injury  a  man  may 
lose  his  reason  is  no  argument  against  us,  for  this  happens  only  when 
an  injury  is  inflicted  on  the  brain,  which  is  the  reason's  instrument. 
This  accounts  for  the  fact,  too,  that  men  in  good  health  if  given  hen- 
bane to  drink  lose  their  reason,  because  the  drink  affects  the  brain. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  see  that  those  afiflicted  with  a  certain  disease  of 
the  intestines,  which  causes  their  death,  are  more  rational  and  brighter 
at  the  time  of  death  than  ever  before,  showing  that  the  soul  cannot  be 
an  accident  depending  upon  the  "mixture"  of  the  body. 

To  regard  the  soul  as  an  accident,  while  the  body  is  a  substance, 
would  make  the  soul  inferior  to  the  body.    This  is  absurd.    For  we 


138  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

have  the  body  in  common  with  the  beasts;  whereas  it  is  in  virtue  of 
the  reason  that  we  are  given  commandments,  and  reward  and  punish- 
ment in  the  world  to  come. 

If  the  soul  is  neither  a  corporeal  thing  nor  an  accident  of  body, 
it  must  be  a  spiritual  substance.  And  the  best  definition  of  the  soul 
is  that  of  Aristotle,  who  says  it  is  a  substance  giving  perfection  to  a 
natural  organic  body,  which  has  life  potentially.  Every  phrase  in  this 
definition  tells.  "Substance"  excludes  the  view  that  the  soul  is  an 
accident.  "Giving  perfection"  signifies  that  the  soul  is  that  which 
makes  man  perfect,  bringing  him  to  the  next  world,  and  being  the 
purpose  not  merely  of  his  creation  and  the  composition  of  his  body, 
but  of  the  creation  of  matter  as  well.  "Natural  organic  body"  in- 
dicates that  the  body  is  an  organon,  or  instrument  in  the  function  of 
the  soul,  the  latter  using  the  body  to  carry  out  its  own  purposes.  The 
rational  soul  is  like  a  king;  the  animal  soul  is  like  an  ojB&cial  before 
the  king,  rebuking  the  appetitive  soul. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  last  paragraph  we  have  a  good  example 
of  the  uncritical  attitude  of  Ibn  Zaddik  toward  the  various  schools 
of  philosophical  thought,  particularly  those  represented  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  This  attitude  is  typical  of  the  middle  ages,  which  appealed 
to  authority  in  philosophy  as  weU  as  in  theology,  and  hence  developed 
a  harmonistic  attitude  in  the  presence  of  conflicting  authorities.  Aided 
by  their  defective  knowledge  of  the  complete  systems  of  the  ancient 
Greek  philosophers,  by  the  difficulties  and  obscurities  incident  to 
translations  from  an  alien  tongue,  and  by  the  spurious  writings  cir- 
culating in  the  name  of  an  ancient  Greek  philosopher,  the  precise 
demarcation  of  schools  and  tendencies  became  more  and  more  con- 
fused, and  it  was  possible  to  prove  that  Plato  and  Aristotle  were  in 
entire  agreement.  Thus  Ibn  Zaddik  has  no  scruple  in  combining 
(unconsciously,  to  be  sure)  Platonic  and  Neo-Platonic  psychology 
with  the  Aristotelian  definition  representing  quite  a  different  point 
of  view.  The  one  is  anthropological  duaUsm,  regarding  the  soul  as 
a  distinct  entity  which  comes  to  the  body  from  without.  The  other 
is  a  biological  monism,  in  which  the  soul  is  the  reahty  of  the  body,  the 
essence  of  its  functioning,  which  makes  the  potentially  living  body 
an  actually  living  body.  We  cannot  enter  here  into  a  criticism  of 
the  elements  of  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  the  soul  as  rendered  and 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  139 

interpreted  by  Ibn  Zaddik,  but  will  merely  say  that  it  misses  com- 
pletely the  meaning  of  Aristotle,  and  shows  that  Ibn  Zaddik  did  not 
take  it  from  the  "  De  Anima"  of  Aristotle,  but  found  it  without  its 
context  in  some  Arabic  work. 

To  return  from  our  digression,  the  three  souls,  Ibn  Zaddik  tells  us, 
are  spiritual  powers;  every  one  of  them  is  a  substance  by  itself  of 
benefit  to  the  body.  The  rational  soul  gets  the  name  soul  primarily, 
and  the  others  get  it  from  the  rational  soul.  The  Intellect  is  called  soul 
because  the  rational  soul  and  the  Intellect  have  a  common  matter. 
And  hence  when  the  soul  is  perfected  it  becomes  intellect.  This  is 
why  the  rational  soul  is  called  potential  intellect.  The  only  difference 
between  them  is  one  of  degree  and  excellence.  The  world  of  Intellect 
is  superior,  and  its  matter  is  the  pure  hght,  Intellect  in  which  there  is 
no  ignorance,  because  it  comes  from  God  without  any  intermediate 
agency. 

Here  we  see  just  a  touch  of  the  Neo-Platonic  doctrine  of  emanation, 
of  which  the  Universal  Intellect  is  the  first.  But  it  is  considerably 
toned  down  and  not  continued  down  the  series  as  in  Plotinus  or  the 
Brethren  of  Purity. 

The  accidents  of  the  soul  are  spiritual  like  the  soul  itself.  They 
are,  knowledge,  kindness,  goodness,  justice,  and  other  similar  qual- 
ities. Ignorance,  wrong,  evil,  and  so  on,  are  not  the  opposites  of 
those  mentioned  above,  and  were  not  created  with  the  soul  like  the 
others.  They  are  merely  the  absence  of  the  positive  qualities  men- 
tioned before,  as  darkness  is  the  absence  of  hght.  God  did  not  create 
any  defect,  nor  did  he  desire  it.  Evil  is  simply  the  result  of  the  in- 
capacity of  a  given  thing  to  receive  a  particular  good.  If  all  things 
were  capable  of  receiving  goods  equally,  all  things  would  be  one  thing, 
and  the  Creator  and  his  creatures  would  be  likewise  one.  This  was 
not  God's  purpose. 

There  is  a  tacit  opposition  to  the  Mutakallimun  in  Ibn  Zaddik's 
arguments  against  the  view  that  the  soul  is  an  accident,  as  well  as 
in  his  statement  in  the  preceding  paragraph  that  the  bad  quaUties 
and  evil  generally  are  not  opposites  of  the  good  quahties  and  good 
respectively,  but  that  they  are  merely  privations,  absences,  and  hence 
not  created  by  God.  This  is  a  Neo-Platonic  doctrine.  Pseudo-Bahya, 
we  have  seen  (p.  108  f.),  and  Abraham  bar  Hiyya  (p.  123  f.)  adopt 


I40  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Kalamistic  view  in  the  latter  point,  and  solve  the  problem  of  evil 
differently. 

The  function  of  the  rational  soul  is  knowledge.  The  rational  soul 
investigates  the  unknown  and  comprehends  it.  It  derives  general 
rules,  makes  premises  and  infers  one  thing  from  another.  Man  alone 
has  this  privilege.  It  is  in  virtue  of  the  rational  soul  that  we  have 
been  given  commandments  and  prohibitions,  and  become  liable  to 
reward  and  punishment.  Brute  animals  have  no  commandments, 
because  they  have  no  reason.  The  soul  has  reason  only  potentially, 
and  man  makes  it  actual  by  study.  If  the  reason  were  actual  orig- 
inally in  the  soul,  there  would  be  no  difference  between  the  soul's 
condition  in  its  own  world  and  in  this  one;  and  the  purpose  of  man, 
which  is  that  he  may  learn  in  order  to  choose  the  right  way  and  win 
salvation,  would  have  no  meaning. 

The  existence  of  many  individual  souls,  all  of  which  have  the  soul 
character  in  common,  shows  that  there  is  a  universal  soul  by  virtue 
of  which  all  the  particular  souls  exist.  This  division  of  the  universal 
soul  into  many  individual  souls  is  not  really  a  division  of  the 
former  in  its  essence,  which  remains  one  and  indivisible.  It  is  the 
bodies  which  receive  the  influence  of  the  universal  soul,  as  vessels 
in  the  sun  receive  its  light  according  to  their  purity.  Hence  the  ex- 
istence of  justice  and  evil,  righteousness  and  wrong.  This  does  not, 
however,  mean  to  say  that  the  reception  of  these  qualities  is  independ- 
ent of  a  man's  choice.  Man  is  free  to  choose,  and  hence  he  deserves 
praise  and  blame,  reward  and  punishment. 

The  rational  soul  is  destined  for  the  spiritual  world,  which  is  a  pure 
and  perfect  world,  made  by  God  directly  without  an  intermediate 
agency.  It  is  not  subject  to  change  or  defect  or  need.  God  alone 
created  this  spiritual  world  to  show  his  goodness  and  power,  and  not 
because  he  needed  it.  The  world  is  not  like  God,  though  God  is  its 
cause.  It  is  not  eternal  a  parte  ante,  having  been  made  out  of  nothing 
by  God;  but  it  wiU  continue  to  exist  forever,  for  it  cannot  be  more 
perfect  than  it  is.  It  is  simple  and  spiritual.  This  applies  also  to  the 
heavenly  spheres  and  their  stars. 

Man  is  obhged  to  reason  and  investigate,  as  all  nations  do  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  of  their  capacities.  No  animal  reasons  because  it 
has  not  the  requisite  faculty.    But  if  man  should  neglect  to  exercise 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  141 

the  power  given  him,  he  would  lose  the  benefit  coming  therefrom  and 
the  purpose  of  his  existence.  There  would  then  be  no  difference 
between  him  and  the  beast. 

The  first  requisite  for  study  and  investigation  is  to  deaden  the  ani- 
mal desires.  Then  with  the  reason  as  a  guide  and  his  body  as  a  model, 
man  acquires  the  knowledge  of  the  corporeal  world.  From  his  rational 
soul  he  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  a  spiritual  world. 
Finally  he  will  learn  to  know  the  Creator,  who  is  the  only  real  existent, 
for  nothing  can  be  said  truly  to  exist,  which  at  one  time  did  not  exist, 
or  which  at  some  time  will  cease  to  exist.  When  a  man  neglects  this 
privilege  which  is  his  of  using  his  reason,  he  forfeits  the  name  man, 
and  descends  below  the  station  of  the  beast,  for  the  latter  never  falls 
below  its  animal  nature. 

It  is  very  important  to  study  the  knowledge  of  God,  for  it  is  the 
highest  knowledge  and  the  cause  of  himian  perfection.  The  prophets 
are  full  of  recommendations  in  this  regard.  Jeremiah  says  (31,  2^;^), 
"They  shall  all  know  me,  from  the  least  of  them  even  unto  their 
greatest."  Amos  (5,  6)  bids  us  "Seek  for  the  Lord  and  you  shall 
live."  Hosea  likewise  (6,  3)  recommends  that  "We  may  feel  it,  and 
strive  to  know  the  Lord."  ^^^ 

The  first  loss  a  man  suffers  who  does  not  study  and  investigate  is 
that  he  does  not  understand  the  real  existence  of  God,  and  imagines 
he  is  worshipping  a  body.  Some  think  God  is  light.  But  this  is  as 
bad  as  to  regard  him  body.  For  light  is  an  accident  in  a  shining  body, 
as  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  air  receives  the  light  of  the  sun,  and 
later  it  receives  the  shadow  and  becomes  dark.  And  yet  these  people 
are  not  the  worst  by  any  means,  for  there  are  others  who  do  not 
trouble  to  concentrate  their  minds  on  God,  and  occupy  their  thoughts 
solely  with  the  business  and  the  pleasures  of  this  world.  These  people 
we  do  not  discuss  at  all.  We  are  arguing  against  those  who  imagine 
they  are  wise  men  and  students  of  the  Kalam.  In  fact  they  are  ig- 
norant persons,  and  do  not  know  what  logic  is  and  how  it  is  to  be  used. 

Before  giving  our  own  views  of  the  nature  and  existence  of  God, 
we  must  refute  the  objectionable  doctrines  of  these  people.  Joseph 
al-Basir  in  a  work  of  his  called  "Mansuri"  casts  it  up  to  the  Rab- 
banites  that  in  believing  that  God  descends  and  ascends  they  are  not 
true  worshippers  of  God.    But  he  forgets  that  his  own  doctrines  are 


142  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

no  better.  Anyone  who  believes  that  God  created  with  a  newly 
created  will  and  rejects  by  means  of  a  newly  created  rejection  has 
never  truly  served  God  or  known  him.  Just  as  objectionable  is  their 
view  that  God  is  living  but  not  with  life  residing  in  a  subject,  powerful 
but  not  with  power,  and  so  on.    We  shall  take  up  each  of  these  in  turn. 

The  MutakaUimun  refuse  to  believe  that  God's  will  is  eternal,  for 
fear  of  having  a  second  eternal  beside  God.  And  so  they  say  that 
whenever  God  wills,  he  creates  a  will  for  the  purpose,  and  whenever 
he  rejects  anything  he  creates  a  "  rejection  "  with  which  the  objection- 
able thing  is  rejected.  But  this  leads  them  to  a  worse  predicament 
than  the  one  from  which  they  wish  to  escape,  as  we  shall  see.  If 
God  cannot  create  anything  without  having  a  will  as  the  instrument 
in  creating,  and  for  this  reason  must  first  create  a  will  for  the  purpose 
— ^how  did  he  create  this  will?  He  must  have  had  another  will  to 
create  this  will,  and  a  third  will  to  create  the  second,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum,  which  is  absurd.  If  he  created  the  first  will  without  the 
help  of  another  will,  why  not  create  the  things  he  wanted  outright 
without  any  will?  Besides,  in  making  God  will  at  a  given  time  after 
a  state  of  not  willing,  they  introduce  change  in  God. 

As  for  the  other  dictum,  that  God  is  "living  but  not  with  life," 
"powerful  but  not  with  power,"  "knowing  but  not  with  knowledge," 
and  so  on;  what  do  they  mean  by  this  circumlocution?  If  they  say 
"living"  to  indicate  that  he  is  not  dead,  and  add  "but  not  with  life," 
so  as  to  prevent  a  comparison  of  him  with  other  living  things,  why 
not  say  also,  "He  is  body,  but  not  like  other  bodies "?  If  the  objection 
to  calling  him  body  is  that  body  is  composite,  and  what  is  composite 
must  have  been  composed  by  someone  and  is  not  eternal,  the  same 
objection  applies  to  "living."  For  "living"  implies  "breathing" 
and  "possessed  of  sensation,"  hence  also  composite  and  created. 
If  they  reply,  we  mean  life  peculiar  to  him,  we  say  why  not  also  body 
peculiar  to  him?  You  see  these  people  entangle  themselves  in  their 
own  sophisms,  because  they  do  not  know  what  demonstration 
means.  ^^^ 

Having  disposed  of  the  errors  of  the  MutakaUimun,  we  must  now 
present  our  own  method  of  investigation  into  the  nature  of  God. 
To  know  a  thing,  we  investigate  its  four  causes — material,  formal, 
efi&cient  and  final.    What  has  no  cause  but  is  the  cause  of  all  things, 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  143 

cannot  be  known  in  this  way.  Still  it  is  not  altogether  unknowable 
for  this  reason.  Its  essence  cannot  be  known,  but  it  may  be  known 
through  its  activities,  or  rather  effects,  which  suggest  attributes. 
We  cannot  therefore  know  concerning  God  what  he  is,  nor  how  he  is, 
nor  on  account  of  what,  nor  of  what  kind,  nor  where,  nor  when.  For 
these  can  apply  only  to  a  created  thing  having  a  cause.  But  we  can 
ask  concerning  him,  whether  he  is;  and  this  can  best  be  known  from 
his  deeds. 

We  observe  the  things  of  the  world  and  find  that  they  are  all  com- 
posed of  substance  and  accident,  as  we  saw  before  (p.  131).  These 
are  correlative,  and  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other.  Hence  neither 
precedes  the  other.  But  accident  is  "new"  (/.  e.,  not  eternal),  hence 
so  is  substance.  That  accident  is  new  is  proved  from  the  fact  that 
rest  succeeds  motion  and  motion  succeeds  rest,  hence  accidents  con- 
stantly come  and  go  and  are  newly  created. 

Now  if  substance  and  accident  are  both  new  there  must  be  some- 
thing that  brought  them  into  being  unless  they  bring  themselves 
into  being.  But  the  latter  is  impossible,  for  the  agent  must  either 
exist  when  it  brings  itself  into  being,  or  not.  If  it  exists  it  is  already 
there;  if  it  does  not  exist,  it  is  nothing,  and  nothing  cannot  do  any- 
thing. Hence  there  must  be  a  being  that  brought  the  world  into 
existence.    This  is  God. 

God  is  one,  for  the  cause  of  the  many  must  be  the  one.  If  the  cause 
of  the  many  is  the  many,  then  the  cause  of  the  second  many  is  a  third 
many,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum;  hence  we  must  stop  with  the  one.  God 
is  to  the  world  as  unity  is  to  number.  Unity  is  the  basis  of  number 
without  being  included  in  number,  and  it  embraces  number  on  all 
sides.  It  is  the  foundation  of  number;  for  if  you  remove  unity,  you 
remove  number;  but  the  removal  of  number  does  not  remove  unity. 
The  one  surrounds  number  on  all  sides;  for  the  beginning  of  number 
is  the  one,  and  it  is  also  the  middle  of  number  and  the  end  thereof. 
For  nmnber  is  nothing  but  an  aggregate  of  ones.  Besides,  number 
is  composed  of  odds  and  evens,  and  one  is  the  cause  of  odd  as  well 
as  even. 

If  there  were  two  eternal  beings,  they  would  either  coincide  in  all 
respects,  and  they  would  be  one  and  not  two.  Or  they  would  differ. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  world  is  either  the  work  of  both  or  of  one  only. 


144  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

If  of  both,  they  are  not  omnipotent,  and  hence  not  eternal.  If  of  one 
only,  then  the  other  does  not  count,  since  he  is  not  eternal,  and  there 
is  only  one. 

By  saying  God  is  one  we  do  not  mean  that  he  comes  under  the 
category  of  quantity,  for  quantity  is  an  accident  residing  in  a  sub- 
stance, and  all  substance  is  "new."  What  we  mean  is  that  the  essence 
of  God  is  true  unity,  not  numerical  unity.  For  numerical  unity  is 
also  in  a  sense  multiplicity,  and  is  capable  of  multiphcation  and  divi- 
sion.   God's  unity  is  alone  separate  and  one  in  all  respects. 

God  is  not  like  any  of  his  creatures.  For  if  he  were,  he  would  be 
possessed  of  quality,  since  it  is  in  virtue  of  quahty  that  a  thing  is  said 
to  be  like  another,  and  quality  is  an  accident  contained  in  a  substance. 

God  is  self-sufficient  and  not  in  need  of  anything.  For  if  he  needed 
anything  at  all,  it  would  be  first  of  all  the  one  who  created  him  and 
made  him  an  existent  thing.  But  this  is  absurd,  since  God  is  eternal. 
We  might  suppose  that  he  needs  the  world,  which  he  created  for  some 
purpose,  as  we  sometimes  make  things  to  assist  us.  But  this,  too,  is 
impossible.  For  if  he  were  dependent  upon  the  world  for  anything, 
he  could  not  create  it.  It  is  different  with  us.  We  do  not  create 
things;  we  only  modify  matter  already  existing. 

Again,  if  God  created  the  world  for  his  own  benefit,  then  either  he 
was  always  in  need  of  the  world,  or  the  need  arose  at  the  time  of  creat- 
ing. If  he  was  always  in  need  of  the  world,  it  would  have  existed  with 
him  from  eternity,  but  we  have  already  proved  that  the  world  is  not 
eternal.  If  the  need  arose  in  him  at  the  time  of  creation,  as  heat 
arises  in  a  body  after  cold,  or  motion  after  rest,  then  he  is  like  created 
things,  and  is  himself  "new"  and  not  eternal.  To  say  the  need  was 
always  there,  and  yet  he  did  not  create  it  until  the  time  he  did  would 
be  to  ascribe  inability  to  God  of  creating  the  world  before  he  did, 
which  is  absurd.  For  one  who  is  unable  at  any  given  time,  cannot 
create  at  all.  It  remains  then  that  he  does  not  need  anything,  and 
that  he  created  the  world  by  reason  of  his  goodness  and  generosity 
and  nothing  else. 

The  question  of  God's  will  is  difficult.  The  problem  is  this.  If 
God's  will  is  eternal  and  unchanging,  and  he  created  the  world 
with  his  will,  the  world  is  eternal.  If  we  say,  as  we  must,  that  he 
created  the  world  after  a  condition  of  non-creation,  we  introduce  a 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  145 

change  in  God,  a  something  newly  created  in  him,  namely,  the  will 
to  create,  which  did  not  exist  before.  This  is  a  dilemma.  My  own 
view  is  that  since  God's  creating  activity  is  his  essence,  and  his  essence 
is  infinite  and  eternal,  we  cannot  say  he  created  after  a  condition  of 
non-creation,  or  that  he  willed  after  a  condition  of  non-willing,  or 
that  he  was  formerly  not  able.  And  yet  we  do  not  mean  that  the 
world  is  eternal.  It  was  created  a  definite  length  of  time  before  our 
time.  The  solution  of  the  problem  is  that  time  itself  was  created  with 
the  world;  for  time  is  the  measure  of  motion  of  the  celestial  sphere, 
and  if  there  are  no  spheres  there  is  no  time,  and  no  before  and  after. 
Hence  it  does  not  follow  because  the  world  is  not  eternal  that  before 
its  creation  God  did  not  create.  There  is  no  before  when  the  world  is 
not. 

We  objected  to  the  view  of  the  Mutakallimun  (p.  142),  who  speak 
of  God  creating  a  will  on  the  ground  that  if  he  can  create  a  will  directly 
he  can  create  the  world  instead.  Our  opinion  is  therefore  that  God's 
will  is  eternal  and  not  newly  created,  for  the  latter  view  introduces 
creation  in  God.  There  is  still  the  difficulty  of  the  precise  relation 
of  the  will  to  God.  If  it  is  different  from  God  we  have  two  eternals, 
and  if  it  is  the  same  as  God  in  all  respects,  he  changes  when  he  creates. 
My  answer  is,  it  is  not  different  from  God  in  any  sense,  and  there  is 
no  changing  attribute  in  God.  But  there  is  a  subtle  mystery  in  this 
matter,  which  it  is  not  proper  to  reveal,  and  this  is  not  the  place  to 
explain  it.  The  interested  reader  is  referred  to  the  book  of  Empedocles 
and  other  works  of  the  wise  men  treating  of  this  subject  {cf.  above, 
p.  64). 

God  created  the  world  out  of  nothing,  and  not  out  of  a  pre-existent 
matter.  For  if  the  matter  of  the  world  is  eternal  like  God,  there  is 
no  more  reason  for  supposing  that  God  formed  a  world  out  of  it  than 
that  it  formed  a  world  out  of  God. 

The  world  is  perfect.  For  we  have  repeatedly  shown  that  its  crea- 
tion is  due  entirely  to  God's  goodness.  If  then  it  were  not  perfect, 
this  would  argue  in  God  either  ignorance  or  niggardliness  or  weak- 
ness. ^''^ 

Most  of  the  ancients  avoided  giving  God  attributes  for  fear  of  mak- 
ing him  the  bearer  of  quaUties,  which  would  introduce  plurality  and 
composition  in  his  essence.    The  proper  view,  however,  is  this.    As 


146  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

God's  essence  is  different  from  all  other  essences,  so  are  his  attributes 
different  from  all  other  attributes.  His  attributes  are  not  different 
from  him;  his  knowledge  and  his  truth  and  his  power  are  his  essence. 
The  way  man  arrives  at  the  divine  attributes  is  this.  Men  have 
examined  his  works  and  learned  from  them  God's  existence.  They 
then  reflected  on  this  existent  and  found  that  he  was  not  weak;  so 
they  called  him  strong.  They  found  his  works  perfect,  and  they  called 
him  wise.  They  perceived  that  he  was  self-sufficient,  without  need 
of  anything,  and  hence  without  any  motives  for  doing  wrong.  Hence 
they  called  him  righteous.  And  so  on  with  the  other  attributes.  All 
this  they  did  in  order  that  people  may  learn  from  him  and  imitate 
his  ways.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  all  these  expressions  of  God's 
attributes  are  figurative.  No  one  must  suppose  that  if  we  do  not 
say  he  has  life,  it  means  he  is  dead.  What  we  mean  is  that  we  cannot 
apply  the  term  hving  to  God  literally,  in  the  sense  in  which  we  apply 
it  to  other  living  things.  When  the  Bible  does  speak  of  God  as  alive 
and  living,  the  meaning  is  that  he  exists  forever.  The  philosopher 
is  right  when  he  says  that  it  is  more  proper  to  apply  negative  attri- 
butes to  God  than  positive.  ^''^ 

Taking  a  glance  at  Ibn  Zaddik's  theology  just  discussed  in  its  es- 
sential outlines,  we  notice  that  while  he  opposes  vigorously  certain 
aspects  of  Kalamistic  thought,  as  he  found  them  in  al-Basir,  the 
Karaite,  his  own  method  and  doctrine  are  not  far  removed  from  the 
Kalam.  His  proof  of  the  creation  of  the  world  from  its  composite 
character  (substance  and  accident)  is  the  same  as  one  of  Saadia, 
which  Maimonides  cites  as  a  Kalamistic  proof.  We  have  already 
spoken  of  the  fact  that  the  method  of  basing  one's  theology  upon  the 
creation  of  the  world  is  one  that  is  distinctive  of  the  Kalam,  as  Mai- 
monides himself  tells  us.  And  this  method  is  common  to  Saadia, 
Bahya  and  Ibn  Zaddil^.  In  his  discussion  of  the  attributes  Ibn  Zaddik 
offers  little  if  anything  that  is  new.  His  attitude  is  that  in  the  lit- 
eral and  positive  sense  no  attribute  can  be  applied  to  God.  We  can 
speak  of  God  negatively  without  running  the  risk  of  misunderstanding. 
But  the  moment  we  say  anything  positive  we  do  become  thus  liable 
to  comparing  God  with  other  things;  and  such  circumlocutions  as 
the  Kalamistic  "Living  without  life,"  and  so  on,  do  not  help  matters, 
for  they  are  contradictory,  and  take  away  with  one  hand  what  they 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  147 

give  with  the  other.  The  Biblical  expressions  must  be  taken  figura- 
tively; and  the  most  important  point  to  remember  is  that  God's 
essence  cannot  be  known  at  all.  The  manner  in  which  we  arrive  at 
the  divine  attributes  is  by  transferring  them  from  God's  effects  in 
nature  to  his  own  essence.  All  this  we  have  already  found  in  Bahya 
much  better  expressed,  and  Bahya  is  also  without  doubt  the  source 
of  Ibn  Zaddik's  discussion  of  God's  unity. 

We  must  now  review  briefly  the  practical  part  of  Ibn  Zaddik's 
phi^)sophy  as  it  is  found  in  the  fourth  part  of  the  "Microcosm." 
In  the  manner  of  Bahya  he  points  out  the  importance  of  divine  service 
and  obedience  to  the  commandments  of  God,  vie\\dng  man's  duties 
to  his  maker  as  an  expression  of  gratitude,  which  everyone  owes  to 
his  benefactor.  Like  Bahya  he  compares  God's  benefactions  with 
those  of  one  man  to  another  to  show  the  infinite  superiority  of  the 
former,  and  the  greater  duty  which  follows  therefrom. 

The  commandments  which  God  gave  us  like  the  act  of  our  creation 
are  for  our  own  good,  that  we  may  enjoy  true  happiness  in  the  world 
to  come.  As  it  would  not  be  proper  to  reward  a  person  for  what  he 
has  not  done,  God  gave  man  commandments.  The  righteous  as  well 
as  the  wicked  are  free  to  determine  their  own  conduct,  hence  reward 
and  punishment  are  just. 

Like  Saadia  and  Bahya  before  him,  Ibn  Zaddik  makes  use  of  the 
distinction  (or  rather  takes  it  for  granted)  between  rational  and  tradi- 
tional commandments;  pointing  out  that  the  latter  also  have  a  cause 
and  explanation  in  the  mind  of  God  even  though  we  may  not  know  it. 
In  some  cases  we  can  see  the  explanation  ourselves.  Take  for  instance 
the  observance  of  the  Sabbath.  Its  rational  signification  is  two-fold. 
It  teaches  us  that  the  world  was  created,  and  hence  has  a  Creator 
whom  we  worship.  And  in  the  second  place  the  Sabbath  symbolizes 
the  future  world.  As  one  has  nothing  to  eat  on  the  Sabbath  day 
unless  he  has  prepared  food  the  day  before,  so  the  enjoyment  of  the 
future  world  depends  upon  spiritual  preparation  in  this  world. 

In  his  conduct  a  man  must  imitate  God's  actions  by  domg  good 
and  mercy  and  kindness.  Without  the  knowledge  of  God  a  person's 
good  deeds  are  of  no  account  and  no  better  than  the  work  of  idolaters. 
In  fact  it  is  not  possible  to  do  good  deeds  without  a  knowledge  of  God, 
for  he  is  the  source  of  all  good,  and  there  is  no  true  good  without  him. 


148  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

When  a  fool  is  seen  with  good  qualities  such  as  mercy  and  benevolence, 
they  are  due  to  the  weakness  of  his  animal  soul,  the  spirited  part  of  his 
nature.  Similarly  if  this  fool  abstains  from  pleasures,  it  is  because 
of  the  weakness  of  his  appetitive  soul. 

Thus  we  see  that  knowledge  comes  first  in  importance;  for  knowl- 
edge leads  to  practice,  and  practice  brings  reward  in  the  world  to 
come.  As  the  purpose  of  man's  creation  is  that  he  may  enjoy  the 
future  hfe,  wisdom  or  knowledge  is  the  first  requisite  to  this  great  end. 

The  four  principal  quahties  constituting  goodness  or  virtue  are 
(i)  knowledge  of  God's  attributes;  (2)  righteousness  or  justice;  (3) 
hope;  (4)  humility.  All  other  good  qualities  are  derived  from  these. 
Jeremiah  names  some  of  them  when  he  says  (9,  23),  "I  am  the  Lord 
who  exercise  kindness,  justice  and  righteousness  on  the  earth;  for  in 
these  things  I  dehght,  saith  the  Lord,"  Similarly  Zephaniah  (2,  3) 
bids  us,  "Seek  ye  the  Lord,  all  ye  meek  of  the  earth,  who  have  ful- 
filled his  ordinances;  seek  righteousness,  seek  meekness." 

The  four  qualities  of  wisdom  or  knowledge,  righteousness,  hope  and 
humihty  are  without  doubt  modified  descendants  of  the  four  Platonic 
virtues,  wisdom,  courage,  temperance  and  justice,  which  we  still  find 
in  their  original  form  and  in  their  Platonic  derivation  and  psycholog- 
ical origin  in  Pseudo-Bahya  (c/.  above  p.  in). 

Reward  and  punishment  of  the  real  kind,  Ibn  Zaddik  thinks,  are 
not  in  this  world  but  in  the  next.  In  this  way  he  accounts  for  the 
fact  of  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the  sufferings  of  the  righteous. 
Another  proof  that  this  world  cannot  be  the  place  of  final  reward  and 
punishment  is  that  pleasure  in  this  world  is  not  a  real  good,  but  only 
a  temporary  respite  from  disease.  Pain  and  pleasure  are  correlative, 
as  we  saw  before  (p.  136).  In  fact  pleasure  is  not  a  good  at  all;  for 
if  it  were,  then  the  greater  the  pleasure,  the  greater  the  good,  which 
is  not  true.  Reward  in  the  next  world  is  not  a  corporeal  pleasure 
at  all. 

The  evil  which  happens  to  the  righteous  in  this  world  is  often  a 
natural  occurrence  without  reference  to  reward  and  punishment,  and 
may  be  compared  to  the  natural  pleasures  which  men  derive  from  the 
sense  of  sight  and  the  other  senses,  and  which  have  nothing  to  do  with 
reward  and  punishment.  Sometimes,  too,  this  evil  is  inflicted  upon 
the  good  man  to  forgive  his  sins.    Real  reward  and  punishment  are 


JOSEPH  IBN  ZADDIK  149 

in  the  future  life,  and  as  that  hfe  is  spiritual,  the  reward  as  well  as  the 
punishment  is  timeless. 

The  Mutakallimun  think  that  animals  and  little  children  are  also 
rewarded  in  the  next  world  for  ill  treatment,  suffering  and  death 
which  are  inflicted  upon  them  in  this  world.  So  we  find  in  Joseph  al 
Basir's  Mansuri.  But  this  is  absurd.  If  the  killing  of  animals  is  a 
wrong,  God  would  not  have  commanded  us  to  do  it,  any  more  than 
he  ordered  us  to  kill  human  beings  in  order  that  he  may  reward  them 
later.  Moreover,  we  should  then  deserve  punishment  for  kUUng 
animals  if  that  is  wrong,  and  there  would  follow  the  absurdity  that 
God  commanded  us  to  do  that  for  which  we  deserve  punishment. 
Besides,  if  the  animals  deserve  reward  and  punishment,  they  should 
have  been  given  commandments  and  laws  like  ourselves.  If  this 
was  not  done  because  animals  are  not  rational,  reward  and  punishment 
are  equally  out  of  place  for  the  same  reason. 

When  the  soul  leaves  the  body  in  death,  if  she  exercised  her  reason 
in  the  pursuit  of  knowledge,  she  will  continue  her  existence  forever 
in  the  upper  world.  This  is  her  happiness,  her  reward  and  her  para- 
dise, namely,  to  cleave  to  her  own  world,  and  to  shine  with  the  true 
Hght  emanating  from  God  directly.  This  is  the  end  of  the  human 
soul.  But  if  she  did  not  exercise  her  reason  and  did  not  pursue  right 
conduct,  she  will  not  be  able  to  return  to  the  spiritual  world,  for  she 
will  have  lost  her  own  spirituality.  She  will  be  similar  to  the  body, 
desiring  this  world  and  its  pleasures.  Her  fate  will  be  to  revolve 
forever  with  the  sphere  in  the  world  of  fire,  without  being  able  to 
return  to  her  world.    Thus  she  will  be  forever  in  pain,  and  homeless. 

When  the  Messiah  comes,  the  pious  men  of  our  nation,  the  Prophets, 
the  Patriarchs  and  those  who  died  for  the  sanctification  of  the  name, 
i.  e.,  the  martyrs,  will  be  brought  back  to  life  in  the  body,  and  will 
never  die  again.  There  will  be  no  eating  and  drinking,  but  they  will 
live  like  Moses  on  the  mountain  basking  in  the  divine  light.  The 
wicked  will  also  be  joined  to  their  bodies  and  burned  with  fire.^^^ 


CHAPTER  X 

JUDAH  HALEVI 

In  Judah  Halevi  the  poet  got  the  better  of  the  rationalist.  Not 
that  Judah  Halevi  was  not  famihar  with  philosophical  thinking  and 
did  not  absorb  the  current  philosophical  terminology  as  well  as  the 
ideas  contained  therein.  Quite  the  contrary.  He  shows  a  better 
knowledge  of  Aristotelian  ideas  than  his  predecessors,  and  is  well 
versed  in  Neo-Platonism.  While  he  attacks  all  those  views  of  philoso- 
phers which  are  inconsistent  to  his  mind  with  the  religion  of  Judaism, 
he  speaks  in  other  respects  the  philosophic  language,  and  even  makes 
concessions  to  the  philosophers.  If  the  reason  should  really  demand  it, 
he  tells  us,  one  might  adopt  the  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  matter 
without  doing  any  harm  to  the  essence  of  Judaism.  ^^^  As  for  the 
claims  of  reason  to  rule  our  beUefs,  he  similarly  admits  that  that 
which  is  really  proved  in  the  same  absolute  manner  as  the  propositions 
in  mathematics  and  logic  cannot  be  controverted.  But  this  opinion 
need  cause  one  no  difficulty  as  there  is  nothing  in  the  Bible  which 
opposes  the  unequivocal  demands  of  the  reason.  ^^^  He  cannot  consist- 
ently oppose  all  philosophy  and  science,  for  he  maintains  that  the 
sciences  were  originally  in  the  hands  of  the  Jews,  and  that  it  was 
from  them  that  the  Chaldeans  borrowed  them  and  handed  them 
over  to  the  Persians,  who  in  turn  transferred  them  to  Greece  and 
Rome,  their  origin  being  forgotten.  ^^*^  At  the  same  time  he  insists 
that  philosophy  and  reason  are  not  adequate  means  for  the  solution 
of  all  problems,  and  that  the  actual  solutions  as  found  in  the  writings 
of  the  Aristotelians  of  his  day  are  in  many  cases  devoid  of  aU  demon- 
strative value.  Then  there  are  certain  matters  in  theory  as  well  as 
in  practice  which  do  not  at  all  come  within  the  domain  of  reason, 
and  the  philosophers  are  bound  to  be  wrong  because  they  apply  the 
wrong  method.  Revelation  alone  can  make  us  wise  as  to  certain 
aspects  of  God's  nature  and  as  to  certain  details  in  human  conduct; 
and  in  these  philosophy  must  fail  because  as  philosophy  it  has  no 

150 


JUDAH  EALEVl  151 

revelation.  With  all  due  respect  therefore  to  the  philosophers,  who 
are  the  most  reliable  guides  in  matters  not  conflicting  with  revelation, 
we  must  leave  them  if  we  wish  to  learn  the  truth  concerning  those 
matters  in  which  they  are  incompetent  to  judge. 

This  characterization  of  Judah  Halevi's  attitude  is  brief  and  inade- 
quate. But  before  proceeding  to  elaborate  it  with  more  detail  and 
greater  concreteness,  it  will  be  well  to  sketch  very  briefly  the  httle 
we  know  of  his  life.^^^ 

Judah  Halevi  was  bom  in  Toledo  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  eleventh 
century.  This  is  about  the  time  when  the  city  was  taken  from  the 
Mohammedans  by  the  emperor  Alphonso  VI,  king  of  Leon,  Castile, 
Galicia  and  Navarre.  At  the  same  time  Toledo  remained  Arabic 
in  culture  and  language  for  a  long  while  after  this,  and  even  exerted 
a  great  influence  upon  the  civiHzation  of  Christendom.  The  Jews  were 
equally  well  treated  in  Toledo  by  Mohammedan  emir  and  Christian 
king.  The  youth  of  Halevi  was  therefore  not  embittered  or  saddened 
by  Jewish  persecutions.  It  seems  that  he  was  sent  to  Lucena,  a  Jewish 
centre,  where  he  studied  the  Talmud  with  the  famous  Alfasi,  and 
made  friends  with  Joseph  ibn  Migash,  Ahasi's  successor,  and  Baruh 
Albalia,  the  philosopher.  A  poet  by  nature,  he  began  to  write  Hebrew 
verses  early,  and  soon  became  famous  as  a  poet  of  the  first  order  in 
no  manner  inferior  to  Gabirol.  His  living  he  made  not  from  his  verses, 
but  like  many  others  of  his  day  by  practicing  the  art  of  medicine. 
Later  in  Ufe  he  visited  Cordova,  already  in  its  decline  through  the 
illiberal  government  of  the  Almoravid  dynasty.  The  rulers  were 
strict  religionists,  imphcit  followers  of  the  "fukaha,"  the  men  devoted 
to  the  study  of  Mohammedan  religion  and  law;  and  scientific  learning 
and  philosophy  were  proscribed  in  their  domains.  Men  of  another 
faith  were  not  in  favor,  and  the  Jews  who,  unlike  the  Christians, 
had  no  powerful  emperor  anywhere  to  take  their  part,  had  to  buy 
their  Hves  and  comparative  freedom  with  their  hard  earned  wealth. 
Here  Halevi  spent  some  time  as  a  physician.  He  was  admitted  in 
court  circles,  but  his  personal  good  fortune  could  not  reconcile  him 
to  the  sufferings  of  his  brethren,  and  his  letters  give  expression  to 
his  dissatisfaction.  He  wrote  a  variety  of  poems  on  subjects  secular 
and  religious;  but  what  made  him  famous  above  all  else  was  his  strong 
nationahsm,  and  those  of  his  poems  will  hve  longest  which  give  ex- 


152  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

pression  to  his  intense  love  for  his  people  and  the  land  which  was  once 
their  own.  That  it  was  not  mere  sentiment  with  Judah  Halevi  he 
proved  late  in  life  when  he  decided  to  leave  his  many  friends  and  his 
birthplace  and  go  to  Palestine  to  end  his  life  on  the  soil  of  his  ancestors. 
It  was  after  1140  that  he  left  Spain  for  the  East.  Unfavorable  winds 
drove  him  out  of  course  to  Egypt,  and  he  landed  at  Alexandria.  From 
there  he  went  to  Cairo  at  the  invitation  of  his  admirers  and  friends. 
Everywhere  he  was  received  with  great  honor,  his  fame  preceding 
him,  and  he  was  urged  to  remain  in  Egypt.  But  no  dissuasion  could 
keep  him  from  his  pious  resolve.  We  find  him  later  in  Damietta; 
we  follow  him  to  Tyre  and  Damascus,  but  beyond  the  last  city  all 
trace  of  him  is  lost.  We  know  not  whether  he  reached  Jerusalem  or 
not.  Legend  picks  up  the  thread  where  history  drops  it,  and  tells 
of  Judah  Halevi  meeting  his  death  at  the  gates  of  the  holy  city  as 
with  tears  he  was  singing  his  famous  ode  to  Zion.  An  Arab  horseman, 
the  story  goes,  pierced  him  through  with  his  spear. 

This  sketch  of  Halevi's  life  and  character,  brief  and  inadequate 
as  it  is,  will  prepare  us  to  understand  better  his  attitude  to  philosophy 
and  to  Judaism.  His  was  not  a  critical  intellect  whose  curiosity  is 
not  satisfied  until  the  matter  in  dispute  is  proved  in  logical  form. 
Reason  is  good  enough  in  mathematics  and  physics  where  the  objects 
of  our  investigation  are  accessible  to  us  and  the  knowledge  of  their 
nature  exhausts  their  significance.  It  is  not  so  with  the  truths  of 
Judaism  and  the  nature  of  God.  These  cannot  be  known  adequately 
by  the  reason  alone,  and  mere  knowledge  is  not  enough.  God  and 
the  Jewish  religion  are  not  simply  facts  to  be  known  and  understood 
like  the  laws  of  science.  They  are  living  entities  to  be  acquainted 
with,  to  be  devoted  to,  to  love.  Hence  quite  a  different  way  of  ap- 
proach is  necessary.  And  not  everyone  has  access  to  this  way.  The 
method  of  acquaintance  is  open  only  to  those  who  by  birth  and  tradi- 
tion belong  to  the  family  of  the  prophets,  who  had  a  personal  knowl- 
edge of  God,  and  to  the  land  of  Palestine  where  God  revealed  him- 
self. ^^^ 

We  see  here  the  nationalist  speaking,  the  lover  of  his  people  and  of 
their  land  and  language  and  institutions.  David  Kaufmann  has 
shown  that  Judah  Halevi's  anti-philosophical  attitude  has  much  in 
common  with  that  of  the  great  Arab  writer  Al  Gazali,  from  whom 


JUDAH  HALEVI  153 

there  is  no  doubt  that  he  borrowed  his  inspiration.  ^^^  Gazali  began  as 
a  philosopher,  then  lost  confidence  in  the  logical  method  of  proof, 
pointed  to  the  contradictions  of  the  philosophers,  to  their  disagree- 
ments among  themselves,  and  went  over  to  the  Sufis,  the  pietists 
and  mystics  of  the  Mohammedan  faith.  There  are  a  number  of  re- 
semblances between  Gazali  and  Halevi  as  Kaufmann  has  shown,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  skepticism  in  respect  of  the  powers  of  the 
human  reason  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  deep  religious  sense  on  the  other 
are  responsible  for  the  point  of  view  of  Gazali  as  well  as  Halevi.  But 
there  is  this  additional  motive  in  Halevi  that  he  was  defending  a  per- 
secuted race  and  a  despised  faith  against  not  merely  the  philosophers 
but  against  the  more  powerful  and  more  fortunate  professors  of  other 
religions.  He  is  the  loyal  son  of  his  race  and  his  religion,  and  he  will 
show  that  they  are  above  all  criticism,  that  they  are  the  best  and  the 
truest  there  are,  Maimonides,  too,  found  it  necessary  to  defend 
Judaism  against  the  attacks  of  philosophy.  But  in  his  case  it  was 
the  Jew  in  him  who  had  to  be  defended  against  the  philosopher  in 
him.  It  was  no  external  enemy  but  an  internal  who  must  be  made 
harmless,  and  the  method  was  one  of  reconciliation  and  harmoniza- 
tion. It  is  still  truer  to  say  that  with  Maimonides  both  Judaism  and 
philosophy  were  his  friends,  neither  was  an  enemy.  He  was  attached 
to  one  quite  as  much  as  to  the  other.  And  it  was  his  privilege  to  recon- 
cile their  differences,  to  the  great  gain,  as  he  thought,  of  both,  Judah 
Halevi  takes  the  stand  of  one  who  fights  for  his  hearth  and  home 
agauist  the  attacks  of  foreign  foes.  He  will  not  yield  an  inch  to  the 
adversary.    He  will  maintain  his  own.    The  enemy  cannot  approach. 

Thus  Halevi  begins  his  famous  work  "Kusari":  "  I  was  asked  what 
I  have  to  say  in  answer  to  the  arguments  of  philosophers,  unbeUevers 
and  professors  of  other  religions  against  our  own."  Instead  of  working 
out  his  ideas  systematically,  he  wanted  to  give  his  subject  dramatic 
interest  by  clothing  it  in  dialogue  form.  And  he  was  fortunate  in 
finding  a  historical  event  which  suited  his  purpose  admirably. 

Some  three  or  four  centuries  before  his  time,  the  king  of  the  Chazars, 
a  people  of  Turkish  origin  living  in  the  Caucasus,  together  with  his 
courtiers  and  many  of  his  subjects  embraced  Judaism.  Hasdai  ibn 
Shaprut,  the  Jewish  minister  and  patron  of  learning  of  Cordova,  in 
the  tenth  century  corresponded  with  the  then  king  of  the  Chazars, 


154  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

and  received  an  account  of  the  circumstances  of  the  conversion.  In 
brief  it  was  that  the  king  wishing  to  know  which  was  the  true  reUgion 
invited  representatives  of  the  three  dominant  creeds,  Judaism,  Chris- 
tianity and  Mohammedanism,  and  questioned  them  concerning  the 
tenets  of  their  respective  faiths.  Seeing  that  the  Christian  as  well  as 
the  Mohammedan  appealed  in  their  arguments  to  the  truth  of  the 
Hebrew  Bible,  the  king  concluded  that  Judaism  must  be  the  true 
religion,  which  he  accordingly  adopted.  This  story  gave  Halevi  the 
background  and  framework  for  his  composition.  He  works  out  his 
own  ideas  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue  between  the  Jewish  Rabbi  and  the 
king  of  the  Chazars,  in  which  the  former  explains  to  the  king  the 
essentials  of  the  Jewish  religion,  and  answers  the  king's  questions 
and  criticisms,  taking  occasion  to  discuss  a  variety  of  topics,  religious, 
philosophical  and  scientific,  all  tending  to  show  the  truth  of  Judaism 
and  its  superiority  to  other  religions,  to  philosophy,  Kalam,  and  also 
to  Karaism. 

The  story  is,  Halevi  tells  us,  in  the  introduction  to  his  book,  that 
the  king  of  the  Chazars  had  repeated  dreams  in  which  an  angel  said 
to  him,  "Your  intentions  are  acceptable  to  God,  but  not  your  prac- 
tice." His  endeavors  to  be  faithful  to  his  religion,  and  to  take  part  in 
the  services  and  perform  the  sacrifices  in  the  temple  in  person  only  led 
to  the  repetition  of  the  dream.  He  therefore  consulted  a  philosopher 
about  his  belief,  and  the  latter  said  to  him,  "In  God  there  is  neither 
favor  nor  hatred,  for  he  is  above  all  desire  and  purpose.  Purpose  and 
intention  argue  defect  and  want,  which  the  fulfilment  of  the  intention 
satisfies.  But  God  is  free  from  want.  Hence  there  is  no  purpose  or 
intention  in  his  nature. 

'  God  does  not  know  the  particular  or  individual,  for  the  individual 
constantly  changes,  whereas  God's  knowledge  never  changes.  Hence 
God  does  not  know  the  individual  man  and,  needless  to  say,  he  does 
not  hear  his  prayer.  When  the  philosophers  say  God  created  man, 
they  use  the  word  created  metaphorically,  in  the  sense  that  God  is 
the  cause  of  all  causes,  but  not  that  he  made  man  with  purpose  and 
intention. 

The  world  is  eternal,  and  so  is  the  existence  of  man.  The  character 
and  abihty  of  a  person  depend  upon  the  causes  antecedent  to  him. 
If  these  are  of  the  right  sort,  we  have  a  person  who  has  the  potentiali- 


JUDAH  HALEFI  155 

ties  of  a  philosopher.  To  realize  them  he  must  develop  his  intellect 
by  study,  and  his  character  through  moral  discipline.  Then  he  will 
receive  the  influence  of  the  'Active  Intellect,'  with  which  he  becomes 
identified  so  that  his  limbs  and  faculties  do  only  what  is  right,  and  are 
■wholly  in  the  service  of  the  active  Intellect. 

"This  union  with  the  active  Intellect  is  the  highest  goal  of  man;  and 
he  becomes  like  one  of  the  angels,  and  joins  the  ranks  of  Hermes, 
^sculapius,  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
expression  'favor  of  God.'  The  important  thing  is  to  study  the 
sciences  in  order  to  know  the  truth,  and  to  practice  the  ethical  virtues. 
If  one  does  this,  it  matters  not  what  religion  he  professes,  or  whether 
he  professes  any  religion  at  all.  He  can  make  his  own  religion  in  order 
to  discipline  himself  in  humility,  and  to  govern  his  relations  to  society 
and  country.  Or  he  can  choose  one  of  the  philosophical  religions. 
Purity  of  heart  is  the  important  thing,  and  knowledge  of  the  sciences. 
Then  the  desired  result  will  come,  namely,  union  with  the  active 
intellect,  which  may  also  result  in  the  power  of  prophecy  through  true 
dreams  and  visions." 

The  king  was  not  satisfied  with  the  statement  of  the  philosopher, 
which  seemed  to  him  inadequate  because  he  felt  that  he  himself  had 
the  necessary  purity  of  heart,  and  yet  he  was  told  that  his  practice 
was  not  satisfactory,  proving  that  there  is  something  in  practice  as 
such  apart  from  intention.  Besides,  the  great  conflict  between  Chris- 
tianity and  Islam,  who  kill  one  another,  is  due  to  the  difference  in 
religious  practice,  and  not  in  purity  of  heart.  Moreover,  if  the  view 
of  the  philosophers  were  true,  there  should  be  prophecy  among  them, 
whereas  in  reality  prophecy  is  found  among  those  who  did  not  study 
the  sciences  rather  than  among  those  who  did. 

The  king  then  said,  I  will  ask  the  Christians  and  the  Mohammedans. 
I  need  not  inquire  of  the  Jews,  for  their  low  condition  is  sufficient 
proof  that  the  truth  cannot  be  with  them.  So  he  sent  for  a  Christian 
sage,  who  explained  to  him  the  essentials  of  his  belief,  saying  among 
other  things.  We  beheve  in  the  creation  of  the  world  in  six  days,  in  the 
descent  of  all  men  from  Adam,  in  revelation  and  Providence,  in  short, 
in  all  that  is  found  in  the  law  of  Moses  and  in  the  other  Israelitish 
Scriptures,  which  cannot  be  doubted  because  of  the  publicity  which 
was  given  to  the  events  recorded  therein.    He  also  quoted  the  words 


156  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  gospel,  I  did  not  come  to  destroy  any  of  the  commandments 
of  Israel  and  of  Moses  their  teacher;  I  came  to  confirm  them. 

The  king  was  not  convinced  by  the  Christian  belief,  and  called  a 
Mohammedan  doctor,  who  in  describing  the  specific  tenets  of  Mo- 
hammedanism also  mentioned  the  fact  that  in  the  Koran  are  quoted 
the  Pentateuch  and  Moses  and  the  other  leaders,  and  the  wonderful 
things  they  did.  These,  he  said,  cannot  be  denied;  for  they  are  well 
known. 

Seeing  that  both  Christian  and  Mohammedan  referred  to  the  law 
of  Moses  as  true,  and  as  evidence  that  God  spoke  to  man,  the  king 
determined  to  call  a  Jewish  sage  also,  and  hear  what  he  had  to  say. 

The  Jewish  "Haber, "  as  Judah  Halevi  calls  him,  began  his  discourse 
by  saying,  We  Jews  believe  in  the  God  of  Abraham,  Isaac  and  Jacob, 
who  took  the  children  of  Israel  out  of  Egypt,  supported  them  in  the 
wilderness,  gave  them  the  land  of  Canaan,  and  so  on. 

The  king  was  disappointed  and  said,  I  had  determined  not  to  con- 
sult the  Jews  in  this  matter  at  all,  because  their  abject  condition  in 
the  world  did  not  leave  them  any  good  quality.  You  should  have 
said,  he  told  the  Jew,  that  you  believe  in  him  who  created  the  world 
and  governs  it;  who  made  man  and  provides  for  him.  Every  religionist 
defends  his  belief  in  this  way. 

The  Jew  replied,  The  religion  to  which  you  refer  is  a  rational  religion, 
established  by  speculation  and  argument,  which  are  full  of  doubt, 
and  about  which  there  is  no  agreement  among  philosophers,  because 
not  all  the  arguments  are  vahd  or  even  plausible.  This  pleased  the 
king,  and  he  expressed  a  wish  to  continue  the  discourse.  The  Rabbi 
then  said.  The  proper  way  to  define  one's  religion  is  by  reference  to 
that  which  is  more  certain,  namely,  actual  experience.  Jews  have 
this  actual  experience.  The  God  of  Abraham,  Isaac  and  Jacob  spoke 
to  Moses  and  delivered  the  Israelites  out  of  Egypt.  This  is  well 
known.  God  gave  Israel  the  Torah.  To  be  sure,  all  others  not  of 
Israel  who  accept  the  Law  will  be  rewarded,  but  they  caimot  be  equal 
to  Israel.  There  is  a  peculiar  relation  between  God  and  Israel  in 
which  the  other  peoples  do  not  share.  As  the  plant  is  distinguished 
from  the  mineral,  the  animal  from  the  plant,  and  man  from  the  ir- 
rational animal,  so  is  the  prophetic  individual  distinguished  above 
other  men.    He  constitutes  a  higher  species.    It  is  through  him  that 


JUDAH  HA  LEV  I  157 

the  masses  became  aware  of  God's  existence  and  care  for  them.  It 
was  he  who  told  them  things  unknown  to  them;  who  gave  them  an 
account  of  the  world's  creation  and  its  history.  We  count  now  forty- 
five  hundred  years  from  the  creation.  This  was  handed  down  from 
Adam  through  Seth  and  Enos  to  Noah,  to  Shem  and  Eber,  to  Abra- 
ham, Isaac  and  Jacob,  to  Moses,  and  finally  to  us.  Moses  came  only 
four  hundred  years  after  Abraham  in  a  world  which  was  full  of  knowl- 
edge of  heavenly  and  earthly  things.  It  is  impossible  that  he  should 
have  given  them  a  false  account  of  the  division  of  languages  and 
the  relations  of  nations  without  being  found  out  and  exposed. 

The  philosophers,  it  is  true,  oppose  us  by  maintaining  that  the  world 
is  eternal.  But  the  philosophers  are  Greeks,  descended  from  Japheth, 
who  did  not  inherit  either  wisdom  or  Torah.  Divine  wisdom  is  found 
only  in  the  family  of  Shem.  The  Greeks  had  philosophy  among  them 
only  during  the  short  time  of  their  power.  They  borrowed  it  from  the 
Persians,  who  had  it  in  turn  from  the  Chaldeans.  But  neither  before 
nor  after  did  they  have  any  philosophers  among  them. 

Aristotle,  not  having  any  inherited  tradition  concerning  the  origin 
of  the  world,  endeavored  to  reason  it  all  out  of  his  own  head.  Eternity  » 
was  just  as  hard  to  believe  in  as  creation.  But  as  he  had  no  true 
and  reliable  tradition,  his  arguments  in  favor  of  eternity  seemed  to 
him  to  be  the  stronger.  Had  he  lived  among  a  people  who  had  re- 
liable traditions  on  the  other  side,  he  would  have  found  arguments 
in  favor  of  creation,  which  is  more  plausible  than  eternity.  Real 
demonstration  cannot  be  controverted;  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
Bible  which  opposes  what  the  reason  unequivocally  demands.  But 
the  matter  of  eternity  or  creation  is  very  difficult.  The  arguments 
on  one  side  are  as  good  as  those  on  the  other.  And  tradition  from 
Adam  to  Noah  and  Moses,  which  is  better  than  argument,  lends  its 
additional  weight  to  the  doctrine  of  creation.  If  the  believer  in  the 
Torah  were  obliged  to  hold  that  there  is  a  primitive  eternal  matter 
from  which  the  world  was  made,  and  that  there  were  many  worlds 
before  this  one,  there  would  be  no  great  harm,  as  long  as  he  believes 
that  this  world  is  of  recent  origin  and  Adam  was  the  first  man.^^* 

We  see  now  the  standpoint  of  Judah  Halevi,  for  the  "Haber"  is 
of  course  his  spokesman.  Philosophy  and  independent  reasoning 
on  such  difficult  matters  as  God  and  creation  are  after  all  more  or 


IS8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

less  guess  work,  and  cannot  be  made  the  bases  of  religion  except  for 
those  who  have  nothing  better.  The  Jews  fortunately  have  a  surer 
foundation  all  their  own.  They  have  a  genuine  and  indisputable 
tradition.  History  is  the  only  true  science  and  the  source  of  truth; 
not  speculation,  which  is  subjective,  and  can  be  employed  with  equal 
plausibihty  in  favor  of  opposite  doctrines.  True  history  and  tradition 
in  the  case  of  the  Jews  goes  back  ultimately  to  first  hand  knowledge 
from  the  very  source  of  all  truth.  The  prophets  of  Israel  constitute 
a  higher  species,  as  much  superior  to  the  ordinary  man  as  the  ordinary 
man  is  to  the  lower  animal,  and  these  prophets  received  their  knowl- 
edge direct  from  God.  In  principle  Judah  Halevi  agrees  with  the 
other  Jewish  philosophers  that  true  reason  cannot  be  controverted. 
He  differs  with  them  in  the  concrete  application  of  this  abstract 
principle.  He  has  not  the  same  respect  as  Maimonides  for  the  actual 
achievements  of  the  unaided  human  reason,  and  an  infinitely  greater 
respect  for  the  traditional  beliefs  of  Judaism  and  the  Biblical  expres- 
sions taken  in  their  obvious  meaning.  Hence  he  does  not  feel  the 
same  neccessity  as  Maimonides  to  twist  the  meaning  of  Scriptural 
passages  to  make  them  agree  with  philosophical  theories. 

According  to  this  view  Judah  Halevi  does  not  find  it  necessary 
with  the  philosophers  and  the  Mutakallimun  painfully  to  prove  the 
existence  of  God.  The  existence  of  the  Jewish  people  and  the  facts 
of  their  wonderful  history  are  more  eloquent  demonstrations  than 
any  that  logic  or  metaphysics  can  muster.  But  more  than  this.  The 
philosophical  view  of  God  is  inadequate  in  more  ways  than  one.  It 
is  inaccurate  in  content  and  incorrect  in  motive.  In  the  first  place, 
they  lay  a  great  deal  of  stress  on  nature  as  the  principle  by  which 
objects  move.  If  a  stone  naturally  moves  to  the  centre  of  the  world, 
they  say  this  is  due  to  a  cause  called  nature.  And  the  tendency  is  to 
attribute  intelligence  and  creative  power  to  this  new  entity  as  an  as- 
sociate of  God.  This  is  misleading.  The  real  Intelligence  is  God  alone. 
It  is  true  that  the  elements,  and  the  sun  and  moon,  and  the  stars  exert 
certain  influences,  producing  heat  and  cold,  and  various  other  effects  in 
things  material,  by  virtue  of  which  these  latter  are  prepared  for  the  re- 
ception of  higher  forms.  And  there  is  no  harm  in  caUing  these  agencies 
Nature.  But  we  must  regard  these  as  devoid  of  intelligence,  and  as 
mere  effects  of  God's  wisdom  and  purpose.  ^^^ 


JUDAH  HALEVI  159 

The  philosopher  denies  will  in  God  on  the  ground  that  this  would 
argue  defect  and  want.  This  reduces  God  to  an  impersonal  force. 
We  Jews  believe  God  has  will.  The  word  we  use  does  not  matter. 
I  ask  the  philosopher  what  is  it  that  makes  the  heavens  revolve  con- 
tinually, and  the  outer  sphere  carry  everything  in  uniform  motion, 
the  earth  standing  immovable  in  the  centre?  Call  it  what  you  please, 
will  or  command;  it  is  the  same  thing  that  made  the  air  shape  itself 
to  produce  the  sounds  of  the  ten  commandments  which  were  heard, 
and  that  caused  the  characters  to  form  on  the  Tables  of  Stone.  ^^® 

The  motive  of  the  philosopher  is  also  different  from  that  of  the  be- 
liever. The  philosopher  seeks  knowledge  only.  He  desires  to  know 
God  as  he  desires  to  know  the  exact  position  and  form  of  the  earth. 
Ignorance  in  respect  to  God  is  no  more  harmful  in  his  mind  than 
ignorance  respecting  a  fact  in  nature.  His  main  object  is  to  have 
true  knowledge  in  order  to  become  like  unto  the  Active  Intellect  and 
to  be  identified  with  it.  As  long  as  he  is  a  philosopher  it  makes  no 
difference  to  him  what  he  believes  in  other  respects  and  whether  he 
observes  the  practices  of  religion  or  not.^^^ 

The  true  belief  in  God  is  different  in  scope  and  aim.  What  God  is 
must  be  understood  not  by  means  of  rational  proofs,  but  by  prophetic 
and  spiritual  insight.  Rational  proofs  are  misleading,  and  the  heretics 
and  unbelievers  also  use  rational  proofs — those  for  example  who  believe 
in  two  original  causes,  in  the  eternity  of  the  world,  or  in  the  divinity 
of  the  sun  and  fire.  The  most  subtle  proofs  are  those  used  by  the 
philosophers,  and  they  maintain  that  God  is  not  concerned  about  us, 
and  pays  no  attention  to  our  prayers  and  sacrifices;  that  the  world 
is  eternal.  It  is  different  with  us,  who  heard  his  words,  his  commands 
and  prohibitions,  and  felt  his  reward  and  his  punishment.  We  have 
a  proper  name  of  God,  Jhvh,  representative  of  the  communications 
he  made  to  us,  and  we  have  a  conviction  that  he  created  the  world. 
The  first  was  Adam,  who  knew  God  through  actual  communication 
and  the  creation  of  Eve  from  one  of  his  ribs.  Cain  and  Abel  came 
next,  then  Noah  and  Abraham,  Isaac  and  Jacob,  and  so  on  to  Moses 
and  the  Prophets,  who  came  after  him.  All  these  called  him  Jhvh 
by  reason  of  their  insight.  The  people  who  received  the  teaching 
of  the  Prophets,  in  whom  they  beheved,  also  called  him  Jhvh,  because 
he  was  in  communication  with  men;  and  the  select  among  them  saw 


i6o  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

him  through  an  intermediate  agency,  called  variously,  Form,  Image, 
Cloud,  Fire,  Kingdom,  Shekinah,  Glory,  Rainbow,  and  so  on,  proving 
that  he  spoke  to  them.^^^ 

As  the  sun's  light  penetrates  different  objects  in  varying  degrees, 
for  example,  ruby  and  crystal  receive  the  sun's  light  in  the  highest 
degree ;  clear  air  and  water  come  next,  then  bright  stones  and  polished 
surfaces,  and  last  of  all  opaque  substances  like  wood  and  earth,  which 
the  hght  does  not  penetrate  at  all;  so  we  may  conceive  of  different 
minds  varying  in  the  degree  to  which  they  attain  a  knowledge  of  God. 
Some  arrive  only  as  far  as  the  knowledge  of  "Elohim,"  while  others  at- 
tain to  a  knowledge  of  Jhvh,  which  may  be  compared  to  the  reception 
of  the  sun's  light  in  ruby  and  crystal.  These  are  the  prophets  in  the 
land  of  Israel.  The  conception  involved  in  the  name  "Elohim"  no 
intelligent  man  denies;  whereas  many  deny  the  conception  of  Jhvh, 
because  prophecy  is  an  unusual  occurrence  even  among  individuals, 
not  to  speak  of  a  nation.  That  is  why  Pharaoh  said  (Exod.  5,  2),  "I 
know  not  Jhvh."  He  knew  "Elohim,"  but  not  Jhvh,  that  is  a  God 
who  reveals  himself  to  man.  "Elohim"  may  be  arrived  at  by  reason- 
ing; for  the  reason  tells  us  that  the  world  has  a  ruler;  though  the 
various  classes  of  men  differ  as  to  details,  the  most  plausible  view 
being  that  of  the  philosophers.  But  the  conception  of  Jhvh  cannot 
be  arrived  at  by  reason.  It  requires  that  prophetic  vision  by  which 
a  person  almost  becomes  a  member  of  a  new  species,  akin  to  angels. 
Then  the  doubts  he  formerly  had  about  "  Elohim  "  fall  away,  and  he 
laughs  at  the  arguments  which  led  him  to  the  conception  of  God  and  of 
unity.  Now  he  becomes  a  devotee,  who  loves  the  object  of  his  devo- 
tion, and  is  ready  to  give  his  life  in  his  love  for  him,  because  of  the 
great  happiness  he  feels  in  being  near  to  him,  and  the  misery  of  being 
away  from  him.  This  is  different  from  the  philosopher,  who  sees  in  the 
worship  of  God  only  good  ethics  and  truth,  because  he  is  greater  than 
all  other  existing  things;  and  in  unbelief  nothing  more  than  the  fault  of 
choosing  the  untrue.  ^^^ 

Here  there  is  clearly  a  touch  of  religious  poetry  and  mysticism, 
which  reveals  to  us  Halevi's  real  attitude,  and  we  have  no  dif&culty 
in  understanding  his  lack  of  sympathy  with  what  seemed  to  him  the 
shallow  rationalism  of  the  contemporaneous  Aristotelian,  who  fan- 
cied in  his  conceit  that  with  a  few  logical  formulae  he  could  penetrate 


JUDAH  HA  LEV  I  l6l 

the  mysteries  of  the  divine,  when  in  reality  he  was  barely  enabled  to 
skim  the  surface;  into  the  sanctuary  he  could  never  enter. 

Though,  as  we  have  just  seen,  Halevi  has  a  conception  of  God  as  a 
personal  being,  acting  with  purpose  and  will  and,  as  we  shall  see 
more  clearly  later,  standing  in  close  personal  relation  to  Israel  and  the 
land  of  Palestine,  still  he  is  very  far  from  thinking  of  him  anthropo- 
morphically.  In  his  discussion  of  the  divine  attributes  he  yields  to 
none  in  removing  from  God  any  positive  quality  of  those  ascribed 
to  him  in  the  Bible.  The  various  names  or  appellatives  applied  to 
God  in  Scripture,  except  the  tetragrammaton,  he  divides,  according 
to  their  signification,  into  three  classes,  actional,  relative,  negative. 
Such  expressions  as  "making  high,"  "making  low,"  "  making  poor," 
almighty,  strong,  jealous,  revengeful,  gracious,  merciful,  and  so  on, 
do  not  denote,  he  says,  feeling  or  emotion  in  God.  They  are  ascribed 
to  him  because  of  his  visible  acts  or  effects  in  the  world,  which  we  judge 
on  the  analogy  of  our  own  acts.  As  a  human  being  is  prompted  to 
remove  the  misery  of  a  fellowman  because  he  feels  pity,  we  ascribe 
all  instances  of  divine  removal  of  misery  from  mankind  to  a  similar 
feehng  in  God,  and  call  him  merciful.  But  this  is  only  a  figure  of 
speech.  God  does  remove  misery,  but  the  feeling  of  pity  is  foreign 
to  him.  We  call  therefore  the  attribute  merciful  and  others  like  it 
actional,  meaning  that  it  is  God's  acts  which  suggest  to  us  these  ap- 
pellations. 

Another  class  of  attributes  found  in  the  Bible  embraces  such  ex- 
pressions as  blessed,  exalted,  holy,  praised,  and  so  on.  These  are 
called  relative,  because  they  are  derived  from  the  attitude  of  man  to 
God.  God  is  blessed  because  men  bless  him,  and  so  with  the  rest. 
They  do  not  denote  any  essential  quality  in  God.  And  hence  their 
number  does  not  necessitate  plurality  in  God.  Finally  we  have  such 
terms  as  living,  one,  first,  last,  and  so  on.  These  too  do  not  denote 
God's  positive  essence,  for  in  reality  God  cannot  be  said  to  be  either 
living  or  dead.  Life  as  we  understand  it  denotes  sensation  and  motion, 
which  are  not  in  God.  If  we  do  apply  to  God  the  term  living,  we  do 
so  in  order  to  exclude  its  negative,  dead.  Living  means  not  dead; 
one  means  not  many;  first  means  not  having  any  cause  antecedent  to 
him;  last  means  never  ceasing  to  be.  Hence  we  call  these  attributes 
negative.  ^^^ 


l62  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

We  see  that  Judah  Halevi  is  at  one  with  Bahya  and  Joseph  ibn 
Zaddik  in  his  understanding  of  the  divine  attributes.  The  sHght 
difference  in  the  mode  of  classification  is  not  essential. 

This  God  chose  Israel  and  gave  them  the  ten  commandments  in 
order  to  convince  them  that  the  Law  originated  from  God  and  not 
from  Moses.  For  they  might  have  had  a  doubt  in  their  minds,  seeing 
that  speech  is  a  material  thing,  and  believe  that  the  origin  of  a  law  or 
religion  is  in  the  mind  of  a  human  being,  which  afterwards  comes  to 
be  believed  in  as  divine.  For  this  reason  God  commanded  the  people 
to  purify  themselves  and  be  ready  for  the  third  day,  when  they  all 
heard  the  word  of  God,  and  were  convinced  that  prophecy  is  not 
what  the  philosophers  say  it  is — a  natural  result  of  man's  reason 
identifying  itself  with  the  Active  Intellect  through  the  help  of  the 
imagination,  which  presents  true  visions  in  a  dream — but  a  real  com- 
munication from  God.  Not  only  did  they  hear  the  word  of  God,  but 
they  saw  the  writing  of  God  on  the  Tables  of  Stone. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  believe  in  the  corporeality  of  God; 
Heaven  forbid,  we  do  not  even  think  of  the  soul  of  man  as  corporeal. 
But  we  cannot  deny  the  things  recorded,  which  are  well  known. 
Just  as  God  created  heaven  and  earth,  not  by  means  of  material  tools 
as  a  man  does,  but  by  his  will,  so  he  might  have  willed  that  the  air 
should  convey  articulate  sounds  to  the  ear  of  Moses,  and  that  letters 
should  be  formed  on  the  Tables  of  Stone  to  convey  to  the  people  the 
ideas  which  he  wanted  them  to  know.  They  might  have  happened 
in  a  still  more  wonderful  way  than  I  have  been  able  to  conceive. 

This  may  seem  like  an  unwarranted  magnifying  of  the  virtues  of 
our  people.  But  in  reality  it  is  true  that  the  chain  of  individuals  from 
Adam  to  Moses  and  thereafter  was  a  remarkable  one  of  godly  men. 
Adam  was  surely  a  godlike  man  since  he  was  made  by  the  hand  of 
God  and  was  not  dependent  on  the  inherited  constitution  of  his  par- 
ents, and  on  the  food  and  climate  he  enjoyed  in  the  years  of  his  growth. 
He  was  made  perfect  as  in  the  time  of  mature  youth  when  a  person 
is  at  his  best,  and  was  endowed  with  the  best  possible  soul  for  man. 
Abel  was  his  successor  in  excellence,  also  a  godly  man,  and  so  down 
the  line  through  Seth  and  Noah,  and  so  on.  There  were  many  who 
were  unworthy  and  they  were  excluded.  But  there  was  always  one 
in  every  generation  who  inherited  the  distinguished  qualities  of  the 


JUDAH  HALEFI  163 

Adam  line.  And  even  when,  as  in  the  case  of  Terah,  the  individual 
was  unworthy  in  himself,  he  was  important  as  being  destined  to  give 
birth  to  a  worthy  son,  who  would  carry  on  the  tradition,  like  Abraham. 
Among  Noah's  sons,  Shem  was  the  select  one,  and  he  occupied  the 
temperate  regions  of  Palestine,  whereas  Japheth  went  north  and  Ham 
went  south — regions  not  so  favorable  to  the  development  of  wis- 
dom. ^^^ 

The  laws  were  all  given  directly  to  Moses  with  all  their  details  so 
that  there  is  no  doubt  about  any  of  them.  This  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary, for  had  there  been  any  detail  left  out,  a  doubt  might  arise  re- 
specting it  which  would  destroy  the  whole  spiritual  structure  of  Ju- 
daism. This  is  not  a  matter  which  philosophical  reasoning  can  think 
out  for  itself.  As  in  the  natural  generation  of  plant  and  animal  the 
complexity  of  elements  and  conditions  is  so  great  that  a  slight  tilting 
of  the  balance  in  the  wrong  direction  produces  disease  and  death,  so 
in  the  spiritual  creation  of  Israel  the  ceremonies  and  the  laws  are  all 
absolutely  essential  to  the  whole,  whether  we  understand  it  or  not, 
and  none  could  be  left  to  speculation.    All  were  given  to  Moses. 

Moses  addressed  himself  to  his  own  people  only.  You  say  it  would 
have  been  better  to  call  all  mankind  to  the  true  religion.  It  would  be 
better  also  perhaps  that  all  animals  should  be  rational.  You  have 
forgotten  what  I  said  about  the  select  few  that  worthily  succeeded 
Adam  as  the  heart  of  the  family  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other  members, 
who  are  as  the  peel,  until  in  the  sons  of  Jacob  all  twelve  were  worthy, 
and  from  them  Israel  is  descended.  These  remarkable  men  had  divine 
qualities  which  made  them  a  different  species  from  ordinary  men.  They 
were  aiming  at  the  degree  of  the  prophet,  and  many  of  them  reached 
it  by  reason  of  their  purity,  holiness  and  proximity  to  the  Prophets. 
For  a  prophet  has  a  great  influence  on  the  one  who  associates  with 
him.  He  converts  the  latter  by  awakening  in  him  spirituality  and  a 
desire  to  attain  that  high  degree  which  brings  visible  greatness  and 
reward  in  the  world  to  come,  when  the  soul  is  separated  from  the  senses 
and  enjoys  the  heavenly  light.  We  do  not  exclude  anyone  from  the 
reward  due  him  for  his  good  works,  but  we  give  preference  to  those 
who  are  near  to  God,  and  we  measure  their  reward  in  the  next  world 
by  this  standard.  Our  religion  consists  not  merely  in  saying  certain 
words,  but  in  difiicult  practices  and  a  hne  of  conduct  which  bring  us 


l64  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

near  to  God,  Outsiders  too  may  attain  to  the  grade  of  wise  and  pious 
men,  but  they  cannot  become  equal  to  us  and  be  prophets.  ^^^ 

Not  only  is  Israel  a  select  nation  to  whom  alone  prophecy  is  given 
as  a  gift,  but  Palestine  is  the  most  suitable  place  in  the  world  for  com- 
munion with  God,  as  a  certain  spot  may  be  best  for  planting  certain 
things  and  for  producing  people  of  a  particular  character  and  tem- 
perament. All  those  who  prophesied  outside  of  Palestine  did  so  with 
reference  to  Palestine.  Abraham  was  not  worthy  of  the  divine  cove- 
nant until  he  was  in  this  land.  Palestine  was  intended  to  be  a  guide 
for  the  whole  world.  The  reason  the  second  Temple  did  not  last 
longer  than  it  did  is  because  the  Babylonian  exiles  did  not  sufficiently 
love  their  fatherland  and  did  not  all  return  when  the  decree  of  Cyrus 
permitted  them  to  do  so.^^^ 

Israel  is  the  heart  among  the  nations.  The  heart  is  more  sensitive 
than  the  rest  of  the  body  in  disease  as  in  health.  It  feels  both  more 
intensely.  It  is  more  hable  to  disease  than  the  other  organs,  and  on 
the  other  hand  it  becomes  aware  sooner  of  agencies  dangerous  to  its 
health  and  endeavors  to  reject  them  or  ward  them  off.  So  Israel  is 
among  the  nations.  Their  responsibility  is  greater  than  that  of  other 
nations  and  they  are  sooner  punished.  "Only  you  have  I  loved  out 
of  all  the  families  of  the  earth,"  says  Amos  (3,  2),  "  therefore  will  I 
visit  upon  you  all  your  iniquities."  On  the  other  hand,  God  does  not 
allow  our  sins  to  accumulate  as  he  does  with  the  other  nations  until 
they  deserve  destruction.  "He  pardons  the  iniquities  of  his  people 
by  causing  them  to  pass  away  in  due  order."  As  the  heart  is  affected 
by  the  other  organs,  so  Israel  suffers  on  account  of  their  assimilation 
to  the  other  nations.  Israel  suffers  while  the  other  nations  are  in  peace. 
As  the  elements  are  for  the  sake  of  the  minerals,  the  minerals  for  the 
sake  of  the  plants,  the  plants  for  the  sake  of  the  animals,  the  animals 
for  the  sake  of  man,  so  is  man  for  the  sake  of  Israel,  and  Israel  for  the 
sake  of  the  Prophets  and  the  pious  men.  With  the  purification  of 
Israel  the  world  will  be  improved  and  brought  nearer  to  God.^^^ 

Associated  with  Israel  and  Palestine  as  a  third  privilege  and  dis- 
tinction is  the  Hebrew  language.  This  is  the  original  language  which 
God  spoke  to  Adam.  The  etymologies  of  Biblical  names  prove  it. 
It  v/as  richer  formerly,  and  has  become  impoverished  in  the  course 
of  time  like  the  people  using  it.    Nevertheless  it  still  shows  evidence 


JUDAH  HALEVI  165 

of  superiority  to  other  languages  in  its  system  of  accents  which  shows 
the  proper  expression  in  reading,  and  in  its  wonderful  system  of  vowel 
changes  producing  euphony  in  expression  and  variation  in  meaning.  ^^^ 
The  highest  type  of  man,  we  have  seen,  is  the  Prophet,  for  whose 
sake  Israel  and  the  whole  of  humanity  exists.  He  is  the  highest  type 
because  he  alone  has  an  immediate  knowledge  of  Jhvh  as  distinguished 
from  "Elohim,"  the  concept  of  universal  cause  and  power,  which 
the  philosopher  also  is  able  to  attain.  Jhvh  signifies,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  personal  God  who  performs  miracles  and  reveals  himself  to  man- 
kind through  the  prophet.  We  wish  to  know  therefore  how  Judah 
Halevi  conceives  of  the  essence  and  process  of  prophetic  inspiration. 
We  are  already  aware  that  he  is  opposed  to  the  philosophers  who  re- 
gard the  power  of  prophecy  as  a  natural  gift  possessed  by  the  man  of 
pure  intellect  and  perfect  power  of  imagination.  To  these  Aristote- 
lians, as  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  more  clearly  later,  the  human 
intellect  is  nothing  more  than  an  individualized  reflection,  if  we  may 
so  term  it,  of  the  one  universal  intellect,  which  is — not  God,  but  an 
intellectual  substance  wholly  immaterial,  some  nine  or  ten  degrees 
removed  from  the  Godhead.  It  is  called  the  Active  Intellect,  and  its 
business  is  to  govern  the  sublunar  world  of  generation  and  decay. 
As  pure  thought  the  Active  Intellect  embraces  as  its  content  the  entire 
sublunar  world  in  essence.  In  fact  it  bestows  the  forms  (in  the  Aris- 
totelian sense)  upon  the  things  of  this  world,  and  hence  has  a  timeless 
knowledge  of  all  the  world  and  its  happenings.  The  individualized 
reflection  of  it  in  the  human  soul  is  held  there  so  long  as  the  person  is 
alive,  somewhat  as  a  drop  of  water  may  hold  the  moon  until  it  evapo- 
rates, and  the  reflection  is  reabsorbed  in  the  one  real  moon.  So  it  is 
the  Active  Intellect  which  is  the  cause  of  all  conceptual  knowledge 
in  man  through  its  individualizations,  and  into  it  every  human  in- 
tellect is  reabsorbed  when  the  individual  dies.  Some  men  share  more, 
some  less  in  the  Active  Intellect;  and  it  is  in  everyone's  power,  within 
limits,  to  increase  and  purify  his  participation  in  the  influence  of  the 
Active  Intellect  by  study  and  rigorous  ethical  discipline.  The  prophet 
differs  from  the  ordinary  man  and  the  philosopher  in  degree  only, 
not  in  kind.  His  knowledge  comes  from  the  influence  of  the  Active 
Intellect  as  does  the  knowledge  of  the  philosopher.  The  difference  is 
that  in  the  prophet's  case  the  imagination  plays  an  important  role 


1 66  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

and  presents  concrete  visions  instead  of  universal  propositions,  and 
the  identification  with  the  Active  Intellect  is  much  closer. 

This  conception  of  prophecy,  which  in  its  essentials,  we  shall  see, 
was  adopted  by  Abraham  ibn  Daud,  Maimonides  and  Gersonides, 
naturally  would  not  appeal  to  Judah  Halevi.  Prophecy  is  the  preroga- 
tive of  Israel  and  of  Palestine.  The  philosophers  have  nothing  to  do 
with  it.  A  mere  philosopher  has  no  more  chance  of  entering  the  king- 
dom of  prophecy  than  a  camel  of  passing  through  the  eye  of  a  needle.* 
Have  the  philosophers  ever  produced  prophets?  And  yet,  if  their 
explanation  is  correct,  their  ranks  should  abound  in  them.  Prophecy 
is  a  supernatural  power,  and  the  influence  comes  from  God.  The 
prophet  is  a  higher  species  of  mortal.  He  is  endowed  with  an  internal 
eye,  a  hidden  sense,  which  sees  certain  immaterial  objects,  as  the 
external  sense  sees  the  physical  objects.  No  one  else  sees  those  forms, 
but  they  are  none  the  less  real,  for  the  whole  species  of  prophetic 
persons  testify  to  their  existence.  In  ordinary  perception  we  tell  a 
real  object  from  an  illusion  by  appealing  to  the  testimony  of  others. 
What  appears  to  a  single  individual  only  may  be  an  illusion.  If 
all  persons  agree  that  the  object  is  there,  we  conclude  it  is  real.  The 
same  test  holds  of  the  prophetic  visions.  All  prophets  see  them.  Then 
the  intellect  of  the  prophet  interprets  the  vision,  as  our  intellect  in- 
terprets the  data  of  our  senses.  The  latter  give  us  not  the  essence  of 
the  sensible  object,  but  the  superficial  accidents,  such  as  color,  shape, 
and  so  on.  It  is  the  work  of  the  reason  to  refer  these  qualities  to  the 
essence  of  the  object,  as  king,  sun.  The  same  holds  true  of  the  prophet. 
He  sees  a  figure  in  the  form  of  a  king  or  a  judge  in  the  act  of  giving 
orders;  and  he  knows  that  he  has  before  him  a  being  that  is  served  and 
obeyed.  Or  he  sees  the  form  in  the  act  of  carrying  baggage  or  girded 
for  work;  and  he  infers  that  he  is  dealing  with  a  being  that  is  meant 
for  a  servant.  What  these  visions  really  were  it  is  not  in  all  cases 
possible  to  know  with  certainty.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Prophets 
actually  saw  the  hosts  of  heaven,  the  spirits  of  the  spheres,  in  the 
form  of  man.  The  word  angel  in  the  Bible  (Heb.  Mal'ak)  means  mes- 
senger. What  these  messengers  or  angels  were  we  cannot  tell  with 
certainty.  They  may  have  been  specially  created  from  the  fine  ele- 
mentary bodies,  or  they  belonged  to  the  eternal  angels,  who  may  be 

*Tliis  simile  represents  Halevi's  thought.     He  does  not  use  this  expression. 


JUDAH  HALEVI  167 

the  same  as  the  spiritual  beings  of  whom  the  philosophers  speak. 
We  can  neither  reject  their  view  nor  definitely  accept  it.  Similarly 
the  expression,  "The  Glory  of  Jhvh,"  may  denote  a  fine  body  following 
the  will  of  God  and  formed  every  time  it  has  to  appear  to  a  prophet, 
or  it  may  denote  aU  the  angels  and  spiritual  beings.  Throne  and  Char- 
iot and  Firmament,  and  Ofannim  and  Galgalim,  and  other  eternal 
beings  constituting,  so  to  speak,  the  suite  of  God. 

Even  such  phrases  as,  "They  saw  the  God  of  Israel"  (Exod.  24,  10), 
"He  saw  the  form  of  Jhvh"  (Num.  12,  8),  the  Rabbinic  expression 
"Maase  Merkaba"  (work  of  the  divine  chariot,  cf.  above,  p.  xvi), 
and  the  later  discussions  concerning  the  "Measure  of  the  divine 
stature"  (Shi  ur  Komah),  must  not  be  rejected.  These  visual  images 
representative  of  God  are  calculated  to  inspire  fear  in  the  human  soul, 
which  the  bare  conception  of  the  One,  Omnipotent,  and  so  on,  cannot 
produce.  "^ 

As  Judah  Halevi  is  unwilling  to  yield  to  the  philosophers  and  explain 
away  the  supernaturaHsm  of  prophecy,  maintaining  rather  on  the 
contrary  that  the  supernatural  character  of  the  prophetic  vision  is 
an  evidence  of  the  superior  nature  of  Israel  as  well  as  of  their  land  and 
their  language,  so  he  insists  on  the  inherent  value  of  the  ceremonial 
law,  including  sacrifices.  To  Saadia,  and  especially  to  Bahya  and 
Maimonides,  the  test  of  value  is  rationality.  The  important  laws  of 
the  Bible  are  those  known  as  the  rational  commandments.  The 
other  class,  the  so-called  traditional  commandments,  would  also  turn 
out  to  be  rational  if  we  knew  the  reason  why  they  were  commanded. 
And  in  default  of  exact  knowledge  it  is  the  business  of  the  philosopher 
to  suggest  reasons.  Bahya  lays  the  greatest  stress  upon  the  command- 
ments of  the  heart,  i.  e.,  upon  the  purity  of  motive  and  intention,  upon 
those  laws  which  concern  feeling  and  belief  rather  than  outward 
practice.  Judah  Halevi's  attitude  is  different.  If  the  only  thing  of 
importance  in  rehgion  were  intention  and  motive  and  moral  sense, 
why  should  Christianity  and  Islam  fight  to  the  death,  shedding  un- 
told human  blood  in  defence  of  their  religion.  As  far  as  ethical  theory 
and  practice  are  concerned  there  is  no  difference  between  them.  Cere- 
monial practice  is  the  only  thing  that  separates  them.  And  the  king 
of  the  Chazars  was  told  repeatedly  in  his  dreams  that  his  intentions 
were  good  but  not  his  practice,  his  religious  practice.    To  be  sure  the 


1 68  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ethical  law  is  important  in  any  religion,  but  it  is  not  peculiar  to  religion 
as  such.  It  is  a  necessary  condition  of  social  life,  without  which  no 
association  is  possible,  not  even  that  of  a  robber  band.  There  is 
honesty  even  among  thieves.  Religion  has  its  peculiar  practices, 
and  it  is  not  sufficient  for  an  Israelite  to  observe  the  rational  command- 
ments alone.  When  the  Prophets  inveigh  against  sacrifices;  when 
Micah  says  (6,  8),  "He  hath  shewed  thee,  O  man,  what  is  good;  and 
what  doth  the  Lord  require  of  thee,  but  to  do  justly,  and  to  love 
mercy,  and  to  walk  humbly  with  thy  God,"  they  mean  that  the  cere- 
monies alone  are  not  sufficient;  but  surely  a  man  is  not  fully  an  Israel- 
ite if  he  neglects  the  ceremonial  laws  and  observes  only  the  rational 
commandments.  We  may  not  understand  the  value  of  the  ceremonial 
laws,  the  meaning  of  the  institution  of  sacrifices.  But  neither  do  we 
understand  why  the  rational  soul  does  not  attach  itself  to  a  body 
except  when  the  parts  are  arranged  in  a  certain  manner  and  the  ele- 
ments are  mixed  in  a  certain  proportion,  though  the  reason  needs  not 
food  and  drink  for  itself.  God  has  arranged  it  so,  that  only  under 
certain  conditions  shall  a  body  receive  the  light  of  reason.  So  in  the 
matter  of  sacrifices  God  has  ordained  that  only  when  the  details  of 
the  sacrificial  and  other  ceremonies  are  minutely  observed  shall  the 
nation  enjoy  his  presence  and  care.  In  some  cases  the  signfficance 
of  certain  observances  is  clearer  than  in  others.  Thus  the  various 
festivals  are  also  symbolic  of  certain  truths  of  history  and  the  divine 
government  of  the  world.  The  Sabbath  leads  to  the  belief  in  the 
exodus  from  Egypt  and  the  creation  of  the  world;  and  hence  inculcates 
belief  in  God.^^^ 

In  his  views  of  ethics  Judah  Halevi  is  more  human  than  Bahya, 
being  opposed  to  all  manner  of  asceticism.  The  law,  he  says,  does 
not  demand  excess  in  any  direction.  Every  power  and  faculty  must 
be  given  its  due.  Our  law  commends  fear,  love  and  joy  as  means  of 
worshipping  God;  so  that  fasting  on  a  fast  day  does  not  bring  a  man 
nearer  to  God  than  eating  and  drinking  and  rejoicing  on  a  feast  day, 
provided  all  is  done  with  a  view  to  honoring  God.  A  Jewish  devotee 
is  not  one  who  separates  himself  from  the  world.  On  the  contrary, 
he  loves  the  world  and  a  long  life  because  thereby  he  wins  a  share  in 
the  world  to  come.  Still  his  desire  is  to  attain  the  degree  of  Enoch 
or  Elijah,  and  to  be  fit  for  the  association  of  angels.    A  man  hke  this 


JUDAH  HA  LEV  I  169 

feels  more  at  home  when  alone  than  in  company  of  other  people; 
for  the  higher  beings  are  his  company,  and  he  misses  them  when 
people  are  around  him.  Philosophers  also  enjoy  sohtude  in  order  to 
clarify  their  thoughts,  and  they  are  eager  to  meet  disciples  to  discuss 
their  problems  with  them.  In  our  days  it  is  difficult  to  reach  the  posi- 
tion of  these  rare  men.  In  former  times  when  the  Shekinah  rested  in 
the  Holy  Land,  and  the  nation  was  fit  for  prophecy,  there  were  people 
who  separated  themselves  from  their  neighbors  and  studied  the  law 
in  purity  and  holiness  in  the  company  of  men  like  them.  These  were 
the  Sons  of  the  Prophets.  Nowadays  when  there  is  neither  prophecy 
nor  wisdom,  a  person  who  attempted  to  do  this,  though  he  be  a  pious 
man,  would  come  to  grief;  for  he  would  find  neither  prophets  nor 
philosophers  to  keep  him  company;  nor  enough  to  keep  his  mind  in 
that  high  state  of  exaltation  needed  for  communion  with  God.  Prayer 
alone  is  not  sufficient,  and  soon  becomes  a  habit  without  any  influence 
on  the  soul.  He  would  soon  find  that  the  natural  powers  and  desires 
of  the  soul  begin  to  assert  themselves  and  he  will  regret  his  separation 
from  mankind,  thus  getting  farther  away  from  God  instead  of  coming 
nearer  to  him. 

The  right  practice  of  the  pious  man  at  the  present  day  is  to  give 
all  the  parts  of  the  body  their  due  and  no  more,  without  neglecting 
any  of  them;  and  to  bring  the  lower  powers  and  desires  under  the 
dominion  of  the  higher;  feeding  the  soul  with  things  spiritual  as  the 
body  with  things  material.  He  must  keep  himself  constantly  under 
guard  and  control,  making  special  use  of  the  times  of  prayer  for  self- 
examination,  and  striving  to  retain  the  influence  of  one  prayer  imtil 
the  time  comes  for  the  next.  He  must  also  utiHze  the  Sabbaths  and 
the  festivals  and  the  Great  Fast  to  keep  himseK  in  good  spiritual  trim. 
In  addition  he  must  observe  all  the  commandments,  traditional, 
rational,  and  those  of  the  heart,  and  reflect  on  their  meaning  and  on 
God's  goodness  and  care.^^^ 

Judah  Halevi  has  no  doubt  of  the  immortahty  of  the  soul  and  of 
reward  and  punishment  after  death,  though  the  Bible  does  not  dwell 
upon  these  matters  with  any  degree  of  emphasis.  Other  religions, 
he  admits,  make  greater  promises  of  reward  after  death,  whereas 
Judaism  offers  divine  nearness  through  miracles  and  prophecy.  In- 
stead of  saying.  If  you  do  thus  and  so,  I  will  put  you  in  gardens  after 


I70  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

death  and  give  you  pleasures,  our  Law  says,  I  will  be  your  God  and 
you  will  be  my  people.  Some  of  you  will  stand  before  me  and  will  go  up 
to  heaven,  walking  among  the  angels;  and  my  angels  will  walk  among 
you,  protecting  you  in  your  land,  which  is  the  holy  land,  not  like  the 
other  nations,  which  are  governed  by  nature.  Surely,  he  exclaims,  we 
who  can  boast  of  such  things  during  life  are  more  certain  of  the  future 
world  than  those  whose  sole  rehance  is  on  promises  of  the  hereafter. 
It  would  not  be  correct,  the  Rabbi  says  to  the  king  of  the  Chazars, 
who  was  tempted  to  despise  the  Jews  as  well  as  their  religion  because 
of  their  material  and  pohtical  weakness,  to  judge  of  our  destiny  after 
death  by  our  condition  during  life,  in  which  we  are  inferior  to  all 
other  people.  For  these  very  people,  like  the  Christians  and  Mo- 
hammedans, glory  in  their  founders,  who  were  persecuted  and  de- 
spised, and  not  in  the  present  power  and  luxury  of  the  great  kings. 
The  Christians  in  particular  worship  the  man  who  said,  "Whosoever 
smiteth  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other  also.  And  if 
a  man  .  .  .  take  away  thy  coat,  let  him  have  thy  cloak  also  "  (Matth. 
5,  39).  Accordingly  our  worth  is  greater  in  the  sight  of  God  than  if 
we  were  prosperous.  It  is  true  that  not  all  of  us  accept  our  miserable 
condition  with  becoming  humihty.  If  we  did,  God  would  not  keep 
us  so  long  in  misery.  But  after  all  there  is  reward  awaiting  our  people 
for  bearing  the  yoke  of  the  exile  voluntarily,  when  it  would  be  an  easy 
matter  for  any  one  of  us  to  become  a  brother  to  our  oppressors  by 
the  saying  of  one  word. 

Our  wise  men,  too,  have  said  a  great  deal  about  the  pleasures  and  suf- 
ferings awaiting  us  in  the  next  world,  and  in  this  also  they  surpass  the 
wise  men  of  other  rehgions.  The  Bible,  it  is  true,  does  not  lay  stress 
on  this  aspect  of  our  belief;  but  so  much  is  clear  from  the  Bible  also, 
that  the  spirit  returns  to  God.  There  are  also  allusions  to  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  in  the  disappearance  of  Elijah,  who  did  not  die,  and 
in  the  belief  of  his  second  coming.  This  appears  also  from  the  prayer  of 
Balaam, "  Let  me  die  the  death  of  the  righteous,  and  may  my  last  end  be 
like  his"  (Num.  23, 10),  and  from  the  calling  of  Samuel  from  the  dead. 
The  idea  of  paradise  (Gan  Eden)  is  taken  from  the  Torah,  and  Gehenna 
is  a  Hebrew  word,  the  name  of  a  valley  near  Jerusalem,  where  fire  al- 
ways burned,  consuming  unclean  bones,  carcases,  and  so  on.  There  is 
nothing  new  in  the  later  religions  which  is  not  already  found  in  ours.  ^^* 


JUDAH  HALE VI  171 

An  important  ethical  problem  which  Judah  Halevi  discusses  more 
thoroughly  than  any  of  his  predecessors  is  that  of  free  will,  which  he 
defends  against  fatalistic  determinism,  and  endeavors  to  reconcile 
with  divine  causality  and  foreknowledge.  We  have  already  seen 
(p.  xxi)  that  this  was  one  of  the  important  theses  of  the  Mu'  tazilite 
Kalam.  And  there  is  no  doubt  that  fatalism  is  opposed  to  Judaism. 
A  fatalistic  determinist  denies  the  category  of  the  contingent  or 
possible.  He  says  not  merely  that  an  event  is  determined  by  its 
proximate  cause,  he  goes  further  and  maintains  that  it  is  determined 
long  in  advance  of  any  of  its  secondary  causes  by  the  will  of  God. 
It  would  follow  then  that  there  is  no  way  of  preventing  an  event 
thus  predetermined.  If  we  take  pains  to  avoid  a  misfortune  fated 
to  come  upon  us,  our  very  efforts  may  carry  us  toward  it  and  land  us 
in  its  clutches.  Literature  is  full  of  stories  illustrating  this  behef, 
as  for  example  the  story  of  (Edipus.  Against  this  form  of  belief 
Judah  Halevi  vindicates  the  reaUty  of  the  contingent  or  possible  as 
opposed  to  the  necessary.  No  one  except  the  obstinate  and  perverse 
denies  the  possible  or  contingent.  His  preparations  to  meet  and  avoid 
that  which  he  hopes  and  fears  prove  that  he  beheves  the  thing  amen- 
able to  pains  and  precautions.  If  he  had  not  this  belief,  he  would  fold 
his  hands  in  resignation,  never  taking  the  trouble  to  supply  himself 
with  arms  to  meet  his  enemy,  or  with  water  to  quench  his  thirst.  To  be 
sure,  we  may  argue  that  whether  one  prepare  himself  or  omit  to  do  so, 
the  preparation  or  neglect  is  itself  determined.  But  this  is  no  longer 
the  same  position  as  that  maintamed  at  the  outset.  For  we  now 
admit  that  secondary  causes  do  play  a  part  in  determining  the  result, 
whereas  we  denied  it  at  first.  The  will  is  one  of  these  secondary 
causes.  Accordingly  Judah  Halevi  divides  all  acts  or  events  into  four 
classes,  divine,  natural,  accidental  and  voluntary.  Strictly  divine 
events  are  the  direct  results  of  the  divine  will  without  any  intermediate 
cause.  There  is  no  way  of  preparing  for  or  avoiding  these;  not,  that 
is,  physically;  but  it  is  possible  to  prepare  oneself  mentally  and 
morally,  namely,  through  the  secrets  of  the  Torah  to  him  who  knows 
them. 

Natural  events  are  produced  by  secondary  causes,  which  bring 
the  objects  of  nature  to  their  perfection.  These  produce  their  effects 
regularly  and  uniformly,  provided  there  is  no  hindrance  on  the  part 


172  MEDmVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  other  three  causes.  An  example  of  natural  events  would  be  the 
growth  of  a  plant  or  animal  under  favorable  conditions.  Accidental 
events  are  also  produced  by  secondary  causes,  but  they  happen  by 
chance,  not  regularly  and  not  as  a  result  of  purpose.  Their  causes 
are  not  intended  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  perfection  to  their  chance 
effects.  These  too  may  be  hindered  by  any  one  of  the  other  three 
causes.  An  example  of  a  chance  event  might  be  death  in  war.  The 
secondary  cause  is  the  battle,  but  its  purpose  was  not  that  this  given 
person  might  meet  his  death  there,  and  not  all  men  die  in  war. 

Finally,  voluntary  acts  are  those  caused  by  the  will  of  man.  It  is 
these  that  concern  us  most.  We  have  already  intimated  that  the  hu- 
man will  is  itself  a  secondary  cause  and  has  a  role  in  determining  its 
effect.  It  is  true  that  the  will  itself  is  caused  by  other  higher  causes 
until  we  get  to  the  first  cause,  but  this  does  not  form  a  necessary  chain 
of  causation.  Despite  the  continuous  chain  of  causes  antecedent  to 
a  given  volition  the  soul  finding  itself  in  front  of  a  given  plan  is 
free  to  choose  either  of  the  two  alternatives.  To  say  that  a  man's 
speech  is  as  necessary  as  the  beating  of  his  pulse  contradicts  experience. 
We  feel  that  we  are  masters  of  our  speech  and  our  silence.  The  fact 
that  we  praise  and  blame  and  love  and  hate  a  person  according  to 
his  deliberate  conduct  is  another  proof  of  freedom.  We  do  not  blame 
a  natural  or  accidental  cause.  We  do  not  blame  a  child  or  a  person 
asleep  when  they  cause  damage,  because  they  did  not  do  the  damage 
deliberately  and  with  intention.  If  those  who  deny  freedom  are 
consistent,  they  must  either  refrain  from  being  angry  with  a  person 
who  injures  them  deliberately,  or  they  must  say  that  anger  and  praise 
and  blame  and  love  and  hate  are  delusive  powers  put  in  our  souls  in 
vain.  Besides  there  would  be  no  difference  between  the  pious  and  the 
disobedient,  because  both  are  doing  that  which  they  are  by  necessity 
bound  to  do. 

But  there  are  certain  strong  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  freedom. 
If  man  is  absolutely  free  to  do  or  forbear,  it  follows  that  the  effects 
of  his  conduct  are  removed  from  God's  control.  The  answer  to  this 
is  that  they  are  not  absolutely  removed  from  his  control.  They  are 
still  related  to  him  by  a  chain  of  causes. 

Another  argument  against  free  will  is  that  it  is  irreconcilable  with 
God's  knowledge.    If  man  alone  is  the  master  of  his  choice,  God  cannot 


JUDAH  HALEVI  I7S 

know  beforehand  what  he  will  choose.  And  if  God  does  know,  the  man 
cannot  but  choose  as  God  foreknew  he  would  choose,  and  what  be- 
comes of  his  freedom?  This  may  be  answered  by  saying  that  the 
knowledge  of  a  thing  is  not  the  cause  of  its  being.  We  do  not  deter- 
mine a  past  event  by  the  fact  that  we  know  it.  Knowledge  is  simply 
evidence  that  the  thing  is.  So  man  chooses  by  his  own  determination, 
and  yet  God  knows  beforehand  which  way  he  is  going  to  choose, 
simply  because  he  sees  into  the  future  as  we  remember  the  past.^"" 

Judah  Halevi's  discussion  of  the  problem  of  freedom  is  fuller  than 
any  we  have  met  so  far  in  our  investigation.  But  it  is  not  satisfactory. 
Apart  from  his  fourfold  classification  of  events  which  is  open  to  criti- 
cism, there  is  a  weak  spot  in  the  very  centre  of  his  argument,  which 
scarcely  could  have  escaped  him.  He  admits  that  the  will  is  caused, 
by  higher  causes  ending  ultimately  in  the  will  of  God,  and  yet  main- 
tains in  the  same  breath  that  the  will  is  not  determined.  As  free 
the  will  is  removed  from  God's  control,  and  yet  it  is  not  completely 
removed,  being  related  to  him  by  a  chain  of  causes.  This  is  a  plain 
contradiction,  unless  we  are  told  how  far  it  is  determined  and  how 
far  it  is  not.  Surely  the  aspect  in  which  it  is  not  determined  is  abso- 
lutely removed  from  God's  control  and  altogether  uncaused.  But 
Judah  Halevi  is  unwilling  to  grant  this.  He  just  leaves  us  with  the 
juxtaposition  of  two  incompatibles.  We  shall  see  that  Hasdai  Crescas 
was  more  consistent,  and  admitted  determinism. 

We  have  now  considered  Judah  Halevi's  teachings,  and  have  seen 
that  he  has  no  sympathy  with  the  point  of  view  of  those  people  who 
were  called  in  his  day  philosophers,  i.  e.,  those  who  adopted  the  teach- 
ings ascribed  to  Aristotle.  At  the  same  time  he  was  interested  in 
maintaining  that  all  science  really  came  originally  from  the  Jews;  and 
in  order  to  prove  this  he  undertakes  a  brief  interpretation  of  the 
"Sefer  Yezirah"  (Book  of  Creation),  an  early  mystic  work  of  unknown 
authorship  and  date,  which  Judah  Halevi  in  common  with  the  un- 
critical opinion  of  his  day  attributed  to  Abraham.  ^^  Not  to  lay 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  inconsistency,  he  throws  out  the  sug-^ 
gestion  that  the  Sefer  Yezirah  represented  Abraham's  own  specu- 
lations before  he  had  the  privilege  of  a  prophetic  communication  from 
God.  When  that  came  he  was  ready  to  abandon  all  his  former  ration- 
ahstic  lucubrations  and  abide  by  the  certainty  of  revealed  truth.  ^^ 


174  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

We  may  therefore  legitimately  infer  that  Judah  Halevi's  idea  was  that 
the  Jews  were  the  originators  of  philosophy,  but  that  they  had  long 
discarded  it  in  favor  of  something  much  more  valid  and  certain; 
whereas  the  Greeks  and  their  descendants,  having  nothing  better, 
caught  it  up  and  are  now  parading  it  as  their  own  discovery 
and  even  setting  it  up  as  superior  to  direct  revelation. 

Natural  science  in  so  far  as  it  had  to  do  with  more  or  less  verifiable 
data  could  not  be  considered  harmful,  and  so  we  find  Judah  Halevi 
taking  pains  to  show  that  the  sages  of  Rabbinical  literature  cultivated 
the  sciences,  astronomy  in  connection  with  the  Jewish  calendar; 
anatomy,  biology  and  physiology  in  relation  to  the  laws  of  slaughter 
and  the  examination  of  animal  meat  (laws  of  "Terefa").^^ 

But  so  great  was  the  fascination  philosophy  exerted  upon  the  men 
of  his  generation  that  even  Judah  Halevi,  despite  his  efforts  to  shake 
its  authority  and  point  out  its  inadequacy  and  evident  inferiority 
to  revelation,  was  not  able  wholly  to  escape  it.  And  we  find  accord- 
ingly that  he  deems  it  necessary  to  devote  a  large  part  of  the  fifth 
book  of  the  Kusari  to  the  presentation  of  a  bird's  eye  view  of  the  cur- 
rent philosophy  of  the  day.  To  be  sure,  he  does  not  give  all  of  it 
the  stamp  of  his  approval;  he  repeatedly  attacks  its  foundations  and 
lays  bare  their  weakness.  At  the  same  time  he  admits  that  not  every 
man  has  faith  by  nature  and  is  proof  against  the  erroneous  arguments 
of  heretics,  astrologers,  philosophers  and  others.  The  ordinary  mortal 
is  affected  by  them,  and  may  even  be  misled  for  a  time  until  he  comes 
to  see  the  truth.  It  is  therefore  well  to  know  the  principles  of  religion 
according  to  those  who  defend  it  by  reason,  and  this  involves  a  knowl- 
edge of  science  and  theology.  But  we  must  not,  he  says,  in  the  man- 
ner of  the  Karaites,  advance  all  at  once  to  the  higher  study  of  theology. 
One  must  first  understand  the  fundamental  principles  of  physics, 
psychology,  and  so  on,  such  as  matter  and  form,  the  elements,  nature, 
Soul,  Intellect,  Divine  Wisdom.  Then  we  can  proceed  to  the  more 
properly  theological  matters,  like  the  future  world,  Providence,  and 
so  on. 

Accordingly  Judah  Halevi  gives  us  in  the  sequel  a  brief  account 
such  as  he  has  just  outlined.  It  will  not  be  worth  our  while  to  re- 
produce it  all  here,  as  in  the  first  place  Judah  Halevi  does  not  give  it 
as  the  result  of  his  own  investigation  and  conviction,  and  secondly 


JUDAH  HA  LEV  I  175 

a  good  deal  of  it  is  not  new;  and  we  have  already  met  it  in  more  or  less 
similar  form  before  in  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik,  Abraham  bar  Hiyyah,  and 
others.  We  must  point  out,  however,  the  new  features  which  we  did 
not  meet  before,  explain  their  origin  and  in  particular  indicate  Judah 
Halevi's  criticisms. 

In  general  we  may  say  that  Judah  Halevi  has  a  better  knowledge 
of  Aristotelian  doctrines  than  any  of  his  predecessors.  Thus  to  take 
one  example,  which  we  used  before  (p.  138),  Aristotle's  famous  defi- 
nition of  the  soul  is  quoted  by  Isaac  Israeli,  Saadia,  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik 
as  well  as  by  Judah  Halevi.  Israeli  does  not  discuss  the  definition  in 
detail.  ^°^  Saadia  and  Ibn  Zaddik  show  clearly  that  they  did  not  un- 
derstand the  precise  meaning  of  the  definition.  Judah  Halevi  is  the 
first  who  understands  correctly  all  the  elements  of  the  definition. 
And  yet  it  would  be  decidedly  mistaken  to  infer  from  this  that  Judah 
Halevi  studied  the  Aristotelian  works  directly.  By  a  fortunate  dis- 
covery of  S.  Landauer  ^°^  we  are  enabled  to  follow  Judah  Halevi's 
source  with  the  certainty  of  eyewitnesses.  The  sketch  which  he  gives 
of  the  Aristotelian  psychology  is  taken  bodily  not  from  Aristotle's 
De  Anima,  but  from  a  youthful  work  of  Ibn  Sina.  Judah  Halevi 
did  not  even  take  the  trouble  to  present  the  subject  in  his  own  words. 
He  simply  took  his  model  and  abridged  it,  by  throwing  out  all  argu- 
mentative, illustrative  and  amplificatory  material.  Apart  from  this 
abridgment  he  follows  his  authority  almost  word  for  word,  not  to 
speak  of  reproducing  the  ideas  in  the  original  form  and  order.  This 
is  a  typical  and  extremely  instructive  instance;  and  it  shows  how 
careful  we  must  be  before  we  decide  that  a  mediaeval  writer  read  a 
certain  author  with  whose  ideas  he  is  familiar  and  whom  he  quotes. 

In  the  sketch  of  philosophical  theory  Judah  Halevi  first  speaks  of 
the  hyle  {vXrf)  or  formless  matter,  which  according  to  the  philosophers 
was  in  the  beginning  of  things  contained  within  the  lunar  sphere.  The 
"water"  in  the  second  verse  of  Genesis  ("and  the  spirit  of  God  moved 
upon  the  face  of  the  water")  is  supposed  by  them  to  denote  this  prim- 
itive matter,  as  the  "darkness"  in  the  same  verse  and  the  "chaos" 
("Tohu")  in  the  first  verse  signify  the  absence  of  form  and  compo- 
sition in  the  matter  (the  Aristotelian  o-reprjai^;).  God  then  willed 
the  revolution  of  the  outermost  sphere,  known  as  the  diurnal  sphere, 
which  caused  all  the  other  spheres  to  revolve  with  it,  thereby  produc- 


176  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  changes  in  the  hyle  in  accordance  with  the  motions  of  the  sphere. 
The  first  change  was  the  heating  of  that  which  was  next  to  the  lunar 
sphere  and  making  it  into  pure  fire,  known  among  the  philosophers 
as  "natural  fire,"  a  pure,  fine  and  light  substance,  without  color  or 
burning  quality.  This  became  the  sphere  of  fire.  The  part  that  was 
further  away  changed  as  a  result  of  the  same  revolution  into  the  sphere 
of  air,  then  came  the  sphere  of  water,  and  finally  the  terrestrial  globe 
in  the  centre,  heavy  and  thick  by  reason  of  its  distance  from  the  place 
of  motion.  From  these  four  elements  come  the  physical  objects  by 
composition.  The  forms  (in  the  Aristotelian  sense)  of  things  are 
imposed  upon  their  matters  by  a  divine  power,  the  "Intellect,  and 
Giver  of  Forms";  whereas  the  matters  come  from  the  hyle,  and  the 
accidental  proximity  of  different  parts  to  the  revolving  lunar  sphere 
explains  why  some  parts  became  fire,  some  air,  and  so  on. 

To  this  mechanical  explanation  of  the  formation  of  the  elements 
Judah  Halevi  objects.  As  long  as  the  original  motion  of  the  diurnal 
sphere  is  admittedly  due  not  to  chance  but  to  the  will  of  God,  what  is 
gained  by  referring  the  formation  of  the  elements  to  their  accidental 
proximity  to  the  moving  sphere,  and  accounting  for  the  production  of 
mineral,  plant  and  animal  in  the  same  mechanical  way  by  the  acciden- 
tal composition  of  the  four  elements  in  proportions  varying  according  to 
the  different  revolutions  and  positions  of  the  heavenly  bodies?  Besides 
if  the  latter  explanation  were  true,  the  number  of  species  of  plants 
and  animals  should  be  infinite  like  the  various  positions  and  formations 
of  the  heavenly  bodies,  whereas  they  are  finite  and  constant.  The 
argument  from  the  design  and  purpose  that  is  clearly  visible  in  the  ma- 
jority of  plants  and  animals  further  refutes  such  mechanical  explana- 
tion as  is  attempted  by  the  philosophers.  Design  is  also  visible  in  the 
violation  of  the  natural  law  by  which  water  should  always  be  above 
and  around  earth;  whereas  in  reality  we  see  a  great  part  of  the  earth's 
surface  above  water.  This  is  clearly  a  beneficent  provision  in  order 
that  animal  life  may  sustain  itself,  and  this  is  the  significance  of  the 
words  of  the  Psalmist  (136,  6),  "To  him  that  stretched  out  the  earth 
above  the  waters." 

The  entire  theory  of  the  four  elements  and  the  alleged  composition 
of  all  things  out  of  them  is  a  pure  assumption.  Take  the  idea  of  the 
world  of  fire,  the  upper  fire  as  they  call  it,  which  is  colorless,  so  as  not 


JUDAH  HALEVI  177 

to  obstruct  the  color  of  the  heavens  and  the  stars.  Whoever  saw  such 
a  fire?  The  only  fire  we  know  is  an  extremely  hot  object  in  the  shape 
of  coal,  or  as  a  flame  in  the  air,  or  as  boiling  water.  And  whoever 
saw  a  fiery  or  aery  body  enter  the  matter  of  plant  and  animal  so  as  to 
warrant  us  in  saying  that  the  latter  are  composed  of  the  four  elements? 
True,  we  know  that  water  and  earth  do  enter  the  matter  of  plants, 
and  that  they  are  assisted  by  the  air  and  the  heat  of  the  sun  in  causing 
the  plant  to  grow  and  develop,  but  we  never  see  a  fiery  or  aery  body. 
Or  whoever  saw  plants  resolved  into  the  four  elements?  If  a  part 
changes  into  earth,  it  is  not  real  earth,  but  ashes;  and  the  part  changed 
to  water  is  not  real  water,  but  a  kind  of  moisture,  poisonous  or  nu- 
tritious, but  not  water  fit  for  drinking.  Similarly  no  part  of  the  plant 
changes  to  real  air  fit  for  breathing,  but  to  vapor  or  mist.  Granted 
that  we  have  to  admit  the  warm  and  the  cold,  and  the  moist  and  the 
dry  as  the  primary  quahties  without  which  no  body  can  exist;  and 
that  the  reason  resolves  the  composite  objects  into  these  primary 
qualities,  and  posits  substances  as  bearers  of  these  qualities,  which 
it  calls  fire,  air,  water  and  earth — this  is  true  conceptually  and  theoret- 
ically only.  It  cannot  be  that  the  primary  qualities  really  existed 
in  the  simple  state  extra  animam,  and  then  all  existing  things  were 
made  out  of  them.  How  can  the  philosophers  maintain  such  a  thing, 
since  they  believe  in  the  eternity  of  the  world,  that  it  always  existed 
as  it  does  now? 

These  are  the  criticisms  of  their  theory  of  the  elements.  According 
to  the  Torah  God  created  the  world  just  as  it  is,  with  its  animals  and 
plants  already  formed.  There  is  no  need  of  assuming  intermediate 
powers  or  compositions.  The  moment  we  admit  that  the  world  was 
created  out  of  nothing  by  the  will  of  God  in  the  manner  in  which 
he  desired,  all  difl&culties  vanish  about  the  origin  of  bodies  and  their 
association  with  souls.  And  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
accept  the  firmament,  and  the  waters  above  the  heaven,  and  the 
demons  mentioned  by  the  Rabbis,  and  the  account  of  the  days  of  the 
Messiah  and  the  resurrection  and  the  world  to  come.^^ 

Another  theory  he  criticizes  is  that  developed  by  Alfarabi  and 
Avicenna,  the  chief  Aristotehans  of  the  Arabs  before  Averroes.  It  is 
a  combination  of  Aristotelianism  with  the  Neo-Platonic  doctrine 
of  emanation,  though  it  was  credited  as  a  whole  to  Aristotle  in  the 


178  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

middle  ages.  We  have  already  seen  in  the  Introduction  (p.  xxxiv)  that 
Aristotle  conceived  the  world  as  a  series  of  concentric  spheres  with 
the  earth  in  the  centre.  The  principal  spheres  are  eight  in  number, 
and  they  carry  in  order,  beginning  with  the  external  sphere,  (i)  the 
fixed  stars,  (2)  Saturn,  (3)  Jupiter,  (4)  Mars,  (5)  Mercury,  (6)  Venus, 
(7)  Sun,  (8)  Moon.  To  account  for  the  various  motions  of  the  sun  and 
the  planets  additional  spheres  had  to  be  introduced  amounting  in  all  to 
fifty-six.  But  the  principal  spheres  remained  those  mentioned.  Each 
sphere  or  group  of  spheres  with  the  star  it  carries  is  moved  by  an  in- 
corporeal mover,  a  spirit  or  Intelligence,  and  over  them  all  is  the  first 
unmoved  mover,  God.  He  sets  in  motion  the  outer  sphere  of  the  fixed 
stars,  and  so  the  whole  world  moves.  There  is  nothing  said  in  this  of 
the  origin  of  these  spheres  and  their  intelligible  movers.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  Neo-Platonic  system  of  Plotinus  all  existence  and  particu- 
larly that  of  the  intelligible  or  spiritual  world  issues  or  emanates  from 
the  One  or  the  Good.  Intellect  is  the  first  emanation,  Soul  the  second, 
Nature  the  third  and  Matter  the  last. 

On  accoimt  of  the  confusion  which  arose  in  the  middle  ages,  as  a 
result  of  which  Neo-Platonic  writings  and  doctrines  were  attributed 
to  Aristotle,  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna  worked  out  a  scheme  which 
combined  the  motion  theory  of  Aristotle  with  the  doctrine  of  emana- 
tion of  Plotinus.  The  theory  is  based  upon  a  principle  alleged  to  be 
Aristotle's  that  from  a  unitary  cause  nothing  but  a  unitary  effect  can 
follow.  Hence,  said  Avicenna,  God  cannot  have  produced  directly 
all  the  world  we  see  in  its  complexity.  He  is  the  direct  cause  of  the 
first  IntelUgence  only,  or  first  angel  as  Judah  Halevi  calls  him.  This 
Intelligence  contemplates  itself  and  it  contemplates  its  cause.  The 
effect  of  the  latter  act  is  the  emanation  of  a  second  intelligence  or 
angel;  the  effect  of  the  former  is  a  sphere — that  of  the  fixed  stars,  of 
which  the  first  Intelligence  is  the  mover.  The  second  Intelligence 
again  produces  a  third  Intelligence  by  its  contemplation  of  the  First 
Cause,  and  by  its  self-contemplation  it  creates  the  second  sphere, 
the  sphere  of  Saturn,  which  is  moved  by  it.  So  the  process  continues 
until  we  reach  the  sphere  of  the  moon,  which  is  the  last  of  the  celestial 
spheres,  and  the  Active  Intellect,  the  last  of  the  Intelligences,  having 
in  charge  the  sublunar  world. 

This  fanciful  and  purely  mythological  scheme  arouses  the  antago- 


JUDAH  HALEVI  179 

nism  of  Judah  Halevi.  It  is  all  pure  conjecture,  he  says,  and  there  is 
not  an  iota  of  proof  in  it.  People  believe  it  and  think  it  is  convincing, 
simply  because  it  bears  the  name  of  a  Greek  philosopher.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  this  theory  is  less  plausible  than  those  of  the  "Sefer  Yezirah"; 
and  there  is  no  agreement  even  among  the  philosophers  themselves 
except  for  those  who  are  the  followers  of  the  same  Greek  authority, 
Empedocles,  or  Pythagoras,  or  Aristotle,  or  Plato.  These  agree  not 
because  the  proofs  are  convincing,  but  simply  because  they  are  mem- 
bers of  a  given  sect  or  school.  The  objections  to  the  theory  just 
outlined  are  manifold.  In  the  first  place  why  should  the  series  of 
emanations  stop  with  the  moon?  Is  it  because  the  power  of  the 
First  Cause  has  given  out?  Besides  why  should  self-contemplation 
result  in  a  sphere  and  contemplation  of  the  First  Cause  in  an  IntelH- 
gence  or  angel?  It  should  follow  that  when  Aristotle  contemplates 
himself  he  produces  a  sphere,  and  when  he  contemplates  the  First 
Cause  he  gives  rise  to  an  angel.  Granting  the  truth  of  the  process, 
one  does  not  see  why  the  mover  of  Saturn  should  not  produce  two  more 
emanations,  one  by  contemplating  the  Intelligence  immediately  above 
it,  and  the  other  by  contemplating  the  first  IntelHgence,  thus  making 
four  emanations  instead  of  two.^"*^ 

In  his  outline  of  the  philosophers'  psychology,  which  as  we  have 
seen  (p.  175)  is  borrowed  verbally  from  Avicenna,  what  is  new  to  us 
is  the  exposition  of  the  inner  senses  and  the  account  of  the  rational 
faculty.  We  must  therefore  repooduce  it  here  in  outline  together 
with  Judah  Halevi's  criticism. 

The  three  kinds  of  soul,  vegetative,  animal  and  rational,  we  have 
already  met  before.  We  have  also  referred  to  the  fact  that  Judah 
Halevi  analyzes  correctly  the  well-known  Aristotelian  definition  of 
the  soul.  We  must  now  give  a  brief  account  of  the  inner  senses  as 
Judah  Halevi  took  it  from  Avicenna.  The  five  external  senses,  seeing, 
hearing,  touching,  smelling  and  tasting,  give  us  merely  colors,  sounds, 
touch  sensations,  odors  and  tastes.  These  are  combined  into  an  ob- 
ject by  the  common  sense,  known  also  as  the  forming  power.  Thus 
when  we  see  honey  we  associate  with  its  yellow  color  a  sweet  taste. 
This  could  not  be  done  unless  we  had  a  power  which  combines  in  it 
all  the  five  senses.  For  the  sense  of  sight  cannot  perceive  taste,  nor 
can  color  be  apprehended  by  the  gustatory  sense.    There  is  need  there- 


i8o  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

fore  of  a  common  sense  which  comprehends  all  the  five  external  senses. 
This  is  the  first  internal  sense.  This  retains  the  forms  of  sensible 
objects  just  as  the  external  senses  present  them.  Then  comes  the 
composing  power  or  power  of  imagination.  This  composes  and  divides 
the  material  of  the  common  sense.  It  may  be  true  or  false,  whereas 
the  common  sense  is  always  true.  Both  of  these  give  us  merely  forms; 
they  do  not  exercise  any  judgment.  The  latter  function  belongs  to 
the  third  internal  sense,  the  power  of  judgment.  Through  this  an  ani- 
mal is  enabled  to  decide  that  a  given  object  is  to  be  sought  or  avoided. 
It  also  serves  to  rectify  the  errors  of  reproduction  that  may  be  found 
in  the  preceding  faculty  of  imagination.  Love,  injury,  beUef,  denial, 
belong  likewise  to  the  judging  faculty  together  with  such  judgments 
as  that  the  wolf  is  an  enemy,  the  child  a  friend.  The  last  of  the  in- 
ternal senses  is  that  of  factual  memory,  the  power  which  retains  the 
judgments  made  by  the  faculty  preceding. 

In  addition  to  these  sensory  powers  the  animal  possesses  motor 
faculties.  These  are  two,  the  power  of  desire,  which  moves  the  animal 
to  seek  the  agreeable;  and  the  power  of  anger,  which  causes  it  to  reject 
or  avoid  the  disagreeable.  All  these  powers  are  dependent  upon  the 
corporeal  organs  and  disappear  with  the  destruction  of  the  latter. 

The  highest  power  of  the  soul  and  the  exclusive  possession  of  man 
(the  faculties  mentioned  before  are  found  also  in  animals)  is  the  ra- 
tional soul.  This  is  at  first  simply  a  potentiality.  Actually  it  is  a 
tabula  rasa,  an  empty  slate,  a  blank  paper.  But  it  has  the  power 
(or  is  the  power)  of  acquiring  general  ideas.  Hence  it  is  called  hylic 
or  material  intellect,  because  it  is  like  matter  which  in  itself  is  nothing 
actual  but  is  potentially  everything,  being  capable  of  receiving  any 
form  and  becoming  any  real  object.  As  matter  receives  sensible  forms, 
so  the  material  intellect  acquires  intelligible  forms,  i.  e.,  thoughts, 
ideas,  concepts.  When  it  has  these  ideas  it  is  an  actual  intellect.  It 
is  then  identical  with  the  ideas  it  has,  i.  e.,  thinker  and  thought  are 
the  same,  and  hence  the  statement  that  the  actual  intellect  is  "intel- 
ligent" and  "  intelligible  "  at  the  same  time.  As  matter  is  the  principle 
of  generation  and  destruction  the  rational  soul,  which  is  thus  shown 
to  be  an  immaterial  substance,  is  indestructible,  hence  immortal. 
And  it  is  the  ideas  it  acquires  which  make  it  so.  When  the  rational 
soul  is  concerned  with  pure  knowledge  it  is  called  the  speculative  or 


JUDAH  HALEVI  l8i 

theoretical  intellect.  When  it  is  engaged  in  controlling  the  animal 
powers,  its  function  is  conduct,  and  is  called  the  practical  intellect. 
The  rational  soul,  i.  e.,  the  speculative  intellect,  is  separable  from 
the  body  and  needs  it  not,  though  it  uses  it  at  first  to  acquire  some  of 
its  knowledge.  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  whereas  the  corporeal 
powers,  like  the  senses,  are  weakened  by  strong  stimuli,  the  reason  is 
strengthened  by  hard  subjects  of  thought.  Old  age  weakens  the  body, 
but  strengthens  the  mind.  The  activities  of  the  body  are  finite;  of 
the  mind,  infinite. 

We  must  also  show  that  while  the  rational  soul  makes  use  of  the 
data  of  sense  perception,  which  are  corporeal,  as  the  occasions  for 
the  formation  of  its  general  ideas,  it  is  not  wholly  dependent  upon 
them,  and  the  sense  data  alone  are  inadequate  to  give  the  soul  its 
intellectual  truths.  Empirical  knowledge  is  inductive,  and  no  induc- 
tion can  be  more  general  and  more  certain  than  the  particular  facts 
from  which  it  is  derived.  As  all  experience,  however  rich,  is  neces- 
sarily finite,  empirical  knowledge  is  never  universally  certain.  But 
the  soul  does  possess  universally  certain  knowledge,  as  for  example  the 
truths  of  mathematics  and  logic;  hence  the  origin  of  these  truths  can 
not  be  empirical.  How  does  the  soul  come  to  have  such  knowledge? 
We  must  assume  that  there  is  a  divine  emanation  cleaving  to  the 
soul,  which  stands  to  it  in  the  relation  of  light  to  the  sense  of  sight. 
It  is  to  the  illumination  of  this  intellectual  substance  and  not  to  the 
data  of  sense  perception  that  the  soul  owes  the  universal  certainty 
of  its  knowledge.  This  divine  substance  is  the  Active  Intellect.  As 
long  as  the  soul  is  united  with  the  body,  perfect  union  with  the  Active 
Intellect  is  impossible.  But  as  the  soul  becomes  more  and  more  per- 
fect through  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  it  cleaves  more  and 
more  to  the  Active  Intellect,  and  this  union  becomes  complete  after 
death.  Thus  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  proved  by  reason.  It  is 
based  upon  the  conviction  that  the  soul  is  an  immaterial  substance 
and  that  its  perfection  Hes  in  its  acquisition  of  intellectual  ideas.  ^^ 

Judah  Halevi  cannot  help  admitting  the  fascination  such  specula- 
tion exercises  upon  the  mind  of  the  student.  But  he  must  warn  him 
against  being  misled  by  the  fame  of  such  names  as  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
and  supposing  that  because  in  logic  and  mathematics  the  philosophers 
give  us  real  proofs,  they  are  equally  trustworthy  in  metaphysical 


l82  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

speculation.  If  the  soul  is,  as  they  say,  an  intellectual  substance 
not  limited  in  place  and  for  this  reason  not  subject  to  genesis  and  de- 
cay, there  is  no  way  to  distinguish  one  soul  from  another,  since  it  is 
matter  which  constitutes  individual  existence.  How  then  can  my 
soul  be  distinguished  from  yours,  or  from  the  Active  Intellect  and 
the  other  Intelligences,  or  from  the  First  Cause  itself?  The  souls  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle  should  become  one  so  that  the  one  should  know  the 
secret  thoughts  of  the  other.  If  the  soul  gets  its  ideas  through  divine 
illumination  from  the  Active  Intellect,  how  is  it  that  philosophers  do 
not  intuit  their  ideas  at  once  like  God  and  the  Active  Intellect,  and 
how  is  it  they  forget? 

Then  as  to  their  ideas  about  immortality.  If  immortality  is  a  neces- 
sary phenomenon  due  to  the  intellectual  nature  of  the  soul  and  de- 
pendent upon  the  degree  of  intellectual  knowledge  it  possesses,  how 
much  knowledge  must  a  man  have  to  be  immortal?  If  any  amount 
is  sufficient,  then  €very  rational  soul  is  immortal,  for  everybody  knows 
at  least  the  axioms  of  logic  and  mathematics,  such  as  that  things 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other,  that  a  thing  cannot 
both  be  and  not  be,  and  so  on.  If  a  knowledge  of  the  ten  categories 
is  necessary,  and  of  the  other  universal  principles  which  embrace 
existence  conceptually,  though  not  practically,  this  knowledge  can 
be  gotten  in  a  day,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  a  man  can  become  an 
angel  in  a  day.  If  on  the  other  hand  one  must  know  everything  not 
merely  conceptually  but  in  detail,  no  one  can  ever  acquire  universal 
knowledge  and  no  one  is  immortal  The  philosophers  may  be  excused 
because  this  is  the  best  they  can  do  with  the  help  of  pure  reason.  We 
may  commend  them  for  their  mode  of  life  in  accordance  with  the  moral 
law  and  in  freedom  from  the  world,  since  they  were  not  bound  to 
accept  our  traditions.  But  it  is  different  with  us.  Why  should  we 
seek  peculiar  proofs  and  explanations  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
since  we  have  promises  to  that  effect  whether  the  soul  be  corporeal 
or  spiritual?  If  we  depend  upon  logical  proof,  our  life  will  pass  away 
without  our  coming  to  any  conclusion.  ^°^ 

Judah  Halevi  takes  issue  also  with  the  Mutakallimun.  These,  as 
we  know,  were  Mohammedan  theologians  who,  unlike  the  philoso- 
phers, were  not  indifferent  to  religion.  On  the  contrary  their  sole 
motive  in  philosophizing  was  to  prove  the  dogmas  of  their  faith. 


JUDAH  HALEFI  183 

They  had  no  interest  in  pure  speculation  as  such.  Judah  Halevi 
has  no  more  sympathy  with  them  than  with  the  philosophers.  Owing 
to  the  fact  that  the  Karaites  were  implicit  followers  of  the  Kalam  and 
for  other  reasons,  no  doubt,  more  objective,  he  thinks  less  of  them 
than  he  does  of  the  philosophers.  The  only  possible  use,  he  tells  us, 
of  their  methods  is  to  afford  exercise  in  dialectics  so  as  to  be  able  to 
answer  the  arguments  of  unbelievers.  To  the  superficial  observer 
the  MutakaUim  may  seem  to  be  superior  to  the  prophet,  because 
he  argues,  whereas  the  latter  afi&rms  without  proving.  In  reahty, 
however,  this  is  not  so.  The  aim  of  the  MutakaUim  is  to  acquire  the 
belief  which  the  prophet  has  by  nature.  But  his  Kalam  may  injure  his 
belief  instead  of  confirming  it,  by  reason  of  the  many  difficulties  and 
doubts  it  introduces.  The  prophet,  who  has  natural  belief,  teaches 
not  by  means  of  dialectic  discussion.  If  one  has  a  spark  of  the  true 
belief  in  his  nature,  the  prophet  by  his  personaUty  will  benefit  him  by 
a  slight  hint.  Only  he  who  has  nothing  of  true  behef  in  his  nature 
must  have  recourse  to  Kalam,  which  may  benefit  him  or  injure. 

Judah  Halevi  follows  up  this  general  comment  by  a  brief  sketch 
of  the  system  of  the  Kalam,  but  we  need  not  enter  into  this  matter 
as  there  is  Httle  there  that  we  do  not  already  know,  and  there  is  no 
detailed  criticism  on  the  part  of  Judah  Halevi.  ^^° 

The  Rabbi  concludes  his  discourse  with  the  king  of  the  Chazars 
by  declaring  his  intention  to  leave  the  land  in  order  to  go  to  Jerusalem. 
Although  the  visible  Shekinah  is  no  longer  in  Palestine,  the  invisible 
and  spiritual  presence  is  with  every  born  Israelite  of  pure  heart  and 
deed;  and  Palestine  is  the  fittest  land  for  this  communion,  being 
conducive  to  purity  of  heart  and  mind.^^^ 


CHAPTER  XI 

MOSES    AND    ABRAHAM    IBN    EZRA 

I.  Moses  ihn  Ezra 

Among  the  Jewish  Neo-Platonists  must  be  included  the  two  Ibn 
Ezras,  Moses  and  Abraham.  They  were  contemporary  and  came 
from  Spain.  Moses,  the  older  of  the  two,  was  born  at  Granada  about 
1070  and  died  after  1138.  Abraham,  who  travelled  all  over  the  world, 
was  born  at  Toledo  in  1092  and  died  in  1167.  Neither  is  particularly 
famous  as  a  philosopher.  Moses's  celebrity  rests  on  his  poetic  pro- 
ductions, secular  as  well  as  religious,  which  are  highly  praised  by 
Harizi,  above  even  those  of  Halevi.  Abraham  is  best  known  as  a 
grammarian  and  BibHcal  commentator,  particularly  the  latter,  though 
his  versatility  is  remarkable.  Besides  grammar  and  exegesis  he  wrote 
on  mathematics,  astronomy  and  astrology,  on  religious  philosophy, 
and  was  a  poet  of  no  mean  order;  though,  as  Zunz  says,^^^  "flashes 
of  thought  spring  from  his  words,  but  not  pictures  of  the  imagination." 

All  that  is  accessible  in  print  of  Moses  Ibn  Ezra's  philosophical 
treatise  is  a  Hebrew  translation  of  extracts  under  the  title  "Arugat 
ha-Bosem  "  (Bed  of  Spices). ^^^  If  we  may  judge  of  the  rest  of  the  work 
by  these  Hebrew  fragments,  we  should  say  that  philosophy  was  not 
Ibn  Ezra's  forte.  He  dabbled  in  it  as  any  poet  of  that  age  did,  but 
what  caught  his  fancy  was  more  the  mysteriously  sounding  phrases 
of  celebrated  authorities  like  Pythagoras,  Empedocles,  Socrates, 
Plato,  Aristotle,  Hermes  (whom  he  identifies  with  Enoch),  than  a 
strictly  reasoned  out  argument.  Accordingly  the  Hebrew  selections 
consist  of  little  more  than  a  string  of  quotations  on  the  transcendence 
and  unknowableness  of  God,  on  the  meaning  of  philosophy,  on  the 
position  of  man  in  the  universe,  on  motion,  on  nature  and  on  intellect. 
It  is  of  historical  interest  to  us  to  know  that  Moses  ibn  Ezra,  so  famous 
as  a  poet,  was  interested  in  philosophy,  and  that  the  views  which 
appealed  to  him  were  those  of  Ibn  Gabirol,  whose  "Fountain  of  Life" 

184 


MOSES  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  185 

he  knew,  and  from  which  he  quotes  a  celebrated  mystical  passage. 
A  few  details  will  suffice  to  make  this  clear. 

Man  is  a  microcosm,  a  world  in  miniature,  and  there  is  nothing 
above  or  below,  the  counterpart  of  which  is  not  found  in  man.  There 
is  no  sphere,  or  star,  or  animal,  or  plant,  or  mineral,  or  power,  or 
nature,  but  something  similar,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  found  in  man. 
The  ten  categories,  which  according  to  the  philosophers  embrace  all 
existence,  are  also  found,  all  of  them,  in  man.  The  perfection  of 
man's  creation  points  to  a  wise  Creator.  Man  comes  after  multi- 
plicity, God  is  before  multiplicity.  Man  is  like  the  great  imiverse, 
and  in  both  the  spiritual  cannot  come  in  direct  contact  with  the 
corporeal,  but  needs  intermediating  powers  to  bring  the  extremes  to- 
gether.   In  man  soul  and  spirit  stand  between  intellect  and  body. 

Hence  a  man  must  know  himseK  before  he  can  know  the  universe, 
else  he  is  like  a  person  who  feeds  other  people  while  he  is  himself 
hungry.  To  know  the  Creator,  the  soul  must  first  know  herself,  and 
this  is  one  of  the  definitions  of  philosophy,  to  know  one's  own  soul. 
He  who  can  strip  his  soul  of  his  corporeal  senses  and  worldly  desires, 
and  rise  to  the  sphere  will  find  there  his  reward.  Other  similarly 
ascetic  and  mystical  expressions  are  quoted  from  Aristotle  (!),  Pythag- 
oras, and  ''one  of  the  modern  philosophers."  The  last  is  none  other 
than  Ibn  Gabirol,  and  the  passage  quoted  is  the  same  as  that  cited 
above,  p.  69. 

Unity  precedes  the  unitary  object  as  heat  comes  before  the  hot 
object.  Unity  alone  is  self-subsistent.  Numerical  unity  is  prior  to 
two,  and  is  the  very  root  and  essence  of  number.  God's  unity  is  above 
all  other  unities,  hence  it  cannot  be  described,  because  it  has  no  cause, 
being  the  cause  of  everything  else.  As  our  eye  cannot  see  the  sun  by 
reason  of  its  very  brilliance,  so  our  intellect  cannot  comprehend  God 
because  of  the  extreme  perfection  of  his  existence.  The  finite  and 
imperfect  cannot  know  the  infinite  and  perfect.  Hence  no  names  can 
apply  to  God  except  metaphorically.  When  we  say  that  God  knows, 
we  mean  that  he  is  knowledge  itself,  not  that  knowledge  is  an  attribute 
which  he  possesses.  Socrates  (!)  said  in  his  prayers,  "Thou  art  not  far 
from  me  so  that  I  should  raise  my  voice  to  thee,  nor  art  Thou  near 
imto  me  that  I  should  content  myself  with  a  low  whisper  and  the 
meditation  of  the  heart;  nor  art  Thou  on  any  side  of  me  so  that  I 


l86  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

may  turn  toward  Thee;  for  nearness  and  distance  have  measure, 
but  there  is  no  measure  between  me  and  Thee.  Thou  art  united  with 
me  and  embracest  me  more  closely  than  my  intellect  and  soul." 

He  who  knows  most  of  the  secret  of  the  Creator,  knows  least;  and 
he  who  knows  least,  knows  most.  As  the  limbs  of  the  body  and  the 
senses  cannot  know  the  intelligible  ideas  because  the  latter  are  superior 
to  them,  so  the  intellect  cannot  know  the  essence  of  the  Creator  be- 
cause he  is  above  the  sphere  of  the  intellect.  Although  the  intellect 
is  spiritual,  it  cannot  comprehend  the  Creator  because  he  is  above 
all  intellectual  powers,  and  is  infinite.  What  is  infinite  has  no  division 
or  multiplication,  or  part  or  whole. 

The  Gentiles  make  use  of  the  anthropomorphic  expressions  in  the 
Bible  to  annoy  us,  charging  us  with  believing  in  a  corporeal  God. 
Would  that  we  had  strength  to  silence  their  impudence  by  a  crushing 
reply.  But  alas!  their  tyranny  prevents  us  from  raising  our  voice. 
But  it  is  still  more  aggravating  to  hear  men  of  our  own  people,  heretics, 
repeating  the  same  charge  against  the  Bible  and  Talmud,  when  they 
ought  to  know  better,  since  the  expressions  in  question  are  meta- 
phorical.    Saadia  has  made  this  sufficiently  clear. 

The  Active  Intellect  is  the  first  of  God's  creations.  It  is  a  power 
emanating  from  the  Will.  It  is  a  simple,  pure  and  transparent  sub- 
stance, bearing  in  itself  the  forms  of  all  existing  things.  The  human 
intellect  is  known  as  the  passive  intellect.  The  rational  soul  is  a  pure 
substance  giving  perfection  to  a  natural  body,  etc.  It  is  inferior  to 
the  intellect,  and  the  animal  soul  is  inferior  to  the  rational.  The 
soul  is  the  horseman,  the  body  represents  the  soldiers  and  the  arms. 
As  the  horseman  must  take  care  of  his  arms  that  he  may  not  be  put 
to  death,  so  the  soul  must  take  care  of  the  body  that  she  may  not 
perish.  And  the  senses  must  be  taken  into  account,  for  the  powers  of 
the  soul  are  dependent  upon  the  powers  of  the  body.  If  the  food  of 
the  body  is  in  proper  proportion,  the  activity  of  the  soul  is  proper 
and  right.  Similarly  if  one  neglects  moderation  in  food,  he  is  bound 
to  suffer  morally  and  spiritually. 

The  above  selections,  which  are  representative  of  the  accessible 
portion  of  Moses  ibn  Ezra's  philosophical  treatise,  except  that  such 
recurring  phrases  have  been  omitted  as  "And  the  philosopher  said," 
*  And  they  say, "  etc.,  show  that  the  work  is  nothing  but  a  compilation 


MOSES  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  187 

of  sayings  on  various  philosophical  topics,  without  any  attempt  on 
the  author's  part  to  think  out  the  subject  or  any  part  thereof,  for 
himself. 

2.  Abraham  ibn  Ezra 

Abraham  Ibn  Ezra  did  not  write  any  special  work  on  philosophy, 
and  his  importance  lies  chiefly  in  his  Biblical  commentary,  which 
unlike  that  of  Rashi,  is  based  upon  a  scientific  and  philological  founda- 
tion. Ibn  Ezra  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  Arabic  and  well  versed 
in  the  philological,  scientific  and  philosophical  studies  cultivated  by 
Arabs  and  Jews  in  his  native  land.  For  reasons  not  known  to  us — 
poverty  was  very  likely  one  of  them — he  left  his  native  Spain  and 
wandered  as  far  as  Rome  in  the  east,  Egypt  and  Morocco  in  the 
south,  and  London  in  the  north.  Everywhere  he  was  busy  with 
literary  activity,  and  as  he  wrote  in  Hebrew  his  purpose  must  have 
been,  as  the  result  certainly  proved  to  be,  the  enlightenment  of  the 
non-Arabic  speaking  Jews  of  England,  France  and  Italy,  by  bringing 
before  them  in  a  language  that  they  knew  the  grammar  of  Hayyuj, 
the  mathematics  and  astronony  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Arabs,  the 
philosophy  of  Neo-Platonism,  and  the  scientific  and  rationalistic 
spirit  generally,  as  enlightened  Spain  had  developed  it  in  Jew  and 
Arab  alike. 

We  are  interested  here  more  particularly  in  Ibn  Ezra's  philosophical 
views.  These  are  scattered  through  his  Biblical  commentaries  and 
in  a  few  other  small  works  devoted  to  an  investigation  of  the  laws  of 
the  Pentateuch  and  the  meaning  of  the  names  of  God.^^*  For  though 
Ibn  Ezra  favors  tlie  philological  method  as  the  best  way  to  arrive  at 
the  true  meaning  of  Scripture,  and  decries  allegory  as  well  as  Midrash 
when  pushed  too  far,  and  though  his  commentary  is  for  the  most 
part  based  upon  the  philological  method  of  interpretation,  he  was  too 
much  a  child  of  his  age  to  be  able  to  refrain  from  finding  in  the  Bible 
views  akin  to  those  he  learned  from  Gabirol,  the  Brethren  of  Purity 
and  what  other  philosophical  Uterature  of  the  Arabs  he  read  and  was 
influenced  by.  And  so  he,  too,  the  grammarian  and  philologist,  suc- 
cumbed to  the  aUegorical  and  symbolical  method  he  condemned. 
Without  denying  the  historical  reality  of  the  Garden  of  Eden,  the 
Tree  of  Knowledge  and  the  Tree  of  Life,  he  also  sees  in  these  expres- 


l88  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

sions  symbols  of  cosmological,  psychological  and  ethical  ideas.  In 
the  fashion  of  Philo  he  sees  in  Eden  a  representation  of  the  higher 
world  of  the  divinity,  in  the  Garden  the  intermediate  world  of  the 
spheres  and  Intelligences,  in  the  river  issuing  from  the  Garden  the 
substance  of  the  sublunar  world,  in  the  four  heads  into  which  the  river 
divides  the  four  elements,  and  so  on.  He  speaks  of  these  s3anbolic 
meanings  as  the  ''secrets,"  and  so  we  have  the  secret  of  the  Garden, 
of  the  rivers,  of  the  coats.  And  in  the  same  way  he  speaks  of  the 
secret  of  the  Cherubim,  of  the  ark  and  the  Tabernacle.  These  objects 
also  symbolize  metaphysical  and  cosmological  truths.  He  was  a  be- 
liever in  astrology,  and  laid  this  pseudo-science  also  under  contribu- 
tion in  the  interpretation  of  Holy  Writ.  Here  the  various  numbers 
found  in  the  Bible  in  connection  with  ritual  prescriptions,  the  construc- 
tion of  the  Tabernacle,  and  so  on,  were  of  great  service  to  Ibn  Ezra 
in  his  symbolizations.  Like  Philo  and  the  Neo-Pythagoreans  he 
analyzes  the  virtues  and  significances  of  the  different  numbers,  and 
thus  finds  a  s)anbol  in  every  number  found  in  the  Bible.  Writing  as 
he  did  for  the  Jews  of  central  Europe,  who  were  not  trained  in  secular 
science  and  philosophy,  Ibn  Ezra  was  not  prepared  to  shock  the  sen- 
sibilities of  his  readers  by  his  novel  and,  to  them,  heretical  views;  and 
hence  he  expressed  himself  in  cryptic  phrases  and  allusions,  which 
often  make  his  meaning  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  decipher.  This, 
taken  together  with  the  fact  that  his  views  are  not  laid  down  any- 
where systematically  and  in  connected  fashion,  but  are  thrown  out 
briefly,  often  enigmatically,  in  connection  with  the  explanation  of 
Biblical  verses  and  phrases,  accounts  for  the  difference  among  critics 
concerning  the  precise  doctrines  of  Abraham  Ibn  Ezra. 

Of  his  predecessors  among  the  Jewish  philosophers  Ibn  Ezra  shows 
closest  relation  to  Solomon  ibn  Gabirol.  He  does  not  quote  the 
"Fountain  of  Life,"  but  he  names  its  author  as  a  great  thinker  and 
writer  of  poems,  and  shows  familiarity  with  Gabirol's  doctrines. 
Like  Gabirol  he  says  that  all  except  God  consists  of  substance  (matter) 
and  form.  Not  only  the  sublunar  things,  subject  to  generation  and 
decay,  but  the  higher  incorporeal  things,  also,  are  in  essence  two,  i.  e., 
are  composed  of  two  elements,  subject  and  predicate.  God  alone  is 
One;  he  is  subject  only  and  not  predicate.  And  Ibn  Ezra  also  has  some 
allusion  to  the  divine  Will  as  taught  by  Gabirol. 


MOSES  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  i8g 

In  giving  a  connected  sketch  of  Ibn  Ezra's  philosophical  ideas,  the 
most  one  can  do  is  to  collect  all  the  sayings  bearing  upon  our  subject 
which  are  found  scattered  through  Ibn  Ezra's  writings,  and  classify 
them  and  combine  them  into  a  connected  whole.  This  has  been  done 
before  by  Nahman  Krochmal  ^^^  and  by  David  Rosin,^^®  and  we  shall 
follow  the  latter  in  our  exposition  here. 

God  is  the  One.  He  gives  forms  to  all  things,  and  is  himself  all 
things.  God  alone  is  the  real  existent,  all  else  is  an  existent  by  virtue 
of  him.  Unity  is  the  symbol  of  God  because  in  mmiber  also  the  unit 
is  the  foundation  of  all  number,  and  yet  is  not  itself  number.  It 
exists  by  virtue  of  itself  and  needs  not  the  numbers  that  come  after. 
At  the  same  time  the  unit  is  also  aU  number,  because  all  number  is 
made  up  of  the  unit.  God  alone  is  one,  because  he  alone  is  not  com- 
posed of  matter  and  form,  as  everything  else  is.  God  has  neither 
likeness  nor  form,  for  he  is  the  creator  of  all  things,  i.  e.,  of  all  likeness 
and  form.  He  is  therefore  incorporeal.  In  God  the  subject  knowing 
and  the  object  of  his  knowledge  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Else 
he  would  not  be  one.  In  knowing  himself,  therefore,  he  knows  the 
universe.  God  as  the  cause  and  creator  of  all  things  must  know  all 
things,  the  universal  as  well  as  the  particular,  the  world  soul  as  well 
as  the  various  species,  and  even  every  single  creature,  but  he  knows 
the  particular  in  a  general  way.  For  God  knows  only  what  is  perma- 
nent, whereas  the  particular  is  constantly  changing,  hence  he  does 
not  know  the  particular  as  such,  but  only  as  involved  in  the  general 
and  permanent. 

As  God  is  incorporeal  he  is  not  subject  to  corporeal  accidents  or 
human  feelings.  Hence  the  many  expressions  in  the  Bible  which  as- 
cribe such  accidents  and  feelings  to  God  must  be  understood  as  meta- 
phors. It  is  a  psychological  necessity  for  man  wishing  to  communicate 
his  ideas  to  other  men  to  speak  in  human  terms,  whether  he  speak  of 
beings  and  things  inferior  or  superior  to  him.  The  result  is  that  the 
metaphor  he  finds  it  necessary  to  employ  either  raises  or  lowers  the 
object  to  which  it  refers.  It  elevates  the  sub-human  and  lowers  the 
superhuman  to  the  human.  This  is  the  explanation  of  such  phrases 
as  "the  mouth  of  the  earth"  the  "hand  of  the  Jordan,"  the  "  head  of 
the  dust  of  the  world,"  and  so  on,  in  which  the  figure  is  that  of 
personification.     And  the  fundamental  explanation   is  the  same  in 


igo  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

such  phrases  as  "The  Lord  repented,"  "The  Lord  rested,"  "The 
Lord  remembered,"  "He  that  dwelleth  in  heaven  laughs,"  and  so 
on,  where  the  process  is  the  reverse  of  personification.  The  motive 
common  to  both  is  to  convey  some  idea  to  the  reader. 

The  Hebrew  word  "bara,"  ordinarily  translated  "created,"  which 
implies  to  most  people  the  idea  of  creatio  ex  nihilo,  Ibn  Ezra  renders, 
in  accordance  with  its  etymology,  to  limit,  to  define,  by  drawing  or 
incising  a  line  or  boundary.  Having  said  this,  Ibn  Ezra,  in  his  wonted 
mysterious  manner,  stops  short,  refusing  to  say  more  and  preferring 
to  mystify  the  reader  by  adding  the  tantalizing  phrase,  "The  intel- 
ligent will  understand."  He  means  apparently  to  indicate  that  an 
eternal  matter  was  endowed  with  form.  In  fact  he  seems  to  favor 
the  idea  of  eternal  creation  and  maintenance  of  the  universe,  the  re- 
lation of  which  to  God  is  as  the  relation  of  speech  to  the  speaker,  which 
exists  only  so  long  as  the  speaker  speaks.  The  moment  he  ceases 
speaking  the  sounds  cease  to  exist. 

The  two  ideas  of  eternal  emanation  of  the  world  from  God  after 
the  manner  of  the  Neo-Platonists  and  of  an  eternal  matter  which  God 
endows  with  forms,  are  not  really  quite  consistent,  for  the  latter 
implies  that  matter  is  independent  of  God,  whereas  according  to  the 
former  everything  owes  its  existence  and  continuance  to  God,  from 
whom  it  emanates.  But  it  is  difficult  from  the  fragmentary  and  la- 
conic sayings  of  Ibn  Ezra  to  extract  a  consistent  and  certain  system. 

The  world  consists  of  three  parts,  three  worlds  Ibn  Ezra  calls  them. 
The  highest  world  consists  of  the  separate  Intelligences  or  angels, 
including  the  world-soul  of  which  the  human  soul  is  a  part.  The 
intermediate  world  consists  of  the  spheres,  planets  and  fixed  stars. 
Finally  the  lower  world  contains  the  four  elements  and  the  product 
of  their  various  mixtures,  minerals,  plants,  animals,  man.  These 
three  worlds,  Ibn  Ezra  appears  to  intimate  in  his  oracular  manner, 
are  symboHzed  by  the  three  divisions  of  the  Tabernacle,  the  holy  of 
holies  typif3dng  the  world  of  spirits,  the  holy  pointing  to  the  spheres, 
while  the  outer  court  represents  the  sublunar  world. 

The  highest  world,  the  world  of  Intelligences  and  angels,  is  eternal, 
though  it  too  is  dependent  upon  God  for  its  existence.  The  angels, 
too,  are  composed  of  matter  and  form,  and  their  function  is  to  move 
the  bodies  of  the  intermediate  world,  the  spheres  and  their  stars. 


MOSES  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  191 

Through  the  instrumentality  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the  angels  form 
the  lower  world.  This  amounts  to  saying  that  the  corporeal  world 
is  the  last  stage  in  the  descending  series  of  emanations  from  the  One, 
and  is  preceded  by  the  heavenly  bodies  and  the  Intelligences.  The 
angels  are  also  the  immediate  agents  in  prophetic  inspiration. 

Not  all  mention  of  angels  in  the  Bible,  however,  must  be  identified 
with  a  separate  Intelligence  or  a  spheral  soul  (for  the  latter  too  is 
called  angel  by  Ibn  Ezra).  There  are  instances  of  the  expression 
angel  which  refer  to  a  momentary,  special  creation  of  a  light  or  air 
for  the  special  benefit  of  the  people.  This  explains  a  number  of  the- 
ophanies  in  the  Bible,  such  as  the  burning  bush,  "the  glory  of  the 
Lord,"  the  cloud  in  the  wilderness,  and  so  on. 

The  intermediate  world  of  spheres  is  also  eternal  and  consists  of 
nine  spheres,  that  of  the  Intelligences  making  up  the  perfect  number 
ten.  The  nine  spheres  are  arranged  as  follows,  the  spheres  of  the 
seven  planets,  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars,  and  the  diurnal  sphere 
without  stars,  which  gives  the  motion  from  east  to  west  to  the  whole 
heaven. 

The  lower  world,  the  sublunar  and  corporeal  world  of  generation 
and  decay,  was  created  in  time.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that 
there  was  time  before  this  creation,  for  time  exists  only  with  motion 
and  change.  Creation  here  signifies  the  formation  of  the  chaotic 
matter.  As  God  cannot  come  in  contact  with  the  material  and  change- 
able (we  have  already  seen  that  he  cannot  know  it  as  such),  it  follows 
that  this  lower  world  was  not  made  directly  by  him,  but  by  the  angels, 
hence  the  word  "Elohim"  is  used  in  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis, 
which  means  primarily  the  angels,  and  secondarily  God  as  acting 
through  the  angels. 

In  this  lower  world  man  is  the  noblest  creature.  By  means  of  his 
soul  he  may  attain  eternal  life  as  an  individual  like  God  and  the 
angels  {i.  e.,  the  Intelligences),  whereas  all  other  creatures  of  the  lower 
world  are  permanent  in  species  only  but  not  as  individuals.  This 
is  the  meaning  of  the  expression  in  Genesis,  "Let  us  make  man  in 
our  image,"  in  the  image,  that  is,  of  God  and  the  angels.  Man  is  a 
microcosm,  a  universe  in  little,  for  like  the  great  universe  he  consists 
of  a  body  animated  by  a  soul. 

As  the  noblest  part  of  man  is  his  soul,  it  becomes  his  duty  to  know 


192  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

it.  He  must  know  whether  it  is  substance  or  accident,  whether  it  will 
die  when  it  is  separated  from  the  body,  and  for  what  purpose  it  was 
brought  into  union  with  the  body.  In  order  to  learn  all  this  one 
must  first  study  the  preparatory  branches,  grammar,  logic,  mathe- 
matics and  physics.  In  the  study  of  psychology  we  learn  that  man 
has  three  souls,  vegetative,  animal  and  rational,  and  the  latter  alone 
is  immortal.  It  is  a  part  of  the  world  soul,  having  existed  before  it 
came  into  the  body,  and  under  favorable  conditions  will  return  again 
to  the  world  soul  when  separated  from  the  body.  The  condition 
which  must  be  fulfilled  by  the  soul  before  it  can  return  to  the  world 
soul  is  the  acquisition  of  wisdom,  for  this  is  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  put  into  the  body,  namely,  in  order  that  it  may  learn  the  work 
of  its  master  and  observe  his  commandments.  There  are  many  sci- 
ences, but  they  are  related  to  each  other,  all  leading  up  to  the  one 
highest  science,  the  knowledge  of  God  and  his  goodness.  A  person 
must  advance  gradually  in  studying  the  work  of  God  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  minerals,  plants,  animals,  the  human  body,  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  spheres  and  heavenly  bodies,  the  causes  of  eclipses,  etc.,  and  from 
this  he  will  gradually  come  to  know  God.  The  commandments  of 
the  Bible  are  also  of  importance  for  this  purpose.  To  understand 
the  secret  of  the  commandments  is  to  gain  eternal  life.  For  wisdom 
is  the  form  of  the  soul,  and  hence  the  soul  does  not  die  like  a  body. 

The  reward  of  the  soul  is  re-absorption  in  the  world  soul  of  which 
it  is  a  part,  and  the  punishment  of  the  unworthy  soul  that  neglected 
to  acquire  knowledge  is  destruction.  What  Ibn  Ezra  means  by  the 
Hebrew  word  "abad"  (ordinarily  rendered  to  perish,  to  be  destroyed) 
is  not  clear.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  a  pre-existing  soul  can  perish  ut- 
terly. Rosin  suggests  that  Ibn  Ezra  is  alluding  to  transmigration,  ^^^ 
but  it  is  not  clear. 

We  have  seen  that  Ibn  Ezra  holds  that  the  events  of  the  sublunar 
world  and  the  destinies  of  men  are  governed  by  the  positions  and 
motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  which  in  turn  are  determined  by  the 
Intelligences  or  angels.  The  heavenly  bodies,  he  tells  us,  follow  neces- 
sary laws  imposed  upon  them,  and  are  not  responsible  for  any  good 
or  evil  which  results  to  mankind  from  them,  since  the  effects  are  not 
of  their  intention,  and  they  cannot  change  them  if  they  would.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  foolish  to  pray  to  the  heavenly  bodies  in  order  to  appease 


MOS£S  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  193 

them  and  prevent  evil,  as  some  of  the  heathen  are  accustomed  to  do. 
The  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  are  determined  and  invariable, 
and  no  prayer  will  change  them.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  to 
say  that  no  one  can  escape  the  evil  which  is  destined  for  him  in  the 
stars.  Ordinarily,  it  is  true,  God  does  not  know  the  particular  indi- 
vidual as  such.  He  knows  him  only  as  imphed  in  the  whole,  and  his 
destiny  is  determined  accordingly.  But  there  are  exceptions  when  a 
person  by  developing  his  soul  and  intellect,  as  we  saw  above,  succeeds 
in  his  lifetime  in  separating  his  soul  from  the  corporeal  and  particular, 
and  brings  it  into  contact  with  the  spiritual  and  universal.  In  that 
case  he  attracts  to  himself  the  special  providence  of  God,  which  enables 
him  to  evade  the  evil  threatened  by  his  star,  without  in  any  way  chang- 
ing the  star's  natural  course  or  ordinary  effects.  How  this  is  done, 
Ibn  Ezra  illustrates  by  an  example.  ^^^  Suppose,  he  says,  that  it  is 
fated  according  to  the  stars  that  a  given  city  shall  be  flooded  by  a 
river  and  its  inhabitants  drowned.  A  prophet  comes  and  warns  them, 
urging  them  to  repent  of  their  evil  ways  before  their  fate  is  sealed. 
They  obey  him,  return  to  God  with  all  their  heart  and  leave  the  city 
to  offer  prayer  to  God.  The  river  rises  in  their  absence,  as  often  hap- 
pens, and  floods  the  city.  The  wolf  is  satisfied  and  the  lamb  is  whole. 
The  decree  of  the  stars  is  not  interfered  with,  and  the  good  man  is 
delivered  from  evil.  In  this  way  Ibn  Ezra  endeavors  to  reconcile 
natural  law  (or  astrological  fatahsm)  with  the  ethical  purpose  of  divine 
providence.  And  he  also  vindicates  free  will  and  responsibility.  The 
rational  soul  of  man  has  power,  he  says,  to  counteract  in  part  the 
indications  of  the  stars,  though  it  cannot  annul  them  entirely.  The 
punishment  of  the  wicked  is  that  they  are  left  entirely  to  the  fates 
determined  for  them  by  their  constellations. 

The  highest  good  of  man,  we  have  seen,  is  the  knowledge  of  God 
and  his  work.  There  are  two  ways  of  knowing  God.  One  is  through 
a  study  of  nature,  the  work  of  God.  This  is  described  in  the  first 
part  of  the  nineteenth  Psalm,  "The  Heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God; 
and  the  firmament  showeth  his  handiwork."  But  there  is  a  second 
and,  in  a  sense,  a  better  way  of  knowing  God.  This  is  derived  from 
his  revelation  in  the  Law.  As  we  are  told  in  the  second  part  of  the 
above  Psalm  {v.  7),  "The  law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect,  restoring  the  soul." 
The  law  of  the  Lord  restores  the  soul,  Ibn  Ezra  says,  by  removing 


194  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

doubt  from  it.  For  the  first  method  of  knowing  God,  with  all  its 
importance  for  the  man  of  wisdom  and  reason,  is  not  fit  for  all  persons; 
and  not  everything  can  be  proved  by  reason.  Revelation  in  the  Law 
is  necessary  for  the  simple  minded.  "I  am  the  Lord  thy  God"  (Exod. 
20,  2)  is  a  hint  to  the  philosopher,  who  need  not  depend  on  hearsay, 
for  real  knowledge  is  proved  knowledge.  But  as  not  everyone  is  in 
a  position  to  have  such  knowledge,  the  Bible  adds,  "which  brought 
thee  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt."  This  all  can  understand,  the  simple 
minded  as  well  as  the  philosopher.  The  Law  has  also  a  practical 
purpose,  to  strengthen  the  rational  soul  so  as  to  prevent  the  body  from 
gaining  the  upper  hand. 

God's  messenger,  through  whom  his  will  is  made  known,  is  the 
prophet.  He  seeks  retirement  so  as  to  get  in  communion  with  God, 
and  receives  such  influence  as  he  is  capable  of  getting.  Moses  was  the 
greatest  of  the  prophets.  He  was  able  to  communicate  with  God 
whenever  he  chose,  whereas  the  others  had  to  wait  until  the  inspira- 
tion came.  The  revelation  of  God  to  Moses  was  without  an  inter- 
mediary, and  without  visions  and  likenesses.  Moses' saw  the  things 
presented  to  him  in  their  true  form. 

The  laws  may  be  divided  into  i.  Innate  or  rational  laws,  i.  e., 
laws  planted  by  God  in  the  mind  of  every  rational  being.  There 
are  many  such  in  the  Torah.  All  the  laws  of  the  Ten  Commandments 
belong  to  this  class,  with  the  exception  of  the  Sabbath.  Hence  all 
mankind  beheve  in  them,  and  Abraham  observed  them  all  before  ever 
the  Law  was  given  on  Sinai.  2.  Hidden  laws,  i.  e.,  laws,  the  reason  of 
which  is  not  given.  We  must  not  suppose  for  a  moment  that  there  is 
any  law  which  is  against  reason,  Heaven  forbid!  We  must  observe 
them  all,  whether  we  understand  the  reason  or  not.  If  we  find  a 
law  that  apparently  is  unreasonable,  we  must  assume  that  it  has  some 
hidden  meaning  and  is  not  to  be  taken  in  its  Uteral  sense.  It  is  our 
duty,  then,  to  look  for  this  hidden  meaning,  and  if  we  cannot  find 
it,  we  must  admit  that  we  do  not  understand  it. 

The  laws  may  also  be  classified  as  i.  Commandments  of  the  heart, 
2.  Commandments  of  the  tongue,  and  3.  Commandments  of  action. 
An  example  of  commandments  of  the  heart  is,  "Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God,"  "Thou  shalt  not  hate  thy  brother  in  thy  heart," 
and  so  on.    To  the  commandments  of  the  tongue  belong  the  reading 


MOSES  AND  ABRAHAM  IBN  EZRA  195 

of  the  Shema,  grace  after  meals,  the  priestly  benediction,  and  so  on. 
The  laws  of  the  third  class  are  so  numerous  that  there  is  no  need  of 
mentioning  them.  The  laws  of  the  heart  are  the  most  important  of  all. 
The  reader  will  recognize  in  this  two-fold  classification  Saadia's  divi- 
sion of  the  laws  into  rational  and  traditional,  and  Bahya's  classification 
of  duties  of  the  heart  and  duties  of  the  limbs.  This  second  class  in- 
cludes Ibn  Ezra's  second  and  third  classes,  tongue  and  action.  ^^^ 

The  problem  of  evil  Ibn  Ezra  solves  by  saying  that  from  God  comes 
good  only.  The  world  as  a  whole  is  good;  evil  is  due  to  the  defect  of 
the  object  receiving  higher  influence.  To  argue  that  because  of  the 
small  part  of  evil  the  whole  world,  which  is  good,  should  not  have 
been  created,  is  foolish. 

The  highest  good  of  man  is  to  develop  his  reason.  As  the  traveller 
and  the  captive  long  to  return  to  the  land  of  their  birth  and  be  with 
their  family,  so  the  rational  soul  is  eager  to  rise  to  the  upper  world 
which  is  not  made  of  clay.  This  it  can  do  only  if  it  purifies  itself  from 
the  uncleanness  of  corporeal  desire  which  drags  it  down,  and  takes 
pains  to  know  its  own  nature  and  origin,  with  the  help  of  Wisdom 
whose  eyes  are  undimmed.  Then  she  will  know  the  truth,  which  will 
remain  indelibly  impressed  upon  her  when  she  separates  from  the 
body,  where  she  was  put  for  her  own  good.  The  suffering  she  under- 
went here  for  a  time  will  give  place  to  everlasting  rest  and  joy.  All 
man's  work  is  vain,  for  man  can  neither  create  nor  annihilate  a  sub- 
stance. All  his  corporeal  activity  consists  in  combination  and  separa- 
tion of  accidents.  The  only  thing  of  value  is  the  fear  of  God.  But  no 
man  can  rise  to  this  stage  until  he  has  ascended  the  ladder  of  wisdom, 
and  has  acquired  understanding.^^" 

More  concretely  the  way  to  purify  the  soul  from  the  body  is  by 
uniting  the  rational  and  spirited  soul,  as  Plato  has  it,  against  the  ap- 
petitive, and  giving  the  reason  the  mastery  over  the  spirited  soul  as 
well.  A  moderate  degree  of  asceticism  is  to  be  recommended  as 
favoring  the  emancipation  of  the  soul  from  the  tyranny  of  the  body. 
This  is  the  meaning  of  the  institution  of  the  Nazirite;  and  the  offering 
he  must  bring  after  the  expiration  of  his  period  is  to  atone  for  the  sin 
of  returning  to  a  life  of  indulgence.  But  one  should  not  go  to  extremes. 
Too  much  praying  and  fasting  results  in  stupefaction.  It  is  a  mistake 
to  develop  one  side  of  one's  nature  at  the  expense  of  another.    Every 


196  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

one  of  the  three  souls  (the  rational,  the  spirited  and  the  appetitive) 
must  be  given  its  due. 

But  the  most  important  activity  of  man,  which  leads  to  eternal 
life  and  happiness,  is  the  knowledge  of  God.  This  knowledge  cannot 
be  attained  at  once.  It  must  be  preceded  by  a  study  of  one's  own 
soul  and  of  the  natural  sciences.  Through  a  knowledge  of  oneself 
and  nature,  one  arrives  finally  at  a  knowledge  of  God.  The  soul, 
originally  a  tabula  rasa,  is  gradually  perfected  by  the  ideas  which 
theoretical  speculation  acquires.  These  ideas  are  identified  with  the 
rational  soul,  and  there  results  the  acquired  Intellect,  which,  as  ab- 
solutely immaterial,  is  immortal  and  becomes  one  with  the  world 
soul  of  which  it  is  a  part.  During  life  complete  union  with  the  spiritual 
world  is  impossible.  Even  Moses  could  only  see  the  "rear  part"  of 
God.  But  when  one  has  during  life  kept  as  far  as  possible  away  from 
the  sensuous  and  corporeal,  then  at  the  time  of  death,  when  the  soul 
is  separated  from  the  body,  he  will  be  completely  absorbed  in  the 
world  soul  and  possess  the  knowledge  of  God. 


CHAPTER  XII 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD 


What  was  poison  to  Judah  Halevi  is  meat  to  Abraham  Ibn  Daud. 
We  must,  he  says,  investigate  the  principles  of  the  Jewish  rehgion 
and  seek  to  harmonize  them  with  true  philosophy.  And  in  order  to 
do  these  things  properly  a  preHminary  study  of  science  is  necessary. 
Nowadays  all  this  is  neglected  and  the  result  is  confusion  in  funda- 
mental principles,  for  a  superficial  and  Uteral  reading  of  the  Bible 
leads  to  contradictory  views,  not  to  speak  of  anthropomorphic  con- 
ceptions of  God  which  cannot  be  the  truth.  Many  of  our  day  think 
that  the  study  of  philosophy  is  injurious.  This  is  because  it  frequently 
happens  in  our  time  that  a  person  who  takes  up  the  study  of  philosophy 
neglects  religion.  In  ancient  times  also  this  happened  in  the  person 
of  Elisha  ben  Abuya,  known  by  the  name  of  Aher.  Nevertheless  sci- 
ence was  diligently  studied  in  Rabbinic  times.  Witness  what  was  said 
concerning  Rabbi  Yohanan  ben  Zakkai,  Samuel  and  the  Synhedrin.^^^ 
It  cannot  be  that  God  meant  us  to  abstain  from  philosophical  study, 
for  many  statements  in  the  Bible,  such  as  those  relating  to  freedom 
of  the  will,  to  the  nature  of  God  and  the  divine  attributes,  to  the 
creation  of  the  world,  and  so  on,  are  a  direct  stimulus  to  such  investi- 
gation. Surely  mental  confusion  cannot  be  the  purpose  God  had  in 
mind  for  us.  If  he  preferred  our  ignorance  he  would  not  have  called 
our  attention  to  these  matters  at  all.^^^ 

This,  as  we  see,  is  decidedly  a  different  point  of  view  from  that  of 
Judah  Halevi.  The  difference  between  them  is  not  due  to  a  difference 
in  their  age  and  environment,  but  solely  to  personal  taste  and  tempera- 
ment. Toledo  was  the  birthplace  of  Ibn  Daud  as  it  was  of  Halevi. 
And  the  period  in  which  they  lived  was  practically  the  same.  Judah 
Halevi's  birth  took  place  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  eleventh  century, 
whereas  Ibn  Daud  is  supposed  to  have  been  born  about  1 1  lo,  a  differ- 
ence of  some  twenty-five  or  thirty  years.  The  philosopher  whom 
Judah  Halevi  presents  to  us  as  the  typical  representative  of  his  time 

197 


198  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

is  an  Aristotelian  of  the  t3^e  of  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna.  And  it  is 
the  same  type  of  philosophy  that  we  meet  in  the  pages  of  the  "Emunah 
Ramah  "  (Exalted  Faith),  Ibn  Baud's  philosophical  work.^-^  Whereas, 
however,  Judah  Halevi  was  a  poet  by  the  grace  of  God,  glowing  with 
love  for  his  people,  their  religion,  their  language  and  their  historic 
land,  Ibn  Baud  leaves  upon  us  the  impression  of  a  precise  thinker, 
cold  and  analytical.  He  exhibits  no  graces  of  style,  eloquence  of  dic- 
tion or  depths  of  enthusiasm  and  emotion.  He  passes  systematically 
from  one  point  to  the  next,  uses  few  words  and  technical,  and  moves 
wholly  in  the  Peripatetic  philosophy  of  the  day.  In  1161,  the  same 
year  in  which  the  Emunah  Ramah  was  composed,  he  also  wrote  a 
historical  work,  "Sefer  Hakabala"  (Book  of  Tradition),  which  we 
have;  and  in  1180,  regarded  by  some  as  the  year  of  his  death^  he 
published  an  astronomical  work,  which  is  lost.  This  gives  an  index 
of  his  interests  which  were  scientific  and  philosophic.  Mysticism, 
whether  of  the  poetic  or  the  philosophic  kind,  was  far  from  his  nature; 
and  this  too  may  account  for  the  intense  opposition  he  shows  to 
Solomon  Ibn  Gabirol.  On  more  than  one  occasion  he  gives  vent  to 
his  impatience  with  that  poetic  philosopher,  and  he  blames  him  princi- 
pally for  two  faults.  Choosing  to  devote  a  whole  book  to  one  purely 
metaphysical  topic,  in  itself  not  related  to  Judaism,  Gabirol,  we  are 
told  by  Ibn  Daud,  gave  expression  to  doctrines  extremely  dangerous 
to  the  Jewish  rehgion.  And  apart  from  his  heterodoxy,  he  is  philo- 
sophically incompetent  and  his  method  is  abominable.  His  style  is 
profuse  to  the  point  of  weariness,  and  his  logic  carries  no  conviction.  ^^^ 

While  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  is  thus  expressly  unsympathetic  to  Ga- 
birol and  tacitly  in  disagreement  with  Halevi  (he  does  not  mention 
him),  he  shows  the  closest  relation  to  Maimonides,  whose  forerunner  he 
is.  We  feel  tempted  to  say  that  if  not  for  Ibn  Daud  there  would  have 
been  no  Maimonides.  And  yet  the  irony  of  history  has  willed  that 
the  fame  of  being  the  greatest  Jewish  philosopher  shall  be  Maimon- 
ides's  own,  while  his  nearest  predecessor,  to  whose  influence  he  owed 
most,  should  be  all  but  completely  forgotten.  The  Arabic  original 
of  Ibn  Daud's  treatise  is  lost,  and  the  Hebrew  translations  (there  are 
two)  lay  buried  in  manuscript  in  the  European  hbraries  until  one  of 
them  was  pubUshed  by  Simson  Weil  in  1852.^-^ 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud  is  the  first  Jewish  philosopher  who  shows  an 


ABRAHAM  IBM  BAUD  199 

intimate  knowledge  of  the  works  of  Aristotle  and  makes  a  deliberate 
effort  to  harmonize  the  Aristotelian  system  with  Judaism.  To  be 
sure,  he  too  owes  his  Aristotelian  knowledge  to  the  Arabian  exponents 
of  the  Stagirite,  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna,  rather  than  to  the  works 
of  Aristotle  himself.  But  this  peculiarity  was  rooted  in  the  intellec- 
tual conditions  of  his  time,  and  must  not  be  charged  to  his  personal 
neglect  of  the  sources.  And  Maimonides  does  nothing  more  than 
repeat  the  effort  of  Ibn  Daud  in  a  more  brilliant  and  masterly  fashion. 

The  development  of  the  three  religious  philosophies  in  the  middle 
ages,  Jewish,  Christian  and  Mohammedan,  followed  a  similar  line  of 
progression.  In  all  of  them  it  was  not  so  much  a  development  from 
within,  the  unfolding  of  what  was  impHcit  and  potential  in  the  original 
germ  of  the  three  respective  religions,  as  a  stimulus  from  without, 
which  then  combined,  as  an  integral  factor,  with  the  original  mass, 
and  the  final  outcome  was  a  resultant  of  the  two  originally  disparate 
elements.  We  know  by  this  time  what  these  two  elements  were  in 
each  case,  Hellenic  speculation,  and  Semitic  religion  in  the  shape  of 
sacred  and  revealed  documents.  The  second  factor  was  in  every  case 
complete  when  the  process  of  fusion  began.  Not  so  the  first.  What  I 
mean  is  that  not  all  of  the  writings  of  Greek  antiquity  were  known  to 
Jew,  Christian  and  Mohammedan  at  the  beginning  of  their  philoso- 
phizing career.  And  the  progress  in  their  philosophical  development 
kept  equal  step  with  the  successive  accretion  of  Greek  philosophical 
literature,  in  particular  Aristotle's  physical,  psychological  and  meta- 
physical treatises,  and  their  gradual  purgation  of  Neo-Platonic  ad- 
hesions. 

The  Syrian  Christians,  who  were  the  first  to  adopt  Greek  teachings, 
seem  never  to  have  gone  beyond  the  mathematical  and  medical  works 
of  the  Greeks  and  the  logic  of  Aristotle.  The  Arabs  began  where 
their  Syrian  teachers  ended,  and  went  beyond  them.  The  Mutakal- 
limim  were  indebted  to  the  Stoics, ^-^  the  Pure  Brethren  to  the  Neo- 
Platonists;  and  it  was  only  gradually  that  Aristotle  became  the  sole 
master  not  merely  in  logic,  which  he  always  had  been,  but  also 
in  physics,  metaphysics  and  psychology.  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and 
Averroes  represent  so  many  steps  in  the  Aristotelization  of  Arabic 
philosophy. 

Christian  mediaeval  thought,  which  was  really  a  continuation  of 


200  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Patristic  period,  likewise  began  with  Eriugena  in  the  ninth  cen- 
tury under  Platonic  and  Neo-Platonic  influences.  Of  Aristotle  the 
logic  alone  was  known,  and  that  too  only  in  small  part.  Here  also 
progress  was  due  to  the  increase  of  Aristotelian  knowledge;  though 
in  this  case  it  was  not  gradual  as  with  the  Arabs  before  them,  but 
sudden.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  twelfth  and  the  early  part  of  the 
thirteenth  century,  through  the  Crusades,  through  the  Moorish  civi- 
lization in  Spain,  through  the  Saracens  in  Sicily,  through  the  Jews 
as  translators  and  mediators,  Aristotle  invaded  Christian  Europe 
and  transformed  Christian  philosophy.  Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas 
Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus,  WiUiam  of  Occam  are  the  results  of  this  trans- 
formation. 

The  same  thing  holds  true  of  the  Jews.  Their  philosophizing  career 
stands  chronologically  between  that  of  their  Arab  teachers  and  their 
Christian  disciples.  And  the  hne  of  their  development  was  similar. 
It  was  parallel  to  that  of  the  Arabs.  First  came  Kalam  in  Saadia, 
Mukammas,  the  Karaites  Al  Basir  and  Jeshua  ben  Judah.  Then  Neo- 
Platonism  and  Kalam  combined,  or  pure  Neo-Platonism,  in  Bahya, 
Gabirol,  Ibn  Zaddik  and  the  two  Ibn  Ezras,  Abraham  and  Moses. 
In  Judah  Halevi,  so  far  as  philosophy  is  represented,  we  have  Neo- 
Platonism  and  Aristotelianism.  Finally  in  Ibn  Daud  and  Maimonides, 
Neo-Platonism  is  reduced  to  the  vanishing  point,  and  Aristotelianism 
is  in  full  view  and  in  possession  of  the  field.  After  Maimonides  the 
only  philosopher  who  deviates  from  the  prescribed  path  and  endeavors 
to  uproot  Aristotehan  authority  in  Judaism  is  Crescas.  All  the  rest 
stand  by  Aristotle  and  his  major  domo,  Maimonides. 

This  may  seem  like  a  purely  formal  and  external  mode  of  char- 
acterizing the  development  of  philosophical  thought.  But  the  char- 
acter of  mediaeval  philosophy  is  responsible  for  this.  Their  ideal  of 
truth  as  well  as  goodness  was  in  the  past.  Knowledge  was  thought  to 
have  been  discovered  or  revealed  in  the  past,^-^  and  the  task  of  the 
philosopher  was  to  acquire  what  was  already  there  and  to  harmonize 
contradictory  authorities.  Thus  the  more  of  the  past  literature  that 
came  to  them,  the  greater  the  transformation  in  their  own  philosophy. 

The  above  digression  will  make  clear  to  us  the  position  of  Ibn  Daud 
and  his  relation  to  Maimonides.  Ibn  Daud  began  what  Maimonides 
finished — the  last  stage  in  the  Aristotelization  of  Jewish  thought.  Why 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  201 

is  it  then  that  so  little  was  known  about  him,  and  that  his  important 
treatise  was  neglected  and  practically  forgotten?  The  answer  is  to 
be  found  partly  in  the  nature  of  the  work  itself  and  partly  in  historical 
circumstances. 

The  greatest  and  most  abiding  interest  in  intellectual  Jewry  was  after 
all  the  Bible  and  the  Talmud.  This  interest  never  flagged  through 
adversity  or  through  success.  The  devotion  paid  to  these  Jewish 
classics  and  sacred  books  may  have  been  fruitful  in  original  research 
and  intelligent  application  at  one  time  and  place  and  relatively  barren 
at  another.  Great  men  devoted  to  their  study  abounded  in  one  coun- 
try and  were  relatively  few  in  another.  The  nature  of  the  study 
applied  to  these  books  was  affected  variously  by  historical  con- 
ditions, political  and  economic;  and  the  cultivation  or  neglect  of 
the  sciences  and  philosophy  was  reflected  in  the  style  of  Biblical 
and  Talmudical  interpretation.  But  at  all  times  and  in  all  coun- 
tries, under  conditions  of  comparative  freedom  as  well  as  in  the 
midst  of  persecution,  the  sacred  heritage  of  Israel  was  studied 
and  its  precepts  observed  and  practiced.  In  this  field  alone  fame  was 
sure  and  permanent.  All  other  study  was  honored  according  to  the 
greater  or  less  proximity  to  this  paramount  interest.  In  times  of 
freedom  and  of  great  philosophic  and  scientific  interest  like  that  of  the 
golden  era  in  Spain,  philosophical  studies  almost  acquired  independent 
value.  But  this  independence,  never  quite  absolute,  waned  and  waxed 
with  external  conditions,  and  at  last  disappeared  entirely.  If  Ibn 
Daud  had  made  himself  famous  by  a  Biblical  commentary  or  a  halakic 
work,  or  if  his  philosophic  treatise  had  the  distinction  of  being  written 
in  popular  and  attractive  style,  like  Bahya's  "Duties  of  the  Hearts," 
or  Halevi's  Cusari,"  it  might  have  fared  better.  As  it  is,  it  suffers 
from  its  conciseness  and  technical  terminology.  Add  to  this  that 
it  was  superseded  by  the  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed"  of  Maimonides, 
published  not  many  years  after  the  "Emunah  Ramah,"  and  the 
neglect  of  the  latter  is  completely  explained. 

Abraham  ibn  Daud  tells  us  in  the  introduction  to  his  book  that 
it  was  written  in  response  to  the  question  of  a  friend  concerning  the 
problem  of  free  will.  The  dilemma  is  this.  If  human  action  is  de- 
termined by  God,  why  does  he  punish,  why  does  he  admonish,  and 
why  does  he  send  prophets?    If  man  is  free,  then  there  is  something 


202  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

in  the  world  over  which  God  has  no  control.  The  problem  is  made 
more  diflScult  by  the  fact  that  Biblical  statements  are  inconsistent, 
and  passages  may  be  cited  in  favor  of  either  of  the  theories  in  question. 
This  inconsistency  is  to  be  explained,  however,  by  the  circumstance 
that  not  all  Biblical  phrases  are  to  be  taken  literally — their  very 
contradiction  is  a  proof  of  this.  Now  the  passages  which  require 
exegetic  manipulation  are  in  general  those  which  seem  opposed  to 
reason.  Many  statements  in  the  Bible  are  in  fact  intended  for  the 
common  people,  and  are  expressed  with  a  view  to  their  comprehension, 
and  without  reference  to  philosophic  truth.  In  the  present  instance 
the  objections  to  determinism  are  much  greater  and  more  serious 
than  those  to  freedom.  In  order  to  realize  this,  however,  it  is  necessary 
to  investigate  the  principles  of  the  Jewish  religion  and  seek  to  har- 
monize them  with  true  philosophy.  This  in  turn  cannot  be  done 
without  a  preliminary  study  of  science.  A  question  like  that  of  de- 
terminism and  freedom  cannot  be  decided  without  a  knowledge  of 
the  divine  attributes  and  the  consequences  flowing  from  them.  But 
to  understand  these  we  must  have  a  knowledge  of  the  principles  of 
physics  and  metaphysics. ^^^  Accordingly  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  devotes 
the  entire  first  part  of  the  "Emunah  Ramah"  to  general  physics  and 
metaphysics  in  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  these  terms. 

Concerning  the  kind  of  persons  for  whom  he  wrote  his  book,  he 
says,  I  advise  everyone  who  is  perfectly  innocent,  who  is  not  interested 
in  philosophical  and  ethical  questions  like  that  of  determinism  and 
freedom  on  the  ground  that  man  cannot  grasp  them;  and  is  entirely 
unconcerned  about  his  ignorance — I  advise  such  a  person  to  refrain 
from  opening  this  book  or  any  other  of  a  similar  nature.  His  ignorance 
is  his  bUss,  for  after  all  the  purpose  of  philosophy  is  conduct.  On 
the  other  hand,  those  who  are  learned  in  the  principles  of  religion  and 
are  also  famiUar  with  philosophy  need  not  my  book,  for  they  know 
more  than  I  can  teach  them  here.  It  is  the  beginner  in  speculation 
who  can  benefit  from  this  work,  the  man  who  has  not  yet  been  able 
to  see  the  rational  necessity  of  beliefs  and  practices  which  he  knows 
from  tradition. 

That  the  principles  of  the  Jewish  religion  are  based  upon  phil- 
osophic foundations  is  shown  in  Deuteronomy  4,  6:  "Keep  there- 
fore and  do  them;  for  this  is  your  wisdom  and  your  understanding 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  203 

in  the  sight  of  the  peoples,  which  shall  hear  all  these  statutes,  and  say, 
surely  this  great  nation  is  a  wise  and  understanding  people."  This 
cannot  refer  to  the  ceremonial  precepts,  the  so-called  "traditional" 
commandments;  for  there  is  nothing  in  them  to  excite  the  admiration 
of  a  non-Jew.  Nor  can  it  refer  to  the  political  and  moral  regulations, 
for  one  need  not  profess  the  Jewish  or  any  other  religion  in  order  to 
practice  them;  they  are  a  matter  of  reason  pure  and  simple.  The 
verse  quoted  can  only  mean  that  the  other  nations  will  be  seized 
with  admiration  and  wonder  when  they  find  that  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Jewish  religion,  which  we  received  by  tradition  and 
without  effort,  are  identical  with  those  philosophical  principles  at 
which  they  arrived  after  a  great  deal  of  labor  extending  over  thousands 
of  years. ^^^ 

Ibn  Daud  is  not  consistent  in  his  idea  of  the  highest  aim  of  man. 
We  have  just  heard  him  say  that  the  purpose  of  philosophy  is  conduct. 
This  is  true  to  the  spirit  of  Judaism  which,  despite  all  the  efforts  of 
the  Jewish  philosophers  to  the  contrary,  is  not  a  speculative  theology 
but  a  practical  religion,  in  which  works  stand  above  faith.  But  as 
an  Aristotelian,  Ibn  Daud  could  not  consistently  stand  by  the  above 
standpoint  as  the  last  word  in  this  question.  Accordingly  we  find 
him  elsewhere  in  true  Aristotehan  fashion  give  priority  to  theoretical 
knowledge. 

Judging  from  the  position  of  man  among  the  other  creatures  of  the 
sublunar  world,  we  come  to  the  conclusion,  he  tells  us,  that  that  which 
distinguishes  him  above  his  surroundings,  namely,  his  rational  soul, 
is  the  aim  of  all  the  rest;  and  they  are  means  and  preparations  for  it. 
The  rational  soul  has  two  forms  of  activity.  It  may  face  upward  and 
receive  wisdom  from  the  angels  (theoretical  knowledge).  Or  it  may 
direct  its  attention  downwards  and  judge  the  other  corporeal  powers 
(practical  reason).  But  it  must  not  devote  itself  unduly  or  without 
system  to  any  one  occupation.  The  aim  of  man  is  wisdom,  science. 
Of  the  sciences  the  highest  and  the  aim  of  all  the  rest  is  the  knowledge 
of  God.  The  body  of  man  is  his  animal,  which  leads  him  to  God. 
Some  spend  all  their  time  in  feeding  the  animal,  some  in  clothing  it, 
and  some  in  curing  it  of  its  ills.  The  latter  is  not  a  bad  occupation, 
as  it  saves  the  body  from  disease  and  death,  and  so  helps  it  to  attain 
the  higher  life.    But  to  think  of  the  study  of  medicine  as  the  aim  of 


204  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

life  and  devote  all  one's  time  to  it  is  doing  injury  to  one's  soul.  Some 
spend  their  time  in  matters  even  less  significant  than  this,  viz,  in 
studying  grammar  and  language;  others  again  in  mathematics  and  in 
solving  curious  problems  which  are  never  likely  to  happen.  The 
only  valuable  part  here  is  that  which  has  relation  to  astronomy. 
Some  are  exclusively  occupied  in  "twisting  threads."  This  is  an  ex- 
pression used  by  an  Arabian  philosopher,^^"  who  compares  man's 
condition  in  the  world  to  that  of  a  slave  who  was  promised  freedom 
and  royalty  besides  if  he  made  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca  and  celebrated 
there.  If  he  made  the  journey  and  was  prevented  from  reaching 
the  holy  city,  he  would  get  freedom  only;  but  if  he  did  not  undertake 
the  trip  he  would  get  nothing.  The  three  steps  in  the  realization  of 
the  purpose  are  thus:  making  the  preparations  for  the  journey,  getting 
on  the  road  and  passing  from  station  to  station,  and  finally  wandering 
about  in  the  place  of  destination.  One  small  element  in  the  prepara- 
tion for  the  journey  is  twisting  the  threads  for  the  water  bottle.  Medi- 
cine and  law  as  means  of  gaining  a  livelihood  and  a  reputation  repre- 
sent the  stage  of  preparing  for  the  journey.  They  are  both  intended 
to  improve  the  ills  of  life,  whether  in  the  relations  of  man  to  man  as 
in  law;  or  in  the  treatment  of  the  internal  humors  as  in  medicine. 
Medicine  seems  more  important,  for  on  the  assumption  of  mankind  be- 
ing just,  there  would  be  no  need  of  law,  whereas  the  need  for  medicine 
would  remain.  To  spend  one's  whole  life  in  legal  casuistry  and  the 
working  out  of  hypothetical  cases  on  the  pretext  of  sharpening  one's 
wits,  is  like  being  engaged  in  twisting  threads  continually — a  little 
is  necessary,  but  a  great  deal  is  a  waste  of  time.  It  would  be  best 
if  the  religious  man  would  first  learn  how  to  prove  the  existence  of 
God,  the  meaning  of  prophecy,  the  nature  of  reward  and  punishment 
and  the  future  world,  and  how  to  defend  these  matters  before  an  un- 
believer. Then  if  he  has  time  left,  he  may  devote  it  to  legalistic  dis- 
cussions, and  there  would  be  no  harm. 

Self-examination,  in  order  to  purify  oneseK  from  vices  great  and 
small,  represents  the  second  stage  of  getting  on  the  road  and  travelling 
from  station  to  station.  The  final  stage,  arriving  in  the  holy  city 
and  celebrating  there,  is  to  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  God.  He  who 
attains  this  is  the  best  of  wise  men,  having  the  best  of  knowledge, 
which  deals  with  the  noblest  subject.     The  reader  must  not  expect 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  205 

to  find  it  all  in  this  book.  If  he  reads  this  and  does  not  study  the  sub- 
ject for  himself,  he  is  like  a  man  who  spent  his  time  in  reading  about 
medicine  and  cannot  cure  the  simplest  ailment.  The  knowledge  of 
God  is  a  form  that  is  bestowed  from  on  high  upon  the  rational  soul 
when  she  is  prepared  by  means  of  moral  perfection  and  scientific  study. 
The  prophet  puts  all  three  functions  of  the  soul  on  the  same  level, 
and  gives  preference  to  knowledge  of  God.  "Thus  saith  the  Lord," 
says  Jeremiah  (9,  22),  "Let  not  the  wise  man  glory  in  his  wisdom 
[rational  soul],  neither  let  the  mighty  man  glory  in  his  might  [spirited 
soul],  let  not  the  rich  man  glory  in  his  riches  [nutritive  soul]:  but  let 
him  that  glorieth  glory  in  this,  that  he  understandeth,  and  knoweth 
me.  .  .  ."  Jeremiah  also  recommends  {ib.)  knowing  God  through 
his  deeds — "That  I  am  the  Lord  which  exercise  loving-kindness" — 
in  order  that  man  may  imitate  him.^^^ 

We  have  now  a  general  idea  of  Ibn  Baud's  attitude  and  point  of 
view;  and  in  passing  to  the  details  of  his  system  it  will  not  be  necessary 
to  rehearse  all  the  particulars  of  his  thought,  much  of  it  being  common 
to  all  mediaeval  writers  on  Jewish  philosophy.  We  shall  confine  our- 
selves to  those  matters  in  which  Ibn  Baud  contributed  something  new, 
not  contained  in  the  writings  of  his  predecessors. 

Following  the  Aristotelian  system,  he  begins  by  describing  substance 
and  accident  and  gives  a  list  and  characterization  of  the  ten  categories. 
This  he  follows  up  by  showing  that  the  classification  of  the  ten  cate- 
gories hes  at  the  basis  of  the  139th  Psalm.  It  needs  not  our  saying 
that  it  must  be  an  extraordinary  mode  of  exegesis  that  can  find  such 
things  in  such  unusual  places.  But  the  very  strangeness  of  the  phe- 
nomenon bears  witness  to  the  remarkable  influence  exerted  by  the 
Aristotehan  philosophy  upon  the  thinking  of  the  Spanish  Jews  at 
that  time.232 

From  the  categories  he  passes  to  a  discussion  of  the  most  fundamen- 
tal concepts  in  the  Aristotehan  philosophy,  matter  and  form.  And 
here  his  method  of  proving  the  existence  of  matter  is  Aristotehan 
and  new.  It  is  based  upon  the  discussion  in  Aristotle's  Physics, 
though  not  necessarily  derived  from  there  directly.  Primary  matter, 
he  says,  is  free  from  all  form.  There  must  be  such,  for  in  the  change 
of  one  thing  to  another,  of  water  to  air  for  example,  it  cannot  be  the 
form  of  water  that  receives  the  form  of  air;  for  the  form  of  water  dis- 


2o6  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

appears,  whereas  that  which  receives  the  new  form  must  be  there. 
Reason  therefore  leads  us  to  assume  a  common  substrate  of  all  things 
that  are  subject  to  change.  This  is  primary  matter,  free  from  all 
form.  This  matter  being  at  the  basis  of  all  change  and  becoming, 
could  not  itself  have  come  to  be  through  a  similar  process,  or  we  should 
require  another  matter  prior  to  it,  and  it  would  not  be  the  prime  matter 
we  supposed  it  to  be.  This  last  argument  led  Aristotle  to  the  concept 
of  an  eternal  matter,  the  basis  of  becoming  for  all  else  besides,  itself 
not  subject  to  any  such  process.  It  is  an  ultimate,  to  ask  for  the  origin 
of  which  would  signify  to  misunderstand  the  meaning  of  origin.  All 
things  of  the  sublunar  world  originate  in  matter,  hence  matter  itself 
is  the  unoriginated,  the  eternal. 

Ibn  Daud  as  a  Jew  could  not  accept  this  solution,  and  so  he  cut  the 
knot  by  saying  that  while  it  is  true  that  matter  cannot  originate  in 
the  way  in  which  the  composite  objects  of  the  sublunar  world  come 
to  be,  it  does  not  yet  follow  that  it  is  absolutely  ultimate  and  eternal. 
God  alone  is  the  ultimate  and  eternal;  nothing  else  is.  Matter  is  a 
relative  ultimate;  relative,  that  is,  to  the  composite  and  changeable 
objects  of  our  world;  but  it  is  itself  an  effect  of  God  as  the  universal 
cause.    God  created  it  outright. 

Prime  matter,  therefore,  represents  the  first  stage  in  creation.  The 
next  stage  is  the  endowment  of  this  formless  matter  with  corporeality 
in  the  abstract,  i.  e.,  with  extension.  Then  come  the  specific  forms  of 
the  four  elements,  then  their  compounds  through  mineral,  plant 
and  animal  to  man.  This  is  not  new;  we  have  already  met  with  it  in 
Gabirol  and  Ibn  Zaddik.  Nor  is  the  following  significant  statement 
altogether  new,  though  no  one  before  Ibn  Daud  expressed  it  so  clearly 
and  so  definitely.  It  is  that  the  above  analysis  of  natural  objects 
into  matter,  universal  body,  the  elements,  and  so  on,  is  not  a  physical 
division  but  a  logical.  It  does  not  mean  that  there  was  a  time  when 
prime  matter  actually  existed  as  such  before  it  received  the  form  of 
corporeality,  and  then  there  existed  actually  an  absolute  body  of  pure 
extension  until  it  received  the  four  elements.  No,  nothing  has  exist- 
ence in  actu  which  has  not  individuality,  including  not  only  form, 
but  also  accidents.  The  above  analysis  is  theoretical,  and  the  order 
of  priority  is  logical  not  real.  In  reality  only  the  complete  compound 
of  matter  and  form  (the  individual)  exists. 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  207 

Allusion  to  matter  and  form  is  also  found  in  the  Bible  in  Jeremiah 
(18,  iff.))  "Arise  and  go  down  to  the  potter's  house  .  .  .  Then  I 
went  down  to  the  potter's  house,  and,  behold,  he  wrought  his  work 
on  the  wheels  .  .  .  Behold  as  the  clay  in  the  potter's  hand  ...   "  "^^ 

The  next  important  topic  analyzed  by  Ibn  Daud  is  that  of  motion. 
This  is  of  especial  importance  to  Ibn  Daud  because  upon  it  he  bases 
a  new  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  not  heretofore  found  in  the  works 
of  any  of  his  predecessors.  It  is  taken  from  Aristotle's  Physics,  prob- 
ably from  Avicenna's  treatises  on  the  subject,  is  then  adopted  by  Mai- 
monides,  and  through  his  example  no  doubt  is  made  use  of  by  Thomas 
Aquinas,  the  great  Christian  Scholastic  of  the  thirteenth  century, 
who  gives  it  the  most  prominent  place  in  his  "Summa  Contra  Gen- 
tiles." 

Ibn  Daud  does  not  give  Aristotle's  general  definition  of  motion  as 
the  "  actualization  of  the  potential  qua  potential "  {cf.  above,  p.  xxxii), 
but  his  other  remarks  concerning  it  imply  it.  Motion,  he  says,  is 
applied  first  to  movement  in  place,  and  is  then  transferred  to  any 
change  which  is  gradual,  such  as  quantitative  or  qualitative  change. 
Sudden  change  is  not  called  motion.  As  the  four  elements  have  all 
the  same  matter  and  yet  possess  different  motions — earth  and  water 
moving  downward,  fire  and  air  upward — it  cannot  be  the  matter 
which  is  the  cause  of  their  motions.  It  must  therefore  be  the  forms, 
which  are  different  in  different  things. 

Nothing  can  move  itseff.  While  it  is  true  that  the  form  of  a  thing 
determines  the  kind  of  motion  it  shall  have,  it  cannot  in  itself  produce 
that  motion,  which  can  be  caused  only  by  an  efi&cient  cause  from 
without.  The  case  of  animal  motions  may  seem  like  a  refutation  of 
this  view,  but  it  is  not  really  so.  The  soul  and  the  body  are  two  dis- 
tinct principles  in  the  animal;  and  it  is  the  soul  that  moves  the  body. 
The  reason  why  a  thing  cannot  move  itself  is  because  the  thing  which 
is  moved  is  potential  with  reference  to  that  which  the  motion  is  in- 
tended to  realize,  whereas  the  thing  causing  the  motion  is  actual  with 
respect  to  the  relation  in  question.  If  then  a  thing  moved  itself, 
it  would  be  actual  and  potential  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same 
relation,  which  is  a  contradiction.  The  Bible,  too,  hints  at  the  idea 
that  every  motion  must  have  a  mover  by  the  recurring  questions  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  prophetic  visions,  of  the  existence  of  the  earth, 


2o8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

and  so  on.  Such  are  the  expressions  in  Job  (38,  36,  37):  "Who  hath 
put  wisdom  in  the  inward  parts?"  "Who  can  number  the  clouds  by 
wisdom?"  In  Proverbs  (30,  4):  "Who  hath  estabhshed  all  the  ends 
of  the  earth?"  and  in  many  passages  besides. ^^^ 

The  question  of  infinity  is  another  topic  of  importance  for  proving 
the  existence  of  God.  We  proceed  as  follows:  An  infinite  line  is  an  im- 
possibility.   For  let  the  Hnes  c 1 a  be  infinite  in  the 

directions  h,  d.  Take  away  from  cd  a  finite  length  =ce,  and  pull 
up  the  line  ed  so  that  e  coincides  with  c.  Now  if  ed  is  equal  to  ab, 
and  cd  was  also  equal  to  ab  by  hypothesis,  it  follows  that  ed  =  cd,  which 
is  impossible,  for  ed  is  a  part  of  cd.  If  it  is  shorter  than  cd  and  yet  is 
infinite,  one  infinite  is  shorter  than  another  infinite,  which  is  also 
impossible.  The  only  alternative  left  is  then  that  ed  is  finite.  If 
then  we  add  to  it  the  finite  part  ce,  the  sum,  ce  -\-ed  =  cd,  will  be  finite, 
and  cd  being  equal  to  ab  by  hypothesis,  ab  is  also  finite.  Hence  there 
is  no  infinite  line.  If  there  is  no  infinite  line,  there  is  no  infinite  sur- 
face or  infinite  solid,  for  we  could  in  that  case  draw  in  them  infinite 
lines.  Besides  we  can  prove  directly  the  impossibility  of  infinite  sur- 
face and  solid  by  the  same  methods  we  employed  in  line. 

We  can  prove  similarly  that  an  infinite  series  of  objects  is  also  an 
impossibility.  In  other  words,  infinite  number  as  an  actuality  is  im- 
possible because  it  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  A  nvunber  of  things 
means  a  known  number;  infinite  means  having  no  known  number. 
A  series  is  something  that  has  beginning,  middle  and  end.  Infinite 
means  being  all  middle.  We  have  thus  proved  that  an  actual  infinite 
is  impossible,  whether  as  extension  or  number.  And  the  Bible  also 
alludes  to  the  finiteness  of  the  universe  in  the  words  of  Isaiah  (40,  12): 
"Who  hath  measured  the  waters  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand  .  ,  .  ," 
intimating  that  the  universe  is  capable  of  being  measured. 

We  must  prove  next  that  no  finite  body  can  have  an  infinite  power. 
For  let  the  line  ae  a  l  c  2  e  be  a  finite  line  having  an  infinite 
power.  Divide  into  the  several  parts  ab,  be,  cd,  de,  etc.  If  every  one 
of  the  parts  has  an  infinite  power,  ab  has  an  infinite  power,  ac  a  greater 
infinite  power,  ad  a  still  greater,  ae  a  still  greater,  and  so  on.  But 
this  is  absurd,  for  there  cannot  be  anything  greater  than  the  infinite. 
It  follows  then  that  each  of  the  parts  has  a  finite  power;  and  as  the 
sum  of  finites  is  finite,  the  line  ae  also  has  a  finite  power.    All  these 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  209 

principles  we  must  keep  in  mind,  for  we  shall  by  means  of  them  prove 
later  the  existence  and  incorporeality  of  God.^^^ 

As  the  concepts  of  physics  are  essential  for  proving  the  existence 
of  God,  so  are  the  principles  of  psychology  of  importance  in  showing 
that  there  are  intermediate  beings  between  God  and  the  corporeal 
substances  of  the  world.  These  are  called  in  the  Bible  angels.  The 
philosophers  call  them  secondary  causes. 

Accordingly  Ibn  Daud  follows  his  physical  doctrines  with  a  discus- 
sion of  the  soul.  There  is  nothing  new  in  his  proof  that  such  a  thing 
as  soul  exists.  It  is  identical  with  the  deduction  of  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik 
{supra,  p.  134).  Stone  and  tree  and  horse  and  man  are  all  bodies  and 
yet  the  last  three  have  powers  and  functions  which  the  stone  has  not, 
viz.,  nutrition,  growth  and  reproduction.  Horse  and  man  have  in 
addition  to  the  three  powers  above  mentioned,  which  they  have  in 
common  with  tree,  the  powers  of  sensation  and  motion  and  imagina- 
tion, which  plants  have  not.  Finally  man  is  distinguished  above  all 
the  rest  of  animal  creation  in  possessing  the  faculty  of  intelligence, 
and  the  knowledge  of  art  and  of  ethical  discrimination.  All  these 
functions  cannot  be  body  or  the  result  of  body,  for  in  that  case  all 
corporeal  objects  should  have  all  of  them,  as  they  are  all  bodies.  We 
must  therefore  attribute  them  to  an  extra-corporeal  principle;  and 
this  we  call  soul.  As  an  incorporeal  thing  the  soul  cannot  be  strictly 
defined,  not  being  composed  of  genus  and  species;  but  we  can  describe 
it  in  a  roundabout  way  in  its  relation  to  the  body.  He  then  gives 
the  Aristotehan  definition  of  the  soul  as  "the  [first]  entelechy  of  a 
natural  body  having  life  potentially"  {cf.  above,  p.  xxxv). 

Like  many  of  his  predecessors  who  treated  of  the  soul,  Ibn  Daud 
also  finds  it  necessary  to  guard  against  the  materialistic  theory  of 
the  soul  which  would  make  it  the  product  of  the  elemental  mixture 
in  the  body,  if  not  itself  body.  This  would  reduce  the  soul  to  a  phe- 
nomenon of  the  body,  or  in  Aristotelian  terminology,  an  accident  of 
the  body,  and  would  deprive  it  of  all  substantiality  and  independence, 
not  to  speak  of  immortahty.  How  can  that  which  is  purely  a  resultant 
of  a  combination  of  elements  remain  when  its  basis  is  gone?  Accord- 
ingly Ibn  Daud  takes  pains  to  refute  the  most  important  of  these 
phenomenalistic  theories,  that  of  Hippocrates  and  Galen.  Their 
theory  in  brief  is  that  the  functions  which  we  attribute  to  the  soul 


2IO  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

are  in  reality  the  results  of  the  various  combinations  of  the  four  ele- 
mentary qualities,  hot,  cold,  moist,  dry.  The  more  harmonious  and 
equable  the  proportion  of  their  union,  the  higher  is  the  function  result- 
ing therefrom.  The  difference  between  man  and  beast,  and  between 
animal  and  plant  is  then  the  difference  in  the  proportionality  of  the 
elemental  mixture.  They  prove  this  theory  of  theirs  by  the  observation 
that  as  long  as  the  mixture  is  perfect  the  activities  above  mentioned 
proceed  properly;  whereas  as  soon  as  there  is  a  disturbance  in  the  mix- 
ture, the  animal  becomes  sick  and  cannot  perform  his  activities,  or  dies 
altogether  if  the  disturbance  is  very  great.  The  idea  is  very  plausible 
and  a  great  many  believe  it,  but  it  is  mistaken  as  we  shall  prove. 

His  refutation  of  the  "accident"  or  "mixture"  theory  of  the  soul, 
as  well  as  the  subsequent  discussion  of  the  various  functions,  sensuous 
and  rational,  of  the  tripartite  soul,  are  based  upon  Ibn  Sina's  treat- 
ment of  the  same  topic,  and  we  have  already  reproduced  some  of  it 
in  our  exposition  of  Judah  Halevi.  We  shall  therefore  be  brief  here 
and  refer  only  to  such  aspects  as  are  new  in  Ibn  Daud,  or  such  as  we 
found  it  advisable  to  omit  in  our  previous  expositions. 

His  main  argument  against  the  materialistic  or  mechanistic  theory 
of  the  soul  is  that  while  a  number  of  phenomena  of  the  growing  animal 
body  can  be  explained  by  reference  to  the  form  of  the  mixture  in  the 
elementary  qualities,  not  all  aspects  can  be  thus  explained.  Its  growth 
and  general  formation  may  be  the  result  of  material  and  mechanical 
causes,  but  not  so  the  design  and  purpose  evident  in  the  similarity,  to 
the  smallest  detail,  of  the  individuals  of  a  species,  even  when  the 
mixture  is  not  identical.  There  is  no  doubt  that  there  is  wisdom  here 
working  with  a  purpose.  This  is  soul.  There  is  another  argument 
based  upon  the  visible  results  of  other  mixtures  which  exhibit  proper- 
ties that  cannot  be  remotely  compared  with  the  functions  we  attribute 
to  the  soul.  The  animal  and  the  plant  exhibit  activities  far  beyond 
anything  present  in  the  simple  elements  of  the  mixture.  There  must 
therefore  be  in  animals  and  plants  something  additional  to  the  elements 
of  the  mixture.  This  extra  thing  resides  in  the  composite  of  which  it 
forms  a  part,  for  without  it  the  animal  or  plant  is  no  longer  what  it  is. 
Hence  as  the  latter  is  substance,  that  which  forms  a  part  of  it  is  also 
substance;  for  accident,  as  Aristotle  says,  is  that  which  resides  in 
a  thing  but  not  as  forming  a  part  of  it. 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  211 

We  have  now  shown  that  the  soul  is  substance  and  not  accident. 
We  must  still  make  clear  in  which  of  the  four  senses  of  the  Aristote- 
lian substance  the  soul  is  to  be  regarded.  By  the  theory  of  exclusion 
Ibn  Daud  decides  that  the  soul  is  substance  in  the  sense  in  which  we 
apply  that  term  to  "form."  The  form  appears  upon  the  common 
matter  and  "specifies"  it,  and  makes  it  what  it  is,  bringing  it  from 
potentiality  to  actuality.  It  is  also  the  efficient  and  final  cause  of  the 
body.  The  body  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  soul,  in  order  that  the  soul 
may  attain  its  perfection  through  the  body.  As  the  most  perfect 
body  in  the  lower  world  is  the  human  body,  and  it  is  for  the  sake  of 
the  soul,  it  follows  that  the  existence  of  the  sublunar  world  is  for  the 
sake  of  the  human  soul,  that  it  may  be  purified  and  made  perfect  by 
science  and  moral  conduct. 

While  we  have  proved  that  soul  is  not  mixture  nor  anything  like 
it,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  kind  of  soul  bestowed  upon  a  given 
body  depends  upon  the  state  of  the  mixture  in  the  elementary  quahties 
of  that  body.  Thus  we  have  the  three  kinds  of  soul,  vegetative, 
animal  and  human  or  rational.  We  need  not  follow  Ibn  Daud  in  his 
detailed  descriptions  of  the  functions  of  the  several  kinds  of  soul,  as 
there  is  little  that  is  new  and  that  we  have  not  already  met  in  Joseph 
Ibn  Zaddik  and  Judah  Halevi.  Avicenna  (Ibn  Sina)  is  the  common 
source  for  Halevi  and  Ibn  Daud,  and  the  description  of  the  inner  senses 
is  practically  identical  in  the  two,  with  the  slight  difference  that 
Halevi  attributes  to  the  "common  sense"  the  two  functions  which 
are  divided  in  Ibn  Daud  between  the  common  sense  and  the  power  of 
representation. 

The  soul  is  not  eternal.  It  was  created  and  bestowed  upon  body. 
When  a  body  comes  into  being,  the  character  of  its  mixture  determines 
that  a  soul  of  a  certain  kind  shall  be  connected  with  it.  The  other 
alternatives  are  (i)  that  the  soul  existed  independently  before  the 
body,  is  then  connected  with  the  body  and  dies  with  the  death  of  the 
latter;  or  (2)  it  remains  after  the  death  of  the  body.  The  first  al- 
ternative is  impossible;  because  if  the  soul  is  connected  with  the  body 
in  order  to  die  with  it,  its  union  is  an  injury  to  the  soul,  for  in  its 
separate  existence  it  was  free  from  the  defects  of  matter.  The  second 
alternative  is  equally  impossible;  for  if  the  soul  was  able  to  exist  with- 
out the  body  before  the  appearance  of  the  latter  and  after  its  extinc; 


212  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

tion,  of  what  use  is  its  connection  with  the  body?  Far  from  being  of 
any  benefit,  its  union  with  the  body  is  harmful  to  the  soul,  for  it  is 
obliged  to  share  in  the  corporeal  accidents.  Divine  wisdom  never 
does  anything  without  a  purpose. 

The  truth  is  that  the  soul  does  not  exist  before  the  body.  It  arises 
at  the  same  time  as,  and  in  connection  with  body,  realizing  and  ac- 
tualizing the  latter.  Seed  and  sperm  have  in  them  the  possibility  of 
becoming  plant  and  animal  respectively.  But  they  need  an  agent 
to  bring  to  actuality  what  is  in  them  potentially.  This  agent — an 
angel  or  a  sphere,  or  an  angel  using  a  sphere  as  its  instrument — be- 
stows forms  upon  bodies,  which  take  the  places  of  the  previous  forms 
the  bodies  had.  The  sphere  or  star  produces  these  forms  (or  souls)  by 
means  of  its  motions,  which  motions  ultimately  go  back  to  the  first 
incorporeal  mover,  by  whose  wisdom  forms  are  connected  with  bodies 
in  order  to  perfect  the  former  by  means  of  the  latter. 

Now  the  human  soul  has  the  most  important  power  of  all  other 
animals,  that  of  grasping  intelligibles  or  universals.  It  is  also  able  to 
discriminate  between  good  and  evil  in  conduct,  moral,  poHtical  and 
economic.  The  human  soul,  therefore,  has,  it  seems,  two  powers, 
theoretical  and  practical.  With  the  former  it  understands  the  simple 
substances,  known  as  angels  in  the  Bible  and  as  "secondary  causes" 
and  "separate  intelligences"  among  the  philosophers.  By  this  means 
the  soul  rises  gradually  to  its  perfection.  With  the  practical  reason 
it  attends  to  noble  and  worthy  conduct.  All  the  other  powers  of  the 
soul  must  be  obedient  to  the  behests  of  the  practical  reason.  This 
in  turn  is  subservient  to  the  theoretical,  putting  its  good  quahties  at 
the  disposition  of  the  speculative  reason,  and  thus  helping  it  to  come 
into  closer  communion  with  the  simple  substances,  the  angels  and  God. 
This  is  the  highest  power  there  is  in  the  world  of  nature. 

We  must  now  show  that  the  rational  power  in  man  is  neither  itseK 
body  nor  is  it  a  power  residing  in  a  corporeal  subject.  That  it  is  not  it- 
self body  is  quite  evident,  for  we  have  proved  that  the  lower  souls  too, 
those  of  animals  and  plants,  are  not  corporeal.  But  we  must  show 
concerning  the  rational  power  that  it  is  independent  of  body  in  its 
activity.  This  we  can  prove  in  various  ways.  One  is  by  considering 
the  object  and  content  of  the  reason.  Man  has  general  ideas  or  uni- 
versal propositions.     These  are  not  divisible.     An  idea  cannot  be 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  213 

divided  into  two  halves  or  into  parts.  Reason  in  action  consists  of 
ideas.  Now  if  reason  is  a  power  residing  in  a  corporeal  subject,  it 
would  be  divisible  like  the  latter.  Take  heat  as  an  example.  Heat  is 
a  corporeal  power,  i.  e.,  a  power  residing  in  a  body.  It  extends  through 
the  dimensions  of  the  body,  and  as  the  latter  is  divided  so  is  the 
former.  But  this  is  evidently  not  true  of  general  ideas,  such  as  that 
a  thing  cannot  both  be  and  not  be,  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its 
part,  and  so  on.    Hence  the  rational  power  is  independent  of  body. 

Ibn  Daud  gives  several  other  proofs,  taken  from  Aristotle  and 
Avicenna,  to  show  that  reason  is  independent,  but  we  cannot  reproduce 
them  all  here.  We  shall,  however,  name  one  more  which  is  found  in 
the  "De  Anima"  of  Aristotle  and  is  based  on  experience.  If  the  rea- 
son performed  its  thinking  by  means  of  a  corporeal  organ  like  the 
external  senses,  the  power  of  knowing  would  be  weakened  when 
confronted  with  a  difficult  subject,  and  would  thereby  be  incapaci- 
tated from  exercising  its  powers  as  before.  This  is  the  case  with  the 
eye,  which  is  dazzled  by  a  bright  light  and  cannot  see  at  all,  or  the 
ear,  which  cannot  hear  at  all  when  deafened  by  a  loud  noise.  But 
the  case  of  knowledge  is  clearly  different.  The  more  difficult  the  sub- 
ject the  more  is  the  power  of  the  reason  developed  in  exercising  itself 
therein.  And  in  old  age,  when  the  corporeal  organs  are  v/eakened, 
the  power  of  reason  is  strongest. 

Although  it  is  thus  true  that  the  rational  soul  is  independent  of  the 
body,  nevertheless  it  did  not  exist  before  the  body  any  more  than  the 
lower  souls.  For  if  it  did,  it  was  either  one  soul  for  all  men,  or  there 
were  as  many  souls  as  there  are  individual  men.  The  iirst  is  impossi- 
ble; for  the  same  soul  would  then  be  wise  and  ignorant,  good  and  bad, 
which  is  impossible.  Nor  could  the  separate  souls  be  different,  for 
being  all  human  souls  they  cannot  differ  in  essence,  which  is  their 
common  humanity.  But  neither  can  they  differ  in  accidental  quali- 
ties, for  simple  substances  have  no  accidents.  They  cannot  therefore 
be  either  one  or  many,  i.  e.,  they  cannot  be  at  all  before  body. 

Nor  must  we  suppose  because  the  reason  exercises  its  thought 
functions  without  the  use  of  a  corporeal  organ  that  it  appears  full 
fledged  in  actual  perfection  in  the  person  of  the  infant.  Experience 
teaches  otherwise.  The  perfections  of  the  human  soul  are  in  the  child 
potential.   Later  on  by  divine  assistance  he  acquires  the  first  principles 


214  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  knowledge  about  which  there  is  no  dispute,  such  as  that  two  things 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each  other,  that  two  contrary 
predicates  cannot  apply  to  the  same  subject  at  the  same  time  in  the 
same  relation,  and  so  on.  Some  of  these  are  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  mathematics,  others  of  other  sciences.  Then  he  progresses 
further  and  learns  to  make  premises  and  construct  syllogisms  and 
argue  from  the  known  to  the  iinknown.  We  have  thus  three  stages 
in  the  development  of  the  reason.  The  first  potential  stage  is  known 
as  the  hylic  or  potential  intellect.  The  second  is  known  as  the  actual 
intellect,  and  the  third  is  the  acquired  intellect.  If  not  for  the  body  the 
person  could  not  make  this  progress.  For  without  body  there  are  no 
senses,  and  without  senses  he  would  not  see  how  the  wine  in  the  barrel 
ferments  and  increases  in  volume,  which  suggests  that  quantity  is 
accident  and  body  is  substance.  Nor  would  he  learn  the  distinction 
between  quality  and  substance  if  he  did  not  observe  a  white  garment 
turning  black,  or  a  hot  body  becoming  cold.  There  is  need  therefore 
of  the  body  with  its  senses  to  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  the  universals. 
But  this  knowledge  once  acquired,  the  soul  needs  not  the  body  for 
its  subsequent  existence;  and  as  the  soul  is  not  a  corporeal  power, 
the  death  of  the  body  does  not  cause  the  extinction  of  the  soul. 

Some  think  that  because  the  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body  it  is  de- 
pendent upon  it  and  cannot  survive  it,  as  no  other  form  survives  its 
substance.  But  this  inference  is  not  vaUd.  For  if  the  human  soul 
is  included  in  the  statement  that  no  form  survives  its  matter,  we 
assume  what  we  want  to  prove,  and  there  is  no  need  of  the  argument. 
If  it  is  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  included,  because  it  is  the  question  at 
issue,  its  comparison  with  the  other  observed  cases  is  simply  a  matter 
of  opinion  and  not  decisive. 

The  reader  will  see  that  the  problem  of  the  rational  soul  gave  Ibn 
Daud  much  concern  and  trouble.  The  pre-existence  of  the  soul  as 
Plato  teaches  it  did  not  appeal  to  him  for  many  reasons,  not  the  least 
among  them  being  the  statement  in  Genesis  (2,  7),  "And  God  breathed 
into  his  nostrils  the  breath  of  life,"  which  seems  to  favor  the  idea  of  the 
soul  originating  with  the  body;  though,  to  be  sure,  a  harmless  verse  of 
this  kind  would  not  have  stood  in  his  way,  had  he  had  reason  to  favor 
the  doctrine  of  pre-existence.  Immortality  was  also  a  dogma  which 
he  dared  not  deny.    The  arguments  against  it  seemed  rather  strong. 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD 


215 


From  the  doctrine  of  the  soul's  origin  with  the  body  and  its  being 
fitted  to  the  material  composition  of  the  latter,  would  seem  to  follow 
the  soul's  extinction  with  the  death  of  the  body.  The  same  result 
was  apparently  demanded  by  the  observation  that  the  intellect  de- 
velops as  the  body  matures,  and  that  without  the  senses  and  their 
data  there  would  be  no  intellect  at  all.  The  fluctuation  of  intellectual 
strength  with  the  state  of  bodily  health  would  seem  to  tend  to  the 
same  end,  against  the  doctrine  of  immortality.  Moreover,  the  Aristo- 
telian definition  of  the  soul  as  the  entelechy  or  form  of  the  body,  if 
it  applies  to  the  rational  faculty  as  well  as  to  the  lower  powers,  implies 
necessarily  that  it  is  a  form  like  other  forms  and  disappears  with  the 
dissolution  of  its  substance.  To  avoid  all  these  pitfalls  Ibn  Daud 
insists  upon  the  incorporeal  character  of  the  reason's  activity,  i.  e., 
its  independence  of  any  corporeal  organ,  and  its  increasing  power 
in  old  age  despite  the  gradual  weakening  of  the  body.  He  admits 
that  its  development  is  dependent  on  the  data  of  sense  perception, 
but  insists  that  this  is  not  incompatible  with  its  freedom  from  the 
body  when  fully  developed  and  perfected.  As  for  its  being  a  form  of 
body,  not  all  forms  are  alike;  and  it  is  not  so  certain  that  the  rational 
power  is  a  form  of  body.  Neither  the  difficulties  nor  the  solution  are 
of  Ibn  Baud's  making.  They  are  as  old  as  Aristotle,  and  his  successors 
grappled  with  them  as  best  they  could. 

There  is  still  the  question  of  the  manner  of  the  soul's  survival. 
The  same  reasons  which  Ibn  Daud  brings  forward  against  the  possi- 
bility of  the  existence  of  many  souls  before  the  body,  apply  with 
equal  cogency  to  their  survival  after  death.  If  simple  substances 
having  a  common  essence  cannot  differ  either  in  essence  or  in  accident, 
the  human  souls  after  the  death  of  the  body  must  exist  as  one  soul, 
and  what  becomes  of  individual  immortality,  which  religion  promises? 
Ibn  Daud  has  not  a  word  to  say  about  this,  and  it  is  one  of  the  weak 
points  religiously  in  his  system  as  well  as  in  that  of  Maimonides, 
which  the  critics  and  opponents  of  the  latter  did  not  fail  to  observe. 

Before  leaving  the  problem  of  the  soul  Ibn  Daud  devotes  a  word 
to  showing  that  metempsychosis  is  impossible.  The  soul  of  man  is 
suited  to  the  character  of  his  elemental  mixture,  which  constitutes 
the  individuality  of  his  body.  Hence  every  individual's  body  has  its 
own  peculiar  soul.    A  living  person  cannot  therefore  have  in  him  a 


2i6        ^  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

soul  which  formerly  resided  in  a  different  body  unless  the  two  bodies 
are  identical  in  all  respects.  But  in  that  case  it  is  not  transmigration 
but  the  re-appearance  of  the  same  person  after  he  has  ceased  to  be. 
But  this  has  never  yet  happened. 

Finally  Ibn  Daud  finds  it  necessary  to  defend  the  Bible  against 
those  who  criticize  the  Jews  on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  mention 
of  the  future  world  and  the  existence  of  the  soul  after  death  in  the 
Bibhcal  writings.  All  the  rewards  and  punishments  spoken  of  in  the 
Bible,  they  say,  refer  to  this  world.  His  answer  offers  nothing  new. 
Judah  Halevi  had  already  tried  to  account  for  this  phenomenon, 
besides  insisting  that  altogether  devoid  of  allusion  to  the  future  world 
the  Bible  is  not.  Ibn  Daud  follows  in  Halevi's  footsteps  {cf.  above, 
p.  170). 2^^ 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud  closes  the  first,  the  purely  scientific  part  of 
his  treatise,  by  a  discussion  of  the  heavenly  spheres  and  their  motions. 
In  accordance  with  the  view  of  Aristotle,  which  was  shared  by  the 
majority  of  writers  throughout  the  middle  ages,  he  regards  the  spheres 
with  their  stars  as  living  beings,  and  their  motions  as  voluntary,  the 
result  of  will  and  purpose,  and  not  simply  "  natural,"  i.  e.,  due  to  an 
unconscious  force  within  them  called  nature.  One  of  his  arguments 
to  prove  this  is  derived  from  the  superiority  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
to  our  own.  Their  size,  their  brightness  and  their  continued  duration 
are  all  evidence  of  corporeal  superiority.  And  it  stands  to  reason  that 
as  the  human  body,  which  is  the  highest  in  the  sublunar  world,  has  a 
soul  that  is  nobler  than  that  of  plant  or  animal,  so  the  heavenly  bodies 
must  be  endowed  with  souls  as  much  superior  to  the  human  intellect 
as  their  bodies  are  to  the  human  body.  The  Bible  alludes  to  this 
truth  in  the  nineteenth  Psalm,  "The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of 
God.  .  .  .  There  is  no  speech  nor  language.  ..."  The  last  expression 
signifies  that  they  praise  God  with  the  intellect.  There  are  other 
passages  in  the  Bible  besides,  and  particularly  the  first  chapter  of 
Ezekiel,  which  m.ake  it  clear  that  the  heavenly  bodies  are  living  and 
intelligent  beings;  not,  to  be  sure,  in  the  sense  of  taking  nourishment 
and  growing  and  reproducing  their  kind  and  making  use  of  five  senses, 
but  in  the  sense  of  performing  voluntary  motions  and  being  endowed 
with  intellect.  ^^^ 

We  have  now  concluded  our  preliminary  discussion  of  the  scientific 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  217 

principles  lying  at  the  basis  of  Judaism.  And  our  next  task  is  to  study 
the  fundamental  doctrines  of  Jewish  theology  which  form  the  highest 
object  of  knowledge,  dealing  as  they  do  with  God  and  his  attributes 
and  his  revelation.  The  first  thing  to  prove  then  is  the  existence  of 
God,  since  we  cannot  define  him.  For  definition  means  the  designa- 
tion of  the  genus  or  class  to  which  the  thing  defined  belongs,  whereas 
God  cannot  be  put  in  a  class.  As  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  revealed 
by  its  definition,  we  cannot  know  God's  essence  and  are  limited  to  a 
knowledge  of  his  existence. 

The  principles  for  this  proof  we  have  already  given.  They  are  that 
a  thing  cannot  move  itself,  and  that  an  actual  infinite  series  is  impossi- 
ble. The  argument  then  proceeds  as  follows:  Nothing  can  move  itself, 
hence  everything  that  moves  is  moved  by  something  other  than  itself. 
If  this  is  also  moving,  it  must  be  moved  by  a  third,  and  so  on  ad  in- 
finitum. But  an  actual  infinite  series  of  things  moving  and  being  moved 
is  impossible,  and  unless  we  ultimately  arrive  at  a  first  link  in  this 
chain,  all  motion  is  impossible.  Hence  there  must  be  a  first  to  account 
for  the  motion  we  observe  in  the  world.  This  first  must  not  itself 
be  subject  to  motion,  for  it  would  then  have  to  have  another  before 
it  to  make  it  move,  and  it  would  not  be  the  first  we  supposed  it  to  be. 
We  have  thus  proved,  therefore,  the  existence  of  a  primum  movens 
immobile,  a  first  unmoved  mover. 

We  must  now  show  that  this  unmoved  mover  is  incorporeal. 
This  we  can  prove  by  means  of  another  principle  of  physics,  made 
clear  in  the  first  part.  We  showed  there  that  a  finite  body  cannot 
have  an  infinite  power.  But  God  is  infinite.  For,  being  immovable, 
his  power  is  not  affected  by  time.    Hence  God  cannot  be  body. 

This  proof,  as  we  said  before,  is  new  in  Jewish  philosophy.  In 
Bahya  we  found  a  proof  which  bears  a  close  resemblance  to  this  one  {cf. 
above,  p.  87);  but  the  difference  is  that  Bahya  argues  from  being,  Ibn 
Daud  from  motion.  Bahya  says  if  a  thing  is,  some  cause  must  have 
made  it  to  be,  for  a  thing  cannot  make  itself.  As  we  cannot  proceed 
cd  infinitum,  there  must  be  a  first  which  is  the  cause  of  the  existence 
of  everything  else.  The  objection  here,  of  course,  is  that  if  a  thing 
cannot  make  itself,  how  did  the  first  come  to  be. 

The  Aristotelian  proof  of  Ibn  Daud  knows  nothing  about  the  origin 
of  being.     As  far  as  Aristotle's  own  view  is  concerned  there  is  no 


2i8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

temporal  beginning  either  of  being  or  of  motion.  Both  are  eternal, 
and  so  is  matter,  the  basis  of  all  genesis  and  change.  God  is  the  eternal 
cause  of  the  eternal  motion  of  the  world,  and  hence  of  the  eternal 
genesis  and  dissolution,  which  constitutes  the  life  of  the  sublunar 
world.  How  to  reconcile  the  idea  of  eternal  time  and  eternal  motion 
with  the  doctrine  that  an  actual  infinite  is  impossible  we  shall  see 
when  we  treat  Maimondes  (p.  251).  Ibn  Daud  does  not  adopt  eternity 
of  motion  even  hypothetically,  as  Maimonides  does.  But  this  merely 
removes  the  difficulty  one  step.  For  the  infinity  which  is  regarded 
impossible  in  phenomena  is  placed  in  God.  But  another  more  serious 
objection  is  the  adoption  of  an  AristoteHan  argument  where  it  does 
not  suit.  For  the  argument  from  motion  does  not  give  us  a  creator 
but  a  first  mover.  For  Aristotle  there  is  no  creator,  and  his  proof  is 
adequate.  But  for  Ibn  Daud  it  is  decidedly  inadequate.  We  are  so 
far  minus  a  proof  that  God  is  a  creator  ex  nihilo.  Ibn  Daud  simply 
asserts  that  God  created  matter,  but  this  argument  does  not  prove  it. 
As  to  the  incorporeality  of  God  Aristotle  can  prove  it  adequately 
from  the  eternity  of  motion.  If  a  finite  body  (and  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  an  infinite  body)  cannot  have  an  infinite  power,  God,  whose 
causing  eternal  motion  argues  infinite  power,  is  not  a  body.  Ibn 
Daud's  attempt  to  prove  God's  infinity  without  the  theory  of  infinite 
motion  on  the  ground  that  time  cannot  affect  what  is  immovable, 
is  decidedly  less  satisfactory.  On  the  whole  then  this  adoption  of 
Aristotle's  argument  from  motion  is  not  helpful,  as  it  leads  to  eternity 
of  matter,  and  God  as  the  mover  rather  than  the  Creator.  Gersonides 
was  frank  enough  and  bold  enough  to  recognize  this  consequence 
and  to  adopt  it.  We  shall  see  Maimonides's  attitude  when  we  come 
to  treat  of  his  philosophy. 

Ibn  Daud  may  have  been  aware  of  the  inadequacy  of  his  argument 
from  motion,  and  therefore  he  adds  another,  based  upon  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  "possible  existent"  and  the  "necessary  existent" 
— a  distinction  and  an  argument  due  to  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna.  A 
possible  existent  is  a  thing  whose  existence  depends  upon  another, 
and  was  preceded  by  non-existence.  It  may  exist  or  not,  depending 
upon  its  cause;  hence  the  name  possible  existent.  A  necessary  existent 
is  one  whose  existence  is  in  itself  and  not  derived  from  elsewhere. 
It  is  a  necessary  existent  because  its  own  essence  cannot  be  thought 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  219 

without  involving  existence.  Now  the  question  is,  Is  there  such  a 
thing  as  a  necessary  existent,  or  are  all  existents  merely  possible? 
If  all  existents  are  possible,  we  have  an  infinite  series,  every  link  of 
which  is  dependent  for  its  existence  upon  the  link  preceding  it;  and 
so  long  as  there  is  no  first  there  is  nothing  to  explain  the  existence  of 
any  link  in  the  chain.  We  must  therefore  assume  a  first,  which  is 
itself  not  again  dependent  upon  a  cause  prior  to  it.  This  is  by  defini- 
tion a  necessary  existent,  which  is  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  every- 
thing else.    This  proof  is  compatible  with  God  as  a  Creator. 

Having  shown  the  existence  and  incorporeality  of  God  we  must 
now  prove  his  unity.  We  shall  base  this  proof  upon  the  idea  of  the 
necessary  existent.  Such  an  existent  cannot  have  in  it  any  multi- 
plicity; for  if  it  has,  its  own  essence  would  not  be  able  to  keep  the 
elements  together,  and  there  would  be  need  of  an  external  agent  to 
do  this.  But  in  this  case  the  object  would  be  dependent  upon  some- 
thing else,  which  is  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  a  necessary  existent. 

Nor  is  it  possible  there  should  be  two  necessary  existents;  for  the 
necessary  existent,  we  have  just  shown,  must  be  of  the  utmost  sim- 
plicity, and  hence  cannot  have  any  attribute  added  to  its  essence. 
Now  if  there  is  a  second,  there  must  be  something  by  which  the  first 
differs  from  the  second,  or  they  are  identical.  Either  the  first  or  the 
second  therefore  would  not  be  completely  simple,  and  hence  not  a 
necessary  existent. 

We  have  thus  shown  that  God  is  one  both  in  the  sense  of  simple 
and  in  the  sense  of  unique.  To  have  a  clear  insight  into  the  nature 
of  his  unity,  we  must  now  show  that  nothing  else  outside  of  God  is 
really  one,  though  we  apply  the  term  one  to  many  things.  No  one 
will  claim  that  a  collective  is  one;  but  neither  is  an  individual  really 
one,  for  an  individual  man,  for  example,  consists  of  many  organs. 
You  might  think  that  a  homogeneous  and  continuous  elementary 
mass  like  air  or  water  is  one.  But  this  is  not  true  either,  for  everything 
that  is  corporeal  is  composed  of  matter  and  form.  If  then  we  set 
aside  corporeal  objects  and  aim  to  find  real  unity  in  mathematical 
entities  like  line  and  surface,  which  are  not  corporeal,  we  are  met  with 
the  difl&culty  that  line  and  surface  are  divisible,  and  hence  potentially 
muitiple.  But  neither  are  the  simple  intellectual  substances,  like  the 
angels,  true  ones;  for  they  are  composed  of  their  own  possible  existence 


220  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

and  the  necessary  existence  they  acquire  from  another.  The  only 
being  therefore  that  may  be  a  true  one  is  that  which  is  not  corporeal 
and  not  dependent  upon  another  for  its  existence. 

Considering  the  question  of  unity  from  a  different  aspect,  in  its 
relation,  namely,  to  the  thing  designated  as  one,  we  find  that  unity 
never  forms  the  essence  of  anything  called  by  that  name;  but  is  in 
every  case  an  accident.  Thus  if  it  were  the  essence  of  man  as  man 
that  he  is  one,  there  could  not  on  the  one  hand  be  many  men,  and  on 
the  other  there  could  not  also  at  the  same  time  be  one  horse,  one  tree, 
one  stone.  In  God  his  unity  cannot  be  an  accident,  since  as  simple 
he  has  no  accidents.  Hence  his  unity  is  his  essence.  And  if  we  ex- 
amine the  matter  carefully  we  find  that  it  is  a  negative  concept.  It 
involves  two  things.  First,  that  every  other  unity  involves  plurality 
in  some  form  or  another.  And  second  that  being  unhke  anything 
else,  he  cannot  bear  having  other  things  associated  with  him  to  make 
the  result  many,  as  we  can  in  the  case  of  man.  A,  for  example,  is  one; 
and  with  B,  C,  and  D  he  becomes  many.  This  is  not  apphcable  to 
God.23« 

The  divine  attributes  form  the  next  topic  we  must  consider.  Here 
Ibn  Daud  offers  little  or  nothing  that  is  essentially  new.  He  admits 
neither  essential  nor  accidental  attributes,  for  either  would  bring 
pluraHty  and  composition  in  the  nature  of  God.  The  only  attributes 
he  admits  are  negative  and  relative.  When  we  speak  of  God  as  cause 
we  do  not  place  any  special  entity  in  his  essence,  but  merely  indicate 
the  dependence  of  things  upon  him.  The  truest  attributes  are  the 
negative,  such  as  that  he  is  not  body,  that  his  existence  is  not  depend- 
ent upon  another,  and  so  on;  the  only  difficulty  being  that  negative 
attributes,  though  removing  many  doubts,  do  not  give  us  any  positive 
information.  All  the  anthropomorphic  attributes  in  the  Bible  endow- 
ing God  with  human  functions  like  sleeping  and  waking,  or  ascribing 
to  him  human  limbs,  eyes,  ears,  hands,  feet,  etc.,  must  be  understood 
metaphorically.  For  the  Bible  itself  warns  us  against  corporealizing 
God,  "Take  ye  therefore  good  heed  unto  yourselves;  for  ye  saw  no 
manner  of  form  on  the  day  that  the  Lord  spake  unto  you  in  Horeb" 
(Deut.  4,  15),  When  the  Bible  speaks  of  God's  anger  and  favor, 
the  meaning  is  that  good  deeds  bring  man  near  to  God  and  cause 
happiness  which  is  known  as  paradise  ("Gan  Eden  "),  and  bad  deeds 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  221 

remove  far  away  from  God  and  lead  to  misfortune,  called  Gehenna. 
It  is  like  the  apparent  motion  of  the  trees  and  the  mountains  to  the 
traveller,  when  in  reality  it  is  he  that  is  moving.  So  here  God  is  said 
to  approach  and  depart,  to  be  angry  with  and  favor,  when  in  reality 
it  is  man  who  by  his  deeds  comes  near  to  God  or  departs  far  from  him. 
When  we  assign  many  attributes  to  God  we  do  not  mean  that  there  is 
any  multiplicity  in  his  nature.  This  cannot  be.  It  is  like  the  case  of 
a  man  whose  eyes  are  not  properly  co-ordinated.  He  sees  double 
when  there  is  only  one.  So  we  too  suffer  from  intellectual  squinting, 
when  we  seem  to  see  many  attributes  in  the  one  God. 

The  most  common  and  most  important  attributes  are  the  following 
eight:  One,  existent,  true,  eternal,  living,  knowing,  wilHng,  able.  It 
can  be  easily  shown  (and  Ibn  Daud  does  proceed  to  show,  though 
we  shall  not  follow  him  in  his  details)  that  all  these  are  at  bottom 
negative.  Unity  means  that  there  is  nothing  like  him  and  that  he  is 
indivisible.  Eternal  means  he  is  not  subject  to  change  or  motion. 
True  means  he  will  never  cease  existing  and  that  his  existence  does 
not  come  from  another,  and  so  on  with  the  rest. 

He  closes  his  discussion  of  the  attributes  by  intimating  that  he  has 
more  to  say  on  this  topic,  but  had  better  be  content  with  what  has 
been  said  so  far,  for  a  more  thorough  discussion  of  these  matters  in  a 
book  might  do  harm  to  those  who  do  not  understand  and  interpret 
the  author's  words  incorrectly.  This  reminds  us  of  Maimonides's 
adjuration  of  the  reader  to  keep  what  he  finds  in  the  "Guide  of  the 
Perplexed"  to  himself  and  not  to  spread  it  abroad.  Philosophy  clearly 
was  a  delicate  subject  and  not  meant  for  intellectual  babes,  whose 
intellectual  digestion  might  be  seriously  disturbed. ^^^ 

We  have  now  concluded  our  theory  of  God  and  his  attributes;  and 
in  doing  so  we  made  use  of  principles  of  physics,  such  as  matter  and 
form,  potentiality  and  actuality,  motion  and  infinity.  The  next  step 
is  to  prove  the  existence  and  nature  of  intermediate  spiritual  beings 
between  God  and  the  corporeal  objects  of  the  superlunar  and  sub- 
lunar worlds,  called  angels  in  the  Bible,  and  secondary  causes  by  the 
philosophers.  For  this  purpose  we  shall  have  to  apply  the  principles 
we  have  proved  concerning  the  soul  and  the  motions  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  We  have  proved  above  that  the  human  soul  is  at  first  in  the 
child  intelligent  potentially  and  then  becomes  intelligent  actually. 


222  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

This  requires  an  agent,  in  whom  the  end  to  which  the  potential  is 
proceeding  is  always  actual.  As  the  rational  soul  is  neither  body  nor 
a  corporeal  power,  this  actual  agent  cannot  be  either  of  these,  hence 
it  is  neither  a  sphere  nor  the  soul  of  a  sphere,  but  it  must  be  a  simple 
substance  called  Active  Intellect.  The  prophets  call  it  "Holy  Spirit" 
C'Ruah  Ha-Kodesh").  We  thus  have  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  at 
least  one  such  simple  intellectual  substance,  or  angel,  the  relation  of 
which  to  the  human  soul  is  as  that  of  Kght  to  vision.  Without  light 
vision  is  potential,  light  makes  it  actual.  So  the  active  intellect  makes 
the  potential  soul  actual  and  gives  it  first  the  axioms,  which  are  uni- 
versally certain,  and  hence  could  not  have  originated  by  induction 
from  experience. 

Similarly  we  can  prove  the  existence  of  other  simple  substances 
from  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  spheres.  We  have  already  shown 
that  the  spheres  are  living  beings  and  endowed  with  souls.  But  souls, 
while  causing  motion  in  their  bodies  are  at  the  same  time  themselves 
in  a  sort  of  psychic  motion.  This  must  be  caused  by  unmoved  movers, 
or  intellects,  who  are  also  the  causes  of  the  souls.  To  make  this  diffi- 
cult matter  somewhat  clearer  and  more  plausible,  we  may  instance 
an  analogy  from  famihar  experience.  A  ship  is  made  by  the  ship- 
builder, who  is  its  corporeal  cause.  But  there  is  also  an  incorporeal 
cause,  likewise  a  ship,  viz.,  the  ship  in  the  mind  of  the  shipbuilder. 
The  analogy  is  imperfect,  because  the  incorporeal  ship  in  the  mind 
of  the  builder  cannot  produce  an  actual  corporeal  ship  without  the 
builder  employing  material,  such  as  wood,  iron,  etc.,  and  in  addition 
to  that  expending  time  and  physical  exertion  on  the  material.  But 
if  he  had  the  power  to  give  the  form  of  a  ship  to  the  material  as  soon 
as  the  latter  was  prepared  for  it  without  time  and  physical  manipula- 
lation,  we  should  have  an  instance  of  what  we  want  to  prove,  namely, 
the  existence  of  simple  immaterial  substances  causing  forms  to  ema- 
nate upon  corporeal  existences.  This  is  the  nature  of  the  active  in- 
tellect in  its  relation  to  the  soul  of  man,  and  it  is  in  the  same  way  that 
the  philosophers  conceive  of  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  spheres. 
God  is  the  first  unmoved  mover.  The  angels  or  simple  substances 
stand  next  to  him ;  and  they,  too,  are  always  actual  intelligences,  and 
move  the  heavenly  bodies  as  the  object  of  love  and  desire  moves  the 
object  loving  it  without  itself  being  moved.     The  heavenly  bodies 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  223, 

move  therefore  because  of  a  desire  to  perfect  themselves,  or  to  become 
like  unto  their  movers. 

So  far  Ibn  Daud  agrees  with  the  philosophers,  because  the  doctrines 
so  far  expounded  are  not  incompatible  with  the  Bible.  But  when  the 
philosophers  raise  the  question,  How  can  the  many  originate  from  the 
One,  the  manifold  universe  from  the  one  God,  and  attempt  to  answer 
it  by  their  theory  of  successive  emanations,  Ibn  Daud  calls  a  halt. 
The  human  mind  is  not  really  so  all-competent  as  to  be  able  to  answer 
all  questions  of  the  most  difficult  nature.  The  doctrine  of  successive 
emanations  is  that  elaborated  by  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna,  which  we 
have  already  seen  quoted  and  criticized  by  Judah  Halevi  {cf.  above, 
p.  178  f.).  It  is  slightly  more  complicated  in  Ibn  Daud,  who  speaks  of 
the  treble  nature  of  the  emanations  after  the  first  Intelligence — an 
intelligence,  a  soul  and  a  sphere — whereas  in  Halevi's  account  there 
were  only  two  elements,  the  soul  not  being  mentioned.  ^^° 

We  have  so  far  dealt  with  the  more  theoretical  part  of  theology 
and  religion,  so  much  of  it  as  may  be  and  is  accepted  by  nations  and 
religions  other  than  Jews.  It  remains  now  to  approach  the  more 
practical  and  the  more  specifically  Jewish  phases  of  religion;  though 
in  the  purely  ethical  discussions  and  those  relating  to  Providence 
we  have  once  more  a  subject  of  general  application,  and  not  exclusively 
Jewish. 

As  the  introduction  to  this  second  part  of  the  subject,  Abraham  Ibn 
Daud  devotes  a  few  words  to  the  theoretical  defence  of  tradition,  or 
rather  of  mediate  knowledge.  He  does  so  by  analyzing  the  various 
kinds  of  knowledge.  Knowledge,  he  says,  is  either  intelligible  or 
sensible.  Sensible  knowledge  is  either  directly  perceived  by  the  sub- 
ject or  received  by  him  from  another  who  perceived  it  directly,  and 
whom  he  believes  or  not  as  the  case  may  be.  That  is  why  some  things 
believed  by  some  people  are  not  believed  by  others.  The  ignorant 
may  think  that  this  weakness  is  inherent  in  matters  received  from 
others.  As  a  matter  of  fact  such  indirect  knowledge  is  at  the  basis 
of  civiHzation  and  makes  it  possible.  If  every  man  were  to  judge 
only  by  what  he  sees  with  his  own  eyes,  society  could  never  get  along; 
there  would  be  no  way  of  obtaining  justice  in  court,  for  the  judge 
would  not  put  credence  in  witnesses,  and  the  parties  would  have  to 
fight  out  their  differences,  which  would  lead  to  bloodshed  and  the 


224  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

disruption  of  social  life.  The  different  attitude  of  different  persons 
to  a  given  matter  of  belief  is  due  not  necessarily  to  the  uncertainty 
of  the  thing  itself,  but  to  the  manner  in  which  the  object  of  the  belief 
came  down  to  us.  If  a  thing  rests  upon  the  testimony  of  one  man, 
its  warrant  is  not  very  strong.  But  if  a  whole  nation  witnessed  an 
event,  it  is  no  longer  doubtful,  unless  we  suppose  that  the  account 
itself  is  due  to  one  writer,  and  the  event  never  happened.  We  shall 
discuss  these  matters  in  the  sequel.  ^^^ 

Having  justified  in  a  general  way  the  knowledge  derived  from  the 
testimony  of  others  by  showing  that  society  could  not  exist  without 
depending  upon  such  knowledge;  though  admitting  at  the  same  time 
that  caution  should  be  exercised  and  criticism  in  determining  what 
traditional  testimony  is  valid  or  not,  we  now  take  up  one  of  these 
traditional  phenomena  which  plays  perhaps  the  most  important  role 
in  Jewish  theology,  namely,  the  phenomenon  of  prophecy.  Before 
discussing  the  traditional  aspect  of  this  institution  and  its  purpose 
in  the  history  of  rehgion  we  must  consider  it  from  its  natural  and  psy- 
chological aspect. 

The  explanation  of  Ibn  Daud — it  was  not  original  with  him,  as  we 
have  already  seen  the  non-religious  philosopher  in  Halevi's  Cusari 
giving  utterance  to  the  same  idea,  and  in  Jewish  philosophy  Israeli 
touches  on  it — the  explanation  of  Ibn  Daud  is  grounded  in  his  psychol- 
ogy, the  Aristotelian  psychology  of  Avicenna.  The  first  degree  of 
prophecy,  he  says,  is  found  in  true  dreams,  which  happen  to  many 
people.  Just  as  waking  is  a  state  of  the  body  in  which  it  uses  the 
external  as  well  as  the  internal  senses,  so  sleeping  is  a  state  of  the  body 
in  which  the  soul  suppresses  the  external  senses  by  putting  them  to 
sleep,  and  exercises  its  "natural"  powers  only,  such  as  the  beating  of 
the  heart  pulse,  respiration,  and  so  on.  The  internal  senses  are  also 
at  work  during  sleep,  or  at  least  some  of  them.  In  particular  the  power 
of  imagination  is  active  when  the  external  senses  are  at  rest.  It  then 
makes  various  combinations  and  separations  and  brings  them  to  the 
common  sense.  The  result  is  a  dream,  true  or  false.  When  the  senses 
are  weak  for  one  reason  or  another  this  power  becomes  active  and, 
when  not  controlled  by  the  reason,  produces  a  great  many  erroneous 
visions  and  ideas,  as  in  the  delusions  of  the  sick. 

The  Deity  and  the  angels  and  the  Active  Intellect  have  a  knowledge 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  225 

of  the  past,  present  and  future,  and  we  already  know  that  the  soul, 
i.  e.,  the  rational  soul,  receives  influence  from  the  Active  Intellect  as 
a  natural  thing  in  every  person.  Now  just  as  it  gets  from  it  science 
and  general  ideas,  so  it  may  receive  a  knowledge  of  hidden  things  if 
the  soul  is  adequately  prepared.  The  reason  it  cannot  receive  in- 
formation of  hidden  things  from  the  Active  Intellect  in  its  waking 
state,  is  because  the  soul  is  then  busy  in  acquiring  knowledge  through 
the  senses.  In  sleep,  too,  it  may  be  prevented  by  the  thick  vapors 
rising  from  the  food  consumed  during  the  day,  or  by  anxiety  due  to 
want  of  food  or  drink.  The  imagination  also  sometimes  hinders  this 
process  by  the  constant  presentation  of  its  foolish  combinations  to 
the  common  sense.  But  sometimes  this  power  comes  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  reason,  and  then  the  rational  soul  is  prepared  to  receive 
hidden  things  from  the  Active  Intellect.  In  those  cases  the  imagina- 
tion transforms  these  facts  into  images,  which  are  true  dreams.  If 
they  concern  an  individual  or  a  particular  event,  we  do  not  call  them 
prophecy,  or  at  least  the  share  of  prophecy  they  may  have  is  very 
small.  We  call  them  prophetic  dreams  when  they  concern  important 
matters  and  have  reference  to  a  whole  nation  or  nations,  and  come 
to  pass  in  the  distant  future.  An  example  of  such  a  dream  is  that 
recorded  in  Daniel  7,  i. 

Sometimes  the  information  comes  to  the  prophet  without  the  aid 
of  an  image,  when  the  reason  prevails  over  the  imagination,  like  the 
dream  of  Abraham  at  the  "covenant  of  the  pieces"  (Gen.  15,  i2ff.). 
Sometimes,  also,  the  activity  of  the  senses  does  not  prevent  the  pro- 
phet from  seeing  the  hidden  things  of  the  future,  and  he  receives  pro- 
phetic inspirations  while  awake.  The  prophet  sometimes  faints  as 
he  is  overcome  by  the  unusual  phenomenon,  at  other  times  he  succeeds 
in  enduring  it  without  swooning.  All  these  cases  can  be  illustrated 
from  the  Bible,  and  examples  will  readily  occur  to  the  reader  who  is 
famihar  with  the  various  instances  and  descriptions  of  prophetic 
visions  and  activities  in  Scripture. 

The  purpose  of  prophecy  is  to  guide  the  people  in  the  right  way. 
With  this  end  in  view  God  inspires  a  proper  man  as  a  prophet  and 
gives  him  superior  powers  to  perform  miracles.  Not  every  man  is 
capable  of  prophecy,  only  one  who  has  a  pure  soul.  For  the  most 
part  the  prophetic  gift  is  innate,  at  the  same  time  study  and  good 


226  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

associations  help  to  develop  this  power  in  him  who  has  it.  Witness 
the  "company  of  prophets,"  whose  example  inspired  Saul  (i  Sam. 
19,  20),  and  EUsha  as  the  disciple  of  Elijah. 

While  we  thus  see  Ibn  Daud,  unlike  Halevi,  adopting  the  philo- 
sophical explanation  of  prophecy,  which  tries  to  bring  it  within  the 
class  of  natural  psychological  phenomena  and  relates  it  to  dreams, 
he  could  not  help  recognizing  that  one  cannot  ignore  the  supernatural 
character  of  Bibhcal  prophecy  without  bemg  untrue  to  the  Bible. 
He  accordingly  adds  to  the  above  naturahstic  explanation  a  number 
of  conditions  which  practically  have  the  effect  of  taking  the  bottom 
out  of  the  psychological  theory.  If  Judah  Halevi  insists  that  only 
Israehtes  in  the  land  of  Palestine  and  at  the  tune  of  their  political 
independence  had  the  privilege  of  the  prophetic  gift,  we  realize  that 
such  a  behef  is  of  the  warp  and  woof  of  Halevi's  innermost  sentiment 
and  thinkmg,  which  is  radically  opposed  to  the  shallow  rationahsm 
and  superficial  cosmopoHtanism  of  the  "philosophers"  of  his  day. 
But  when  the  champion  of  Peripateticism,  Abraham  Ibn  Daud,  after 
explaining  that  prophecy  is  of  the  nature  of  true  dreams,  and  though 
in  most  cases  innate,  may  be  cultivated  by  a  pure  soul  through  study 
and  proper  associations — repeats  with  Judah  Halevi  that  the  time  and 
the  place  are  essential  conditions  and  that  Israelites  alone  are  privi- 
leged in  this  respect,  he  is  giving  up,  it  seems  to  us,  all  that  he  pre- 
viously attempted  to  explain.  This  is  only  one  of  the  many  indications 
which  point  to  the  essential  artificiality  of  all  the  mediaeval  attempts 
to  harmonize  a  given  system  of  philosophy  with  a  supernaturalistic 
standpoint,  such  as  is  that  of  the  Bible.  It  is  not  in  this  way  that  the 
Bible  is  to  be  saved  if  it  needs  saving. ^^^ 

The  next  practical  question  Ibn  Daud  felt  called  upon  to  discuss 
was  that  of  the  possibility  of  the  Law  being  repealed,  abrogated  or 
altered.  This  he  found  it  necessary  to  do  in  order  to  defend  the  Jewish 
standpoint  against  that  of  Christianity  in  particular.  How  he  will 
answer  this  question  is  of  course  a  foregone  conclusion.  We  are  only 
interested  in  his  manner  of  argument.  He  adopts  a  classification  of 
long  standing  of  the  Bibhcal  laws  into  rational  and  traditional.  The 
first,  he  says,  are  accepted  by  all  nations  and  can  never  be  changed. 
Even  a  band  of  thieves,  who  disregard  all  laws  of  right  and  wrong  as 
they  relate  to  outsiders,  must  observe  them  in  their  own  midst  or  they 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  227 

cannot  exist.  These  laws  bring  people  of  different  nationalities  and 
beliefs  together,  and  hence  there  can  be  no  change  in  these.  Nor 
can  there  be  any  alteration  in  that  part  of  the  Law  which  is  historical 
in  content.    An  event  of  the  past  cannot  be  repealed. 

It  only  remains  therefore  to  see  whether  abrogation  may  possibly 
be  compatible  with  the  nature  of  the  traditional  or  ceremonial  laws. 
Without  arguing  like  the  philosophers  that  change  of  a  divine  law  is 
incompatible  with  the  nature  of  God,  which  is  unchangeable,  our 
sages  nevertheless  have  a  method  of  explaining  such  phrases  as,  "And 
it  repented  the  Lord  that  he  had  made  man"  (Gen.  6,  6),  so  as  to 
reconcile  the  demands  of  reason  with  those  of  tradition.  Now  if 
there  were  laws  of  the  traditional  kind  stated  in  the  Bible  without 
any  indication  of  time  and  without  the  statement  that  they  are  eternal, 
and  afterwards  other  laws  came  to  change  them,  we  should  say  that 
the  Lord  has  a  certain  purpose  in  his  laws  which  we  do  not  know,  but 
which  is  revealed  in  the  new  law  taking  the  place  of  the  old.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact  the  Bible  states  explicitly  in  many  cases  that  the  laws 
are  not  to  be  changed,  "A  statute  for  ever  throughout  your  genera- 
tions" (Num.  10,  8,  and  passim).  Arguments  from  phrases  like, 
"Your  new  moons  and  your  appointed  feasts  my  soul  hateth,  etc." 
(Is.  I,  14),  have  no  validity,  for  there  is  no  indication  here  that  sacri- 
fices are  abolished.  The  meaning  of  Isaiah  is  that  sacrifices  in  con- 
junction with  wrong  living  are  undesirable. 

Our  opponents  also  argue  that  Biblical  expressions  to  the  effect 
that  the  laws  are  eternal  prove  nothing,  for  we  know  of  similar  in- 
stances in  which  promises  have  been  withdrawn  as  in  the  priesthood 
of  Eli's  family  and  the  royalty  of  the  house  of  David,  where  likewise 
eternity  is  mentioned.  We  answer  these  by  saying,  first,  that  in 
David's  case  the  promise  was  withdrawn  only  temporarily,  and  will 
return  again,  as  the  Prophets  tell  us.  Besides  the  promise  was  made 
only  conditionally,  as  was  that  made  to  Eli.  But  there  is  no  state- 
ment anywhere  that  the  Law  is  given  to  Israel  conditionally  and  that 
it  will  ever  be  taken  away  from  them. 

The  claim  of  those  who  say  that  the  laws  of  the  Old  Testament 
were  true,  but  that  they  were  repealed  and  the  New  Testament  took 
its  place,  we  meet  by  pointing  to  a  continuous  tradition  against  their 
view.     We  have  an  uninterrupted  tradition  during  two  thousand 


228  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

four  hundred  and  seventy- two  years  that  there  was  a  man  Moses  who 
gave  a  Law  accepted  by  his  people  and  held  without  any  break  for 
two  thousand  four  hundred  and  seventy-two  years.  We  do  not  have 
to  prove  he  was  a  genuine  prophet  since  they  do  not  deny  it. 

Some  of  them  say  that  in  the  captivity  in  Babylon  the  old  Law  was 
forgotten  and  Ezra  made  a  new  law,  the  one  we  have  now.  This  is 
absurd.  The  law  could  not  have  been  forgotten,  for  the  people  did 
not  all  go  into  captivity  at  one  time.  They  were  not  all  put  to  death; 
they  were  led  into  exile  in  a  quiet  fashion,  and  there  were  great  men 
among  them  like  Hananiah,  Mishael,  Azariah,  Daniel  and  others  who 
surely  could  not  have  forgotten  the  Law.  Besides  Ezra  could  never 
have  had  the  consent  of  all  the  people  scattered  everywhere  if  he  had 
made  a  law  of  his  own.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Law  as  we  have  it 
is  the  same  in  all  details  throughout  the  world.  ^^^ 

The  next  problem  we  must  consider  is  the  perennial  one — the 
problem  of  evil  and  of  freedom.  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  entire  book, 
as  Ibn  Daud  tells  us  in  his  introduction. 

The  further  a  thing  is  removed  from  matter  the  more  perfect  is 
its  knowledge.  For,  as  we  have  already  said,  it  is  matter  that  hinders 
knowledge.  All  defect  and  evil  is  the  result  of  the  potential.  Hence 
the  farther  a  thing  is  removed  from  potentiality  the  more  perfect  it 
is  and  the  freer  it  is  from  defect.  God's  essence  is  the  most  perfect 
thing  there  is;  and  as  he  knows  his  essence,  his  is  the  most  perfect 
knowledge.  God  knows,  too,  that  his  perfection  is  not  stationary 
in  him,  but  that  it  extends  and  conmiunicates  itself  to  all  other  things 
in  order.  And  the  further  a  thing  is  from  him  the  less  is  its  perfection 
and  the  greater  is  its  imperfection.  We  have  thus  a  graduated  series, 
at  one  end  the  most  perfect  being,  at  the  other  the  least  perfect,  viz., 
matter. 

Now  it  is  impossible  from  any  point  of  view,  either  according  to 
reason  or  Bible  or  tradition,  that  evil  or  defect  should  come  from  God. 
Not  by  reason,  for  two  contradictories  in  the  same  subject  are  impossi- 
ble. Now  if  good  and  evil  both  came  from  God,  he  would  have  to  be 
composite  just  like  man,  who  can  be  the  cause  of  good  and  evil,  the 
one  coming  from  his  rational  power,  the  other  from  the  spirited  or 
appetitive.  But  God  is  simple  and  if  evil  comes  from  him,  good  can- 
not do  so,  which  is  absurd.    Besides,  the  majority  of  defects  are  pri- 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  229 

vational  in  character  and  not  positive,  like  for  example  darkness, 
poverty,  ignorance,  and  so  on,  which  are  not  things,  but  the  negations 
of  light,  wealth,  wisdom,  respectively.  Being  negative,  not  positive, 
they  are  not  made  by  any  body. 

One  may  argue  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  man  that  he  should  have 
understanding  and  perfection;  and  if  God  deprives  him  of  it,  he  does 
evil.  The  answer  is  that  the  evil  in  the  world  is  very  small  in  com- 
parison with  the  good.  For  evil  and  defect  are  found  only  in  things 
composed  of  the  elements,  which  have  a  common  matter,  receiving 
forms  in  accordance  with  the  mixture  of  the  elementary  qualities 
in  the  matter.  Here  an  external  cause  sometimes  prevents  the  form 
from  coming  to  the  matter  in  its  perfection.  The  seed,  for  example, 
depends  upon  the  character  of  the  soil  which  it  finds  for  its  growth. 
Now  it  does  not  follow  that  God  was  bound  to  give  things  the  highest 
perfection  possible.  For  in  that  case  all  minerals  would  be  plants, 
all  plants  animals,  all  animals  men,  all  men  angels;  and  there  would 
be  no  world,  but  only  God  and  a  few  of  the  highest  angels.  In  order 
that  there  shall  be  a  world,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  graduated  series 
as  we  actually  have  it.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  very  defects  in 
the  material  composites  are  a  good  when  we  have  in  view  not  the  par- 
ticular thing  but  the  whole.  Thus  if  all  men  were  of  a  highly  intel- 
lectual type,  there  would  be  no  agriculture  or  manual  labor. 

Now  there  are  men  whose  temperament  is  such  that  they  cannot 
distinguish  between  right  and  wrong,  and  they  follow  their  inchna- 
tions.  To  counteract  these  bad  qualities  God  gave  his  commandments 
and  warnings.  This  shows  that  it  is  not  impossible  to  oppose  these 
evil  tendencies,  for  in  that  case  the  commandments  would  be  useless. 
The  acts  of  man  come  neither  under  the  category  of  the  necessary, 
nor  under  that  of  the  impossible,  but  under  the  category  of  the 
possible. 

There  are  two  senses  in  which  we  may  imderstand  the  term  possible. 
A  thing  may  be  possible  subjectively,  i.  e.,  in  relation  to  our  ignorance, 
though  objectively  it  may  be  necessary  and  determined.  Thus  we  in 
Spain  do  not  know  whether  the  king  of  Babylon  died  to-day  or  not; 
and  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  it  is  possible  that  he  is  dead  or  that 
he  is  ahve.  In  reality  it  is  not  a  question  of  possibility  but  of  neces- 
sity.   God  knows  which  is  true.    The  same  thing  applies  to  the  oc- 


230  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

currence  of  an  eclipse  in  the  future  for  the  man  who  is  ignorant  of  as- 
tronomy.   Such  possibihty  due  to  ignorance  does  not  exist  in  God. 

But  there  is  another  sense  of  the  word  possible;  the  sense  in  which 
an  event  is  objectively  undetermined.  An  event  is  possible  if  there 
is  nothing  in  the  previous  chain  of  causation  to  determine  the  thing's 
happening  in  one  way  rather  than  another.  The  result  is  then  a 
matter  of  pure  chance  or  of  absolute  free  will.  Now  God  may  make 
a  thing  possible  in  this  objective  sense,  and  then  it  is  possible  for  him 
also.  If  you  ask,  but  is  God  then  ignorant  of  the  result?  We  say,  this 
is  not  ignorance.  For  to  assume  that  it  is,  and  that  everything  should 
be  determined  like  echpses,  and  that  God  cannot  create  things  pos- 
sible, means  to  destroy  the  order  of  the  world,  of  this  world  as  well  as 
the  next.  For  why  shall  man  engage  in  various  occupations  or  pursue 
definite  lines  of  conduct  since  his  destiny  is  already  fixed? 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  there  are  several  orders  of  causes. 
Some  are  directly  determined  by  God,  and  there  is  no  way  of  evading 
them;  others  are  entrusted  to  nature,  and  man  is  able  to  enjoy  its 
benefits  and  avoid  its  injuries  by  proper  management.  A  third  class 
contains  the  things  of  chance,  and  one  may  guard  against  these  also. 
So  we  are  bidden  in  the  Bible  to  make  a  parapet  on  the  roofs  of  our 
houses  to  guard  against  the  possibility  of  falling  down.  Finally  there 
is  the  fourth  class,  those  things  which  depend  upon  the  free  choice  of 
the  individual.  Right  and  wrong  conduct  are  matters  of  choice, 
else  there  would  be  no  use  in  prophets,  and  no  reward  and  punishment. 
When  a  person  makes  an  effort  to  be  good,  his  desire  increases,  and 
he  obtains  assistance  from  the  angels. 

Since  freedom  is  supported  by  reason.  Scripture  and  tradition,  the 
passages  in  the  Bible  which  are  in  favor  of  it  should  be  taken  hteraUy, 
and  those  against  it  should  be  interpreted  figuratively.  When  the 
Bible  says  that  God  hardened  Pharaoh's  heart,  it  means  simply  that 
Pharaoh  was  allowed  to  proceed  as  he  began.  AH  the  ancient  sages 
of  our  nation  were  in  favor  of  freedom. ^^* 

If  we  compare  the  above  discussion  of  the  problem  of  freedom  with 
that  of  Judah  Halevi  (above,  p.  171),  we  see  that  Ibn  Daud  is  more 
consistent,  whatever  we  may  think  of  his  success  in  solving  the  in- 
soluble problem.  He  frankly  insists  on  the  absolute  freedom  of  the 
will  and  on  the  reality  of  the  objectively  contingent,  not  shrinking 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  231 

before  the  unavoidable  conclusion  that  the  events  which  are  the 
results  of  such  freedom  or  chance  are  no  more  known  beforehand  to 
God  than  they  are  to  man.  And  he  tries  to  avoid  the  criticism  of 
attributing  imperfection  to  God  by  insisting  that  not  to  be  able  to 
foretell  the  contingent  is  not  ignorance,  and  hence  not  an  imperfec- 
tion. The  reader  may  think  what  he  pleases  of  this  defence,  but  there 
seems  to  be  a  more  serious  difficulty  in  what  this  idea  implies  than 
in  what  it  explicitly  says. 

If  the  contingent  exists  for  God  also,  it  follows  that  he  is  not  the 
complete  master  of  nature  and  the  world.  To  say  as  Ibn  Daud  does 
that  God  made  the  contingent,  i.  e.,  made  it  to  be  contingent,  sounds 
like  a  contradiction,  and  reminds  one  of  the  question  whether  God  can 
make  a  stone  so  big  that  he  cannot  lift  it  himseK. 

His  proofs  in  favor  of  freedom  and  the  contingent  are  partially 
identical  with  those  of  Judah  Halevi,  but  in  so  far  as  he  does  not 
explicitly  admit  that  the  will  may  itself  be  influenced  by  prior  causes 
he  evades,  to  be  sure,  the  strongest  argument  against  him,  but  he 
does  so  at  the  expense  of  completeness  in  his  analysis.  Halevi  is  less 
consistent  and  more  thorough,  Ibn  Daud  is  more  consistent,  because 
he  fails  to  take  account  of  real  difficulties. 

In  the  final  outcome  of  their  respective  analyses,  Halevi  maintains 
God's  foreknowledge  at  the  expense  of  absolute  freedom,  or  rather 
he  does  not  see  that  his  admissions  are  fatal  to  the  cause  he  endeavors 
to  defend.  Ibn  Daud  maintains  absolute  freedom  and  frankly  sacri- 
fices foreknowledge;  though  his  defence  of  freedom  is  secured  by  blind- 
ing himself  to  the  argument  most  dangerous  to  that  doctrine. 

Abraham  Ibn  Daud  concludes  his  '  Emunah  Ramah"  by  a  dis- 
cussion of  ethics  and  the  application  of  the  principles  thus  discovered 
to  the  laws  of  the  Bible.  He  entitles  this  final  division  of  his  treatise, 
"Medicine  of  the  Soul,"  on  the  ground  that  virtue  is  the  health  of 
the  soul  as  vice  is  its  disease.  In  his  fundamental  ethical  distinctions, 
definitions  and  classifications  he  combines  Plato's  psychology  and  the 
virtues  based  thereon  with  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  mean, 
which  he  also  applies  in  detail.  He  omits  wisdom  as  one  of  the  Pla- 
tonic virtues  and,  unlike  Plato  for  whom  justice  consists  in  a  harmony 
of  the  other  three  virtues  and  has  no  psychological  seat  peculiar  to  it, 
Ibn  Daud  makes  justice  the  virtue  of  the  rational  soul. 


232  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

The  end  of  practical  philosophy  is,  he  says,  happiness.  This  is 
attained,  first,  by  good  morals;  second,  by  proper  family  hfe;  and 
third,  by  means  of  correct  social  and  poHtical  conduct. 

The  human  soul  consists  of  three  principal  faculties,  vegetative, 
animal,  rational.  Corresponding  to  these  the  principal  virtues  and 
vices  are  also  three.  The  vegetative  power,  whose  functions  are  nour- 
ishment, growth  and  reproduction,  is  related  to  appetite,  and  is  called 
the  appetitive  soul.  The  animal  power  as  being  the  cause  of  sensation, 
voluntary  motion,  cruelty,  revenge,  mercy  and  kindness,  is  called 
the  spirited  soul,  because  these  quaUties  are  dependent  upon  the  energy 
or  weakness  of  the  spirit.  The  rational  power  has  two  aspects.  One 
is  directed  upwards  and  is  the  means  of  our  learning  the  sciences  and 
the  arts.  The  other  aspect  is  directed  downwards,  and  endeavors  to 
control  (successfully  or  not  as  the  case  may  be),  the  two  lower  powers 
of  the  soul,  guarding  them  against  excess  and  defect.  This  function 
we  call  conduct,  and  virtue  is  the  mean  between  the  two  extremes  of 
too  much  and  too  httle.  The  mean  of  the  appetitive  power  is  tem- 
perance; of  the  spirited  power,  bravery  and  gentleness;  of  the  rational 
soul,  justice.  "^^ 

Justice  consists  in  giving  everything  its  due  without  excess  or  defect. 
Justice  is  therefore  the  highest  of  all  quahties,  and  is  of  value  not 
merely  in  a  person's  relations  to  his  family  and  country,  but  also  in 
the  relations  of  his  powers  one  to  another.  The  rational  power  must 
see  to  it  that  the  two  lower  faculties  of  the  soul  get  what  is  their  due, 
no  more  and  no  less.  This  quality  has  an  important  application  also 
in  the  relations  of  a  man  to  his  maker.  It  is  just  that  a  person  should 
requite  his  benefactor  as  much  as  he  received  from  him,  if  possible. 
If  he  cannot  do  this,  he  should  at  least  thank  him.  Hence  the  reason 
for  divine  worship,  the  first  of  commandments.  This  quahty,  the 
greatest  of  men  possessed  in  the  highest  degree.  Moses  "said  to  him 
that  did  the  wrong,  wherefore  smitest  thou  thy  fellow?  "  (Ex.  2, 13). 
And  when  the  shepherds  came  and  drove  away  the  daughters  of  the 
priest  of  Midian,  ''Moses  stood  up  and  helped  them,  and  watered 
their  flock"  {ih.  17).  This  is  the  reason  why  God  sent  him  to  deliver 
Israel. 

God  showed  the  care  he  had  of  his  nation  by  revealing  himself  to 
them,  and  thus  showing  them  the  error  of  those  who  think  that  God 


ABRAHAM  IBN  BAUD  233 

gave  over  the  rule  of  this  world  to  the  stars,  and  that  he  and  the  angels 
have  no  further  interest  in  it.  Hence  the  first  commandment  is  "I 
am  the  Lord  thy  God,"  which  is  followed  by  "You  shall  have  no  other 
gods,"  "Thou  shalt  not  take  the  name  of  the  Lord  thy  God  in  vain" 
(Ex.  20,  2ff.)-  "Remember  the  Sabbath  day"  is  for  the  purpose  of 
condemning  the  behef  in  the  eternity  of  the  world,  as  is  evident  from 
the  conclusion,  "For  in  six  days  the  Lord  made  heaven  and  earth, 
the  sea,  and  all  that  in  them  is  .  ,  .  "  {ib.  11).  "Honor  thy  father 
and  thy  mother"  {ib.  12)  is  intended  to  inculcate  the  duty  of  honoring 
the  cause  of  one's  being,  including  God.  Thus  the  first  five  command- 
ments all  aim  to  teach  the  revelation  and  Providence  of  God.  The 
rest  deal  with  social  and  poHtical  conduct,  especially  the  last  one, 
"Thou  shalt  not  covet,"  which  is  important  in  the  preservation  of 
society. 

The  commandment  to  love  God  involves  the  knowledge  of  God, 
for  one  cannot  love  what  one  does  not  know.  A  man  must  know  there- 
fore God's  attributes  and  actions.  He  must  be  convinced  likewise 
that  no  evil  comes  from  God,  or  he  cannot  love  him  as  he  should. 
He  may  fear  him  but  not  with  the  proper  fear.  For  there  are  two  kinds 
of  fear,  and  the  one  that  is  commanded  is  fear  of  majesty  and  awe, 
not  fear  of  punishment. 

Divine  service  means  not  merely  prayer  three  times  a  day,  but 
constant  thought  of  God.  To  develop  and  train  this  thought  of  God 
in  us  we  are  commanded  to  put  on  phylacteries  and  fringes,  and  to 
fasten  the  "mezuzah"  to  our  door  posts.  For  the  same  reason  we 
celebrate  the  festivals  of  Passover,  Tabernacles,  Hanukkah  and 
Purim,  as  a  remembrance  of  God's  benefits  to  our  people.  All  these 
observances  are  ultimately  based  upon  the  duty  of  thanking  our 
benefactor,  which  is  part  of  justice,  the  highest  of  the  virtues. 

Among  moral  virtues  we  are  also  commanded  to  practice  suppres- 
sion of  anger,  and  its  inculcation  is  emphasized  by  making  it  a  divine 
attribute,  "The  Lord,  the  Lord,  a  God  full  of  compassion  and  gra- 
cious .  .  ."  (Ex.  34,  6).  Other  virtues  of  the  same  kind  are,  not  to 
repay  evil  for  evil,  not  to  be  jealous,  to  practice  humility  like  Moses, 
and  so  on.  In  fact  all  the  virtues  laid  down  by  ethical  philosophers  are 
found  better  expressed  in  the  Bible. 

In  respect  to  family  virtues,  we  are  bidden  to  care  for  and  protect 


234  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  members  of  our  family,  wife,  children  and  slaves.  Of  social  virtues 
we  have  love  of  our  neighbor,  honesty  in  deahng,  just  weights  and 
measures,  prohibition  of  interest  and  of  taking  a  pledge  from  the  poor, 
returning  a  find  to  the  loser,  and  a  host  of  other  teachings. 

There  are,  however,  some  of  the  traditional  laws,  the  purpose  of 
which  is  not  known,  especially  the  details  of  sacrifices  and  the  like. 
In  explanation  of  these  we  must  say  that  the  law  consists  of  a  rule 
of  life  composed  of  several  parts.  First  is  belief;  second,  moral  quaU- 
ties;  third,  family  life;  fourth,  social  and  political  life;  fifth,  the  com- 
mandments above  referred  to,  which  we  shall  characterize  as  dic- 
tated by  divine  wisdom,  though  we  do  not  understand  them.  Not 
all  the  parts  of  the  Law  are  of  the  same  order  of  value.  The  funda- 
mental portion  and  the  most  important  is  that  dealing  with  belief. 
Next  in  importance  are  the  laws  governing  social  and  moral  conduct, 
without  which  society  is  impossible.  That  is  why  all  nations  agree 
about  these;  and  there  is  honesty  even  among  thieves.  The  last 
class  of  commandments,  whose  purpose  is  not  known,  are  the  least 
in  importance,  as  is  clear  also  from  statements  in  the  Bible,  such  as, 
"I  spake  not  unto  your  fathers,  nor  commanded  them  in  the  day  that 
I  brought  them  out  of  the  land  of  Egypt,  concerning  burnt  offerings 
or  sacrifices.  ..."  (Jer.  7,  22).  At  the  same  time  we  cannot  deny 
that  there  are  some  reasons  for  their  observance.  Thus  sacrifice  leads 
to  repentance  as  a  result  of  reflection,  even  if  the  person  does  not 
confess  his  sin,  as  he  is  bidden  to  do  in  certain  cases. 

In  fact  there  is  one  aspect  which  gives  this  class  of  commandments 
even  greater  importance  than  the  social  duties.  It  is  the  principle 
of  implicit  obedience  even  when  we  do  not  see  the  value  of  the  com- 
mandment. I  do  not  mean  that  a  man  should  not  study  science, 
particularly  what  concerns  the  knowledge  of  God.  This  is  not  to  be 
recommended.  But  when  a  man  is  convinced  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  genuine  prophecy,  showing  God's  providence,  as  we  see  in 
the  case  of  Moses  who  delivered  his  nation,  performed  wonders  for 
them  and  was  always  honored  and  believed — he  should  not  balk  at 
the  acceptance  of  some  laws  given  by  such  a  divine  man  simply  be- 
cause he  does  not  understand  them.  Abraham  is  a  good  example. 
For  when  God  promised  him  that  Isaac  would  become  a  great  nation, 
and  then  commanded  him  to  sacrifice  his  only  child,  he  did  not  ask 


ABRAHAM  IBN  DAUD  235 

any  questions  and  was  ready  to  do  God's  behest.  His  example  is  meant 
to  be  followed  by  all.  This  is  the  purpose  of  these  subtle  command- 
ments, which  are  made  with  wisdom.  Through  them  we  may  see  the 
difference  between  beUef  and  unbehef.^^® 

The  above  discussion  is  extremely  typical  of  the  rationalistic  atti- 
tude of  Ibn  Daud  and  his  school,  which  includes  such  men  as  Mai- 
monides,  Gersonides  and  others.  Reason,  theory,  science,  explana- 
tion— these  are  the  important  considerations  in  things  philosophical, 
as  well  as  things  religious.  Theory  is  more  important  than  practice, 
and  belief  stands  higher  than  mere  conduct.  No  wonder  that  Maimon- 
ides  was  not  satisfied  until  he  elaborated  a  creed  with  a  definite  num- 
ber of  dogmas.  Dogmas  and  faith  in  reason  go  together.  It  is  the 
mystic  who  is  impatient  of  prescribed  generalities,  for  he  is  constantly 
refreshed  by  the  living  and  ever  flowing  stream  of  individual  experi- 
ence. The  rationalist  has  a  fixed  unchangeable  Idea  or  reason  or 
method,  whose  reality  and  value  consists  in  its  unity,  permanence 
and  immutability.  In  favor  of  this  hypostatised  reason,  the  ration- 
alist Ibn  Daud  is  ready  to  sacrifice  so  fundamental  an  institution  as 
sacrifice  in  the  face  of  the  entire  book  of  Leviticus,  pretending  that  a 
single  verse  of  Jeremiah  entitles  him  to  do  so.  But  the  Jew  Ibn  Daud 
in  the  end  asserted  himself,  and  he  finds  it  necessary  to  admit  that 
in  a  sense  these  non-rational  laws  may  be  of  even  greater  importance 
than  the  rational;  not,  however,  as  a  simple  believer  might  say,  be- 
cause we  must  not  search  the  wisdom  of  God,  but  for  the  reason  that 
unreasoned  obedience  is  itseK  a  virtue. 

In  conclusion  we  remind  the  reader  that  Ibn  Daud  was  the  precursor 
of  Maimonides,  touching  upon,  and  for  the  most  part  answering  every 
question  treated  by  his  more  famous  successor.  Ibn  Daud  was  the 
first  to  adopt  Aristotelianism  for  the  purpose  of  welding  it  with  Ju- 
daism. He  showed  the  way  to  follow.  Maimonides  took  his  cue  from 
Ibn  Daud  and  succeeded  in  putting  the  latter  in  the  shade.  Historic 
justice  demands  that  Ibn  Daud  be  brought  forward  into  the  light 
and  given  the  credit  which  is  deservedly  his  due. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


MOSES   MAIMONIDES 


With  Maimonides  we  reach  the  high  water  mark  of  mediaeval  Jewish 
philosophy.  He  was  by  far  the  most  comprehensive  mind  of  mediaeval 
Jewry,  and  his  philosophy  was  the  coping  stone  of  a  complete  system 
of  Judaism.  In  his  training  and  education  he  embraced  all  Jewish 
literature,  Bibhcal  and  Rabbinic,  as  well  as  all  the  science  and  phi- 
losophy of  his  day.  And  his  literary  activity  was  fruitful  in  every  im- 
portant branch  of  study.  He  was  well  known  as  a  practicing  physician, 
having  been  in  the  employ  of  the  Caliph's  visier  at  Cairo  (Fostat), 
and  he  wrote  on  medical  theory  and  practice.  He  was  versed  in 
mathematics  and  astronomy,  and  his  knowledge  of  these  subjects 
served  him  in  good  stead  not  merely  as  an  introduction  to  theology 
and  metaphysics,  but  was  of  direct  service  in  his  studies  and  writings 
on  the  Jewish  calendar.  It  goes  without  saying  that  he  knew  logic, 
for  this  was  the  basis  of  all  learning  in  mediaeval  times;  but  in  this 
branch,  too,  Maimonides  has  left  us  a  youthful  treatise,^^'^  which 
bears  witness  to  his  early  interest  in  science  and  his  efforts  to  recom- 
mend its  study  as  helpful  to  a  better  understanding  of  Jewish  litera- 
ture. 

But  all  these  activities  and  productions  were  more  or  less  side  issues, 
or  preparations  for  a  magnum  opus,  or  rather  magna  opera.  From 
his  youth  we  can  trace  the  evident  purpose,  not  finally  completed 
until  toward  the  end  of  his  brilliant  and  useful  career, — the  purpose 
to  harmonize  Judaism  with  philosophy,  to  reconcile  the  Bible  and 
Talmud  with  Aristotle.  He  was  ambitious  to  do  this  for  the  good  of 
Judaism,  and  in  the  interest  of  a  rational  and  enlightened  faith.  Thus 
in  his  commentary  on  the  Mishna,^^^  the  earliest  of  his  larger  works, 
he  had  already  conceived  the  idea  of  writing  a  composition  of  a  har- 
monizing nature,  viz.,  to  gather  all  the  homiletical  disquisitions  of 
the  Talmud  (the  "derashot")  and  explain  them  in  a  rationalistic 
manner  so  as  to  remove  what  appears  on  the  surface  to  be  offensive 

236 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  237 

to  sound  reason.  But  instead  of  proceeding  at  once  to  the  performance 
of  this  cherished  object  of  his  philosophic  ambition,  he  kept  it  in  his 
bosom,  brooding  over  it  during  a  hfe  of  intense  Hterary  and  practical 
activity,  until  it  was  in  the  end  matured  and  brought  to  fruition  in 
a  manner  quite  diflferent  from  that  at  first  intended.  The  book  ex- 
planatory of  the  Rabbinic  legends  was  given  up  for  reasons  which 
will  appear  later.  But  the  object  that  work  was  to  realize  was  carried 
out  in  a  much  more  effective  manner  because  it  was  delayed,  and  was 
published  toward  the  end  of  his  life  as  the  systematic  and  authorita- 
tive pronouncement  of  the  greatest  Jew  of  his  time.  The  "Guide 
of  the  Perplexed"  would  not  have  attracted  the  attention  it  did,  it 
would  not  have  raised  the  storm  which  divided  Jewry  into  two  opposed 
camps,  if  it  had  not  come  as  the  mature  work  of  the  man  whom  all 
Jewry  recognized  as  the  greatest  Rabbinic  authority  of  his  time. 
Others  had  written  on  philosophy  before  Maimonides.  We  have  in 
these  pages  followed  their  ideas — Saadia,  Gabirol,  Ibn  Zaddik,  Abra- 
ham Ibn  Daud.  The  latter  in  particular  anticipated  Maimonides  in 
almost  all  his  ideas.  None  had  the  effect  of  upsetting  the  theological 
equiHbrium  of  Jewry.  Everyone  had  his  admirers,  no  doubt,  as  well 
as  his  opponents.  Gabirol  was  forgotten,  Ibn  Zaddik  and  Ibn  Daud 
were  neglected,  and  Jewish  learning  continued  the  even  tenor  of  its 
course.  Maimonides  was  the  first  to  make  a  profound  impression, 
the  first  who  succeeded  in  stirring  to  their  depths  the  smooth,  though 
here  and  there  somewhat  turbid,  R.abbinic  waters,  as  they  flowed  not 
merely  in  scientific  Spain  and  Provence,  or  in  the  Orient,  but  also  in 
the  strictly  Talmudic  communities  of  northern  France.  It  was  the 
Commentary  on  the  Mishna  and  the  Talmudic  code  known  as  the 
"Yad  ha-Hazaka"  that  was  responsible  for  the  tremendous  effect 
of  the  "More  Nebukim"  ("Guide  of  the  Perplexed"). 

In  these  two  Rabbinical  treatises,  and  particularly  in  the  "Yad 
ha-Hazaka,"  the  Rabbinic  Code,  Maimonides  showed  himself  the 
master  of  Rabbinic  literature.  And  all  recognized  in  him  the  master 
mind.  Having  been  written  in  Hebrew  the  Code  soon  penetrated  all 
Jewish  communities  everywhere,  and  Maimonides's  fame  spread 
wherever  there  were  Jews  engaged  in  the  study  of  the  Talmud.  His 
fame  as  a  court  physician  in  Egypt  and  as  the  official  head  of  Oriental 
Jewry  enhanced  the  influence  of  his  name  and  his  work.    Jealousy 


238  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

no  doubt  had  its  share  in  starting  opposition  to  the  Code  itself  even 
before  the  publication  of  the  "Guide,"  and  during  the  lifetime  of 
its  author.  When  the  "More  Nebukim"  was  translated  from  the 
original  Arabic  into  Hebrew,  so  that  all  could  read  it,  and  Maimonides 
was  no  longer  among  the  living,  the  zealots  became  emboldened  and 
the  storm  broke,  the  details  of  which,  however,  it  is  not  our  province 
to  relate. 

For  completeness'  sake  let  us  set  down  the  facts  of  his  life.  Moses 
ben  Maimon  was  born  in  the  city  of  Cordova  on  the  fourteenth  of 
Nissan  (30th  of  March)  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  on  a  Sabbath 
which  was  the  day  before  Passover,  in  the  year  1135.  It  is  not  often 
that  the  birth  of  a  medijeval  Jewish  writer  is  handed  down  with  such 
minute  detail.  Usually  we  do  not  even  know  the  year,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  day  and  the  hour.  Cordova  had  long  fallen  from  its  high  estate. 
It  was  no  longer  the  glorious  city  of  the  days  before  the  Almoravid 
conquest.  And  it  was  destined  to  descend  lower  still  when  the  fanati- 
cal hordes  of  the  Almohades  renewed  the  ancient  motto  of  the  early 
Mohammedan  conquerors,  "The  Koran  or  the  Sword." 

Maimonides  was  barely  thirteen  when  his  native  city  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  zealots  from  Morocco,  and  henceforth  neither  Jew  nor 
Christian  dared  avow  his  faith  openly  in  Cordova.  Adoption  of 
Islam,  emigration  or  death  were  the  choices  held  out  to  the  infidel. 
Many  Jews  adopted  the  dominant  faith  outwardly — that  was  all  that 
was  demanded  of  them — while  in  the  secret  of  their  homes  they  ob- 
served Judaism.  Some  emigrated,  and  among  them  was  the  family 
of  Moses'  father.  For  a  time  they  wandered  about  from  city  to  city 
in  Spain,  and  then  crossed  over  to  Fez  in  Morocco.  This  seems  to  us 
like  going  from  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire,  for  Fez  was  the  lion's  den 
itself.  The  conquerors  of  Cordova  came  from  Morocco.  And  there 
seems  to  be  some  evidence  too  that  the  Maimon  family  had  to  appear 
outwardly  as  Mohammedans.  Be  that  as  it  may,  Maimonides  did  not 
stay  long  in  Fez.  On  the  i8th  of  April,  1165,  the  family  set  sail  for 
Palestine,  and  after  a  month's  stormy  voyage  they  arrived  in  Acco. 
He  visited  Jerusalem  and  Hebron,  but  did  not  find  Palestine  a  prom- 
ising place  for  permanent  residence  and  decided  to  go  to  Egypt.  He 
settled  in  Old  Cairo  (Fostat),  and  with  his  brother  David  engaged  in 
the  jewel  trade.    His  father  died  soon  after,  and  later  his  brother  met 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  239 

an  untimely  death  when  the  ship  on  which  he  was  a  passenger  on  one 
of  his  business  trips  was  wrecked  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Thereafter 
Maimonides  gave  up  the  jewel  business  and  began  to  practice  medicine, 
which  at  first  did  not  offer  him  more  than  the  barest  necessities.  But 
in  the  course  of  time  his  fame  spread  and  he  was  appointed  physician 
to  Saladin's  grand  visier  Alfadhil.  He  was  also  made  spiritual  head  * 
of  the  Jews  of  Egypt,  and  what  with  his  official  duties  as  court  physi- 
cian, leader  of  the  Jewish  community,  practicing  physician  among  the 
people,  and  his  literary  activities,  Jewish  and  secular.  Rabbinical 
and  scientific,  he  was  a  busy  man  indeed;  so  much  so  that  he  dissuades 
Samuel  Ibn  Tibbon,  the  translator  of  the  "Guide,"  from  pa)dng  him  a 
visit  on  the  ground  that  he  would  scarcely  have  time  to  spare  to  see 
him,  much  less  to  enter  into  scientific  discussions  with  him.^*^  Mai- 
monides died  on  Monday,  December  13  (20  Tebeth),  1204. 

The  philosophy  of  Maimonides  is  contained  in  the  "Guide  of  the 
Perplexed,"  his  last  great  work,  which  was  published  in  Arabic  in 
1190.^^°  Some  philosophic  and  ethical  material  is  also  found  in  the 
introductory  chapters  of  his  commentary  on  the  Mishnaic  treatise 
"Abot"  (the  so-called  "Eight  Chapters "—" Shemonah  Perakim"),^^! 
in  the  introduction  to  the  eleventh  chapter  (Helek)  of  the  Talmudic 
treatise  "Sanhedrin,"  and  in  the  introductory  sections  of  the  Code 
("Hilkot  Yesode  ha-Torah"  and  "Hilkot  Deot").  Here,  however,  the 
treatment  is  popular  and  elementary,  and  is  intended  for  popular 
consiunption.  He  lays  down  results  in  their  simplest  form  without 
discussing  their  origin  or  the  arguments  pro  and  con.  The  "  Guide  of 
the  Perplexed,"  on  the  other  hand,  is  intended  for  a  special  class  of 
persons,  for  the  sophisticated;  for  those  who  are  well  trained  in  science 
and  philosophy,  not  to  speak  of  Bible  and  Talmud,  and  are  as  a  result 
made  uneasy  by  the  apparent  disagreement  of  philosophical  teaching 
with  the  ideas  expressed  in  the  Biblical  and  Rabbinic  writings.  His 
purpose  is  deliberately  apologetic  and  concordistic.  The  work  is  not 
a  treatise  of  science  or  philosophy.  The  latter  are  presupposed.  He 
introduces  philosophic  principles,  AristoteKan  or  Kalamistic,  only 
with  a  view  to  their  relation  to  Jewish  theology.  And  he  either  accepts 
them,  provisionally  or  absolutely,  if  he  regards  them  as  proven,  as 
true  and  useful;  or  he  refutes  and  rejects  them  if  untenable.  In  the 
*  Not  a  paid  post. 


240  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

former  case  he  shows  by  proper  interpretation  that  similar  principles 
are  taught  in  Bible  and  Talmud;  in  the  latter  he  contents  himself  by 
proving  that  Aristotle  or  the  Mutakallimun,  as  the  case  may  be,  did 
not  prove  their  point. 

His  method,  in  general,  of  quieting  the  doubts  of  the  "perplexed"  is 
the  old  one — as  old  as  Philo  and  beyond — of  regarding  Biblical  phrases 
as  metaphors  and  allegories,  containing  an  esoteric  meaning  beside 
or  opposed  to  the  literal.  Accordingly  he  lays  the  greatest  stress  on 
the  explanation  of  Scriptural  "homonyms,"  as  he  calls  them,  borrow- 
ing an  Aristotelian  term.  A  homon3an  is  a  word  which  has  more  than 
one  meaning;  a  word  which  denotes  several  things  having  nothing  in 
common.  Thus  when  I  apply  the  word  dog  to  the  domestic  animal  we 
know  by  that  name,  as  well  as  to  Sirius,  known  as  the  dog-star,  I  use 
dog  as  a  homonym.  The  star  and  the  animal  have  nothing  in  common. 
So  the  word  "merciful,"  one  of  the  attributes  of  God  in  the  Bible,  is  a 
homonym.  That  is,  we  denote  by  the  same  word  also  a  quahty  in  a 
human  being;  but  this  quahty  and  that  which  is  denoted  by  the  same 
word  when  applied  to  God  have  nothing  in  common.  They  are  not 
merely  different  in  degree  but  in  kind.  In  fact,  as  Maimonides  insists, 
there  is  really  nothing  in  God  corresponding  to  the  word  merciful. 

There  are  besides  certain  passages  in  the  Bible  which  while  having 
an  acceptable  meaning  when  taken  literally,  contain  besides  a  deeper 
signification  which  the  practiced  eye  can  detect.  Thus  in  the  descrip- 
tion of  the  harlot  in  the  seventh  chapter  of  Proverbs  there  is  beside 
the  plain  meaning  of  the  text,  the  doctrine  of  matter  as  the  cause  of 
corporeal  desires.  The  harlot,  never  faithful  to  one  man,  leaving 
one  and  taking  up  with  another,  represents  matter  which,  as  Aristotle 
conceives  it,  never  is  without  form  and  constantly  changes  one  form  for 
another. 

There  is  really  nothing  new  in  this,  and  Philo  apart,  whom  Mai- 
monides did  not  know,  Ibn  Daud  anticipated  Maimonides  here  also  in 
making  use  of  the  term  "homon3an"  as  the  basis  of  this  method  of 
interpretation.^^^  But  whereas  Ibn  Daud  relegates  the  chapter  treating 
of  this  principle  to  a  subordinate  place,  his  interest  being  as  he  teUs  us 
primarily  ethical — to  solve  the  problem  of  free  will;  Maimonides  places 
it  in  the  very  centre  of  his  system.  The  doctrine  of  attributes  as 
leading  to  a  true  conception  of  God, — of  God  as  absolutely  incorporeal 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  241 

and  without  any  resemblance  or  relation  whatsoever  to  anything  else — 
is  the  very  keystone  of  Maimonides's  philosophical  structure.  His 
purpose  is  to  teach  a  spiritual  conception  of  God.  Anything  short  of 
this  is  worse  than  idolatry.  He  cannot  reconcile  the  Bible  to  such  a 
view  without  this  "  homonymic  "  tool.  Hence  the  great  importance  of 
this  in  his  system;  and  he  actually  devotes  the  greater  part  of  the  first 
book  of  the  "Guide"  to  a  systematic  and  exhaustive  survey  of  all 
terms  in  the  Bible  used  as  homonyms. ^^^  All  this  is  preparatory  to  his 
discussion  of  the  divine  attributes. 

This  consideration  will  account  also  for  the  fact  that,  systematic 
and  logical  thinker  as  he  was,  he  perpetrates  what  might  appear  at 
first  sight  as  a  logical  blunder.  Instead  of  first  proving  the  existence 
of  God  and  then  discussing  his  nature  and  attributes,  as  Saadia, 
Bahya,  Ibn  Daud  and  others  did  before  him,  he  treats  exhaustively 
of  the  divine  attributes  in  the  first  book,  whereas  the  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God  does  not  appear  until  the  second  book.  This  inver- 
sion of  the  logical  order  is  deliberate.  Maimonides's  method  is  directed 
ad  hominem.  The  Jews  for  whom  he  wrote  his  "Guide"  did  not 
doubt  the  existence  of  God.  But  a  great  many  of  them  had  an  inade- 
quate idea  of  his  spiritual  nature.  And  apparently  the  Bible  counte- 
nanced their  anthropomorphism.  Hence  Maimonides  cast  logical 
considerations  to  the  wind,  and  dealt  first  with  that  which  was  nearest 
to  his  heart.    The  rest  could  wait,  this  could  not. 

I  promised  in  my  commentary  on  the  Mishna,  he  tells  us  in  the 
introduction  to  the  "Guide,"  to  explain  the  allegories  and  "Mid- 
rashim"  in  two  works  to  be  entitled  "The  Book  of  ReconciHation " 
and  "The  Book  of  Prophecy."  But  after  reflecting  on  the  matter 
a  number  of  years  I  decided  to  desist  from  the  attempt.  The  reasons 
are  these.  If  I  expressed  my  explanations  obscurely,  I  should  have 
accomplished  nothing  by  substituting  one  imintelligible  statement 
for  another.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  I  were  really  to  make  clear  the 
matters  that  require  explanation,  the  result  would  not  be  suitable 
for  the  masses,  for  whom  those  treatises  were  intended.  Besides, 
those  Midrashim  when  read  by  an  ignorant  man  are  harmless  because 
to  such  a  person  nothing  is  impossible.  And  if  they  are  read  by  a 
person  who  is  learned  and  worthy,  one  of  two  things  is  likely  to  happen. 
Either  he  will  take  them  literally  and  suspect  the  author  of  ignorance, 


242  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

which  is  not  a  serious  offence;  or  he  will  regard  the  legendary  state- 
ments as  containing  an  esoteric  meaning  and  think  well  of  the  author 
— which  is  a  good  thing,  whether  he  catch  the  meaning  intended  or 
not.  Accordingly  I  gave  up  the  idea  of  writing  the  books  mentioned. 
In  this  work  I  am  addressing  myself  to  those  who  have  been  philoso- 
phizing; who  are  believers  in  the  Bible  and  at  the  same  time  know 
science;  and  are  perplexed  in  their  ideas  on  account  of  the  homony- 
mous terms. 

Having  made  clear  Maimonides's  chief  interest  and  purpose  in  his 
masterpiece  we  need  not  follow  his  own  method  of  treatment,  which 
often  gives  the  impression  of  a  studied  attempt  to  conceal  his  inner- 
most ideas  from  all  but  the  initiated.  At  least  he  is  not  willing  that 
anyone  who  has  not  taken  the  trouble  carefully  to  study  and  scruti- 
nize every  chapter  and  compare  it  with  what  precedes  and  follows, 
should  by  a  superficial  browsing  here  and  there  arrive  at  an  under- 
standing of  the  profound  problems  treated  in  the  work.  He  believes 
that  the  mysterious  doctrines  passing  by  the  name  of ''  Maase  Bereshit " 
and  "Maase  Merkaba"  in  the  Talmud  {cf.  Introduction,  p.  xvi) 
denote  respectively  Physics  and  Metaphysics — the  very  sciences 
of  which  he  treats  in  the  "Guide."  Accordingly  he  tells  us  that  fol- 
lowing the  instructions  of  the  Rabbis  he  must  not  be  expected  to  give 
more  than  bare  allusions.  And  even  these  are  not  arranged  in  order 
in  the  book,  but  scattered  and  mixed  up  with  other  subjects  which  he 
desires  to  explain.  For,  as  he  says,  "I  do  not  want  to  oppose  the  di- 
vine intention,  which  concealed  the  truths  of  his  being  from  the 
masses." 

"You  must  not  suppose,"  he  continues,  "  that  these  mysteries  are 
known  to  anybody  completely.  By  no  means.  But  sometimes  the 
truth  flashes  upon  us  and  it  is  day;  and  then  again  our  natural  consti- 
tution and  habits  shut  them  out,  and  we  are  again  in  darkness.  The 
relative  proportion  of  light  and  darkness  which  a  person  enjoys  in 
these  matters,  makes  the  difference  in  the  grade  of  perfection  of  great 
men  and  prophets.  The  greatest  of  the  prophets  had  comparatively 
httle  if  any  darkness.  With  those  who  never  see  light  at  all,  namely 
the  masses  of  the  people,  we  have  nothing  to  do  in  this  book." 

Finally  he  adjures  the  reader  not  to  explain  to  anyone  else  the  novel 
ideas  found  in  his  work,  which  are  not  contained  in  the  writings  of 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  243 

his  predecessors.  Heaven  knows,  he  exclaims,  I  hesitated  long  before 
writing  this  book,  because  it  contains  unknown  matters,  never  before 
treated  by  any  Jewish  writer  in  the  "Galut."  But  I  rehed  on  two 
Rabbinic  principles.  One  is  that  when  it  is  a  question  of  doing  some- 
thing for  a  great  cause  in  a  critical  time,  it  is  permitted  to  transgress 
a  law.  The  other  is  the  consciousness  that  my  motives  are  pure  and 
unselfish.  In  short,  he  concludes,  I  am  the  man  who,  when  he  finds 
himself  in  a  critical  position  and  cannot  teach  truth  except  by  suiting 
one  worthy  person  and  scandalizing  ten  thousand  fools,  chooses  to 
say  the  truth  for  the  benefit  of  the  one  without  regard  for  the  abuse 
of  the  great  majority. 

As  we  are  not  bound  by  Maimonides's  principle  of  esoterism  and 
mystery,  nor  are  we  in  fear  of  being  an  offence  and  a  stumbling  block 
to  the  fools,  we  shall  proceed  more  directly  in  our  exposition  of  his 
philosophy;  and  shall  begin  with  Maimonides's  general  ideas  on  the 
need  of  science  for  intelligent  faith  and  the  relation  thereto  of  Jewish 
history  and  literature. 

The  highest  subject  of  study  is  metaphysics  or  theology,  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  (c/.  below,  p.  285).  This  is  not  merely  not  forbidden 
in  the  Bible,  but  it  is  directly  commanded.  When  Moses  says,  "That 
I  may  know  thee,  to  the  end  that  I  may  find  grace  in  thy  sight"  (Exod. 
33,  13),  he  intimates  that  only  he  finds  favor  with  God  who  knows 
him,  and  not  merely  who  fasts  and  prays.  ^^^  Besides,  the  command- 
ment, "Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God,"  cannot  be  fulfilled  with- 
out a  study  and  understanding  of  the  whole  of  nature. ^^^  Thus, 
as  we  shall  see,  it  is  only  by  a  study  of  physics  that  we  come  to  under- 
stand that  affection  is  a  defect  and  must  therefore  be  removed  from 
the  conception  of  God.  The  same  thing  applies  to  the  ideas  of  po- 
tentiahty  and  actuahty.  We  should  not  know  what  they  signify 
without  a  study  of  physics,  nor  should  we  understand  that  potentiality 
is  a  defect  and  hence  not  to  be  found  in  God.  It  is  therefore  a  duty 
to  study  both  physics  and  metaphysics  for  a  true  knowledge  of  God.^^^ 
At  the  same  time  we  must  recognize  that  human  reason  has  a  limit 
and  that  there  are  matters  which  are  beyond  its  ken.  Not  to  realize 
this  and  to  deny  what  has  not  been  proved  impossible  is  dangerous, 
and  may  lead  a  man  astray  after  the  imagination  and  the  evil  desires 
which  quench  the  light  of  the  intellect.    And  it  is  this  the  Bible  and 


244  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Rabbis  had  in  mind  in  such  passages  as,  "Hast  thou  found  hoxiey? 
eat  so  much  as  is  sufficient  for  thee;  lest  thou  be  filled  therewith,  and 
vomit  it  "  (Prov.  25,  16);  or  in  the  following  from  the  Mishna,  "Who- 
ever pries  into  four  things,  had  better  not  come  into  the  world,  m., 
what  is  above  and  what  is  below,  what  was  before  and  what  will  be 
after  "  (Hagigah,  ch.  2).  The  meaning  is  not,  as  some  fools  think, 
that  the  Rabbis  forbid  the  use  of  the  reason  entirely  to  reach  what  is 
in  its  power.  It  is  abuse  of  the  reason  that  they  prohibit,  and  neglect 
of  the  truth  that  the  human  reason  has  a  limit. ^^^ 

Accordingly  while  the  study  of  metaphysics  and  the  explanation  of 
the  allegories  of  Scripture  are  thus  shown  to  be  a  necessity  of  intelli- 
gent belief,  it  is  not  proper  to  begin  with  these  difficult  subjects.  One 
must  first  be  mature  intellectually  and  possessed  of  the  preliminary 
sciences.  Otherwise  the  study  of  metaphysics  is  likely  not  merely 
to  confuse  the  mind  in  its  behef,  but  to  destroy  belief  entirely.  It  is 
like  feeding  an  infant  on  wheat  bread  and  meat  and  wine.  These  are 
not  bad  in  themselves,  but  the  infant  is  not  prepared  to  digest  them. 
That  is  why  these  matters  are  given  in  the  Bible  in  the  form  of  alle- 
gories, because  the  Bible  is  intended  for  all — men,  women  and  children 
— not  because  metaphysical  ideas  are  injurious  in  themselves,  as  some 
fools  imagine,  who  believe  they  are  wise  men.  For  beginners  it  is 
sufficient  that  they  have  the  right  view  by  tradition  and  know  the 
existence  of  certain  beings,  without  being  able  to  prove  the  opinions 
they  hold,  or  to  understand  the  essence  of  the  being  in  the  existence 
of  which  they  believe.  This  they  will  acquire  gradually  if  they  are 
capable.  ^^^ 

There  are  five  causes  preventing  the  study  of  metaphysics  on  the 
part  of  the  general  masses.  First,  the  difficulty  of  the  subject  itself. 
Second,  the  limitations  of  all  people's  minds  at  the  beginning.  Third, 
the  great  amount  of  preparatory  training  that  is  necessary,  and  which 
everybody  is  not  ready  to  undertake,  however  eager  he  may  be  to 
know  the  results.  And  to  study  metaphysics  without  preliminary 
training  is  worse  than  not  to  study  it  at  all.  For  there  is  nothing  in 
existence  except  God  and  his  creation.  To  know  God's  existence 
and  what  is  and  is  not  proper  to  ascribe  to  him  we  must  examine  his 
creation;  and  thus  arithmetic,  the  nature  of  number,  and  the  proper- 
ties of  geometrical  figures  help  us  a  great  deal  in  determining  what 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  245 

attributes  are  inapplicable  to  God.  Even  much  more  important  for 
metaphysics  is  the  study  of  spherical  astronomy  and  physics,  which 
throw  light  on  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world.  Then  there  are  some 
theoretical  topics  which,  while  not  directly  of  help  in  metaphysics, 
are  useful  in  training  the  mind  and  enabling  it  to  know  what  is  true 
demonstration.  One  who  wishes  therefore  to  undertake  the  study  of 
metaphysics,  must  first  study  logic,  then  the  mathematical  sciences 
in  order,  then  physics,  and  not  until  he  has  mastered  all  these  intro- 
ductory branches  should  he  take  up  metaphysics.  This  is  too  much 
for  most  people,  who  would  die  in  the  midst  of  their  preparatory 
studies,  and  if  not  for  tradition  would  never  know  whether  there  is 
a  God  or  not,  not  to  speak  of  knowing  what  attributes  are  applicable 
to  him  and  what  are  not. 

The  fourth  cause  which  keeps  people  away  from  the  study  of  met- 
aphysics is  their  natural  disposition.  For  it  has  been  shown  that 
intellectual  qualities  are  dependent  upon  moral;  and  the  former  can- 
not be  perfect  unless  the  latter  are.  Now  some  persons  are  temper- 
amentally incapable  of  right  thinking  by  reason  of  their  passionate 
nature;  and  it  is  foolish  to  attempt  to  teach  them,  for  it  is  not  medicine 
or  geometry,  and  not  everybody  is  prepared  for  it.  This  is  the  reason, 
too,  why  young  men  cannot  study  it,  because  of  the  passions  which 
are  still  strong  in  them.  Finally  as  a  fifth  reason,  the  necessities  of 
the  body  and  its  luxuries,  too,  stand  in  the  way  of  a  person's  devoting 
enough  time  and  attention  to  this  subject.  ^^^ 

Like  many  others  before  him,  Christians  as  well  as  Jews,  Mai- 
monides  also  believed  that  in  ancient  times  the  Jews  diligently  cul- 
tivated the  sciences,  which  were  gradually  forgotten  on  account  of 
foreign  domination.  Maimonides  adds  another  reason  for  their  dis- 
appearance, namely,  that  they  were  not  disseminated  abroad.  They 
were  confined  to  a  select  few  and  were  not  put  dov/n  in  writing  but 
handed  down  by  word  of  mouth.  As  a  result  only  a  few  hints  are 
found  in  the  Talmud  and  Midrashim,  where  the  kernel  is  small  and 
the  husk  large,  so  that  people  mistake  the  husk  for  the  kernel.^*' 

He  then  traces  the  history  of  philosophical  thinking  in  Jewish 
mediaeval  literature  from  the  time  of  the  Geonim,  and  tells  us  that  the 
little  that  is  found  of  the  Kalam  concerning  the  Unity  of  God  and 
related  topics  in  the  works  of  some  of  the  Geonim  and  the  Karaites 


246  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

in  the  East  is  borrowed  from  the  Mutakallimun  of  the  Mohammedans 
and  constitutes  a  small  fraction  of  the  writings  of  the  latter  on  this 
subject.  The  first  attempt  in  this  direction  among  the  Moslems  was 
that  of  the  party  known  as  the  Mu'tazila,  whom  our  people  followed. 
Later  came  the  party  of  the  Ashariya  with  different  opinions  which, 
however,  were  not  adopted  by  any  of  our  people.  This  was  not  due, 
he  tells  us,  to  a  deliberate  decision  in  favor  of  the  Mu  tazila,  but 
solely  to  the  historical  accident  of  their  chronological  priority.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Spanish  Jews  of  Andalusia  adopted  the  views  of  the 
philosophers,  i.  e.,  the  Aristotelians,  so  far  as  they  are  not  in  conflict 
with  our  religion.  They  do  not  follow  the  Mutakallimun,  and  hence 
what  httle  of  the  subject  is  found  in  the  works  of  the  later  writers  of 
this  class  resembles  our  own  method  and  views. ^®^ 

There  seems  no  doubt  that  whatever  other  Spanish  writers  Mai- 
monides  had  in  mind,  whose  works  are  not  extant,  his  characterization 
fits  admirably  the  "Emunah  Ramah"  of  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  {cf. 
above,  p.  217),  and  in  a  less  degree  it  is  also  true  of  Ibn  Gabirol,  Bahya, 
Judah  Halevi,  Moses  and  Abraham  Ibn  Ezra.  Bahya  as  we  saw  above 
(p.  86)  still  retains  a  good  deal  of  Kalamistic  material  and  so  does 
Ibn  Zaddik  (p.  126).  As  for  Mukammas,  Saadia  and  the  two  Karaites 
Al  Basir  and  Jeshua  ben  Judah,  we  have  seen  (pp.  17,  24,  48,  56)  that 
they  move  wholly  in  the  ideas  of  the  Mutakallimun.  It  becomes  of 
great  interest  for  us  therefore  to  see  what  Maimonides  thinks  of  these 
Islamic  theologians,  of  their  origins,  of  their  methods  and  of  their  phil- 
osophical value.  Maimonides's  exposition  and  criticism  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Mutakallimun  is  of  especial  interest,  too,  because  up  to 
recent  times  his  sketch  of  the  tenets  of  this  school  was  the  only  ex- 
tensive account  known;  and  it  has  not  lost  its  value  even  yet.  We 
shall,  however,  be  obliged  to  abridge  his  detailed  exposition  in  order 
not  to  enlarge  our  volume  beyond  due  limits.  Besides,  there  is  no 
occasion  for  repeating  what  we  have  already  said  of  the  Kalam  in  our 
Introduction  (p.  xxi  ff.);  though  the  account  there  given  was  not 
taken  from  Maimonides  and  does  not  follow  his  order. 

Maimonides  is  aware  that  the  Arabs  are  indebted  to  the  Christians, 
Greeks  as  well  as  Syrians.  The  Mu'tazila  and  Ashariya,  he  says, 
base  their  opinions  upon  premises  and  principles  borrowed  from  Greek 
and  Syrian  Christians,  who  endeavored  to  refute  the  opinions  of  the 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  247 

philosophers  as  dangerous  to  the  Christian  rehgion.  There  was  thus 
a  Christian  Kalam  prior  to  the  Mohammedan.  ^^^  Their  method  was  to 
lay  down  premises  favorable  to  their  religion,  and  by  means  of  these 
to  refute  the  opinions  opposed  to  them.  When  the  Mohammedans 
came  upon  the  scene  and  translated  the  works  of  the  philosophers, 
they  included  in  their  work  of  translation  the  refutations  composed  by 
the  Christians.  In  this  way  they  found  the  works  of  Philoponus, 
Yahya  ben  Adi  and  others;  and  adopted  also  the  opinions  of  the  pre- 
Socratic  philosophers,  which  they  thought  would  be  of  help  to  them, 
though  these  had  already  been  refuted  by  Aristotle,  who  came  after. 
Such  are  the  atomic  theory  of  matter  and  the  behef  in  the  existence  of 
a  vacuum.  These  opinions  they  carried  to  consequences  not  at  all 
contemplated  by  their  authoritieSj^  who  were  closer  to  the  philosophers. 

To  characterize  briefly  the  methods  of  the  MutakaUimun,  Mai- 
monides  continues,  I  would  say  that  the  first  among  them,  the  Greeks 
and  the  Mohammedans,  did  not  follow  reality,  but  adopted  principles 
which  were  calculated  to  help  them  in  defending  their  religious  theses, 
and  then  interpreted  reality  to  suit  their  preconceived  notions.  The 
later  members  of  the  school  no  longer  saw  through  the  motives  of  their 
predecessors  and  imagined  their  principles  and  arguments  were  bona 
fide  refutations  of  philosophical  opinions. 

On  examination  of  their  works  I  found,  he  continues,  that  with 
sUght  differences  they  are  all  alike.  They  do  not  put  any  trust  in 
reality  and  nature.  For,  they  say,  the  so-called  laws  of  nature  are 
nothing  more  than  the  order  of  events  to  which  we  are  accustomed. 
There  is  no  kind  of  necessity  in  them,  and  it  is  conceivable  they  might 
be  different.  In  many  cases  the  MutakaUimun  follow  the  imagination 
and  call  it  reason.  Their  method  of  procedure  is  as  follows.  They  first 
state  their  preliminary  principles,  then  they  prove  that  the  world  is 
''new,"  i.  e.,  created  in  time.  Then  they  argue  that  the  world  must 
have  had  an  originator,  and  that  he  is  one  and  incorporeal.  All  the 
MutakaUimun  foUow  this  method,  and  they  are  imitated  by  those  of 
our  own  people  who  follow  in  their  footsteps. 

To  this  method  I  have  serious  objections,  continues  Maimonides, 
for  their  arguments  in  favor  of  the  creation  of  the  world  are  not  con- 
vincing unless  one  does  not  know  a  real  demonstration  from  a  dialec- 
tical or  sophistic.    The  most  one  can  do  in  this  line  is  to  invaUdate 


248  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  arguments  for  eternity.  But  the  decision  of  the  question  is  by  no 
means  easy,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  controversy  is  three 
thousand  years  old  and  not  yet  settled.  Hence  it  is  a  risky  policy  to 
build  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  God  on  so  shaky  a  foundation 
as  the  "newness"  of  the  world.  The  best  way  then,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
to  prove  God's  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  by  the  methods  of 
the  philosophers,  which  are  based  upon  the  eternity  of  the  world. 
Not  that  I  believe  in  eternity  or  that  I  accept  it,  but  because  on  this 
hypothesis  the  three  fundamental  doctrines  are  vahdly  demonstrated. 
Having  proved  these  doctrines  we  will  then  return  to  the  problem  of 
the  origin  of  the  world  and  say  what  can  be  said  in  favor  of  creation. ^^^ 
This  is  a  new  contribution  of  Maimonides.  All  the  Jewish  writers 
before  Halevi  followed  in  their  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  the 
method  designated  by  Maimonides  as  that  of  the  Kalam,  Judah 
Halevi  criticised  the  Mutakallimun  as  well  as  the  philosophers  in  the 
interest  of  a  point  of  view  all  his  own  (p.  176  fif.,  182).  Ibn  Daud  tacitly 
ignored  the  Kalam  and  based  his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  upon 
the  principles  of  motion  as  exhibited  in  the  Aristotelian  Physics,  with- 
out, however,  finding  it  necessary  to  assume  even  provisionally  the  eter- 
nity of  motion  and  the  world  (p.  217  ff.).  His  proof  of  the  incorporeal- 
ity of  God  is,  as  we  have  seen  {ibid.),  weak,  just  because  he  does  not 
admit  the  eternity  of  motion,  which  alone  implies  infinity  of  power  in 
God  and  hence  incorporeality.  Maimonides  is  the  first  who  takes 
deliberate  account  of  the  MutakalUmun,  gives  an  adequate  outline 
of  the  essentials  of  their  teaching  and  administers  a  crushing  blow  to 
their  principles  as  well  as  their  method.  He  then  follows  up  his  destruc- 
tive criticism  with  a  constructive  method,  in  which  he  frankly  admits 
that  in  order  to  establish  the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  of 
God — the  three  fundamental  dogmas  of  Judaism — beyond  the  possibil- 
ity of  cavil,  we  must  make  common  cause  with  the  philosophers  even 
though  it  be  only  for  a  moment,  until  they  have  done  our  work  for  us, 
and  then  we  may  fairly  turn  on  our  benefactors  and  taking  advantage 
of  their  weakness,  strike  them  down,  and  upon  their  lifeless  arguments 
for  the  eternity  of  the  world  establish  our  own  more  plausible  theory 
of  creation.  The  attitude  of  Maimonides  is  in  brief  this.  If  we  were 
certain  of  creation,  we  should  not  have  to  bother  with  the  philosophers. 
Creation  implies  the  existence  of  God.    But  the  question  cannot  be 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  249 

strictly  demonstrated  either  way.  Hence  let  us  prove  the  existence  of 
God  on  the  least  promising  hypothesis,  namely,  that  of  eternity,  and 
we  are  quite  secure  against  all  possible  criticism. 

Of  the  twelve  propositions  of  the  Mutakallimun  enumerated  by 
Maimonides  as  the  basis  of  their  doctrine  of  God,  we  shall  select  a  few 
of  the  most  important.  ^^* 

1.  The  Theory  of  Atoms.  The  entire  universe  is  made  up  of  in- 
divisible bodies  having  no  magnitude.  Their  combination  produces 
magnitude  and  corporeality.  They  are  all  alike.  Genesis  and  dissolu- 
tion means  simply  the  combination  or  rather  aggregation  of  atoms  and 
their  separation.  These  atoms  are  not  eternal,  as  Epicurus  believed 
them  to  be,  but  created. 

2.  This  atomic  theory  they  extend  from  magnitude  to  time.  Time 
also  according  to  them  is  composed  of  moments  or  atomic  units  of 
time.  Neither  magnitude,  nor  matter,  nor  time  is  continuous  or  in- 
finitely divisible. 

3.  Applying  these  ideas  to  motion  they  say  that  motion  is  the 
passage  of  an  atom  of  matter  from  one  atom  of  place  to  the  next  in 
an  atom  of  time.  It  follows  from  this  that  one  motion  is  as  fast  as 
another;  and  they  explain  the  apparent  variation  in  speed  of  different 
motions,  as  for  example  when  two  bodies  cover  unequal  distances 
in  the  same  time,  by  saying  that  the  body  covering  the  smaller  dis- 
tance had  more  rests  in  the  intervals  between  the  motions.  The 
same  thing  is  true  in  the  flight  of  an  arrow,  that  there  are  rests  even 
though  the  senses  do  not  reveal  them.  For  the  senses  cannot  be 
trusted.    We  must  follow  the  reason. 

Maimonides's  criticism  of  the  atomic  theory  of  matter  and  motion 
just  described  is  that  it  undermines  the  bases  of  geometry.  The 
diagonal  of  a  square  would  be  the  same  length  as  its  side.  The  proper- 
ties of  commensurability  and  incommensurability  in  lines  and  sur- 
faces, of  rational  and  irrational  lines  would  cease  to  have  any  meaning. 
In  fact  all  that  is  contained  in  the  tenth  book  of  Euclid  would  lose  its 
foundation. 

4.  The  atom  is  made  complete  by  the  accidents,  without  which  it 
cannot  be.  Every  atom  created  by  God,  they  say,  must  have  acci- 
dents, such  as  color,  odor,  motion,  and  so  on,  except  quantity  or 
magnitude,  which  according  to  them  is  not  accident.    If  a  substance 


250  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

has  an  accident,  the  latter  is  not  attributed  to  the  body  as  a  whole, 
but  is  ascribed  to  every  atom  of  which  the  body  is  composed.  Thus 
in  a  white  body  every  atom  is  white,  in  a  moving  body  every  atom 
is  in  motion,  in  a  living  body  every  atom  is  aUve,  and  every  atom  is 
possessed  of  sense  perception;  for  life  and  sense  and  reason  and  wisdom 
are  accidents  in  their  opinion  like  whiteness  and  blackness. 

6.  Accident  does  not  last  more  than  one  moment  of  time.  When 
God  creates  an  atom  he  creates  at  the  same  time  an  accident  with  it. 
Atom  without  accident  is  impossible.  The  accident  disappears  at 
the  end  of  the  moment  unless  God  creates  another  of  the  same  kind, 
and  then  another,  and  so  on,  as  long  as  he  wants  the  accident  of  that 
kind  to  continue.  If  he  ceases  to  create  another  accident,  the  sub- 
stance too  disappears. 

Their  motive  in  laying  down  this  theory  of  accidents  is  in  order 
to  destroy  the  conception  that  everything  has  a  peculiar  nature,  of 
which  its  quahties  and  functions  are  the  results.  They  attribute 
everything  directly  to  God.  God  created  a  particular  accident  at 
this  moment,  and  this  is  the  explanation  of  its  being.  If  God  ceases 
to  create  it  anew  the  next  moment,  it  will  cease  to  be. 

7.  All  that  is  not  atom  is  accident,  and  there  is  no  difference  be- 
tween one  kind  of  accident  and  another  in  reference  to  essentiality. 
All  bodies  are  composed  of  similar  atoms,  which  differ  only  in  acci- 
dents; and  animality  and  humanity  and  sensation  and  reason  are  all 
accidents.  Hence  the  difference  between  the  individuals  of  the  same 
species  is  the  same  as  that  between  individuals  of  different  species. 
The  philosophers  distinguish  between  essential  forms  of  things  and 
accidental  properties.  In  this  way  they  would  explain,  for  ex- 
ample, why  iron  is  hard  and  black,  while  butter  is  soft  and  white. 
The  Mutakallimun  deny  any  such  distinction.  All  forms  are  acci- 
dents. Hence  it  would  follow  that  there  is  no  intrinsic  reason  why  man 
rather  than  the  bat  should  be  a  rational  creature.  Everything  that 
is  conceivable  is  possible,  except  what  involves  a  logical  contradiction; 
and  God  alone  determines  at  every  instant  what  accident  shall  com- 
bine with  a  given  atom  or  group  of  atoms. 

8.  It  follows  from  the  above  also  that  man  has  no  power  of  agency 
at  all.  When  we  think  we  are  dyeing  a  garment  red,  it  is  not  we  who 
are  doing  it  at  all.    God  creates  the  red  color  in  the  garment  at  the 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  2$! 

time  when  we  apply  the  red  dye  to  it.  The  red  dye  does  not  enter 
the  garment,  as  we  think,  for  an  accident  is  only  momentary,  and 
cannot  pass  beyond  the  substance  in  which  it  is. 

What  appears  to  us  as  the  constancy  and  regularity  of  nature  is 
nothing  more  than  the  will  of  God.  Nor  is  our  knowledge  of  to-day 
the  same  as  that  of  yesterday.  Yesterday's  is  gone  and  to-day's  is 
created  anew.  So  when  a  man  moves  a  pen,  it  is  not  he  who  moves 
it.  God  creates  motion  in  the  hand,  and  at  the  same  time  in  the  pen. 
The  hand  is  not  the  cause  of  the  motion  of  the  pen.  In  short  they 
deny  causation.    God  is  the  sole  cause. 

In  respect  to  human  conduct  they  are  divided.  The  majority, 
and  the  Ashariya  among  them,  say  that  when  a  person  moves  a 
pen,  God  creates  four  accidents,  no  one  of  which  is  the  cause  of  the 
other.  They  merely  exist  in  succession,  but  no  more.  The  first  acci- 
dent is  the  man's  will  to  move  the  pen;  the  second,  his  ability  to  move 
it;  the  third,  the  motion  of  the  hand;  the  fourth,  the  motion  of  the  pen. 
It  follows  from  this  that  when  a  person  does  anything,  God  creates 
in  him  a  will,  the  abihty  and  the  act  itself,  but  the  act  is  not  the  effect 
of  the  ability.  The  Mu'  tazila  hold  that  the  abUity  is  the  cause  of  the 
effect. 

9.  Impossibility  of  the  Infinite.  They  hold  that  the  infinite  is  im- 
possible in  any  sense,  whether  actual  or  potential  or  accidental.  That 
an  actual  infinite  is  impossible  is  a  matter  of  proof.  So  it  can  be  and 
has  been  proved  that  the  potential  infinite  is  possible.  For  example 
extension  is  infinitely  divisible,  i.  e.,  potentially.  As  to  the  accidental 
infinite,  i.  c,  an  infinity  of  parts  of  which  each  ceases  to  be  as  soon  as 
the  next  appears,  this  is  doubtful.  Those  who  boast  of  having  proved 
the  eternity  of  the  world  say  that  time  is  infinite,  and  defend  their 
view  against  criticism  by  the  claim  that  the  successive  parts  of  time 
disappear.  In  the  same  way  these  people  regard  it  as  possible  that 
an  infinite  number  of  accidents  have  succeeded  each  other  on  the 
universal  matter,  because  here  too  they  are  not  all  present  now,  the 
previous  having  disappeared  before  the  succeeding  ones  came.  The 
Mutakallunun  do  not  admit  of  any  kind  of  infinite.  They  prove  it 
in  this  way.  If  past  time  and  the  world  are  infinite,  then  the  number 
of  men  who  died  up  to  a  given  point  in  the  past  is  infinite.  The  num- 
ber of  men  who  died  up  to  a  point  one  thousand  years  before  the 


252  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

former  is  also  infinite.  But  this  number  is  less  than  the  other  by  the 
number  of  men  who  died  during  the  thousand  years  between  the  two 
starting  points.  Hence  the  infinite  is  larger  than  the  infinite,  which 
is  absurd.  If  the  accidental  infinite  were  really  impossible  the  theory 
of  the  eternity  of  the  world  would  be  refuted  at  once.  But  Alfarabi 
has  shown  that  the  arguments  against  accidental  infinity  are  invalid. 

ID.  Distrust  of  the  Senses.  The  senses,  they  say,  cannot  be  regarded 
as  criteria  of  truth  and  falsehood;  for  many  things  the  senses  cannot 
see  at  all,  either  because  the  objects  are  so  fine,  or  because  they  are 
far  away.  In  other  cases  the  senses  are  deceptive,  as  when  the  large 
appears  small  at  a  distance,  the  small  appears  great  in  the  water,  and 
the  straight  appears  broken  when  partly  in  water  and  partly  without. 
So  a  man  with  the  jaundice  sees  everything  yellow,  and  one  with  red 
bile  on  his  tongue  tastes  everything  bitter.  There  is  method  in  their 
madness.  The  motive  for  this  sceptical  principle  is  to  evade  criticism. 
If  the  senses  testify  in  opposition  to  their  theories,  they  reply  that 
the  senses  cannot  be  trusted,  as  they  did  in  their  exp!  .nation  of  motion 
and  in  their  theory  of  the  succession  of  created  accidents.  These  are 
all  ancient  theories  of  the  Sophists,  as  is  clear  from  Galen.  ^^^ 

Having  given  an  outline  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Muta- 
kallimun  and  criticised  them,  Maimonides  next  gives  their  arguments 
based  upon  these  principles  in  favor  of  creation  in  time  and  against 
eternity.  It  will  not  be  worth  our  while  to  reproduce  them  here  as 
they  are  not  adopted  by  Maimonides,  and  we  have  already  met  some 
of  them  though  in  a  somewhat  modified  form  before  {cf.  above, 
pp.  29  £f.).2«6 

The  Kalamistic  proofs  for  the  unity  of  God  are  similarly  identical 
for  the  most  part  with  those  found  in  Saadia,  Bahya  and  others,  and 
we  need  only  mention  Maimonides's  criticism  that  they  are  inadequate 
unless  we  assume  with  the  Mutakallimun  that  all  atoms  in  the  uni- 
verse are  of  the  same  kind.  If,  however,  we  adopt  Aristotle's  theory, 
which  is  more  plausible,  that  the  matter  of  the  heavenly  bodies  is 
different  from  that  of  the  sublunar  world,  we  may  defend  dualism  by 
supposing  that  one  God  controls  the  heavens  and  the  other  the  earth. 
The  inability  of  the  one  to  govern  the  domain  of  the  other  would  not 
necessarily  argue  imperfection,  any  more  than  we  who  believe  in  the 
unity  of  God  regard  it  as  a  defect  in  God  that  he  cannot  make  a  thing 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  253 

both  be  and  not  be.  This  belongs  to  the  category  of  the  impossible; 
and  we  should  likewise  class  in  the  same  category  the  control  of  a 
sphere  that  is  independent  of  one  and  belongs  to  another.  This  is 
purely  an  argumentum  ad  hominem,  for  Maimonides  does  not  regard 
the  sublunar  and  superlunar  worlds  as  independent  of  each  other. 
He  recognizes  the  unity  of  the  universe.  ^^^ 

Maimonides  closes  his  discussion  of  the  Kalamistic  system  by  citing 
their  arguments  for  incorporeality,  which  he  likewise  finds  inadequate, 
both  because  they  are  based  upon  God's  unity,  which  they  did  not 
succeed  in  proving  (Saadia,  in  so  far  as  he  relates  the  two,  bases 
unity  upon  incorporeality),  and  because  of  inherent  weakness. ^^ 

Having  disposed  of  the  arguments  of  the  Mutakallimun,  Mai- 
monides proceeds  to  prove  the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality 
of  God  by  the  methods  of  the  philosophers,  i.  e.,  those  who,  like  Al- 
farabi  and  Avicenna,  take  their  arguments  from  Aristotle.  The  chief 
proof  ^^^  is  based  upon  the  Aristotelian  principles  of  motion  and  is 
found  in  the  eighth  book  of  Aristotle's  Physics.  We  have  already  met 
this  proof  in  Ibn  Daud  (cf.  above,  p.  217),  and  the  method  in  Mai- 
monides differs  only  in  form  and  completeness,  but  not  in  essence. 
There  is,  however,  this  very  important  difference  that  Ibn  Daud 
fights  shy  of  Aristotle's  theory  of  the  eternity  of  motion  and  time, 
thus  losing  his  strongest  argument  for  God's  infinite  power  and  in- 
corporeaHty  (cf.  p.  218);  whereas  Maimonides  frankly  bases  his  entire 
argument  from  motion  (provisionally  to  be  sure)  upon  the  Aristotelian 
theory,  including  eternity  of  motion.  With  this  important  deviation 
there  is  not  much  in  this  part  of  the  Maimonidean  discussion  which 
is  not  already  contained,  though  less  completely,  in  the  "Emunah 
Ramah"  of  Abraham  Ibn  Daud.  We  should  be  tempted  to  omit 
these  technical  arguments  entirely  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  it  is 
in  the  form  which  Maimonides  gave  them  that  they  became  classic 
in  Jewish  philosophy,  and  not  in  that  of  Ibn  Daud. 

The  second  proof  of  God's  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality, 
that  based  upon  the  distinction  between  "possible"  and  "necessary" 
existent, ^'^'^  which  has  its  origin  in  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna,  is  also 
found  in  Ibn  Daud.^'^^  The  other  two  proofs  ^^^  are  Maimonides's 
own,  i.  e.,  they  are  not  found  in  the  works  of  his  Jewish  predecessors. 

As  in  the  exposition  of  the  theory  of  the  Mutakallimun  Maimonides 


254  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

began  with  their  fundamental  principles,  so  here  he  lays  down  twenty- 
six  propositions  culled  from  the  Physics  and  Metaphysics  of  Aristotle 
and  his  Arabian  commentators,  and  applies  them  later  to  prove  his 
points.  He  does  not  attempt  to  demonstrate  them,  expecting  the 
reader  to  take  them  for  granted,  or  to  be  familiar  with  them  from  a 
study  of  the  philosophical  sources.  Ibn  Daud  presupposed  less  from 
his  readers,  having  written  as  he  said,  for  beginners;  hence  he  proves 
many  of  the  propositions  which  Maimonides  lays  down  dogmatically. 
Possibly  Maimonides  expected  his  readers  to  be  familiar  with  the 
work  of  his  immediate  Jewish  predecessor. 
The  twenty-six  propositions  of  the  philosophers  are  as  follows: 

1.  There  can  be  no  infinite  object  possessing  magnitude. 

2.  There  cannot  be  an  infinite  number  of  bodies  possessing  magni- 
tude, all  at  the  same  time. 

3.  There  cannot  be  an  infinite  chain  of  cause  and  effect,  even  if 
these  links  are  not  possessed  of  magnitude,  for  example,  intellects. 

4.  Change  is  found  in  four  categories.  In  substance — genesis  and 
decay.  In  quantity — growth  and  diminution.  In  quality — qualitative 
change.    In  place — motion  of  translation. 

5.  All  motion  is  change,  and  is  the  realization  of  the  potential. 

6.  Motion  may  be  per  se,  per  accidens,  forcible,  partial,  the  latter 
coming  under  per  accidens.  An  example  of  motion  per  se  is  the  motion 
of  a  body  from  one  place  to  the  next;  of  motion  per  accidens,  when  the 
blackness  of  an  object  is  said  to  move  from  one  place  to  another. 
Forcible  motion  is  that  of  the  stone  when  it  is  forced  upward.  Partial 
motion  is  that  of  a  nail  of  a  ship  when  the  ship  moves. 

7.  Every  changeable  thing  is  divisible;  hence  every  movable  thing 
is  divisible,  i.  e.,  every  body  is  divisible.  What  is  not  divisible  is  not 
movable,  and  hence  cannot  be  body. 

8.  That  which  is  moved  per  accidens  is  necessarily  at  rest  because 
its  motion  is  not  in  itself.  Hence  it  cannot  have  that  accidental  mo- 
tion forever. 

9.  A  body  moving  another  must  itself  be  in  motion  at  the  same 
time. 

10.  Being  in  a  body  means  one  of  two  things:  being  in  it  as  an 
accident,  or  as  constituting  the  essence  of  the  body,  like  a  natural 
form.     Both  are  corporeal  powers. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  255 

11.  Some  things  which  are  in  a  body  are  divided  with  the  division  of 
the  body.  They  are  then  divided  per  accidens,  like  colors  and  other 
powers  extending  throughout  the  body.  Some  of  the  things  which  con- 
stitute the  body  are  not  divisible  at  all,  like  soul  and  intellect. 

12.  Every  power  which  extends  throughout  a  body  is  finite,  because 
all  body  is  finite. 

13.  None  of  the  kinds  of  change  mentioned  in  4  is  continuous  ex- 
cept motion  of  translation;  and  of  this  only  circular  motion. 

14.  Motion  of  translation  is  the  first  by  nature  of  the  motions.  For 
genesis  and  decay  presuppose  quahtative  change;  and  qualitative 
change  presupposes  the  approach  of  the  agent  causing  the  change  to 
the  thing  undergoing  the  change.  And  there  is  no  growth  or  diminu- 
tion without  antecedent  genesis  and  decay. 

15.  Time  is  an  accident  following  motion  and  connected  with  it. 
The  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other.  No  motion  except  in  time, 
and  time  cannot  be  conceived  except  with  motion.  AVhatever  has  no 
motion  does  not  come  under  time. 

16.  Whatever  is  incorporeal  cannot  be  subject  to  number,  unless  it 
is  a  corporeal  power;  in  which  case  the  individual  powers  are  num- 
bered with  their  matters  or  bearers.  Hence  the  separate  forms  or 
Intelligences,  which  are  neither  bodies  nor  corporeal  powers,  cannot 
have  the  conception  of  number  connected  with  them,  except  when  they 
are  related  to  one  another  as  cause  and  efi'ect. 

17.  Everything  that  moves,  necessarily  has  a  mover,  either  outside, 
like  the  hand  moving  the  stone,  or  inside  like  the  animal  body,  which 
consists  of  a  mover,  the  soul,  and  a  moved,  the  body  proper.  Every 
mobile  of  the  last  kind  is  called  a  self-moving  thing.  This  means  that 
the  motor  element  in  the  thing  is  part  of  the  whole  thing  in  motion. 

18.  If  anything  passes  from  potentiality  to  actuahty,  the  agent 
that  caused  this  must  be  outside  the  thing.  For  if  it  were  inside  and 
there  was  no  obstruction,  the  thing  would  never  be  potential,  but  al- 
ways actual;  and  if  there  was  an  obstruction,  which  was  removed,  the 
agency  which  removed  the  obstruction  is  the  cause  v/hich  caused  the 
thing  to  pass  from  potentiality  to  actuahty. 

19.  Whatever  has  a  cause  for  its  existence  is  a  "possible"  existent 
in  so  far  as  itself  is  concerned.  If  the  cause  is  there,  the  thing  exists; 
if  not,  it  does  not.    Possible  here  means  not  necessary. 


256  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

20.  Whatever  is  a  necessary  existent  in  itself,  has  no  cause  for  its 
existence. 

21.  Every  composite  has  the  cause  of  its  existence  in  the  composi- 
tion. Hence  it  is  not  in  itself  a  necessary  existent;  for  its  existence  is 
dependent  upon  the  existence  of  its  constituent  parts  and  upon  their 
composition. 

22.  All  body  is  composed  necessarily  of  two  things,  matter  and 
form;  and  it  necessarily  has  accidents,  viz.,  quantity,  figure,  situation. 

23.  Whatever  is  potential  and  has  in  it  a  possibility  may  at  some 
time  not  exist  as  an  actuaUty. 

24.  Whatever  is  potential  is  necessarily  possessed  of  matter,  for 
possibility  is  always  in  matter. 

25.  The  principles  of  an  individual  compound  substance  are  matter 
and  form;  and  there  must  be  an  agent,  i.  e.,  a  mover  which  moves  the 
object  or  the  underlying  matter  until  it  prepares  it  to  receive  the  form. 
This  need  not  be  the  ultimate  mover,  but  a  proximate  one  having  a 
particular  function.  The  idea  of  Aristotle  is  that  matter  cannot  move 
itself.  This  is  the  great  principle  which  leads  us  to  investigate  into  the 
existence  of  the  first  mover. 

Of  these  twenty-five  propositions,  Maimonides  continues,  some  are 
clear  after  a  little  reflection,  some  again  require  many  premises  and 
proofs,  but  they  are  all  proved  in  the  Physics  and  Metaphysics  of 
Aristotle  and  his  commentators.  My  purpose  here  is,  as  I  said,  not  to 
reproduce  the  writings  of  the  philosophers.  I  will  simply  mention 
those  principles  which  we  must  have  for  our  purpose.  I  must  add, 
however,  one  more  proposition,  which  Aristotle  thinks  is  true  and 
more  deserving  of  belief  than  anything  else.  We  will  grant  him  this 
by  way  of  hypothesis  until  we  explain  what  we  intend  to  prove.  The 
proposition  is: 

26.  Time  and  motion  are  eternal  and  actual.  Hence  there  must  be 
a  body  moving  eternally  and  existing  actually.  This  is  the  matter 
constituting  the  substance  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Hence  the  heavens 
are  not  subject  to  genesis  and  decay,  for  their  motion  is  eternal.  This 
presupposes  the  possibility  of  accidental  infinity  {cf.  above,  p.  251), 
Aristotle  regards  this  as  true,  though  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  he 
claims  he  has  proved  it.  His  followers  and  commentators  maintain 
that  it  is  a  necessary  proposition  and  demonstrated.    The  Mutakalli- 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  257 

mun,  on  the  other  hand,  think  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  an 
infinite  number  of  states  in  succession  {cf.  ibid.).  It  seems  to  me  it  is 
neither  necessary  nor  impossible,  but  possible.  This  is,  however,  not 
the  place  to  discuss  it.^''^ 

Now  follows  the  classical  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  from  motion. 
It  is  in  essence  the  same  as  that  given  by  Ibn  Daud,  but  much  more 
elaborate.  We  shall  try  to  simplify  it  as  much  as  possible.  The  num- 
bers in  parentheses  in  the  sequel  refer  to  the  preliminary  propositions 
above  given. 

We  start  with  something  that  is  known,  namely,  the  motion  we  see 
in  the  sublunar  world,  the  motion  which  is  involved  in  all  the  processes 
of  genesis  and  decay  and  change  generally.  This  motion  must  have 
a  mover  (25).  This  mover  must  have  another  mover  to  move  it,  and 
this  would  lead  us  to  infinity,  which  is  impossible  (3).  We  find,  how- 
ever, that  all  motion  here  below  ends  with  the  motion  of  the  heaven. 
Let  us  take  an  example.  The  wind  is  blowing  through  an  opening  in 
the  waU.  I  take  a  stone  and  stop  up  the  hole.  Here  the  stone  is 
moved  by  the  hand,  the  hand  by  the  tendons,  the  tendons  by  the 
nerves,  the  nerves  by  the  veins,  the  veins  by  the  natural  heat,  the 
natural  heat  by  the  animal  soul,  the  animal  soul  by  a  purpose,  namely, 
to  stop  the  hole  from  which  the  wind  comes,  the  purpose  by  the  wind, 
the  wind  by  the  motion  of  the  heavenly  sphere.  But  this  is  not  the 
end.  The  sphere  must  also  have  a  mover  (17).  This  mover  is  either 
outside  the  sphere  it  moves  or  within  it.  If  it  is  something  outside,  it 
is  either  again  a  body  like  the  sphere,  or  an  incorporeal  thing,  a  "Sep- 
arate Intelligence."  If  the  mover  of  the  sphere  is  something  within  the 
sphere,  two  alternatives  are  again  possible.  The  internal  moving 
power  of  the  sphere  may  be  a  corporeal  force  extended  throughout  the 
body  of  the  sphere  and  divisible  with  it  hke  heat,  or  an  indivisible 
power  like  soul  or  intellect  (10,  11).  We  thus  have  four  possibilities 
in  all.  The  mover  of  the  heavenly  sphere  may  be  (a)  a  body  external 
to  the  sphere;  (b)  a  separate  incorporeal  substance;  (c)  an  internal 
corporeal  power  divisible  with  the  division  of  the  sphere;  (d)  an  internal 
indivisible  power.  Of  these  four,  (a)  is  impossible.  For  if  the  mover 
of  the  sphere  is  another  body,  it  is  likewise  in  motion  (9)  and  must 
have  another  to  move  it,  which,  if  a  body,  must  have  another,  and  so 
on  ad  infinitum,  which  is  impossible  (2).    The  third  hypothesis,  (c), 


258  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

is  likewise  impossible.  For  as  the  sphere  is  a  body  it  is  finite  (i),  and 
its  power  is  also  finite  (12),  since  it  is  divisible  with  the  body  of  the 
sphere  (11).  Hence  it  cannot  move  infinitely  (26).  Nor  can  we  adopt 
the  last  alternative,  (d).  For  a  soul  residing  within  the  sphere  could 
not  alone  be  the  cause  of  continuous  motion.  For  a  soul  that  moves 
its  body  is  itself  in  motion  per  accidens  (6);  and  whatever  moves  per 
accidens  must  necessarily  sometime  stop  (8),  and  with  it  the  thing  set 
in  motion  by  it  will  stop  also.  There  is  thus  only  one  alternative  left, 
(b),  viz.,  that  the  cause  of  the  motion  of  the  sphere  is  a  "separate" 
{i.  e.,  incorporeal)  power,  which  is  itself  not  subject  to  motion  either 
per  se  or  per  accidens;  hence  it  is  indivisible  and  unchangeable  (7,  5). 
This  is  God.  He  cannot  be  two  or  more,  for  "  separate  "  essences  which 
are  not  body  are  not  subject  to  number  unless  one  is  cause  and  the 
other  effect  (16).  It  follows,  too,  that  he  is  not  subject  to  time,  for 
there  is  no  time  without  motion  (15). 

We  have  thus  proved  with  one  stroke  God's  existence  as  weU  as  his 
unity  and  incorporeality.  But,  it  will  be  observed,  if  not  for  the 
twenty-sixth  proposition  concerning  the  eternity  of  motion,  which  im- 
plies an  infinite  power,  we  should  not  have  been  forced  to  the  alter- 
native (b),  and  could  have  adopted  (c)  as  well  as  (d).  That  is,  we 
might  have  concluded  that  God  is  the  soul  of  the  heavenly  sphere 
resident  within  it,  or  even  that  he  is  a  corporeal  force  pervading  the 
extension  of  the  sphere  as  heat  pervades  an  ordinary  body.  But  we 
must  admit  that  in  this  way  we  prove  only  the  existence  of  a  God  who 
is  the  cause  of  the  heavenly  motions,  and  through  these  of  the  processes 
of  genesis  and  decay,  hence  of  all  the  life  of  our  sublunar  world.  This 
is  not  the  God  of  Jewish  tradition,  who  creates  out  of  nothing,  who  is 
the  cause  of  the  being  of  the  universe  as  well  as  of  its  life  processes. 
Maimonides  was  aware  of  this  defect  in  the  Aristotelian  view,  and  he 
later  repudiates  the  Stagirite's  theory  of  eternal  motion  on  philosoph- 
ical as  well  as  religious  grounds.  Before,  however,  we  speak  of  Mai- 
.monides's  attitude  in  this  matter,  we  must  for  completeness'  sake 
briefly  mention  three  other  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  as  given  by 
Maimonides.  They  are  not  strictly  Aristotelian,  though  they  are 
based  upon  Peripatetic  principles  cited  above  and  due  to  the  Arabian 
commentators  of  Aristotle. 

The  second  proof  is  as  follows.    If  we  find  a  thing  composed  of  two 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  259 

elements,  and  one  of  these  elements  is  also  found  separately,  it  follows 
that  the  other  element  is  found  separately  also.  Now  we  frequently 
find  the  two  elements  of  causing  motion  and  being  moved  combined  in 
the  same  object.  And  we  also  find  things  which  are  moved  only, 
but  do  not  cause  motion,  as  for  example  matter,  or  the  stone  in  the 
last  proof.  It  stands  to  reason  therefore  that  there  is  something  that 
causes  motion  without  being  itself  subject  to  motion.  Not  being 
subject  to  motion,  it  is  indivisible,  incorporeal  and  not  subject  to 
time,  as  above. 

The  third  proof  is  based  upon  the  idea  of  necessary  existence.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  there  are  existing  things,  for  example  the  things  we 
perceive  with  our  senses.  Now  either  all  things  are  incapable  of  decay, 
or  all  are  subject  to  genesis  and  decay,  or  some  are  and  some  are  not. 
The  first  is  evidently  untrue  for  we  see  things  coming  into,  and  pass- 
ing out,  of  being.  The  second  hypothesis  is  likewise  untrue.  For  if 
all  things  are  subject  to  genesis  and  decay,  there  is  a  possibility  that 
at  some  time  all  things  might  cease  to  be  and  nothing  should  exist  at 
all.  But  as  the  coming  and  going  of  individuals  in  the  various  species 
in  the  world  has  been  going  on  from  eternity,  the  possibiHty  just 
spoken  of  must  have  been  realized— a  possibility  that  is  never  reahzed 
is  not  a  possibility — and  nothing  existed  at  all  at  that  moment.  But 
in  that  case  how  could  they  ever  have  come  into  being,  since  there  was 
nothing  to  bring  them  into  being?  And  yet  they  do  exist,  as  ourselves 
for  example  and  everything  else.  There  is  only  one  alternative  left, 
therefore,  and  that  is  that  beside  the  great  majority  of  things  subject 
to  genesis  and  decay,  there  is  a  being  not  subject  to  change,  a  necessary 
existent,  and  ultimately  one  that  exists  by  virtue  of  its  own  necessity 

(19). 

Whatever  is  necessary  per  se  can  have  no  cause  for  its  existence 
(20)  and  can  have  no  multipHcity  in  itself  (21);  hence  it  is  neither  a 
body  nor  a  corporeal  power  (12). 

We  can  also  prove  easily  that  there  cannot  be  two  necessary  exist- 
ents  per  se.  For  in  that  case  the  element  of  necessary  existence  would 
be  something  added  to  the  essence  of  each,  and  neither  would  then 
be  necessary  per  se,  but  per  that  element  of  necessary  existence  which 
is  common  to  both. 

The  last  argument  against  dualism  may  also  be  formulated  as  fol- 


26o  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

lows.  If  there  are  two  Gods,  they  must  have  something  in  common — 
that  in  virtue  of  which  they  are  Gods — and  something  in  which  they 
differ,  which  makes  them  two  and  not  one.  If  each  of  them  has 
in  addition  to  divinity  a  differential  element,  they  are  both  composite, 
and  neither  is  the  first  cause  or  the  necessary  existent  (19).  If  one 
of  them  only  has  this  differentia,  then  this  one  is  composite  and  is 
not  the  first  cause. 

The  fourth  proof  is  very  much  like  the  first,  but  is  based  upon  the 
ideas  of  potentiality  and  actuality  instead  of  motion.  But  when  we 
consider  that  Aristotle  defines  motion  in  terms  of  potentiality  and  actu- 
ality, the  fourth  proof  is  identical  with  the  first.  It  reads  in  Maimon- 
ides  as  follows:  We  see  constantly  things  existing  potentially  and  com- 
ing into  actuality.  Every  such  thing  must  have  an  agent  outside  (18). 
It  is  clear,  too,  that  this  agent  was  first  an  agent  potentially  and  then 
became  one  actually.  This  potentiaHty  was  due  either  to  an  obstacle 
in  the  agent  himself  or  to  the  absence  of  a  certain  relation  between  the 
agent  and  its  effect.  In  order  that  the  potential  agent  may  become  an 
actual  agent,  there  is  need  of  another  agent  to  remove  the  obstacle  or 
to  bring  about  the  needed  relation  between  the  agent  and  the  thing  to 
be  acted  upon.  This  agent  requires  another  agent,  and  so  it  goes  ad  in- 
finitum. As  this  is  impossible,  we  must  stop  somewhere  with  an  agent 
that  is  always  actual  and  in  one  condition.  This  agent  cannot  be  ma- 
terial, but  must  be  a  "  separate  "  (24).  But  the  separate  in  which  there 
is  no  kind  of  potentiaHty  and  which  exists  per  se,  is  God.  As  we  have 
already  proved  him  incorporeal,  he  is  one  (16).^^* 

We  must  now  analyze  the  expressions  incorporeal  and  one,  and  see 
what  in  strictness  they  imply,  and  how  our  logical  deductions  agree 
with  Scripture.  Many  persons,  misled  by  the  metaphorical  expressions 
in  the  Bible,  think  of  God  as  having  a  body  with  organs  and  senses 
on  the  analogy  of  ours.  Others  are  not  so  crude  as  to  think  of  God 
in  anthropomorphic  terms,  nor  are  they  polytheists,  and  yet  for  the 
same  reason,  namely,  misunderstanding  of  Scriptural  expressions, 
ascribe  a  plurahty  of  essential  attributes  to  God.  We  must  therefore 
insist  on  the  absolute  incorporeality  of  God  and  explain  the  purpose 
of  Scripture  in  expressing  itself  in  anthropomorphic  terms,  and  on 
the  other  hand  emphasize  the  absolute  unity  of  God  against  the  be- 
lievers in  essential  attributes. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  261 

Belief  in  God  as  body  or  as  liable  to  suffer  affection  is  worse  than 
idolatry.  For  the  idolater  does  not  deny  the  existence  of  God;  he 
merely  makes  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  the  image  of  his  own 
construction  resembles  a  being  which  mediates  between  him  and  God. 
And  yet  because  this  leads  to  erroneous  belief  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
who  are  inclined  to  worship  the  image  itself  instead  of  God  (for  the 
people  cannot  discriminate  between  the  outward  act  and  its  idea), 
the  Bible  punishes  idolatry  with  death,  and  calls  the  idolater  a  man 
who  angers  God.  How  much  more  serious  is  the  error  of  him  who 
thinks  God  is  body!  He  entertains  an  error  regarding  the  nature  of 
God  directly,  and  surely  causes  the  anger  of  God  to  burn.  Habit 
and  custom  and  the  evidence  of  the  literal  understanding  of  the  Bib- 
lical text  are  no  more  an  excuse  for  this  erroneous  belief  than  they  are 
for  idolatry;  for  the  idolater,  too,  has  been  brought  up  in  his  wrong 
ideas  and  is  confirmed  in  them  by  some  false  notions.  If  a  man  is  not 
himself  able  to  reason  out  the  truth,  there  is  no  excuse  for  his  refusing 
to  listen  to  one  who  has  reasoned  it  out.  A  person  is  not  an  unbeliever 
for  not  being  able  to  prove  the  incorporeaHty  of  God.  He  is  an  un- 
believer if  he  thinks  God  is  corporeal. ^'^^ 

The  expressions  in  the  Bible  which  have  led  many  to  err  so  griev- 
ously in  their  conceptions  of  God  are  due  to  a  desire  on  the  part  of 
their  authors  to  show  all  people,  the  masses  including  women  and 
children,  that  God  exists  and  is  possessed  of  all  perfection,  that  he  is 
existent,  living,  wise,  powerful,  and  active.  Hence  it  was  necessary 
to  speak  of  him  as  body,  for  this  is  the  only  thing  that  suggests  real 
existence  to  the  masses.  It  was  necessary  to  endow  him  with  motion, 
as  this  alone  denotes  life;  to  ascribe  to  him  seeing,  hearing,  and  so  on, 
in  order  to  indicate  that  he  understands;  to  represent  him  as  speaking, 
in  order  to  show  that  he  communicates  with  prophets,  because  to  the 
minds  of  common  people  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  ideas  are  com- 
municated from  one  person  to  another.  As  we  are  active  by  our  sense 
of  touch,  God,  too,  is  described  as  doing.  He  is  given  a  soul,  to  denote 
that  he  is  alive.  Then  as  all  these  activities  are  among  us  done  by 
means  of  organs,  these  also  are  ascribed  to  God,  as  feet,  hands,  ear, 
eye,  nose,  mouth,  tongue,  voice,  fingers,  palm,  arm.  In  other  words, 
to  show  that  God  has  all  perfections,  certain  senses  are  ascribed  to 
him;  and  to  indicate  these  senses  the  respective  organs  are  related 


262  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

to  them,  organs  of  motion  to  denote  life,  of  sensation  to  denote  under- 
standing, of  touch  to  denote  activity,  of  speech  to  denote  revelation. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  since  all  these  organs  and  perceptions 
and  powers  in  man  and  animals  are  due  to  imperfection  and  are  for 
the  purpose  of  satisfying  various  wants  for  the  preservation  of  the 
individual  or  the  species,  and  God  has  no  wants  of  any  kind,  he  has 
no  such  powers  or  organs.  ^^^ 

Having  disposed  of  crude  anthropomorphism  we  must  now  take 
up  the  problem  of  attributes,  which  endangers  the  unity.  It  is  a 
self-evident  truth  that  an  attribute  is  something  different  from  the 
essence  of  a  thing.  It  is  an  accident  added  to  the  essence.  Otherwise 
it  is  the  thing  over  again,  or  it  is  the  definition  of  the  thing  and  the 
explanation  of  the  name,  and  signifies  that  the  thing  is  composed  of 
these  elements.  If  we  say  God  has  many  attributes,  it  will  follow 
that  there  are  many  eternals.  The  only  belief  in  true  unity  is  to  think 
that  God  is  one  simple  substance  without  composition  or  multiplicity 
of  elements,  but  one  in  all  respects  and  aspects.  Some  go  so  far  as  to 
say  that  the  divine  attributes  are  neither  God's  essence  nor  anything 
outside  of  his  essence.  This  is  absurd.  It  is  saying  words  which  have 
nothing  corresponding  to  them  in  fact.  A  thing  is  either  the  same 
as  another,  or  it  is  not  the  same.  There  is  no  other  alternative.  The 
imagination  is  responsible  for  this  error.  Because  bodies  as  we  know 
them  always  have  attributes,  they  thought  that  God,  too,  is  made 
up  of  many  essential  elements  or  attributes. 

Attributes  may  be  of  five  kinds: 

1.  The  attributes  of  a  thing  may  be  its  definition,  which  denotes  its 
essence  as  determined  by  its  causes.  This  everyone  will  admit  cannot 
be  in  God,  for  God  has  no  cause,  hence  cannot  be  defined. 

2.  An  attribute  may  consist  of  a  part  of  a  definition,  as  when  we 
say,  "man  is  rational,"  where  the  attribute  rational  is  part  of  the 
definition  of  man,  "  rational  animal  "  being  the  whole  definition.  This 
can  apply  to  God  no  more  than  the  first;  for  if  there  is  a  part  in  God's 
essence,  he  is  composite. 

3.  An  attribute  may  be  an  expression  which  characterizes  not  the 
essence  of  the  thing  but  its  quality.  Quality  is  one  of  the  nine  cate- 
gories of  accident,  and  God  has  no  accidents. 

4.  An  attribute  may  indicate  relation,  such  as  father,  master,  son. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  263 

slave.  At  first  sight  it  might  seem  as  if  this  kind  of  attribute  may  be 
applicable  to  God;  but  after  reflection  we  find  that  it  is  not.  There 
can  be  no  relation  of  time  between  God  and  anything  else;  because 
time  is  the  measure  of  motion,  and  motion  is  an  accident  of  body. 
God  is  not  corporeal.  In  the  same  way  it  is  clear  that  there  cannot 
be  a  relation  of  place  between  God  and  other  things.  But  neither 
can  there  be  any  other  kind  of  relation  between  God  and  his  creation. 
For  God  is  a  necessary  existent,  while  everything  else  is  a  possible 
existent.  A  relation  exists  only  between  things  of  the  same  proximate 
species,  as  between  white  and  black.  If  the  things  have  only  a  com- 
mon genus,  and  still  more  so  if  they  belong  to  two  different  genera, 
there  is  no  relation  between  them.  If  there  were  a  relation  between 
God  and  other  things,  he  would  have  the  accident  of  relation,  though 
relation  is  the  least  serious  of  attributes,  since  it  does  not  necessitate 
a  multiplicity  of  eternals,  nor  change  in  God's  essence  owing  to  change 
in  the  related  things. 

5.  An  attribute  may  characterize  a  thing  by  reference  to  its  effects 
or  works,  not  in  the  sense  that  the  thing  or  author  of  the  effect  has 
acquired  a  character  by  reason  of  the  product,  like  carpenter,  painter, 
blacksmith,  but  merely  in  the  sense  that  he  is  the  one  who  made  a 
particular  thing.  An  attribute  of  this  kind  is  far  removed  from  the 
essence  of  the  thing  so  characterized  by  it;  and  hence  we  may  apply 
it  to  God,  provided  we  remember  that  the  varied  effects  need  not 
be  produced  by  different  elements  in  the  agent,  but  are  all  done  by 
the  one  essence. 

Those  who  believe  in  attributes  divide  them  into  two  classes,  and 
number  the  following  four  as  essential  attributes,  not  derived  from 
God's  effects  like  "creator,"  which  denotes  God's  relation  to  his 
work,  since  God  did  not  create  himself.  The  four  essential  attributes 
about  which  all  agree  are,  living,  powerful,  wise,  possessed  of  will. 
Now  if  by  wise  is  meant  God's  knowledge  of  himself,  there  might  be 
some  reason  for  calling  it  an  essential  attribute;  though  in  that  case 
it  implies  "living,"  and  there  is  no  need  of  two.  But  they  refer  the 
attribute  wise  to  God's  knowledge  of  the  world,  and  then  there  is  no 
reason  for  calling  it  an  essential  attribute  any  more  than  the  word 
"creator,"  for  example.  In  the  same  way  "powerful"  and  "having 
will"  cannot  refer  to  himself,  but  to  his  actions.    We  therefore  hold 


264  MEDIzEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

that  just  as  we  do  not  say  that  there  is  something  additional  in  his 
essence  by  which  he  created  the  heavens,  something  else  with  which 
he  created  the  elements,  and  a  third  with  which  he  created  the  Intel- 
ligences, so  we  do  not  say  that  he  has  one  attribute  with  which  he 
exercises  power,  another  with  which  he  wills,  a  third  with  which  he 
knows,  and  so  on,  but  his  essence  is  simple  and  one.^'''^ 

Four  things  must  be  removed  from  God:  (i)  corporeality,  (2) 
affection,  (3)  potentiality,  (4)  resemblance  to  his  creatures.  The 
first  we  have  already  proved.  The  second  implies  change,  and  the 
author  of  the  change  cannot  be  the  same  as  he  who  suffers  the  change 
and  feels  the  affection.  If  then  God  were  subject  to  affection,  there 
would  be  another  who  would  cause  the  change  in  him.  So  all  want 
must  be  removed  from  him;  for  he  who  is  in  want  of  something  is  po-, 
tential,  and  in  order  to  pass  into  actuaUty  requires  an  agent  having 
that  quality  in  actii.  The  fourth  is  also  evident;  for  resemblance  in- 
volves relation.  As  there  is  no  relation  between  God  and  ourselves, 
there  is  no  resemblance.  Resemblance  can  exist  only  between  things 
of  the  same  species.  All  the  expressions  including  "existent"  are 
applied  to  God  and  to  ourselves  in  a  homonymous  sense  (c/.  above, 
p.  240).  The  use  is  not  even  analogical;  for  in  analogy  there  must  be 
some  resemblance  between  the  things  having  the  same  name,  but  not 
so  here.  Existence  in  things  which  are  determined  by  causes  (and 
this  includes  all  that  is  not  God),  is  not  identical  with  the  essence  of 
those  things.  The  essence  is  that  which  is  expressed  in  the  definition, 
whereas  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the  thing  so  defined  is  not 
part  of  the  definition.  It  is  an  accident  added  to  the  essence.  In 
God  the  case  is  different.  His  existence  has  no  cause,  since  he  is  a 
necessary  existent;  hence  his  existence  is  identical  with  his  essence. 
So  we  say  God  exists,  but  not  with  existence,  as  we  do.  Similarly 
he  is  living,  but  not  with  life;  knowing,  but  not  with  knowledge;  pow- 
erful, but  not  with  power;  wise,  but  not  with  wisdom.  Unity  and 
plurality  are  also  accidents  of  things  which  are  one  or  many  as  the 
case  may  be.  They  are  accidents  of  the  category  of  quantity.  God, 
who  is  a  necessary  existent  and  simple  cannot  be  one  any  more  than 
many.  He  is  one,  but  not  with  unity.  Language  is  inadequate  to 
express  our  ideas  of  God.  Wishing  to  say  he  is  not  many,  we  have 
to  say  he  is  one;  though  one  as  well  as  many  pertains  to  the  accidents 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  265 

of  quantity.  To  correct  the  inexactness  of  the  expression,  we  add, 
"but  not  with  unity."  So  we  say  "eternal"  to  indicate  that  he  is  not 
"new,"  though  in  reality  eternal  is  an  accident  of  time,  which  in  turn 
is  an  accident  of  motion,  the  latter  being  dependent  upon  body.  In 
reality  neither  "eternal"  nor  "new"  is  apphcable  to  God.  When  we 
say  one,  we  mean  merely  that  there  is  none  other  like  him;  and  when 
Scripture  speaks  of  him  as  the  first  and  the  last,  the  meaning  is  that 
he  does  not  change. 

The  only  true  attributes  of  God  are  the  negative  ones.  Negative 
attributes,  too,  by  excluding  the  part  of  the  field  in  which  the  thing 
to  be  designated  is  not  contained,  bring  us  nearer  to  the  thing  itself; 
though  unlike  positive  attributes  they  do  not  designate  any  part  of  the 
thing  itself.  God  cannot  have  positive  attributes  because  he  has  no 
essence  different  from  his  existence  for  the  attributes  to  designate,  and 
surely  no  accidents.  Negative  attributes  are  of  value  in  leading  us  to  a 
knowledge  of  God,  because  in  negation  no  plurality  is  involved.  So 
when  we  have  proved  that  there  is  a  being  beside  these  sensible  and 
intelligible  things,  and  we  say  he  is  existent,  we  mean  that  his  non- 
existence is  unthinkable.  In  the  same  way  living  means  not  dead; 
incorporeal  is  negative;  eternal  signifies  not  caused;  powerful  means 
not  weak;  wise — not  ignorant;  wilHng  denotes  that  creation  proceeds 
from  him  not  by  natural  necessity  like  heat  from  fire  or  light  from  the 
sun,  but  with  purpose  and  design  and  method.  All  attributes  there- 
fore are  either  derived  from  God's  effects  or,  if  they  have  reference 
to  himself,  are  meant  to  exclude  their  opposites,  i.  e.,  are  really  neg- 
atives. This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  God  is  devoid  of  a  quality 
which  he  might  have,  but  in  the  sense  in  which  we  say  a  stone  does 
not  see,  meaning  that  it  does  not  pertain  to  the  nature  of  the  stone 
to  see.^''^ 

All  the  names  of  God  except  the  tetragrammaton  designate  his 
activities  in  the  world.  Jhvh  alone  is  the  real  name  of  God,  which  be- 
longs to  him  alone  and  is  not  derived  from  anything  else.  Its  meaning 
is  unknown.  It  denotes  perhaps  the  idea  of  necessary  existence.  All 
the  other  so-called  divine  names  used  by  the  writers  of  talismans  and 
charms  are  quite  meaningless  and  absurd.  The  wonderful  claims 
these  people  bespeak  for  them  are  not  to  be  believed  by  any  intelligent 
man.^*^^ 


266  MEDIMVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

The  above  account  of  Maimonides's  doctrine  of  attributes  shows  us 
that  he  followed  the  same  line  of  thought  as  his  predecessors.  His 
treatment  is  more  thorough  and  elaborate,  and  his  requirements  of  the 
religionist  more  stringent.  He  does  not  even  allow  attributes  of  rela- 
tion, which  were  admitted  by  Ibn  Daud.  Negative  attributes  and 
those  taken  from  God's  effects  are  the  only  expressions  that  may  be 
applied  to  God.  This  is  decidedly  not  a  Jewish  mode  of  conceiving 
of  God,  but  it  is  not  even  Aristotelian.  Aristotle  has  very  little  to  say 
about  God's  attributes,  it  is  true,  but  there  seems  no  warrant  in  the 
Httle  he  does  say  for  such  an  absolutely  transcendental  and  agnostic 
conception  as  we  find  in  Maimonides.  To  Aristotle  God  is  pure  form, 
thought  thinking  itself.  In  so  far  as  he  is  thought  we  may  suppose  him 
to  be  similar  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  human  thought.  The 
only  source  of  Maimonides's  ideas  is  to  be  sought  in  Neo-Platonism,  in 
the  so-called  Theology  of  Aristotle  which,  however,  Maimonides  never 
quotes.  He  need  not  have  used  it  himself.  He  was  a  descendant  of  a 
long  line  of  thinkers,  Christian,  Mohammedan  and  Jewish,  in  which 
this  problem  was  looked  at  from  a  Neo-Platonic  point  of  view;  and 
the  Theology  of  Aristotle  had  its  share  in  forming  the  views  of  his 
predecessors.  The  idea  of  making  God  transcendent  appealed  to 
Maimonides,  and  he  carried  it  to  the  limit.  How  he  could  combine 
such  transcendence  with  Jewish  prayer  and  ceremony  it  is  hard  to 
tell;  but  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  his  philosophical  deduc- 
tions represented  his  last  word  on  the  subject.  As  in  Philo  so  in  Mai- 
monides, his  negative  theology  was  only  a  means  to  a  positive.  Its 
purpose  was  to  emphasize  God's  perfection.  And  in  the  admission, 
nay  maintenance,  of  man's  inability  to  understand  God  Hes  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  we  raised  above.  Prayer  is  answered,  man  is  pro- 
tected by  divine  Providence;  and  if  we  cannot  understand  how,  it  is 
because  the  matter  is  beyond  our  limited  intellect. 

Having  discussed  the  existence  and  nature  of  God,  our  next  prob- 
lem is  the  existence  of  angels  and  their  relation  to  the  "Separate 
Intelhgences "  of  the  philosophers.  In  this  matter,  too,  Ibn  Daud 
anticipated  Maimonides,  though  the  latter  is  more  elaborate  in  his 
exposition  as  well  as  criticism  of  the  extreme  philosophic  view.  He 
adopts  as  much  of  Aristotelian  (or  what  he  thought  was  Aristotelian) 
doctrine  as  is  compatible  in  his  mind  with  the  Bible  and  subject  to 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  267 

rigorous  demonstration,  and  rejects  the  rest  on  philosophic  as  well  as 
religious  grounds. 

The  existence  of  separate  intelligences  he  proves  in  the  same  way  as 
Ibn  Daud  from  the  motions  of  the  celestial  spheres.  These  motions 
cannot  be  purely  "natural,"  i.  e.,  unconscious  and  involuntary  like  the 
rectilinear  motions  of  the  elements,  fire,  air,  water  and  earth,  because 
in  that  case  they  would  stop  as  soon  as  they  came  to  their  natural 
place,  as  is  true  of  the  elements  (cf.  above,  p.  xxxiii) ;  whereas  the  spheres 
actually  move  in  a  circle  and  never  stop.  We  must  therefore  assume 
that  they  are  endowed  with  a  soul,  and  their  motions  are  conscious 
and  voluntary.  But  it  is  not  sufficient  to  regard  them  as  irrational 
creatures,  for  on  this  hypothesis  also  their  motions  would  have  to 
cease  as  soon  as  they  attained  the  object  of  their  desire,  or  escaped 
the  thing  they  wish  to  avoid.  Neither  object  can  be  accomplished  by 
circular  motion,  for  one  approaches  in  this  way  the  thing  from  which 
one  flees,  and  flees  the  object  which  one  approaches.  The  only  way 
to  account  for  continuous  circular  motion  is  by  supposing  that  the 
sphere  is  endowed  with  reason  or  intellect,  and  that  its  motion  is  due 
to  a  desire  on  its  part  to  attain  a  certain  conception.  God  is  the  object 
of  the  conception  of  the  sphere,  and  it  is  the  love  of  God,  to  whom  the 
sphere  desires  to  become  similar,  that  is  the  cause  of  the  sphere's  mo- 
tion. So  far  as  the  sphere  is  a  body,  it  can  accomplish  this  only  by 
circular  motion;  for  this  is  the  only  continuous  act  possible  for  a  body, 
and  it  is  the  simplest  of  bodily  motions. 

Seeing,  however,  that  there  are  many  spheres  having  difi"erent  kinds 
of  motions,  varying  in  speed  and  direction,  Aristotle  thought  that  this 
difference  must  be  due  to  the  difference  in  the  objects  of  their  con- 
ceptions. Hence  he  posited  as  many  separate  Intelligences  as  there 
are  spheres.  That  is,  he  thought  that  intermediate  between  God  and 
the  rational  spheres  there  are  pure  incorporeal  intelligences,  each  one 
moving  its  own  sphere  as  a  loved  object  moves  the  thing  that  loves  it. 
As  the  number  of  spheres  were  in  his  day  thought  to  be  fifty,  he  as- 
sumed there  were  fifty  separate  Intelligences.  The  mathematical 
sciences  in  Aristotle's  day  were  imperfect,  and  the  astronomers  thought 
that  for  every  motion  visible  in  the  sky  there  must  be  a  sphere,  not 
knowing  that  the  inclination  of  one  sphere  may  be  the  cause  of  a 
number  of  apparent  motions.    Later  writers  making  use  of  the  more 


268  MEDimVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

advanced  state  of  astronomical  science,  reduced  the  number  of  In- 
telligences to  ten,  corresponding  to  the  ten  spheres  as  follows:  the 
seven  planetary  spheres,  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars,  the  diurnal 
sphere  embracing  them  all  and  giving  all  of  them  the  motion  from  east 
to  west,  and  the  sphere  of  the  elements  surrounding  the  earth.  Each 
one  of  these  is  in  charge  of  an  Intelligence.  The  last  separate  Intel- 
ligence is  the  Active  Intellect,  which  is  the  cause  of  our  mind's  passing 
from  potentiaHty  to  actuahty,  and  of  the  various  processes  of  sub- 
lunar life  generally. 

These  are  the  views  of  Aristotle  and  his  followers  concerning  the  sep- 
arate Intelligences.  And  in  a  general  way  his  views,  says  Maimonides, 
are  not  incompatible  with  the  Bible.  What  he  calls  Intelligences  the 
Scriptures  call  angels.  Both  are  pure  forms  and  incorporeal.  Their  ra- 
tionahty  is  indicated  in  the  nineteenth  Psalm,  "The  heavens  declare 
the  glory  of  God."  That  God  rules  the  world  through  them  is  evident 
from  a  number  of  passages  in  Bible  and  Talmud.  The  plural  number  in 
"Let  us  make  man  in  our  image"  (Gen.  i,  26),  "Come,  let  us  go  down 
and  confuse  their  speech"  {ib.  11,  7)  is  explained  by  the  Rabbis  in  the 
statement  that  "  God  never  does  anything  without  first  looking  at  the 
celestial  'familia.'"  (Bab.  Talm.  Sanhedrin  38b.)  The  word  "look- 
ing" (" Mistakkel ")  is  striking;  "^^^  for  it  is  the  very  expression  Plato 
uses  when  he  says  that  God  looks  into  the  world  of  Ideas  and  produces 
the  uni  verse.  ^^^ 

For  once  Maimonides  in  the  last  Rabbinic  quotation  actually  hit 
upon  a  passage  which  owes  its  content  to  Alexandrian  and  possibly 
Philonian  influence.  Having  no  idea  of  the  Alexandrian  School  and  of 
the  works  of  Philo  and  his  relation  to  some  theosophic  passages  in  the 
Haggadah,  he  made  no  distinction  between  Midrash  and  Bible,  and 
read  Plato  and  Aristotle  in  both  alike,  as  we  shall  see  more  particularly 
later. 

Maimonides's  detailed  criticism  of  Aristotle  we  shaU  see  later.  For 
the  present  he  agrees  that  the  philosophic  conception  of  separate 
Intelligences  is  the  same  as  the  Biblical  idea  of  angels  with  this  excep- 
tion that  according  to  Aristotle  these  Intelligences  and  powers  are  all 
eternal  and  proceed  from  God  by  natural  necessity,  whereas  the 
Jewish  view  is  that  they  are  created.  God  created  the  separate  Intel- 
ligences; he  likewise  created  the  spheres  as  rational  beings  and  im- 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  269 

planted  in  them  a  desire  for  the  Intelhgences  which  accounts  for  their 
various  motions. 

Now  Maimonides  has  prepared  the  ground  and  is  ready  to  take  up 
the  question  of  the  origin  of  the  world,  which  was  left  open  above.  He 
enumerates  three  views  concerning  this  important  matter. 

1.  The  Biblical  View.  God  created  everything  out  of  nothing. 
Time  itself  is  a  creation,  which  did  not  exist  when  there  was  no  world. 
For  time  is  a  measure  of  motion,  and  motion  cannot  be  without  a 
moving  thing.    Hence  no  motion  and  no  time  without  a  world. 

2.  The  Platonic  View.  The  world  as  we  see  it  now  is  subject  to 
genesis  and  decay;  hence  it  originated  in  time.  But  God  did  not  make 
it  out  of  nothing.  That  a  composite  of  matter  and  form  should  be 
made  out  of  nothing  or  should  be  reduced  to  nothing  is  to  the  Plato- 
nists  an  impossibility  like  that  of  a  thing  being  and  not  being  at  the 
same  time,  or  the  diagonal  of  a  square  being  equal  to  its  side.  There- 
fore to  say  that  God  cannot  do  it  argues  no  defect  in  him.  They  be- 
lieve therefore  that  there  is  an  eternal  matter,  the  effect  of  God  to  be 
sure,  but  co-eternal  with  him,  which  he  uses  as  the  potter  does  the  clay. 

3.  The  Aristotelian  View.  Time  and  motion  are  eternal.  The 
heavens  and  the  spheres  are  not  subject  to  genesis  and  decay,  hence 
they  were  always  as  they  are  now.  And  the  processes  of  change  in 
the  lower  world  existed  from  eternity  as  they  exist  now.  Matter  is 
not  subject  to  genesis  and  decay;  it  simply  takes  on  forms  one  after 
the  other,  and  this  has  been  going  on  from  eternity.  It  results  also 
from  his  statements,  though  he  does  not  say  it  in  so  many  words,  that 
it  is  impossible  there  should  be  a  change  in  God's  will.  He  is  the  cause 
of  the  universe,  which  he  brought  into  being  by  his  will,  and  as  his 
will  does  not  change,  the  universe  has  existed  this  way  from  eternity. 

The  arguments  of  Aristotle  and  his  followers  by  which  they  defend 
their  view  of  the  eternity  of  the  world  are  based  partly  upon  the  na- 
ture of  the  world,  and  partly  upon  the  nature  of  God.  Some  of  these 
arguments  are  as  follows: 

Motion  is  not  subject  to  beginning  and  end.  For  everything  that 
comes  into  being  after  a  state  of  non-existence  requires  motion  to 
precede  it,  namely,  the  actualization  from  non-being.  Hence  if  motion 
came  into  being,  there  was  motion  before  motion,  which  is  a  contra- 
diction.   As  motion  and  time  go  together,  time  also  is  eternal. 


270  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Again,  the  prime  matter  common  to  the  four  elements  is  not  sub- 
ject to  genesis  and  decay.  For  all  genesis  is  the  combination  of  a  pre- 
existing matter  with  a  new  form,  namely,  the  form  of  the  generated 
thing.  If  therefore  the  prime  matter  itself  came  into  being,  there  must 
be  a  previous  matter  from  which  it  came,  and  the  thing  that  resulted 
must  be  endowed  with  form.  But  this  is  impossible,  since  the  prime 
matter  has  no  matter  before  it  and  is  not  endowed  with  form. 

Among  the  proofs  derived  from  the  nature  of  God  are  the  following: 

If  God  brought  forth  the  world  from  non-existence,  then  before 
he  created  it  he  was  a  creator  potentially  and  then  became  a  creator 
actually.  There  is  then  potentiality  in  the  creator,  and  there  must 
be  a  cause  which  changed  him  from  a  potential  to  an  actual  creator. 

Again,  an  agent  acts  at  a  particular  time  and  not  at  another  be- 
cause of  reasons  and  circumstances  preventing  or  inducing  action. 
In  God  there  are  no  accidents  or  hindrances.    Hence  he  acts  always. 

Again,  how  is  it  possible  that  God  was  idle  an  eternity  and  only 
yesterday  made  the  world?  For  thousands  of  years  and  thousands 
of  worlds  before  this  one  are  after  all  as  yesterday  in  comparison  with 
God's  eternity. 

These  arguments  Maimonides  answers  first  by  maintaining  that 
Aristotle  himself,  as  can  be  inferred  from  his  manner,  does  not  regard 
his  discussions  favoring  the  eternity  of  the  world  as  scientific  demon- 
strations. Besides,  there  is  a  fundamental  flaw  in  Aristotle's  entire 
attitude  to  the  question  of  the  ultimate  principles  and  beginnings  of 
things.  All  his  arguments  in  favor  of  eternity  of  motion  and  of  the 
world  are  based  upon  the  erroneous  assumption  that  the  world  as  a 
whole  must  have  come  into  being  in  the  same  way  as  its  parts  appear 
now  after  the  world  is  here.  According  to  this  supposition  it  is  easy 
to  prove  that  motion  must  be  eternal,  that  matter  is  not  subject  to 
genesis,  and  so  on.  Our  contention  is  that  at  the  beginning,  when 
God  created  the  world,  there  were  not  these  laws;  that  he  created 
matter  out  of  nothing,  and  then  made  it  the  basis  of  all  generation 
and  destruction. 

We  can  also  answer  the  arguments  in  favor  of  eternity  taken  from 
the  nature  of  God.  The  first  is  that  God  would  be  passing  from  po- 
tentiality to  actuality  if  he  made  the  world  at  a  particular  time  and 
not  before,  and  there  would  be  need  of  a  cause  producing  this  passage. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  271 

Our  answer  is  that  this  appHes  only  to  material  things  but  not  to  im- 
material, which  are  always  active  whether  they  produce  visible  re- 
sults or  not.  The  term  action  is  a  homonym  (c/.  above,  p.  240),  and 
the  conditions  applying  to  it  in  the  ordinary  usage  do  not  hold  when 
we  speak  of  God. 

Nor  is  the  second  argimient  conclusive.  An  agent  whose  will  is 
determined  by  a  purpose  external  to  himself  is  subject  to  influences 
positive  and  negative,  which  now  induce,  now  hinder  his  activity.  A 
person  desires  to  have  a  house  and  does  not  build  it  by  reason  of  ob- 
stacles of  various  sorts.  When  these  are  removed,  he  builds  the  house. 
In  the  case  of  an  agent  whose  will  has  no  object  external  to  itseK  this 
does  not  hold.  If  he  does  not  act  always,  it  is  because  it  is  the  nature 
of  will  sometimes  to  will  and  sometimes  not.  Hence  this  does  not 
argue  change.  ^^^ 

So  far  our  results  have  been  negative.  We  have  not  proved  that 
God  did  create  the  world  in  time;  we  have  only  taken  the  edge  off 
the  Aristotelian  arguments  and  thereby  shown  that  the  doctrine  of 
creation  is  not  impossible.  We  must  now  proceed  to  show  that  there 
are  positive  reasons  which  make  creation  a  more  plausible  theory 
than  eternity. 

The  gist  of  Maimonides's  arguments  here  is  that  the  difference 
between  eternity  and  creation  resolves  itself  into  a  more  fundamental 
difference  between  an  impersonal  mechanical  law  as  the  explanation 
of  the  universe  and  an  intelligent  personality  acting  with  will,  purpose 
and  design.  Aristotle  endeavors  to  explain  all  motions  in  the  world 
above  the  moon  as  well  as  below  in  terms  of  mechanics.  He  succeeds 
pretty  well  as  far  as  the  sublunar  world  is  concerned,  and  no  one  who 
is  free  from  prejudice  can  fail  to  see  the  cogency  of  his  reasoning. 
If  he  were  just  as  convincing  in  his  explanation  of  celestial  phenomena 
on  the  mechanical  principle  as  he  is  in  his  interpretation  of  sublunar 
events,  eternity  of  the  world  would  be  a  necessary  consequence. 
Uniformity  and  absolute  necessity  of  natural  law  are  more  compatible 
with  an  eternal  world  than  with  a  created  one.  But  Aristotle's  method 
breaks  down  the  moment  he  leaves  the  sublunar  sphere.  There  are 
too  many  phenomena  unaccounted  for  in  his  system. 

Aristotle  tries  to  find  a  reason  why  the  heavens  move  from  east  to 
west  and  not  in  the  opposite  direction;  and  his  explanation  for  the 


272  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

difference  in  speed  of  the  motions  of  the  various  spheres  is  that  it  is 
due  to  their  relative  proximity  to  the  outer  sphere,  which  is  the  cause 
of  this  motion  and  which  it  communicates  to  all  the  other  spheres 
under  it.  But  his  reasons  are  inadequate,  for  some  of  the  swift  mov- 
ing spheres  are  below  the  slow  moving  and  some  are  above.  When  he 
says  that  the  reason  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars  moves  so  slowly 
from  west  to  east  is  because  it  is  so  near  to  the  diurnal  sphere  (the 
outer  sphere),  which  moves  from  east  to  west,  his  explanation  is 
wonderfully  clever. ^^^  But  when  he  infers  from  this  that  the  farther 
a  sphere  is  from  the  fixed  stars  the  more  rapid  is  its  motion  from  west 
to  east,  his  conclusion  is  not  true  to  fact.  Or  let  us  consider  the  exist- 
ence of  the  stars  in  the  spheres.  The  matter  of  the  stars  must  be  differ- 
ent from  that  of  the  spheres,  for  the  latter  move,  whereas  the  stars  are 
always  stationary.  Now  what  has  put  these  two  different  matters 
together?  Stranger  still  is  the  existence  and  distribution  of  the  fixed 
stars  in  the  eighth  sphere.  Some  parts  are  thickly  studded  with  stars, 
others  are  very  thin.  In  the  planentary  spheres  what  is  the  reason 
(since  the  sphere  is  simple  and  uniform  throughout)  that  the  star 
occupies  the  particular  place  that  it  does?  This  can  scarcely  be  a 
matter  of  necessity.  It  will  not  do  to  say  that  the  differences  in 
the  motions  of  the  spheres  are  due  to  the  separate  Intelligences  for 
which  the  respective  spheres  have  a  desire.  For  the  Intelligences 
are  not  bodies,  and  hence  do  not  occupy  any  position  relative  to 
the  spheres.  There  must  therefore  be  a  being  who  determines  their 
various  motions. 

Further,  it  is  argued  on  the  philosophical  side  that  from  a  simple 
cause  only  a  simple  effect  can  follow;  and  that  if  the  cause  is  composite, 
as  many  effects  will  follow  as  there  are  simple  elements  in  the  cause. 
Hence  from  God  directly  can  come  only  one  simple  Intelligence.  This 
first  Intelligence  produces  the  second,  the  second  produces  the  third, 
and  so  on  {cf.  above,  p.  178).  Now  according  to  this  idea,  no  matter 
how  many  Intelligences  are  produced  in  this  successive  manner,  the 
last,  even  if  he  be  the  thousandth,  would  have  to  be  simple.  Where 
then  does  composition  arise?  Even  if  we  grant  that  the  farther  the 
Intelligences  are  removed  from  the  first  cause  the  more  composite  they 
become  by  reason  of  the  composite  nature  of  their  ideas  or  thoughts, 
how  can  we  explain  the  emanation  of  a  sphere  from  an  Intelligence, 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  273 

seeing  that  the  one  is  body,  the  other  Intellect?  Granting  again  this 
also  on  the  ground  that  the  Intelligence  producing  the  sphere  is  com- 
posite (since  it  thinks  itself  and  another),  and  hence  one  of  its  parts 
produces  the  next  lower  Intelligence  and  the  other  the  sphere,  there 
is  still  this  difficulty  that  the  part  of  the  Intelligence  producing  the 
sphere  is  simple,  whereas  the  sphere  has  four  elements — the  matter 
and  the  form  of  the  sphere,  and  the  matter  and  the  form  of  the  star 
fixed  in  the  sphere. 

All  these  are  difificulties  arising  from  the  Aristotelian  theory  of 
mechanical  causation,  necessity  of  natural  law  and  eternity  of  the 
world.  And  they  are  all  removed  at  a  stroke  when  we  substitute 
intelligent  cause  working  with  purpose,  will  and  design.  To  be  sure, 
by  finding  difl&culties  attaching  to  a  theory  we  do  not  disprove  it, 
much  less  do  we  prove  our  own.  But  we  should  follow  the  view  of 
Alexander,  who  says  that  where  a  theory  is  not  proved  one  should 
adopt  the  view  which  has  the  least  number  of  objections.  This,  we 
shall  show,  is  the  case  in  the  doctrine  of  creation.  We  have  already 
pointed  out  a  number  of  difficulties  attaching  to  the  Aristotelian  view, 
which  are  solved  if  we  adopt  creation.  And  there  are  others  besides. 
It  is  impossible  to  explain  the  heavenly  motions  as  a  necessary  me- 
chanical system.  The  hypotheses  made  by  Ptolemy  to  account  for 
the  apparent  motions  conflict  with  the  principles  of  the  Aristotelian 
Physics.  According  to  these  principles  there  is  no  motion  of  trans- 
lation, i.  e.,  there  is  no  change  of  place,  in  the  heavenly  spheres.  Also 
there  are  three  kinds  of  motion  in  the  world,  toward  the  centre  (water, 
earth),  away  from  the  centre  (air,  fire)  and  around  the  centre  (the 
celestial  spheres).  Also  motion  in  a  circle  must  be  around  a  fijxed 
centre.  x\ll  these  principles  are  violated  in  the  theories  of  the  epicycle 
and  eccentric,  especially  the  first.  For  the  epicycle  is  a  sphere  which 
changes  place  in  the  circumference  of  the  large  sphere. 

Finally,  an  important  objection  to  the  doctrine  of  eternity  as  taught 
by  Aristotle,  involving  as  it  does  necessity  and  absolute  changelessness 
of  natural  phenomena,  is  that  it  subverts  the  foundations  of  rehgion, 
and  does  away  with  miracles  and  signs.  The  Platonic  view  {cf.  above, 
p.  269)  is  not  so  bad  and  does  not  necessitate  the  denial  of  miracles; 
but  there  is  no  need  of  forcing  the  BibHcal  texts  to  that  opinion  so  long 
as  it  has  not  been  proved.    As  long  as  we  believe  in  creation  all  possible 


274  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

questions  concerning  the  reasons  for  various  phenomena  such  as  proph- 
ecy, the  various  laws,  the  selection  of  Israel,  and  so  on,  can  be  an- 
swered by  reference  to  the  will  of  God,  which  we  do  not  understand. 
If,  however,  the  world  is  a  mechanical  necessity,  all  these  questions 
arise  and  demand  an  answer.  ^^^ 

It  will  be  seen  that  Maimonides's  objections  to  eternity  and  mechan- 
ical necessity  (for  these  two  are  necessarily  connected  in  his  mind),  are 
twofold,  philosophic  and  religious.  The  latter  objection  we  may  con- 
ceive Maimonides  to  insist  upon  if  he  were  living  to-day.  Mechanical 
necessity  as  a  universal  explanation  of  phenomena  would  exclude  free 
will  and  the  efficacy  of  prayer  as  ordinarily  understood,  though  not 
necessarily  miracles,  if  we  mean  by  miracle  simply  an  extraordinary 
phenomenon  not  explicable  by  the  laws  of  nature  as  we  know  them, 
and  happening  only  on  rare  occasions.  But  in  reality  this  is  not  what 
we  mean  by  miracle.  A  miracle  is  a  discontinuity  in  the  laws  of  nature 
brought  to  pass  on  a  special  occasion  by  a  personal  being  in  response 
to  a  prayer  or  in  order  to  realize  a  given  purpose.  In  this  sense  mir- 
acles are  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  and  Maimon- 
ides's objections  hold  to-day,  except  for  those  to  whom  religion  is  in- 
dependent of  the  Bible,  tradition  or  any  external  authority. 

As  concerns  the  scientific  objections,  the  case  is  different.  We  may 
allow  Maimonides's  negative  criticism  of  the  Aristotelian  arguments, 
namely,  that  they  are  not  convincing.  His  positive  criticism  that 
Aristotle's  interpretation  of  phenomena  on  the  mechanical  principle 
does  not  explain  all  the  facts  is  not  valid.  Aristotle  may  be  wrong 
in  his  actual  explanations  of  particular  phenomena  and  yet  be  correct 
in  his  method.  Modern  science,  in  fact,  has  adopted  the  mechanical 
method  of  interpreting  phenomena,  assuming  that  this  is  the  only  way 
in  which  science  can  exist  at  all.  And  if  there  is  any  domain  in  which 
mechanical  causation  is  still  denied,  it  is  not  the  celestial  regions  about 
which  Maimonides  was  so  much  concerned — the  motions  of  the  heav- 
enly bodies  have  been  reduced  to  uniformity  in  accordance  with  nat- 
ural law  quite  as  definitely  as,  and  in  some  cases  more  definitely  than, 
some  terrestrial  phenomena — but  the  regions  of  life,  mind  and  will. 
In  these  domains  the  discussion  within  the  scientific  and  philosophic 
folds  is  still  going  on.  But  in  inanimate  nature  modern  science 
has  succeeded  in  justifying  its  method  by  the  ever  increasing  number 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  275 

of  phenomena  that  yield  to  its  treatment.  Maimonides  fought  an 
obsolete  philosophy  and  obsolete  scientific  principles.  It  is  possible 
that  he  might  have  found  much  to  object  to  in  modern  science  as  well, 
on  the  ground  that  much  is  yet  unexplained.  But  an  objection  of  this 
sort  is  captious,  particularly  if  we  consider  what  Maimonides  desires 
to  place  in  science's  stead.  Science  is  doing  its  best  to  classify  all 
natural  phenomena  and  to  discover  the  uniformities  underlying  their 
behavior.  It  has  succeeded  admirably  and  is  continually  widening 
its  sphere  of  activity.  It  has  been  able  to  predict  as  a  result  of  its 
method.  The  principle  of  uniformity  and  mechanical  necessity  is 
becoming  more  and  more  generally  verified  with  every  new  scientific 
discovery  and  invention. 

And  what  does  Maimonides  offer  us  in  its  stead?  The  principle  of 
intelligent  purpose  and  design.  This,  he  says,  is  not  open  to  the  objec- 
tions which  apply  to  the  AristoteKan  principles  and  methods.  It  is  as 
if  one  said  the  coward  is  a  better  man  than  the  brave  warrior,  because 
the  latter  is  open  to  the  danger  of  being  captured,  wounded  or  killed, 
whereas  the  former  is  not  so  liable.  The  answer  obviously  would  be 
that  the  only  way  the  coward  escapes  the  dangers  mentioned  is  by 
running  away,  by  refusing  to  fight.  Maimonides's  substitution  is 
tantamount  to  a  refusal  to  fight,  it  is  equivalent  to  flight  from  the 
field  of  battle. 

Aristotle  tries  to  explain  the  variation  in  speed  of  the  different 
celestial  motions,  and  succeeds  indifferently.  Another  man  coming 
after  Aristotle  and  following  the  same  method  may  succeed  better. 
This  has  actually  been  the  case.  Leverrier  without  ever  looking  into 
a  telescope  discovered  Neptune,  and  told  the  observers  in  what  part 
of  the  heavens  they  should  look  for  the  new  planet.  Substitute  Mai- 
monides's principle,  and  death  to  science!  Why  do  the  heavenly 
bodies  move  as  they  do?  Maimonides  replies  in  effect,  because  so 
God's  wisdom  has  determined  and  his  wisdom  is  transcendent.  There 
is  no  further  impulse  to  investigation  in  such  an  answer.  It  is  the 
reply  of  the  obscurantist,  and  it  is  very  surprising  that  Maimonides 
the  rationalist  should  so  far  have  forgotten  his  own  ideal  of  reason  and 
enlightenment.  He  is  here  playing  into  the  hands  of  those  very  Mu- 
takallimun  whom  he  so  severely  criticises.  They  were  more  consistent. 
Distrustful  of  the  irreligious  consequences  of  the  philosophical  theories 


276  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  Aristotle  and  his  Arabian  followers,  they  deliberately  denied  causa- 
tion and  natural  law,  and  substituted  the  will  of  God  as  interfering 
continuously  in  the  phenomena  of  nature.  A  red  object  continues  red 
because  and  as  long  as  God  creates  the  "accident  "  red  and  attaches 
it  to  the  atoms  of  which  the  object  is  composed.  Fire  taking  hold 
of  wood  burns  it  and  reduces  it  to  ashes  because  God  wills  at  the 
particular  moment  that  this  shall  be  the  result.  The  next  moment 
God  may  will  otherwise  and  the  fire  and  the  wood  will  lie  down  in 
peace  together  and  no  harm  done.  This  makes  miracles  possible  and 
easy.  Maimonides  would  not  think  of  going  so  far;  he  has  no  names 
harsh  enough  to  describe  this  unscientific,  unphilosophic,  illogical,  ir- 
rational, purely  imaginary  procedure.  But  we  find  that  he  is  himself 
guilty  of  the  same  lack  of  scientific  insight  when  he  rejects  a  method 
because  it  is  not  completely  successful,  and  substitutes  something 
else  which  will  always  be  successful  because  it  will  never  tell  us  any- 
thing at  all  and  will  stifle  all  investigation.  Were  Maimonides  living 
in  our  day,  we  may  suppose  he  would  be  more  favorably  inclined  to 
the  mechanical  principle  as  a  scientific  method. 

Having  laid  the  philosophical  foundations  of  religion  in  proving 
the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  of  God,  and  purposeful  crea- 
tion in  time,  Maimonides  proceeds  to  the  more  properly  religious 
doctrines  of  Judaism,  and  begins  with  the  phenomenon  of  prophecy. 
Here  also  he  follows  Aristotelian  ideas  as  expressed  in  the  writings 
of  the  Arabs  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna,  and  was  anticipated  among  the 
Jews  by  Ibn  Daud.  His  distinction  here  as  elsewhere  is  that  he  went 
further  than  his  model  in  the  manner  of  his  elaboration  of  the  doctrine. 

He  cites  three  opinions  concerning  prophecy: 

1.  The  Opinion  of  the  Masses.  God  chooses  any  person  he  desires, 
be  he  young  or  old,  wise  or  ignorant,  and  inspires  him  with  the  pro- 
phetic spirit. 

2.  The  Opinion  of  the  Philosophers.  Prophecy  is  a  human  gift  and 
requires  natural  aptitude  and  hard  preparation  and  study.,  But 
given  these  qualifications,  and  prophecy  is  sure  to  come. 

3.  The  Opinion  of  Judaism.  This  is  very  much  like  that  of  the 
philosophers,  the  only  difference  being  that  a  man  may  have  all  the 
qualifications  and  yet  be  prevented  from  prophesying  if  God,  by  way 
of  punishment,  does  not  desire  that  he  should. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  277 

Prophecy  is  an  inspiration  from  God,  which  passes  through  the 
mediation  of  the  Active  Intellect  to  the  rational  power  first  and  then 
to  the  faculty  of  the  imagination.  It  is  the  highest  stage  a  man  can 
attain  and  is  not  open  to  everyone.  It  requires  perfection  in  theo- 
retical wisdom  and  in  morals,  and  perfect  development  of  the  imagina- 
tive power.  This  latter  does  its  work  when  the  senses  are  at  rest, 
giving  rise  to  true  dreams,  and  producing  also  prophetic  visions. 
Dream  and  prophecy  differ  in  degree,  not  in  kind.  What  a  man  thinks 
hard  in  his  waking  state,  that  the  imagination  works  over  in  sleep. 
Now  if  a  person  has  a  perfect  brain;  develops  his  mind  as  far  as  a  man 
can;  is  pure  morally;  is  eager  to  know  the  mysteries  of  existence,  its 
causes  and  the  First  Cause;  is  not  susceptible  to  the  purely  animal 
desires,  or  to  those  of  the  spirited  soul  ambitious  for  dominion  and 
honor — if  a  man  has  all  these  qualifications,  he  without  doubt  receives 
through  his  imagination  from  the  Active  Intellect  divine  ideas.  The 
difference  in  the  grade  of  prophets  is  due  to  the  difference  in  these 
three  requirements — perfection  of  the  reason,  perfection  of  the  imagi- 
nation and  perfection  of  moral  character. 

According  to  the  character  and  development  of  their  reasons  and 
imaginations  men  may  be  divided  into  three  classes. 

1.  Those  whose  rational  faculties  are  highly  developed  and  receive 
influences  from  the  Active  Intellect,  but  whose  imagination  is  defec- 
tive constitutionally,  or  is  not  under  the  influence  of  the  Active  In- 
tellect.   These  are  wise  men  and  philosophers. 

2.  When  the  imagination  also  is  perfect  in  constitution  and  well 
developed  under  the  influence  of  the  Active  Intellect,  we  have  the 
class  of  prophets. 

3.  When  the  imagination  alone  is  in  good  condition,  but  the  in- 
tellect is  defective,  we  have  statesmen,  lawgivers,  magicians,  dreamers 
of  true  dreams  and  occult  artists.  These  men  are  so  confused  some- 
times by  visions  and  reveries  that  they  think  they  have  the  gift  of 
prophecy. 

Each  of  the  first  two  classes  may  be  further  divided  into  two  accord- 
ing as  the  influence  from  above  is  just  sufficient  for  the  perfection 
of  the  individual  himself,  or  is  so  abundant  as  to  cause  the  recipient 
to  seek  to  impart  it  to  others.  We  have  then  authors  and  teachers 
in  the  first  class,  and  preaching  prophets  in  the  second. 


278  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Among  the  powers  we  have  in  varying  degrees  are  those  of  courage 
and  divination.  These  are  innate  and  can  be  perfected  if  one  has 
them  in  any  degree.  By  means  of  the  power  of  divination  we  some- 
times guess  what  a  person  said  or  did  under  certain  conditions,  and 
guess  truly.  The  result  really  follows  from  a  number  of  premises,  but 
the  mind  passes  over  these  so  rapidly  that  it  seems  the  guess  was 
made  instantaneously.  The  prophet  must  have  these  two  faculties 
in  a  high  degree.  Witness  Moses  braving  the  wrath  of  a  great  king. 
Some  prophets  also  have  their  rational  powers  more  highly  developed 
than  those  of  an  ordinary  person  who  perfects  his  reason  by  theoretical 
study.  The  same  inspiration  which  renders  the  activity  of  the  imagi- 
nation so  vivid  that  it  seems  to  it  its  perceptions  are  real  and  due 
to  the  external  senses — this  same  inspiration  acts  also  upon  the  ra- 
tional power,  and  makes  its  ideas  as  certain  as  if  they  were  derived 
by  intellectual  effort. 

The  prophetic  vision  (Heb.  Mar'ah)  is  a  state  of  agitation  coming 
upon  the  prophet  in  his  waking  state,  as  is  clear  from  the  words  of 
Daniel,  "And  I  saw  this  great  vision,  and  there  remained  no  strength 
in  me:  for  my  comeliness  was  turned  in  me  into  corruption,  and  I 
retained  no  strength"  (Dan.  10,  8).  In  vision  also  the  senses  cease 
their  functions,  and  the  process  is  the  same  as  in  sleep. 

Whenever  the  Bible  speaks  of  prophecy  commg  to  anyone,  it  is 
always  through  an  angel  and  in  a  dream  or  vision,  whether  this  is 
specifically  stated  or  not.  The  expression,  "And  God  came  to  .  .  . 
in  a  dream  of  the  night,"  does  not  denote  prophecy  at  all.  It  is  merely 
a  dream  that  comes  to  a  person  warning  him  of  danger.  Laban  and 
Abimelech  had  such  dreams,  but  no  one  would  credit  these  heathens 
with  the  prophetic  power. 

Whenever  an  angel  is  met  in  Scripture  speaking  or  communicating 
with  a  person,  it  is  always  in  a  dream  or  vision.  Examples  are,  Abra- 
ham and  the  three  men,  Jacob  wresthng  with  the  angel,  Balaam  and 
the  ass,  Joshua  and  the  angel  at  Jericho; — all  these  were  in  a  dream 
or  vision.  Sometimes  there  is  no  angel  at  all,  but  merely  a  voice  that 
is  heard  by  such  as  are  not  deserving  of  prophecy,  for  example  Hagar, 
and  Manoah  and  his  wife. 

The  prophets  see  images  in  their  visions.  These  images  are  some- 
times interpreted  in  the  vision  itself;  sometimes  the  interpretation 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  279 

does  not  appear  until  the  prophet  wakes  up.  Sometimes  the  prophet 
sees  a  likeness,  sometimes  he  sees  God  speaking  to  him,  or  an  angel; 
or  he  hears  an  angel  speaking  to  him,  or  sees  a  man  speaking  to  him, 
or  sees  nothing  at  all  but  only  hears  a  voice. 

In  this  way  we  distinguish  eleven  grades  of  prophecy.  The  first 
two  are  only  preparatory,  not  yet  constituting  one  who  has  them  a 
prophet. 

1.  When  one  is  endowed  by  God  with  a  great  desire  to  save  a  com- 
munity or  a  famous  individual,  and  he  undertakes  to  bring  it  about, 
we  have  the  first  grade  known  as  the  "Spirit  of  God."  This  was  the 
position  of  the  Judges.  Moses  always  had  this  desire  from  the  moment 
he  could  be  called  a  man,  hence  he  killed  the  Egyptian  and  chided  the 
two  quarreling  men,  and  delivered  the  daughters  of  Jethro  from  the 
shepherds,  and  so  on.  The  same  is  true  of  David.  Not  everyone, 
however,  who  has  this  desire  is  a  prophet  until  he  succeeds  in  doing 
a  very  great  thing. 

2.  When  a  person  feels  something  come  upon  him  and  begins  to 
speak — words  of  wisdom  and  praise  or  of  warning,  or  relating  to  social 
or  religious  conduct — all  this  while  in  a  waking  state  and  with  full 
consciousness,  we  have  the  second  stage  called  the  "Holy  Spirit." 
This  is  the  inspiration  which  dictated  the  Psalms,  the  Proverbs, 
Ecclesiastes,  Song  of  Songs,  Daniel,  Job,  Chronicles  and  the  other 
sacred  writings  (Hagiographa).  Balaam's  discourses  also  belong  to 
this  class.  David,  Solomon  and  Daniel  belong  here,  and  are  not  in  the 
same  class  with  Isaiah,  Jeremiah,  Nathan,  Ahiah,  and  so  on.  God 
spoke  to  Solomon  through  Ahiah  the  Shilonite;  at  other  times  he  spoke 
to  him  in  a  dream,  and  when  Solomon  woke  up,  he  knew  it  was  a  dream 
and  not  a  prophecy.  Daniel's  visions  were  also  in  dreams.  This  is 
why  his  book  is  classed  in  the  third  division  of  the  BibHcal  writings 
(Hagiographa),  and  not  in  the  second  (Prophets). 

3.  This  is  the  first  grade  of  real  prophecy,  i.  e.,  when  a  prophet 
sees  a  picture  in  a  dream  under  the  proper  conditions,  and  the  picture 
is  explained  to  him  in  the  dream  itself.  Most  of  the  dreams  of  Zecha- 
riah  are  of  this  nature. 

4.  When  he  hears  speech  in  a  prophetic  dream,  but  does  not  see 
the  speaker,  as  happened  to  Samuel  in  the  beginning  of  his  career. 

5.  When  a  man  speaks  to  him  in  a  dream,  as  we  find  in  some 


28o  MEDimVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  prophecies  of  Ezekiel,  "And  the  man  said  unto  me,  son  of 
man.  .  .  ." 

6.  When  an  angel  speaks  to  him  in  a  dream.  This  is  the  condition 
of  most  prophets,  as  is  indicated  in  the  expression,  "And  an  angel 
of  God  said  to  me  in  a  dream." 

7.  When  it  seems  to  him  in  a  prophetic  dream  as  if  God  is  speaking 
to  him;  as  we  find  in  Isaiah,  "I  saw  the  Lord  ,  .  .  and  he  said, 
whom  shall  I  send  and  who  will  go  for  us"  (Isa.  6,  i,  8). 

8.  When  a  vision  appears  to  him  and  he  sees  pictures,  like  Abraham 
at  the  covenant  of  the  pieces  (Gen.  15). 

9.  When  he  hears  words  in  a  vision,  as  in  the  case  of  Abraham, 
"And,  behold,  the  word  of  the  Lord  came  unto  him  saying,  This  man 
shall  not  be  thine  heir"  (Gen.  15,  4). 

10.  When  he  sees  a  man  speaking  to  him  in  a  prophetic  vision. 
Examples,  Abraham  in  the  plain  of  Mamre,  Joshua  in  Jericho. 

1 1 .  When  he  sees  an  angel  speaking  to  him  in  a  vision,  like  Abraham 
in  the  sacrifice  of  Isaac.  This  is  the  highest  degree  of  prophecy, 
excepting  Moses.  The  next  higher  stage  would  be  that  a  prophet 
should  see  God  speaking  to  him  in  a  vision.  But  this  seems  impossible, 
as  it  is  too  much  for  the  imaginative  faculty.  In  fact  it  is  possible 
that  in  a  vision  speech  is  never  heard  at  all,  but  only  likenesses  are 
seen.    In  that  case  the  eleven  grades  are  reduced  to  eight. 

All  the  details  of  actions  and  travels  that  are  described  in  prophetic 
visions  must  not  be  understood  as  having  actually  taken  place,  as  for 
example  Hosea's  marrying  a  harlot.  They  appear  only  in  the 
prophet's  vision  or  dream.  Many  expressions  in  the  prophets  are 
h)^erbolical  or  metaphorical,  and  must  not  be  taken  literally. 

Moses  was  the  greatest  of  the  prophets.  He  alone  received  his 
communications  direct  from  God.  All  the  others  got  their  divine 
messages  through  an  angel.  Moses  performed  his  miracles  before 
the  whole  people  as  no  one  else  did.  The  standing  stiU  of  the  sun  pro- 
duced by  Joshua  was  not  in  the  presence  of  all  the  people.  Besides 
it  may  be  the  meaning  is  that  that  day  seemed  to  the  people  the 
longest  of  any  they  experienced  in  those  regions.  Moses  alone,  by 
reason  of  his  superiority  to  all  other  prophets  before  or  after,  called 
the  people  to  the  Law.  No  one  before  him  did  this,  though  there 
were  many  prophets  before  Moses.    Abraham  taught  a  few  people, 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  281 

and  so  did  others.  But  no  one  like  Moses  said  to  the  people,  "The 
Lord  sent  me  to  you  that  you  may  do  thus  and  so."  After  Moses  all 
the  prophets  urge  upon  the  people  obedience  to  the  law  of  Moses. 
This  shows  that  the  law  of  Moses  will  never  change.  For  it  is  perfect, 
and  any  change  in  any  direction  would  be  for  the  worse.  ^^^ 

From  the  theoretical  part  of  philosophy  we  pass  to  the  practical. 
This  includes  ethics  and  other  topics  related  thereto,  theodicy,  provi- 
dence, free  will  and  its  compatibility  with  God's  omniscience.  To 
give  his  ethical  doctrine  a  scientific  character,  Maimonides  bases  it 
upon  a  metaphysical  and  psychological  foundation.  The  doctrine 
of  matter  and  form  gives  him  a  convenient  formula  underlying  his 
ethical  discussion.  Sin  and  vice  are  due  to  matter,  virtue  and  goodness 
to  form.  For  sensuous  desires,  which  are  due  to  matter,  are  at  the 
basis  of  vice;  whereas  intellectual  pursuits,  which  constitute  the  no- 
blest activity  of  the  soul,  the  form  of  the  living  body,  lead  to  virtue. 
We  may  therefore  state  man's  ethical  duty  in  broad  philosophical 
terms  as  follows:  Despise  matter,  and  have  to  do  with  it  only  so  far 
as  is  absolutely  necessary.  ^^^  This  is  too  general  to  be  enlightening, 
and  it  is  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  psychology.  Ethics  has  for  its 
subject-matter  the  improvement  and  perfection  of  character.  Mak- 
ing use  of  a  medical  analogy  we  may  say  that  as  it  is  the  business  of 
the  physician  to  cure  the  body,  so  it  is  the  aim  of  the  moral  teacher 
to  cure  the  soul.  We  may  carry  this  figure  further  and  conclude  that 
as  the  physician  must  know  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of  the  body 
before  he  can  undertake  to  cure  it  of  its  ills,  so  the  moraUst  must  know 
the  nature  of  the  soul  and  its  powers  or  faculties. 

In  the  details  of  his  psychology  Maimonides  follows  Alfarabi  in- 
stead of  Avicenna  who  was  the  model  of  Judah  Halevi  and  Ibn  Daud 
(pp.  175,  211). 

The  soul  consists  of  five  parts  or  faculties:  the  nutritive,  the  sensi- 
tive, the  imaginative,  the  appetitive  and  the  rational.  The  further 
description  of  the  nutritive  soul  pertains  to  medicine  and  does  not 
concern  us  here.  The  sensitive  soul  contains  the  well  known  five 
senses.  The  imaginative  faculty  is  the  power  which  retains  the  forms 
of  sensible  objects  when  they  are  no  longer  present  to  the  external 
senses.  It  also  has  the  function  of  original  combination  of  sense 
elements  into  composite  objects  having  no  real  existence  in  the  out- 


282  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

side  world.  This  makes  the  imagination  an  unreliable  guide  in  matters 
intellectual. 

The  appetitive  faculty  is  the  power  of  the  soul  by  which  a  person 
desires  a  thing  or  rejects  it.  Acts  resulting  from  it  are  the  pursuit 
of  an  object  and  its  avoidance;  also  the  feelings  of  anger,  favor,  fear, 
courage,  cruelty,  pity,  love,  hate,  and  so  on.  The  organs  of  these 
powers,  feelings  and  activities  are  the  members  of  the  body,  like  the 
hand,  which  takes  hold  of  an  object;  the  foot,  which  goes  toward  a 
thing  or  away  from  it;  the  eye,  which  looks;  the  heart,  which  takes 
courage  or  is  stricken  with  fear;  and  so  with  the  rest. 

The  rational  faculty  is  the  power  of  the  soul  by  which  a  person  re- 
flects, acquires  knowledge,  discriminates  between  a  praiseworthy 
act  and  a  blameworthy.  The  functions  of  the  rational  soul  are  practi- 
cal and  theoretical.  The  practical  activity  of  the  reason  has  to  do 
with  the  arts  directly,  as  in  learning  carpentry,  agriculture,  medicine, 
seamanship;  or  it  is  concerned  with  reflecting  upon  the  methods  and 
principles  of  a  given  art.  The  theoretical  reason  has  for  its  subject- 
matter  the  permanent  and  unchangeable,  what  is  known  as  science 
in  the  true  sense  of  the  term.^^*^ 

Now  as  far  as  the  commandments,  mandatory  and  prohibitive, 
of  the  Bible  are  concerned,  the  only  parts  of  the  soul  which  are  involved 
are  the  sensitive  and  the  appetitive.  For  these  are  the  only  powers 
subject  to  control.  The  nutritive  and  the  imaginative  powers  func- 
tion in  sleep  as  well  in  waking,  hence  a  person  cannot  be  held  responsi- 
ble for  their  activities,  which  are  involuntary.  There  is  some  doubt 
about  the  rational  faculty,  but  it  seems  that  here  too  a  person  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  opinions  he  holds,  though  no  practical  acts  are  in- 
volved. 

Virtues  are  divided  into  ethical  and  intellectual  (dianoetic);  and 
so  are  the  contrary  vices.  The  intellectual  virtues  are  the  excellencies 
of  the  reason.  Such  are  science,  which  consists  in  the  knowledge  of 
proximate  and  remote  causes  of  things;  pure  reason,  having  to  do  with 
such  innate  principles  as  the  axioms;  the  acquired  reason,  which  we 
cannot  discuss  here;  clearness  of  perception  and  quick  insight.  The 
intellectual  vices  are  the  opposites  or  the  contraries  of  these. 

The  ethical  virtues  are  resident  in  the  appetitive  faculty.  The 
sensitive  soul  is  auxihary  to  the  appetitive.    The  number  of  these 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  283 

virtues  is  large.  Examples  are;  temperance,  generosity,  justice, 
modesty,  humility,  contentment,  courage,  and  so  on.  The  vices  of 
this  class  are  the  above  qualities  carried  to  excess,  or  not  practiced 
to  the  required  extent.  The  faculties  of  nutrition  and  imagination 
have  neither  virtues  nor  vices.  We  say  a  person's  digestion  is  good 
or  it  is  poor;  his  imagination  is  correct  or  it  is  defective,  but  we  do  not 
attach  the  idea  of  virtue  or  vice  to  these  conditions. 

Virtue  is  a  permanent  and  enduring  quahty  of  the  soul  occupying 
an  intermediate  position  between  the  two  opposite  extremes  each 
of  which  is  a  vice,  sinning  by  exceeding  the  proper  measure  of  the 
golden  mean  or  by  falhng  short  of  it.  A  good  act  is  that  form  of  con- 
duct which  follows  from  a  virtuous  disposition  as  just  defined.  A  bad 
act  is  the  result  of  a  tendency  of  the  soul  to  either  of  the  two  extremes, 
of  excess  or  defect.  Thus  temperance  or  moderation  is  a  virtue.  It 
is  the  mean  between  over-indulgence  in  the  direction  of  excess,  and 
insensibility  or  indifference  in  the  direction  of  defect.  The  last  two 
are  vices.  Similarly  generosity  is  a  mean  between  niggardliness  and 
extravagance;  courage  is  a  mean  between  foolhardiness  and  cowardice; 
dignity  is  a  mean  between  haughtiness  and  loutishness;  humihty  is 
a  mean  between  arrogance  and  self-abasement;  contentment  is  a 
mean  between  avarice  and  slothful  indifference;  kindness  is  a  mean 
between  baseness  and  excessive  self-denial;  gentleness  is  a  mean  be- 
tween irascibility  and  insensibihty  to  insult;  modesty  is  a  mean  be- 
tween impudence  and  shamefacedness.  People  are  often  mistaken 
and  regard  one  of  the  extremes  as  a  virtue.  Thus  the  reckless  and 
the  foolhardy  is  often  praised  as  the  brave;  the  man  of  no  backbone 
is  called  gentle;  the  indolent  is  mistaken  for  the  contented;  the  in- 
sensible for  the  temperate,  the  extravagant  for  the  generous.  This  is 
an  error.    The  mean  alone  is  worthy  of  commendation. 

The  ethical  virtues  and  vices  are  acquired  as  a  result  of  repeated 
practice  during  a  long  time  of  the  corresponding  acts  until  they  become 
a  confirmed  habit  and  a  second  nature.  A  person  is  not  born  virtuous 
or  vicious.  What  he  will  turn  out  to  be  depends  upon  the  way  he  is 
trained  from  childhood.  If  his  training  has  been  wrong  and  he  has 
acquired  a  vicious  disposition  in  a  particular  tendency,  he  may  be 
cured.  And  here  we  may  borrow  a  leaf  from  the  book  of  medicine. 
As  in  bodily  disease  the  physician's  endeavor  is  to  restore  the  disturbed 


284  MEDIMVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

equilibrium  in  the  mixture  of  the  humors  by  increasing  the  element 
that  is  deficient,  so  in  diseases  of  the  soul,  if  a  person  has  a  decided 
tendency  to  one  of  the  vicious  extremes,  he  must  as  a  curative  measure, 
for  a  certain  length  of  time,  be  directed  to  practice  the  opposite  ex- 
treme until  he  has  been  cured.  Then  he  may  go  back  to  the  virtuous 
mean.  Thus  if  a  person  has  the  vice  of  niggardliness,  the  practice 
of  liberality  is  not  sufi&cient  to  cure  him.  As  a  heroic  measure  he  must 
practice  extravagance  until  the  former  tendency  has  left  him.  Then 
he  may  return  to  the  liberal  mean.  The  same  thing  applies  to  the 
other  virtues,  except  that  it  is  necessary  to  use  proper  judgment  in 
the  amount  of  practice  of  a  vicious  extreme  necessary  to  bring  about 
a  satisfactory  result.  Too  great  deviation  and  too  long  continued 
from  the  mean  would  in  some  cases  be  dangerous,  as  likely  to  develop 
the  opposite  vice.  Thus  it  is  comparatively  safe  to  indulge  in  extrava- 
gance as  a  cure  for  niggardliness;  the  reverse  process  must  be  used 
with  caution.  Care  should  likewise  be  taken  in  trying  to  wean  a 
person  away  from  a  habit  of  insensibility  to  pleasure  by  means  of 
a  regime  of  indulgence.  If  it  is  not  discontinued  in  time,  he  may 
become  a  pleasure  seeker,  which  is  even  worse  than  total  indifference. 

It  is  in  this  way  that  we  must  explain  the  conduct  of  certain  pious 
men  and  saints  who  were  not  content  with  following  the  middle  way, 
and  inclined  to  one  extreme,  the  extreme  of  asceticism  and  self-abase- 
ment. They  did  this  as  a  measure  of  cure,  or  because  of  the  wicked- 
ness of  their  generation,  whose  example  they  feared  would  contaminate 
them  by  its  contagion.  Hence  they  lived  a  retired  and  solitary  life, 
the  life  of  a  recluse.  It  was  not  meant  as  the  normal  mode  of  conduct, 
which  would  be  as  unwholesome  to  the  soul  as  an  invalid's  drugs 
would  be  dangerous  if  taken  regularly  by  a  person  of  sound  health. 

The  will  of  God  is  that  we  should  follow  the  middle  way  and  eat 
and  drink  and  enjoy  ourselves  in  moderation.  To  be  sure,  we  must  be 
always  on  our  guard  against  slipping  into  the  forbidden  extreme, 
but  it  is  not  necessary  for  this  purpose  to  inflict  additional  burdens 
upon  ourselves  or  to  practice  mortification  of  the  flesh  and  abstention 
from  food  and  drink  beyond  what  is  prescribed  in  the  Law.  For 
many  of  the  regulations  in  the  Pentateuch  have  been  laid  down  for 
this  very  purpose.  The  dietary  laws,  the  laws  of  forbidden  marriages, 
the  laws  of  tithes,  the  laws  prescribing  that  the  corner  of  the  field, 


MOSES  MAI MON IDES  285 

the  dropped  and  forgotten  ears  and  the  gleanings  of  the  vintage  should 
be  left  to  the  poor,  the  laws  of  the  sabbatical  year,  the  Jubilee,  and 
the  regulations  governing  charity — all  these  are  intended  to  guard 
us  against  avarice  and  selfishness.  Other  laws  and  precepts  are  for 
the  purpose  of  moderating  our  tendency  to  anger  and  rage,  and  so 
with  all  the  other  virtues  and  vices.  Hence  it  is  folly  and  overscrupu- 
lousness  to  add  restrictions  of  one's  own  accord  except  in  critical 
instances,  as  indicated  above. 

The  purpose  of  all  human  life  and  activity  is  to  know  God  as  far  as 
it  is  possible  for  man.  Hence  all  his  activities  should  be  directed  to 
that  one  end.  His  eating  and  drinking  and  sleeping  and  waking  and 
motion  and  rest  and  pleasure  should  have  for  their  object  the  mainte- 
nance of  good  health  and  cheerful  spirits,  not  as  an  end  in  themselves, 
but  as  a  means  to  intellectual  peace  and  freedom  from  worry  and  care 
in  order  that  he  may  have  leisure  and  abihty  to  study  and  reflect 
upon  the  highest  truths  of  God.  Good  music,  beautiful  scenery, 
works  of  art,  splendid  architecture  and  fine  clothing  should  not  be 
pursued  for  their  own  sake,  but  only  so  far  as  they  may  be  necessary 
to  relieve  the  tedium  and  monotony  of  toil  and  labor,  or  as  a  curative 
measure  to  dispel  gloom  and  low  spirits  or  a  tendency  to  melancholy. 
The  same  thing  appHes  to  the  arts  and  sciences.  Medicine  is  of  as- 
sistance in  maintaining  bodily  health  and  curing  it  of  its  ills.  The 
logical,  mathematical  and  physical  sciences  are  either  directly  helpful 
to  speculative  theology,  and  their  value  is  evident;  or  they  serve  to 
train  the  mind  in  deduction  and  analysis,  and  are  thus  indirectly 
of  benefit  for  the  knowledge  of  God.^^^ 

The  ethical  quaUties  similarly  conduce  to  intellectual  perfection, 
and  the  difference  between  one  prophet  and  another  is  in  large  measure 
dependent  upon  relative  ethical  superiority.  Thus  when  the  Rabbis 
say  that  Moses  saw  God  through  a  luminous  mirror,  and  tlie  other 
prophets  through  a  non-luminous,  the  meaning  is  that  Moses  had 
intellectual  and  moral  perfection,  so  far  as  a  human  being  is  capable 
of  having  them,  and  the  only  partition  separating  him  from  a  complete 
vision  of  God  was  his  humanity.  The  other  prophets  had  other  de- 
fects besides,  constituting  so  many  additional  partitions  obscuring 
the  divine  view.^^^ 

Some  foolish  astrologers  are  of  the  opinion  that  a  man's  character 


286  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

is  determined  in  advance  by  the  position  of  the  stars  at  the  time  of 
his  birth.  This  is  a  grave  error,  as  can  be  shown  from  reason  as  well 
as  tradition.  The  Bible  as  well  as  the  Greek  philosophers  are  agreed 
that  a  man's  acts  are  under  his  own  control,  and  that  he  himself  and 
no  one  else  is  responsible  for  his  virtues  as  well  as  his  vices.  It  is  true 
that  a  person's  temperament,  which  is  constitutional  and  over  which 
he  has  no  control,  plays  an  important  role  in  his  conduct.  There  is 
no  denying  that  men  are  born  with  certain  tendencies.  Some  are 
born  phlegmatic,  some  are  passionate  and  hot-blooded.  One  man  has 
a  tendency  to  fearlessness  and  bravery,  another  is  timid  and  back- 
ward. But  while  it  is  true  that  it  is  more  difficult  for  the  hot-blooded 
to  develop  the  virtue  of  temperance  and  moderation  than  it  is  for  the 
phlegmatic,  that  it  is  easier  for  the  warm-tempered  to  learn  courage 
than  it  is  for  the  cold-tempered — these  are  not  impossible.  Virtue, 
we  have  seen  before,  is  not  a  natural  state,  but  an  acquired  possession 
due  to  long  continued  discipline  and  practice.  One  man  may  require 
longer  and  more  assiduous  practice  than  another  to  acquire  a  certain 
virtue,  but  no  matter  what  his  inherited  temperament,  he  can  acquire 
it  if  he  undertakes  to  do  so,  or  if  properly  trained.  If  man's  character 
and  conduct  were  determined,  all  the  commandments  and  prohibi- 
tions in  the  Bible  would  be  in  vain,  for  without  freedom  command 
has  no  effect.  Similarly  there  would  be  no  use  in  a  person's  endeavor- 
ing to  learn  any  trade  or  profession;  for  if  it  is  determined  beforehand 
that  a  given  individual  shall  be  a  physician  or  a  carpenter,  he  is  bound 
to  be  one  whether  he  studies  or  not.  This  would  make  all  reward  and 
punishment  wrong  and  unjust  whether  administered  by  man  or  by 
God.  For  the  person  so  rewarded  or  punished  could  not  help  doing 
what  he  did,  and  is  therefore  not  responsible.  All  our  plans  and 
preparations  would  on  this  supposition  be  useless  and  without  mean- 
ing, such  as  building  houses,  acquiring  food,  avoiding  danger,  and  so 
on.  All  this  is  absurd  and  opposed  to  reason  as  well  as  to  sense.  It 
undermines  the  foundation  of  religion  and  imputes  wrong  to  God.  The 
Bible  says  distinctly,  "See,  I  have  set  before  thee  this  day  life  and 
the  good,  death  and  the  evil  .  .  .  therefore  choose  thou  life.  .  .  ." 
(Deut.  30,  15,  19.) 

There  are  some  passages  in  the  Bible  which  apparently  lend  color 
to  the  idea  that  a  person's  acts  are  determined  from  on  high.    Such 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  287 

are  the  expressions  used  in  relation  to  Pharaoh's  conduct  toward  the 
IsraeUtes  in  refusing  to  let  them  go  out  of  Egypt.  We  are  told  there 
that  God  hardened  the  heart  of  Pharaoh  that  he  should  not  let  the 
Israehtes  go.  And  he  did  this  in  order  to  punish  the  Egyptians.  The 
criticism  here  is  twofold.  First,  these  expressions  indicate  that  a 
person  is  not  always  free;  and  second,  it  seems  scarcely  just  to  force 
a  man  to  act  in  a  certain  way  and  then  to  punish  him  for  it. 

The  explanation  Maimonides  gives  to  this  passage  is  as  follows: 
He  admits  that  in  Pharaoh's  case  there  was  a  restriction  of  Pharaoh's 
freedom.  But  this  was  a  penal  measure  and  exceptional.  Normally 
a  man  is  free,  but  he  may  forfeit  this  freedom  if  he  abuses  it.  So 
Pharaoh's  primary  offence  was  not  that  he  would  not  let  the  children  of 
Israel  go  out  of  Egypt,  His  sin  consisted  in  his  tyrannical  treatment 
of  Israel  in  the  past,  which  he  did  of  his  own  accord  and  as  a  result  of 
free  choice.  His  loss  of  freedom  in  complying  with  Moses's  request 
to  let  the  Israelites  go  was  already  in  the  nature  of  a  punishment,  and 
its  object  was  to  let  all  the  world  know  that  a  person  may  forfeit  his 
freedom  of  action  as  a  punishment  for  abusing  his  human  privilege. 
To  be  sure  God  does  not  always  punish  sin  so  severely,  but  it  is  not  for 
us  to  search  his  motives  and  ask  why  he  punishes  one  man  in  one  way 
and  another  in  another.    We  must  leave  this  to  his  wisdom. 

Another  argument  against  free  will  is  that  it  is  incompatible  with 
the  knowledge  of  God.  If  God  is  omniscient  and  knows  the  future  as 
well  as  the  past  and  the  present,  he  knows  how  a  given  person  will  act 
at  a  given  moment.  But  since  God's  knowledge  is  certain  and  not 
liable  to  error,  the  person  in  question  cannot  help  acting  as  God  long 
foreknew  he  would  act,  and  hence  his  act  is  not  the  result  of  his  free 
will.  Maimonides's  answer  to  this  objection  is  virtually  an  admission 
of  ignorance.  He  takes  refuge  in  the  transcendence  of  God's  knowl- 
edge, upon  which  he  dwelt  so  insistently  in  the  earlier  part  of  his 
work  (p.  260  ff.).  God  is  not  qualified  by  attributes  as  we  his  creatures 
are.  As  he  does  not  live  by  means  of  life,  so  he  does  not  know  by 
means  of  knowledge.  He  knows  through  his  own  essence.  He  and 
his  existence  and  his  knowledge  are  identical.  Hence  as  we  cannot 
know  his  essence,  we  cannot  have  any  conception  of  his  knowledge. 
It  is  mistaken  therefore  to  argue  that  because  we  cannot  know  a  future 
event  unless  it  is  already  determined  in  the  present,  God  cannot  do  so. 


288  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

His  knowledge  is  of  a  diflferent  kind  from  ours,  and  he  can  do  what  we 
cannot.  ^^^ 

The  next  problem  Maimonides  takes  up  is  the  doctrine  of  evil. 
The  presence  of  evil  in  the  world,  physical  as  well  as  moral,  was  a 
stumbling  block  to  all  religious  thinkers  in  the  middle  ages.  The 
difficulty  seems  to  find  its  origin  in  Neo-Platonism,  or,  farther  back 
still,  in  Philo  of  Alexandria,  who  identified  God  with  the  Good.  If  he 
is  the  Good,  evil  cannot  come  from  him.  How  then  account  for  the 
evil  in  the  world?  The  answer  that  was  given  was  extremely  unsat- 
isfactory. It  was  founded  on  a  metaphysical  distinction  which  is  as 
old  as  Plato,  namely,  of  matter  as  the  non-existent.  Matter  was  con- 
sidered a  principle  without  any  definite  nature  or  actual  being,  and 
this  was  made  the  basis  of  all  imperfection,  death,  sin.  Evil  partakes 
of  the  non-existence  of  matter,  it  is  nothing  positive,  but  only  a  nega- 
tion or  privation  of  good  as  darkness  is  the  absence  of  light;  hence  it 
needs  no  creator,  it  has  no  efficient  cause,  but  only  a  deficient  cause. 
In  this  way  physical  evil  was  accounted  for.  Moral  evil  as  the  result  of 
man's  inhumanity  to  man  could  easily  be  explained  by  laying  it  to  the 
charge  of  man's  free  will  or  even  to  the  free  will  of  the  fallen  angels  as 
Origen  conceives  it.  This  removes  from  God  all  responsibihty  for 
evil.  We  shall  find  that  Maimonides  has  nothing  essentially  new  to 
contribute  to  the  solution  of  the  problem. 

Strictly  speaking,  he  says,  only  a  positive  thing  can  be  made,  nega- 
tion or  privation  carmot.  We  may  speak  loosely  of  the  negative  being 
produced  when  one  removes  the  positive.  So  if  a  man  puts  out  a 
light,  we  say  he  made  darkness,  though  darkness  is  a  negation. 

Evil  is  nothing  but  the  negation  of  the  positive,  which  is  good.  All 
positive  things  are  good.  Hence  God  cannot  be  said  to  produce  evil. 
The  positive  thing  which  he  produces  is  good;  the  evil  is  due  to  defect 
in  the  thing.  Matter  also  is  good  so  far  as  it  is  positive,  i.  e.,  so  far  as 
it  causes  continued  existence  of  one  thing  after  another.  The  evil 
in  matter  is  due  to  its  negative  or  privative  aspect  as  the  formless, 
which  makes  it  the  cause  of  defect  and  evil.  All  evil  that  men  do  to 
each  other  is  also  due  to  negation,  namely,  absence  of  wisdom  and 
knowledge. 

Many  people  think  there  is  more  evil  in  the  world  than  good.  Their 
mistake  is  due  to  the  fact  that  they  make  the  experience  of  the  Individ- 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  289 

ual  man  the  arbiter  in  this  question,  thinking  that  the  universe  was 
made  for  his  sake.  They  forget  that  man  is  only  a  small  fraction  of 
the  world,  which  is  made  by  the  will  of  God.  Even  so  man  should  be 
grateful  for  the  great  amount  of  good  he  receives  from  God,  for  many 
of  the  evils  of  man  are  self-inflicted.  In  fact  the  evils  befalling  man 
come  under  three  categories. 

1.  The  evil  that  is  incident  to  man's  nature  as  subject  to  genesis  and 
decay,  i.  e.,  as  composed  of  matter.  Hence  arise  the  various  accidents 
to  which  man  is  liable  on  account  of  bad  air  and  other  natural  causes. 
These  are  inevitable,  and  inseparable  from  matter,  and  from  the  gen- 
eration of  individuals  in  a  species.  To  demand  that  a  person  of  flesh 
and  blood  shall  not  be  subject  to  impressions  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms.    And  with  all  this  the  evils  of  this  class  are  comparatively  few. 

2.  They  are  the  evils  inflicted  by  one  man  upon  the  other.  These 
are  more  frequent  than  the  preceding.  Their  causes  are  various.  And 
yet  these  too  are  not  very  frequent. 

3.  These  are  the  most  common.  They  are  the  evils  man  brings  upon 
himself  by  self-indulgence  and  the  formation  of  bad  habits.  He  injures 
the  body  by  excess,  and  he  injures  the  mind  through  the  body  by  per- 
verting and  weakening  it,  and  by  enslaving  it  to  luxuries  to  which 
there  is  no  end.  If  a  person  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  necessary, 
he  will  easily  have  what  he  needs;  for  the  necessaries  are  not  hard  to 
get.  God's  justice  is  evident  in  affording  the  necessaries  to  all  his 
creatures  and  in  making  all  the  individuals  of  the  same  species  similar 
in  power  and  ability.  ^^^ 

The  next  problem  Maimonides  discusses  is  really  theoretical  and 
should  have  its  place  in  the  discussion  of  the  divine  attributes,  for  it 
deals  with  the  character  of  God's  knowledge.  The  reason  for  taking 
it  up  here  is  because,  according  to  Maimonides,  it  was  an  ethical  ques- 
tion that  was  the  motive  for  the  formulation  of  the  view  of  the  oppo- 
nents. Accordingly  the  problem  is  semi-ethical,  semi-metaphysical, 
and  is  closely  related  to  the  question  of  Providence. 

Observing  that  the  good  are  often  wretched  and  the  bad  prosperous, 
the  philosophers  came  to  the  conclusion  that  God  does  not  know  in- 
dividual things.  For  if  he  knows  and  does  not  order  them  as  is  proper, 
this  must  be  due  either  to  inability  or  to  jealousy,  both  of  which  are 
impossible  in  God.    Having  come  to  this  conclusion  in  the  way  in- 


290  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

dicated,  they  then  bolstered  it  up  with  arguments  to  justify  it  pos- 
itively. Such  are  that  the  individual  is  known  through  sense  and  God 
has  no  sensation;  that  the  number  of  individual  things  is  infinite,  and 
the  infinite  cannot  be  comprehended,  hence  cannot  be  known;  that 
knowledge  of  the  particular  is  subject  to  change  as  the  object  changes, 
whereas  God's  knowledge  is  unchangeable.  Against  us  Jews  they  argue 
that  to  suppose  God  knows  things  before  they  are  connects  knowledge 
with  the  non-existent;  and  besides  there  would  be  two  kinds  of  knowl- 
edge in  God,  one  knowledge  of  potential  things,  and  another  of  actual 
things.  So  they  came  to  the  conclusion  that  God  knows  only  species 
but  not  individuals.  Others  say  that  God  knows  nothing  except  his 
own  essence,  else  there  would  be  multiplicity  in  his  nature.  As  the 
entire  dif&culty,  according  to  Maimonides,  arose  from  the  supposed 
impropriety  in  the  government  of  individual  destinies,  he  first  dis- 
cusses the  question  of  Providence  and  comes  back  later  to  the  problem 
of  God's  knowledge.  ^^^ 
He  enumerates  five  opinions  concerning  Providence. 

1.  The  Opinion  oj  Epicurus.  There  is  no  Providence  at  all;  every- 
thing is  the  result  of  accident  and  concurrence  of  atoms.  Aristotle  has 
refuted  this  idea. 

2.  The  Opinion  oj  Aristotle.  Some  things  are  subject  to  Providence, 
others  are  governed  by  accident.  God  provides  for  the  celestial 
spheres,  hence  they  are  permanent  individually;  but,  as  Alexander 
says  in  his  name.  Providence  ceases  with  the  sphere  of  the  moon. 
Aristotle's  doctrine  concerning  Providence  is  related  to  his  belief  in 
the  eternity  of  the  world.  Providence  corresponds  to  the  nature  of 
the  object  in  question.  As  the  individual  spheres  are  permanent, 
it  shows  that  there  is  special  Providence  which  preserves  the  spheres 
individually.  As,  again,  there  proceed  from  them  other  beings  which 
are  not  permanent  individually  but  only  as  species,  namely,  the  species 
of  our  world,  it  is  clear  that  with  reference  to  the  sublunar  world 
there  is  so  much  Providential  influence  as  to  bring  about  the  per- 
manence of  the  species,  but  not  of  the  individual.  To  be  sure,  the 
individuals  too  are  not  completely  neglected.  There  are  various  powers 
given  to  them  in  accordance  with  the  quality  of  their  matters;  which 
powers  determine  the  length  of  their  duration,  their  motion,  percep- 
tion, purposive  existence.     But  the  other  incidents  and  motions  in 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  291 

individual  human  as  well  as  animal  life  are  pure  accident.  When  a 
storm  scatters  the  leaves  of  trees,  casts  down  some  trunks  and  drowns 
a  ship  with  its  passengers,  the  incident  is  as  accidental  with  the  men 
drowned  as  with  the  scattered  leaves.  That  which  follows  invariable 
laws  Aristotle  regards  as  Providential,  what  happens  rarely  and  with- 
out nile  is  accidental. 

3.  The  View  of  the  Ashariya.  This  is  the  very  opposite  of  the  pre- 
ceding opinion.  The  Ashariya  deny  all  accident.  Everything  is 
done  by  the  will  of  God,  whether  it  be  the  fall  of  a  leaf  or  the  death 
of  a  man.  Everything  is  determined,  and  a  person  cannot  of  himself 
do  or  forbear.  It  follows  from  this  view  that  the  category  of  the  pos- 
sible is  ruled  out.  Everything  is  either  necessary  or  impossible.  It 
follows  also  that  all  laws  are  useless,  for  man  is  helpless,  and  reward 
and  punishment  are  determined  solely  by  the  will  of  God,  to  whom 
the  concepts  of  right  and  wrong  do  not  apply. 

4.  The  Opinion  of  the  Mu  tazila.  They  vindicate  man's  power  to 
do  and  forbear,  thus  justifying  the  commands  and  prohibitions,  and 
the  rewards  and  punishments  of  the  laws.  God  does  not  do  wrong. 
They  also  believe  that  God  knows  of  the  fall  of  a  leaf,  and  provides 
for  all  things.  This  opinion,  too,  is  open  to  criticism.  If  a  person  is 
born  with  a  defect,  they  say  this  is  due  to  God's  wisdom,  and  it  is 
better  for  the  man  to  be  thus.  If  a  pious  man  is  put  to  death,  it  is  to 
increase  his  reward  in  the  next  world.  They  extend  this  to  lower 
animals  also,  and  say  that  the  mouse  killed  by  the  cat  will  be  rewarded 
in  the  next  world. 

The  last  three  opinions  all  have  their  motives.  Aristotle  followed 
the  data  of  nature.  The  Ashariya  refused  to  impute  ignorance 
to  God.  The  Mu'  tazila  object  to  imputing  to  him  wrong,  or  to  deny- 
ing reason,  which  holds  that  to  cause  a  person  pain  for  no  offence  is 
wrong.  Their  opinion  leads  to  a  contradiction,  for  they  say  God 
knows  everything  and  at  the  same  time  man  is  free. 

5.  The  Opinion  of  our  Law.  A  fundamental  principle  of  the  law  of 
Moses  is  that  man  has  absolute  freedom  in  his  conduct,  and  so  has 
an  irrational  animal.  No  one  of  our  religion  disputes  this.  Another 
fundamental  principle  is  that  God  does  no  wrong,  and  hence  all  reward 
and  punishment  is  justly  given.  There  is  only  one  exception  men- 
tioned by  the  Rabbis,  what  they  call  "suffering  for  love,"  i.  e.,  mis- 


292  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

fortunes  which  are  not  in  the  nature  of  punishment  for  sins  committed, 
but  in  order  to  increase  reward.  There  is  no  support,  however,  for 
this  view  in  the  Bible.  All  this  applies  only  to  man.  Nothing  is 
said  in  the  Bible  or  in  the  Talmud  of  reward  and  punishment  of  ani- 
mals. It  was  adopted  by  some  of  the  later  Geonim  from  the  Mu  - 
tazila. 

After  citing  these  five  opinions  on  the  nature  of  Providence,  Mai- 
monides  formulates  his  own  to  the  following  effect: 

My  own  belief  in  the  matter,  not  as  a  result  of  demonstration,  but 
based  upon  what  seems  to  me  to  be  the  meaning  of  Scripture  is  that 
in  the  sublunar  world  man  alone  enjoys  individual  Providence.  All 
other  individual  things  besides  are  ruled  by  chance,  as  Aristotle  says. 
Divine  Providence  corresponds  to  divine  influence  or  emanation. 
The  more  one  has  of  divine  influence,  the  more  one  has  of  Providence. 
Thus  in  plants  and  animals  divine  Providence  extends  only  to  the 
species.  When  the  Rabbis  teU  us  that  cruelty  to  animals  is  forbidden 
in  the  Torah,  the  meaning  is  that  we  must  not  be  cruel  to  animals 
for  our  own  good,  in  order  not  to  develop  habits  of  cruelty.  To  ask 
why  God  does  not  provide  for  the  lower  animals  in  the  same  way  as 
he  does  for  man,  is  the  same  as  to  ask  why  he  did  not  endow  the  ani- 
mals with  reason.  The  answer  would  be,  so  he  willed,  so  his  wisdom 
decreed.  My  opinion  is  not  that  God  is  ignorant  of  anything  or  is 
incapable  of  doing  certain  things,  but  that  Providence  is  closely  re- 
lated to  reason.  One  has  as  much  of  Providence  as  he  has  of  the  in- 
fluence of  the  divine  reason.  It  follows  from  this  that  Providence  is 
not  the  same  for  all  individuals  of  the  human  species,  but  varies  with 
the  person's  character  and  achievements.  The  prophets  enjoy  a 
special  Providence;  the  pious  and  wise  men  come  next;  whereas  a 
person  who  is  ignorant  and  disobedient  is  neglected  and  treated  like 
a  lower  animal,  being  left  to  the  government  of  chance.^^^ 

Having  disposed  of  the  question  of  Providence,  we  may  now  resume 
the  discussion  undertaken  above  (p.  289)  of  the  nature  of  God's  knowl- 
edge. The  idea  that  God  does  not  know  the  particular  things  in  our 
world  below  is  an  old  one  and  is  referred  to  in  the  Bible  often.  Thus, 
to  quote  one  instance  from  the  Psalms,  the  idea  is  clearly  enunciated 
in  the  following  passage,  "And  they  say  [sc.  the  wicked].  How  doth 
God  know?    And  is  there  knowledge  in  the  most  High?     Behold, 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  293 

these  are  the  wicked;  and,  being  alway  at  ease,  they  increase  in  riches. 
Surely  in  vain  have  I  cleansed  my  heart,  and  washed  my  hands  in 
innocency  .  .  ."  (73,  11-13).  The  origin  of  this  notion  is  in  hmnan 
experience,  which  sees  the  adversity  of  the  good  and  the  prosperity 
of  the  wicked,  though  many  of  the  troubles  are  of  a  man's  own  doing, 
who  is  a  free  agent.  But  this  view  is  wrong.  For  ignorance  of  any 
kind  is  a  defect,  and  God  is  perfect.  David  pointed  out  this  when  he 
said,  "He  that  planted  the  ear  shall  he  not  hear?  He  that  formed 
the  eye  shall  he  not  see?"  (94,  9).  This  means  that  unless  God 
knows  what  the  senses  are,  he  could  not  have  made  the  sense  organs 
to  perceive. 

We  must  now  answer  the  other  metaphysical  arguments  against 
God's  knowledge  of  particulars.  It  is  agreed  that  no  new  knowledge 
can  come  to  God  which  he  did  not  have  before,  nor  can  he  have  many 
knowledges.  We  say  therefore  (we  who  are  believers  in  the  Torah) 
that  with  one  knowledge  God  knows  many  things,  and  his  knowledge 
does  not  change  as  the  objects  change.  We  say  also  that  he  knows 
all  things  before  they  come  into  being,  and  knows  them  always;  hence 
his  knowledge  never  changes  as  the  objects  appear  and  disappear. 
It  follows  from  this  that  his  knowledge  relates  to  the  non-existent 
and  embraces  the  infinite.  We  beheve  this  and  say  that  only  the 
absolutely  non-existent  cannot  be  known;  but  the  non-existent  whose 
existence  is  in  God's  knowledge  and  which  he  can  bring  into  reality 
can  be  known.  As  to  comprehending  the  infinite,  we  say  with  some 
thinkers  that  knowledge  relates  primarily  to  the  species  and  extends 
indirectly  to  the  individuals  included  in  the  species.  And  the  species 
are  finite.  The  philosophers,  however,  decide  that  there  cannot  be 
knowledge  of  the  non-existent,  and  the  infinite  cannot  be  compre- 
hended. God,  therefore,  as  he  cannot  have  new  and  changing  knowl- 
edge knows  only  the  permanent  things,  the  species,  and  not  the 
changing  and  temporary  individuals.  Others  go  still  further  and 
maintain  that  God  cannot  even  know  the  permanent  things,  because 
knowledge  of  many  things  involves  many  knowledges,  hence  multi- 
pUcity  in  God's  essence.  They  insist  therefore  that  God  knows  only 
himself.  My  view  is,  says  Maimonides,  that  the  error  of  all  these 
people  is  that  they  assume  there  is  a  relation  of  resemblance  between 
our  knowledge  and  God's  knowledge.    And  it  is  surprising  that  the 


294  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

philosophers  should  be  guilty  of  such  an  error,  the  very  men  who 
proved  that  God's  knowledge  is  identical  with  his  essence,  and  that 
our  reason  cannot  know  God's  essence. 

The  difference  between  our  knowledge  and  God's  knowledge  is 
that  we  get  our  knowledge  from  the  data  of  experience,  upon  which 
it  depends.  Each  new  datum  adds  to  our  knowledge,  which  cannot 
run  ahead  of  that  which  produces  it.  It  is  different  in  the  case  of 
God.  He  is  the  cause  of  the  data  of  experience.  The  latter  follow 
his  knowledge,  and  not  vice  versa.  Hence  by  knowing  himself  he  knows 
everything  else  before  it  comes  into  being.  We  cannot  conceive  of 
his  knowledge,  for  to  do  this  would  be  to  have  it  ourselves.  ^^^ 

The  last  topic  Maimonides  considers  in  his  philosophical  work  is 
the  reason  and  purpose  of  the  commandments  of  the  Bible,  partic- 
ularly the  ceremonial  precepts  which  apparently  have  no  rational 
meaning.  In  fact  there  are  those  who  maintain  that  it  is  vain  to  search 
for  reasons  of  the  laws  where  none  are  given  in  the  Bible  itself;  that 
the  sole  reason  in  those  cases  is  the  will  of  God.  These  people  labor 
under  the  absurd  impression  that  to  discover  a  rational  purpose  in 
the  ceremonial  laws  would  diminish  their  value  and  reduce  them  to 
human  institutions.  Their  divine  character  and  origin  is  attested  in 
the  minds  of  these  people  by  their  irrationality,  by  the  fact  that  they 
have  no  human  meaning.  This  is  clearly  absurd,  says  Maimonides 
the  rationalist.  It  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  man  is  superior  to 
God;  and  that  whereas  a  man  will  command  only  that  which  is  of 
benefit,  God  gives  orders  which  have  no  earthly  use.  The  truth  is 
quite  the  reverse,  and  all  the  laws  are  for  our  benefit. ^^^ 

Accordingly  Maimonides  undertakes  to  account  for  all  the  laws  of 
the  Bible.  The  Law,  he  says,  has  two  purposes,  the  improvement  of 
the  body  and  the  improvement  of  the  soul  or  the  mind.  The  improve- 
ment of  the  soul  is  brought  about  by  study  and  reflection,  and  the 
result  of  this  is  theoretical  knowledge.  But  in  order  to  be  able  to 
realize  this  perfectly  a  necessary  prerequisite  is  the  improvement  of 
the  body.  This  is  inferior  in  value  to  perfection  of  the  soul,  but  comes 
naturally  and  chronologically  first  as  a  means  to  an  end.  For  bodily 
perfection  one  must  have  health  and  strength  as  far  as  one's  constitu- 
tion permits,  and  for  this  purpose  a  person  must  have  his  needs  at 
all  times.     Social  life  is  necessary  for  the  supply  of  the  individuals' 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  295 

needs,  and  to  make  social  life  possible  there  must  be  rules  of  right 
and  wrong  to  be  observed.  ^^® 

Applying  what  has  just  been  said  to  the  Law,  we  may  divide  its 
contents  broadly  into  four  classes,  (i)  Precepts  inculcating  true 
beliefs  and  ideas,  such  as  the  existence  of  God,  his  unity,  knowledge, 
power,  will,  eternity.  (2)  Legal  and  moral  precepts,  such  as  the  incul- 
cation of  justice  and  a  benevolent  disposition  for  the  good  of  society. 
(3)  The  narratives  and  genealogies  of  the  Law.  (4)  The  ceremonial 
prescriptions. 

Of  these  the  purpose  of  the  first  two  divisions  is  perfectly  clear  and 
admitted  by  aU.  True  beliefs  and  ideas  regarding  God  and  his  govern- 
ment of  the  world  are  directly  conducive  to  the  highest  end  of  man, 
knowledge  and  perfection  of  the  soul.  Honorable  and  virtuous  con- 
duct is  a  preHminary  requisite  to  intellectual  perfection.  The  gen- 
ealogies and  narratives  of  the  Bible  are  also  not  without  a  purpose. 
They  are  intended  to  inculcate  a  theoretical  doctrine  or  a  moral,  and 
to  emphasize  the  one  or  the  other,  which  cannot  be  done  so  well  by  a 
bare  statement  or  commandment.  Thus,  to  take  a  few  examples, 
the  creation  of  the  world  is  impressed  upon  the  reader  beyond  the 
possibiHty  of  a  doubt  by  a  circumstantial  narrative  of  the  various 
steps  in  the  process,  the  gradual  peopling  of  the  earth  by  the  mul- 
tiplication of  the  human  race  descended  from  the  first  paif;"and  so  on. 
The  story  of  the  flood  and  of  the  destruction  of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah 
has  for  its  purpose  to  emphasize  the  truth  that  God  is  a  just  judge,  who 
rewards  the  pious  and  punishes  the  wicked.  The  genealogy  of  the 
kings  of  Edom  in  Genesis  (36,  31)  is  intended  as  a  warning  to  Israel 
in  the  appointment  of  kings.  These  kings  of  the  Edomites  were  all  of 
them  foreigners  not  of  Edom,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  history  of 
their  tyrannical  rule  and  oppression  of  their  Edomite  subjects  was 
well  known  to  the  people  in  Moses's  time.  Hence  the  point  of  the 
enumeration  of  the  list  of  kings  and  their  origin  is  to  serve  as  a  de- 
terring example  to  the  Israelites  never  to  appoint  as  king  of  Israel  a 
man  who  came  from  another  nation,  in  accordance  with  the  precept 
in  Deuteronomy  (17,  15),  "Thou  mayest  not  put  a  foreigner  over  thee, 
which  is  not  thy  brother."  ^^'' 

There  remains  the  division  of  the  ceremonial  laws,  which  are  the  sub- 
ject of  dispute.    The  purpose  in  these  precepts  is  not  evident,  and 


296  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

opinions  are  divided  as  to  whether  they  have  any  purpose.  I  will  en- 
deavor to  show,  says  Maimonides,  that  these  also  have  one  or  more  of 
the  following  objects:  to  teach  true  beliefs  and  opinions,  to  remove 
injustice  and  to  inculcate  good  qualities. 

Abraham  grew  up  among  the  Sabeans,  who  were  star  worshippers 
and  believers  in  the  eternity  of  the  world.  The  object  of  the  law  is  to 
keep  men  away  from  the  erroneous  views  of  the  Sabeans,  which  were 
prevalent  in  those  days.  The  Sabeans  beUeved  that  the  worship  of 
the  stars  helps  in  the  cultivation  of  the  ground  to  make  it  fruitful. 
For  this  reason  they  think  highly  of  the  husbandmen  and  laborers  on 
the  land.  They  also  respect  cattle  and  prohibit  slaughtering  them  be- 
cause they  are  of  benefit  in  the  cultivation  of  the  land.  In  the  interest 
of  agriculture  they  instituted  the  worship  of  the  stars,  which  they  be- 
lieved would  cause  the  rain  to  fall  and  the  earth  to  yield  its  fertility. 
On  this  account  we  find  the  reverse  of  this  in  the  Bible,  telling  us  that 
worship  of  the  stars  will  result  in  lack  of  rain  and  infertility. 

In  the  life  of  nature  we  see  how  one  thing  serves  another,  and  certain 
objects  are  not  brought  about  except  through  certain  others,  and  de- 
velopment is  gradual.  So,  for  example,  a  young  infant  cannot  be  fed 
on  meat  and  solid  food,  and  nature  provides  milk  in  the  mother's 
breast.  Similarly  in  governing  the  people  of  Israel,  who  were  living 
in  a  certain  environment,  God  could  not  at  once  tear  them  away  from 
the  habits  of  thought  to  which  they  were  accustomed,  but  he  led  them 
gradually.  Hence  as  they  were  accustomed  to  sacrificing  to  the  stars, 
God  ordered  them  to  sacrifice  to  him,  the  object  being  to  wean  them 
away  from  the  idols  in  the  easiest  way  possible.  This  is  why  the 
prophets  do  not  lay  stress  on  the  sacrifices.  To  be  sure,  it  was  not 
impossible  for  God  to  form  their  minds  so  that  they  would  not  require 
this  form  of  training,  and  would  see  at  once  that  God  does  not  need 
sacrifices,  but  this  would  have  been  a  miracle.  And  while  God  does 
perform  miracles  sometimes  for  certain  purposes,  he  does  not  change 
the  nature  of  man;  not  because  he  cannot,  but  because  he  desires  man 
to  be  free  and  responsible.  Otherwise  there  would  be  no  sense  in  laws 
and  prophets. 

Among  the  purposes  of  the  law  are  abstention  from  self-indulgence 
in  the  physical  appetites,  like  eating  and  drinking  and  sensuous  pleas- 
ure, because  these  things  prevent  the  ultimate  perfection  of  man,  and 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  297 

are  likewise  injurious  to  civil  and  social  life,  multiplying  as  they  do 
sorrow  and  trouble  and  strife  and  jealousy  and  hate  and  warfare. 

Another  purpose  is  to  inculcate  gentleness  and  politeness  and 
docility.  Another  is  purity  and  hohness.  External  cleanliness  is  also 
recommended,  but  not  as  a  substitute  for  internal.  The  important 
thing  is  internal  purity,  external  takes  a  secondary  place. 

Maimonides  ends  the  discussion  of  the  Pentateuchal  laws  by  dividing 
them  into  fourteen  classes  (following  in  this  the  divisions  in  his  great 
legal  code,  the  "Yad  Ha-Hazakah")  and  explaining  the  purposes  of 
each  class.    It  will  be  useful  briefly  to  reproduce  the  division  here. 

1.  Those  laws  that  concern  fundamental  ideas  of  religion  and 
theology,  including  the  duty  of  learning  and  teaching,  and  the  institu- 
tions of  repentance  and  fasting.  The  purpose  here  is  clear.  Intellec- 
tual perfection  is  the  greatest  good  of  man,  and  this  cannot  be  attained 
without  learning  and  teaching;  and  without  wisdom  there  is  neither 
good  practice  nor  true  opinion.  Similarly  honoring  the  wise,  swearing 
by  God's  name,  and  not  to  swear  falsely — all  these  lead  to  a  firm  belief 
in  God's  greatness.  Repentance  is  useful  to  guard  against  despair 
and  continuance  in  evil  doing  on  the  part  of  the  sinner. 

2.  The  precepts  and  prohibitions  relating  to  idolatry.  Here  are 
included  also  the  prohibition  to  mix  divers  kinds  of  seeds  in  planting, 
the  prohibition  against  eating  the  fruit  of  a  tree  during  the  first  three 
years  of  its  growth,  and  against  wearing  a  garment  made  of  a  mixture 
of  wool  and  flax.  The  prohibition  of  idolatry  is  evident  in  its  purpose, 
which  is  to  teach  true  ideas  about  God.  The  other  matters  above 
mentioned  are  connected  with  idolatry.  Magic  is  a  species  of  idolatry 
because  it  is  based  on  a  belief  in  the  direct  influence  of  the  stars.  All 
practices  done  to  produce  a  certain  effect,  which  are  not  justified  by  a 
reason  or  at  least  are  not  verified  by  experience,  are  forbidden  as 
being  superstitious  and  a  species  of  magic.  Cutting  the  beard  and  the 
earlocks  is  forbidden  on  a  similar  ground  because  it  was  a  custom  of 
the  idolatrous  priests.  The  same  thing  applies  to  mixing  of  cotton  and 
flax,  to  men  wearing  women's  garments  and  vice  versa,  though  here 
there  is  the  additional  reason,  to  prevent,  namely,  laxness  in  sexual 
morality. 

3.  The  precepts  relating  to  ethical  and  moral  conduct.  Here  the 
purpose  is  clear,  namely,  to  improve  social  life. 


298  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

4.  The  rules  relating  to  charity,  loans,  gifts,  and  so  on.  The  pur- 
pose is  to  teach  kindness  to  the  poor,  and  the  benefit  is  mutual,  for 
the  rich  man  to-day  may  be  poor  to-morrow. 

5.  Laws  relating  to  injury  and  damages.  The  purpose  is  to  remove 
wrong  and  injustice. 

6.  Laws  relating  to  theft,  robbery,  false  witnesses.  The  purpose  is 
to  prevent  injury  by  punishing  the  offender. 

7.  The  regulation  of  business  intercourse,  like  loan,  hire,  deposits, 
buying  and  selling,  inheritance,  and  so  on.  The  purpose  here  is  social 
justice  to  make  life  in  society  possible. 

8.  Laws  relating  to  special  periods,  such  as  the  Sabbath  and  the 
festivals.  The  purpose  is  stated  in  each  case  in  the  Law  itself,  and 
it  is  either  to  inculcate  a  true  idea  like  the  creation  in  the  case  of  the 
Sabbath,  or  to  enable  mankind  to  rest  from  their  labors,  or  for  both 
combined. 

9.  The  other  practical  observances  like  prayer,  the  reading  of 
"Shema,"  and  so  on.  These  are  all  modes  of  serving  God,  which  lead 
to  true  opinions  concerning  him,  and  to  fear  and  love. 

10.  The  regulations  bearing  upon  the  temple  and  its  service.  The 
purpose  of  these  was  explained  above  in  connection  with  the  institu- 
tion of  sacrifice,  namely  that  it  was  a  concession  to  the  primitive  ideas 
and  customs  of  the  people  of  those  times  for  the  purpose  of  gradually 
weaning  them  away  from  idolatry. 

11.  Laws  relating  to  sacrifices.  The  purpose  was  stated  above  and 
under  10. 

12.  Laws  of  cleanness  and  uncleanness.  The  purpose  is  to  guard 
against  too  great  familiarity  with  the  Temple  in  order  to  maintain 
respect  for  it.  Hence  the  regulations  prescribing  the  times  when  one 
may,  and  the  occasions  when  one  may  not,  approach  or  enter  the 
Temple. 

13.  The  dietary  laws.  Unwholesome  food  is  forbidden,  also  un- 
clean animals.  The  purpose  in  some  cases  is  to  guard  against  excess 
and  self-indulgence.  Some  regulations  like  the  laws  of  slaughter  and 
others  are  humanitarian  in  their  nature. 

14.  Forbidden  marriages,  and  circumcision.  The  purpose  is  to 
guard  against  excess  in  sexual  indulgence,  and  against  making  it  an 
end  in  itself.  ^^^ 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  299 

To  sum  up,  there  are  four  kinds  of  human  accomplishments  or 
excellencies,  (i)  Acquisition  of  wealth,  (2)  Physical  perfection, 
strength,  beauty,  etc.,  (3)  Moral  perfection,  (4)  Intellectual  and  spirit- 
ual perfection.  The  last  is  the  most  important.  The  first  is  purely  ex- 
ternal; the  second  is  common  to  the  lower  animals;  the  third  is  for  the 
sake  of  one's  fellowmen,  in  the  interest  of  society,  and  would  not  exist 
for  a  solitary  person.  The  last  alone  concerns  the  individual  himself. 
Jeremiah  expresses  this  truth  in  his  statement,  "Thus  saith  the  Lord, 
Let  not  the  wise  man  glory  in  his  wisdom,  neither  let  the  mighty  man 
glory  in  his  might,  let  not  the  rich  man  glory  in  his  riches:  but  let  him 
that  glorieth  glory  in  this,  that  he  understandeth,  and  knoweth  me, 
that  I  am  the  Lord  which  exercise  loving  kindness,  judgment  and 
righteousness  in  the  earth"  (Jer.  9,  22).  "Wise  man"  in  the  above 
quotation  means  the  man  of  good  morals.  The  important  thing, 
Jeremiah  says,  is  to  know  God  through  his  actions  and  to  imitate 

Jjjjjj  299 

Maimonides's  ethics  as  well  as  his  interpretation  of  the  Pentateu- 
chal  laws  is  intellectualistic,  as  the  foregoing  account  shows.  And 
it  is  natural  that  it  should  be.  The  prevailing  trend  of  thought  in 
the  middle  ages,  alike  among  the  Arabs,  Jews  and  Christians,  was  of 
this  character.  Aristotle  was  the  master  of  science,  and  to  him  in- 
tellectual contemplation  is  the  highest  good  of  man.  The  distinction 
of  man  is  his  rational  faculty,  hence  the  excellence  and  perfection  of 
this  faculty  is  the  proper  function  of  man  and  the  realization  of  his 
being.  This  alone  leads  to  that  "eudaimonia"  or  happiness  for  which 
man  strives.  To  be  sure  complete  happiness  is  impossible  without 
the  complete  development  of  all  one's  powers,  but  this  is  because  the 
reason  in  man  is  not  isolated  from  the  rest  of  his  individual  and  social 
life;  and  perfection  of  mind  requires  as  its  auxiliaries  and  preparation 
complete  living  in  freedom  and  comfort.  But  the  aim  is  after  all  the 
life  of  the  intellect,  and  the  "dianoetic"  virtues  are  superior  to  the 
practical.  Theoretic  contemplation  stands  far  higher  than  practical 
activity.  Add  to  this  that  Aristotle's  God  is  pure  thought  thinking 
eternally  itself,  the  universal  mover,  himself  eternally  unmoved,  and 
attracting  the  celestial  spheres  as  the  object  of  love  attracts  the  lover, 
without  itself  necessarily  being  affected,  and  the  intellectualism  of 
Aristotle  stands  out  clearly. 


300  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Maimonides  is  an  Aristotelian,  and  he  endeavors  to  harmonize 
the  intellectualism  and  theorism  of  the  Stagirite  with  the  diametri- 
cally opposed  ethics  and  religion  of  the  Hebrew  Bible.  And  he  is 
apparently  unaware  of  the  yawning  gulf  extending  between  them. 
The  ethics  of  the  Bible  is  nothing  if  not  practical.  No  stress  is  laid 
upon  knowledge  and  theoretical  speculation  as  such.  The  wisdom  and 
the  wise  man  of  the  book  of  Proverbs  no  more  mean  the  theoretical 
philosopher  than  the  fool  and  the  scorner  in  the  same  book  denote 
the  one  ignorant  in  theoretical  speculation.  "The  beginning  of  wis- 
dom is  the  fear  of  the  Lord."  This  is  the  keynote  of  the  book  of  Prov- 
erbs, and  its  precepts  and  exhortations  are  practical  and  nothing 
else.  That  the  Pentateuchal  law  is  solely  concerned  with  practical 
conduct,  religious,  ceremonial  and  moral,  needs  not  saying.  It  is  so 
absolutely  clear  and  evident  that  one  wonders  how  so  clear-sighted 
a  thinker  like  Maimonides  could  have  been  misled  by  the  authority 
of  Aristotle  and  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the  day  to  imagine 
otherwise.  The  very  passage  from  Jeremiah  which  he  quotes  as 
summing  up  his  idea  of  the  summum  bonum,  speaks  against  him, 
and  he  only  succeeds  in  manipulating  it  in  his  favor  by  misinterpret- 
ing the  word  "wise."  Whatever  the  wise  man  may  denote  in  the 
book  of  Proverbs,  here  in  Jeremiah  he  is  clearly  contrasted  with  the 
person  who  in  imitation  of  God  practices  kindness,  judgment  and 
righteousness.  The  word  does  not  denote  the  theoretical  philosopher, 
to  be  sure,  but  it  approximates  it  more  closely  than  the  expression 
describing  the  ideal  man  of  Jeremiah's  commendation. 

It  is  in  line  with  Maimonides's  general  rationalistic  and  intellectual- 
istic  point  of  view  when  he  undertakes  to  find  a  reason  for  every  com- 
mandment, where  no  reason  is  given  in  the  Law.  He  shows  himself  in 
this  an  opponent  of  all  mysticism,  sentimentality  and  arbitrariness. 
Reason  is  paramount.  The  intellect  determines  the  will,  and  not  even 
God's  will  may  be  arbitrary.  His  will  is  identical  with  his  reason, 
hence  there  is  a  reason  in  everything  that  he  wills.  We  may  not  in 
every  case  succeed  in  finding  the  reason  where  he  himself  did  not 
choose  to  tell  us,  but  a  reason  there  always  is,  and  the  endeavor  on 
our  part  to  discover  it  should  be  commended  rather  than  condemned. 

The  details  of  his  motivation  of  the  ceremonial  laws  are  very  in- 
teresting, and  in  many  cases  they  anticipated,  though  in  a  cruder 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  301 

I 
form,  the  more  scientific  theories  of  modern  critics.  Take  his  inter- 
pretation of  the  institution  of  sacrifices.  Take  away  the  personal 
manner  of  expression,  which  might  seem  to  imply  that  God  spoke  to 
Moses  in  some  such  fashion  as  this:  You  and  I  know  that  sacrifices 
have  no  inherent  meaning  or  value.  They  rather  smack  of  supersti- 
tion and  idolatry.  But  what  can  we  do?  We  cannot,  i.  e.,  we  must 
not,  change  the  nature  of  these  people.  We  must  train  them  gradually 
to  see  the  truth  for  themselves.  They  are  now  on  the  level  of  their 
environment,  and  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  kilUng  sheep  and  oxen  to 
the  stars  and  the  gods.  We  will  use  a  true  pedagogical  method  if 
we  humor  them  in  this  their  crudity  for  the  purpose  of  transferring 
their  allegiance  from  the  false  gods  to  the  one  true  God.  Let  us  then 
institute  a  system  of  sacrifices  with  all  the  details  and  minutiae  of 
the  sacrificial  systems  of  the  heathens  and  star  worshippers.  We 
shaU  impose  this  system  upon  our  people  for  the  time  being,  and  in 
the  end  as  they  grow  wiser  they  will  outgrow  it — take  away  this  mode 
of  expression  in  Maimonides's  interpretation,  which  is  not  essential, 
and  the  essence  may  be  rendered  in  more  modern  terms  thus.  Man 's 
religion  is  subject  to  change  and  development  and  progress  like  all 
his  other  institutions.  The  forms  they  successively  take  in  the  course 
of  their  development  are  determined  by  the  state  of  general  intelli- 
gence and  positive  knowledge  that  the  given  race  or  nation  possesses. 
The  same  thing  holds  of  religious  development.  The  institution  of 
sacrifices  is  prevalent  in  all  religious  communities  at  a  certain  stage 
in  their  career.  It  starts  with  human  sacrifice,  which  is  later  discarded 
and  replaced  by  sacrifices  of  animals.  And  this  is  again  in  the  course 
of  time  discontinued,  leaving  its  traces  only  in  the  prayer  book, 
which  in  Judaism  has  officially  taken  the  place  of  the  Temple  service. 
While  the  merit  of  Maimonides  in  foreshadowing  this  modern 
understanding  of  ancient  religion  cannot  be  overestimated,  it  is  clear 
that  in  some  of  his  other  interpretations  of  Jewish  ceremonial,  he  is 
wide  of  the  mark.  His  rationahsm  could  not  take  the  place  of  a  knowl- 
edge of  history.  His  motivation  of  the  dietary  laws  on  the  score  of 
hygiene  or  of  moderation  and  self-restaint  is  probably  not  true.  Nor 
is  the  prohibition  against  mixing  divers  seeds,  or  wearing  garments 
of  wool  and  flax  mixed,  or  shaving  the  corner  of  the  beard,  and  so  on, 
due  to  the  fact  that  these  were  the  customs  of  the  idolaters  and  their 


302  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

priests.  If  Maimonides  was  bold  enough  to  pull  the  sacrificial  system 
down  from  its  glorious  pedestal  in  Jewish  tradition  and  admit  that 
being  inherently  nothing  but  a  superstition,  it  was  nevertheless  in- 
stituted with  such  great  pomp  and  ceremony,  with  a  priestly  family, 
a  levitical  tribe  and  a  host  of  prescriptions  and  regulations,  merely 
as  a  concession  to  the  habits  and  prejudices  of  the  people,  why  could 
he  not  apply  the  same  method  of  explanation  to  the  few  prohibitions 
mentioned  above?  Why  not  say  the  ancient  Hebrews  were  forbidden 
to  mix  divers  seeds  because  they  had  been  from  time  immemorial 
taught  to  believe  that  there  was  something  sinful  in  joining  together 
what  God  has  kept  asunder;  and  in  order  not  to  shock  their  sensibili- 
ties too  rudely  the  new  religion  let  them  have  these  harmless  notions 
in  order  by  means  of  these  to  inculcate  real  truths? 

Before  concluding  our  sketch  of  Maimonides  we  must  say  a  word 
about  his  Bible  exegesis.  Though  the  tendency  to  read  philosophy 
into  the  Bible  is  as  old  as  Philo,  from  whom  it  was  borrowed  by  Clem- 
ent of  Alexandria  and  Origen  and  by  them  handed  down  to  the  other 
Patristic  writers,  and  though  in  the  Jewish  middle  ages  too,  from 
Saadia  down,  the  verses  of  the  Bible  were  employed  to  confirm  views 
adopted  from  other  considerations;  though  finally  Abraham  Ibn  Daud 
in  the  matter  of  exegesis,  too,  anticipated  Maimonides  in  finding  the 
Aristotelian  metaphysic  in  the  sacred  scriptures,  still  Maimonides 
as  in  everything  else  pertaining  to  Jewish  belief  and  practice,  so  in 
the  interpretation  of  the  Bible  also  obtained  the  position  of  a  leader, 
of  the  founder  of  a  school  and  the  most  brilliant  and  most  authorita- 
tive exponent  thereof,  putting  in  the  shade  everyone  who  preceded 
him  and  every  endeavor  in  the  same  direction  to  which  Maimonides 
himseK  owed  his  inspiration.  Maimonides's  treatment  of  the  Bible 
texts  and  their  application  to  his  philosophical  disquisitions  is  so  much 
more  comprehensive  and  masterly  than  anything  in  the  same  line 
done  before  him,  that  it  made  everything  else  superfluous  and  set 
the  pace  for  manifold  imitation  by  the  successors  of  Maimonides, 
small  and  great.  Reading  the  Bible  through  AristoteUan  spectacles 
became  the  fashion  of  the  day  after  Maimonides.  Joseph  Ibn  Aknin, 
Samuel  Ibn  Tibbon,  Jacob  Anatoli,  Joseph  Ibn  Caspi,  Levi  Ben 
Gerson  and  a  host  of  others  tried  their  hand  at  Biblical  exegesis,  and 
the  Maimonidean  stamp  is  upon  their  work. 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  '  303 

We  have  already  spoken  of  Maimonides's  general  attitude  toward 
the  anthropomorphisms  in  the  Bible  and  the  manner  in  which  he  ac- 
counts for  the  style  and  mode  of  expression  of  the  Biblical  writers. 
He  wrote  no  special  exegetical  work,  he  composed  no  commentaries 
on  the  Bible.  But  his  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed"  is  full  of  quotations 
from  the  Biblical  books,  and  certam  sections  in  it  are  devoted  to  a 
systematic  interpretation  of  those  Biblical  chapters  and  books  which 
lend  themselves  most  easily  and,  as  Maimonides  thought,  imperatively 
to  metaphysical  interpretation.  It  is  impossible  here  to  enter  into 
details,  but  it  is  proper  briefly  to  point  out  his  general  method  of 
treating  the  BibHcal  passages  in  question,  and  to  state  what  these 
passages  are. 

We  have  already  referred  more  than  once  to  the  Talmudic  expres- 
sions ''  Maase  Bereshit"  (Work  of  Creation)  and  "Maase  Merkaba" 
(Work  of  the  Chariot).  Maimonides  says  definitely  that  the  former 
denotes  the  science  of  physics,  i.  e.,  the  fundamental  notions  of  nature 
as  treated  in  Aristotle's  Physics,  and  the  latter  signifies  metaphysics 
or  theology,  as  represented  in  Aristotle's  Metaphysics.  The  creation 
chapters  in  Genesis  contain  beneath  their  simple  exterior  of  a  generally 
intelligible  narrative,  appealing  to  young  and  old  alike,  women  as 
well  as  children,  a  treatment  of  philosophical  physics.  And  similarly 
in  the  obscure  phraseology  of  the  vision  of  Ezekiel  in  the  first  and 
tenth  chapters  of  that  prophet's  book,  are  contained  allusions  to  the 
most  profound  ideas  of  metaphysics  and  theology,  concerning  God 
and  the  separate  Intelligences  and  the  celestial  spheres.  As  the  Rabbis 
forbid  teaching  these  profound  doctrines  except  to  one  or  two  worthy 
persons  at  a  time,  and  as  the  authors  of  those  chapters  in  the  Bible 
clearly  intended  to  conceal  the  esoteric  contents  from  the  gaze  of  the 
vulgar,  Maimonides  with  all  his  eagerness  to  spread  abroad  the  light 
of  reason  and  knowledge  hesitates  to  violate  the  spirit  of  Bible  and 
Talmud.  His  interpretations  of  these  mystic  passages  are  therefore 
expressed  in  allusions  and  half-concealed  revelations.  The  diligent 
student  of  the  "  Guide, "  who  is  familiar  with  the  philosophy  of  Aris- 
totle as  taught  by  the  Arabs  AJfarabi  and  Avicenna  will  be  able  with- 
out much  difficulty  to  solve  Maimonides's  allusions,  the  casual  reader 
will  not.  Without  going  into  details  it  will  suffice  for  our  purpose  to 
say  that  in  the  creation  story  Maimonides  finds  the  Aristotelian 


304  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

doctrines  of  matter  and  form,  of  the  four  elements,  of  potentiality 
and  actuality,  of  the  different  powers  of  the  soul,  of  logical  and  ethical 
distinctions  (the  true  and  the  false  on  one  hand,  the  good  and  the  bad 
on  the  other),  and  so  on.^°°  In  the  Vision  of  Ezekiel  he  sees  the  Peri- 
patetic ideas  of  the  celestial  spheres,  of  their  various  motions,  of  their 
souls,  their  intellects  and  the  separate  Intelligences,  of  the  Active 
Intellect,  of  the  influence  of  the  heavenly  bodies  on  the  changes  in 
the  sublunar  world,  of  the  fifth  element  (the  ether)  and  so  on.^^^  Don 
Isaac  Abarbanel  has  already  criticized  this  attempt  of  Maimonides 
by  justly  arguing  that  if  the  meaning  of  the  mysterious  vision  of 
Ezekiel  is  what  Maimonides  thinks  it  is,  there  was  no  occasion  to  wrap 
it  in  such  obscurity,  since  the  matter  is  plainly  taught  in  all  schools 
of  philosophy.  ^°^  We  might,  however,  reply  that  no  less  a  man  than 
Plato  expresses  himself  in  the  Timaeus  in  similarly  obscure  terms  con- 
cerning the  origin  and  formation  of  the  world.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
Munk  is  certainly  right  when  he  says  that  if,  as  is  not  improbable, 
Ezekiel's  vision  does  contain  cosmological  speculations,  they  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  Aristotelian  cosmology,  but  must  be  related 
to  Babylonian  theories".  ^°^ 

Another  favorite  book  of  the  Bible  for  the  exegesis  of  philosophers 
was  the  book  of  Job.  In  this  Maimonides  sees  reflected  the  several 
views  concerning  Providence,  divine  knowledge  and  human  freedom, 
which  he  enumerates  (p.  290  ff.).^^^ 

The  influence  of  Maimonides  upon  his  contemporaries  and  imme- 
diate successors  was  indeed  very  great,  and  it  was  not  confined  to 
Judaism.  Christian  Scholastics  and  Mohammedan  theologians  stud- 
ied and  used  the  Guide  of  the  Perplexed.  Maimonides  himself,  it 
seems,  though  he  wrote  his  "Guide"  in  the  Arabic  language,  did  not 
desire  to  make  it  accessible  to  the  Mohammedans,  fearing  possibly  that 
some  of  his  doctrines  concerning  prophecy  might  be  offensive  to  them. 
Hence  he  is  said  to  have  instructed  his  friends  and  disciples  not  to 
transliterate  the  Hebrew  characters,  which  he  in  accordance  with 
general  Jewish  usage  employed  in  writing  Arabic,  into  Arabic  char- 
acters. But  he  was  powerless  to  enforce  his  desire  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that  such  transcriptions  were  in  use.  Samuel  Tibbon  himself, 
the  Hebrew  translator  of  the  "Guide,"  made  use  of  manuscript  copies 
written  in  Arabic  letters.     We  are  told  that  in  the  Mohammedan 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  305 

schools  in  the  city  of  Fez  in  Morocco,  Jews  were  appointed  to  teach 
Maimonides's  philosophy,  and  there  is  extant  in  Hebrew  translation 
a  commentary  by  a  Mohammedan  theologian  on  the  twenty-five 
philosophical  propositions  laid  down  by  Maimonides  as  the  basis  of 
his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  (p.  254).^''^ 

The  influence  of  Maimonides  on  Christian  scholasticism  is  still 
greater.  We  have  already  said  (p.  199  f.)  that  the  philosophical  renais- 
sance in  Latin  Europe  during  the  thirteenth  century  was  due  to  the 
introduction  of  the  complete  works  of  Aristotle  in  Latin  translation. 
These  translations  were  made  partly  from  the  Arabic  versions  of  the 
Mohammedans,  partly  from  the  Greek  originals,  which  became 
accessible  after  the  capture  of  Constantinople  by  the  Crusaders  in 
1207.^°  Before  this  time  the  scope  of  philosophical  research  and  in- 
vestigation in  Christian  Europe  was  limited,  and  its  basis  was  the 
Platonism  of  St.  Augustine  and  fragments  of  Aristotle's  logic.  In 
general  Platonism  was  favorable  to  Christian  dogma.  Plato  according 
to  Augustine  came  nearest  to  Christianity  of  all  the  ancient  Greek 
philosophers.^"''  And  the  dangers  to  Church  doctrine  which  lurked 
in  philosophical  discussion  before  the  thirteenth  century  were  a  tend- 
ency to  Pantheism  on  the  part  of  thinkers  imbued  with  the  Neo- 
Platonic  mode  of  thought,  and  an  undue  emphasis  either  on  the  unity 
of  God  as  opposed  to  the  Trinity  (Abelard),  or  on  the  Trinity  at  the 
expense  of  the  unity  (Roscellinus  of  Compiegne) — conclusions  re- 
sulting from  the  attitudes  of  the  thinkers  in  question  on  the  nature 
of  universals. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  thirteenth  century  for  the  first  time,  the 
horizon  of  the  Latin  schoolmen  was  suddenly  enlarged  and  brilliantly 
illumined  by  the  advent  of  the  complete  Aristotle  in  his  severe,  exacting 
and  rigorous  panoply.  All  science  and  philosophy  opened  before  the 
impoverished  schoolmen,  famished  for  want  of  new  ideas.  And  they 
threw  themselves  with  zeal  and  enthusiasm  into  the  study  of  the  new 
philosophy.  The  Church  took  alarm  because  the  new  Aristotle  con- 
stituted a  danger  to  accepted  dogma.  He  taught  the  eternity  of  the 
world,  tiie  uniformity  of  natural  law,  the  unity  of  the  human  intellect, 
denying  by  implication  Providence  and  freedom  and  individual  im- 
mortality. Some  of  these  doctrines  were  not  precisely  those  of  Aris- 
totle but  they  could  be  derived  from  Aristotelian  principles  if  inter- 


3o6  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

preted  in  a  certain  way;  and  the  Arab  intermediators  between  Aris- 
totle and  his  Christian  students  had  so  interpreted  him,  Averroes  in 
particular,  who  gained  the  distinction  of  being  the  commentator  par 
excellence  of  Aristotle,  was  responsible  for  this  mode  of  interpretation; 
and  he  had  his  followers  among  the  Masters  of  Arts  in  the  University 
of  Paris.  These  and  similar  tendencies  the  Church  was  striving  to 
prevent,  and  it  attempted  to  do  this  at  first  crudely  by  prohibiting 
the  study  and  teaching  of  the  Physical  and  Metaphysical  works  of 
Aristotle.  Faihng  in  this  the  Papacy  commissioned  three  represent- 
atives of  the  Dominican  order  to  expurgate  Aristotle  in  order  to  render 
him  harmless.  You  might  as  well  think  of  expurgating  a  book  on 
geometry!  The  task  was  never  carried  out.  But  instead  something 
more  valuable  for  the  welfare  of  the  Church  was  accomplished  in  a 
different  way.  Albertus  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas  undertook  the 
study  of  Aristotle  and  the  interpretation  of  his  works  with  a  view  to 
harmonizing  his  teachings  with  the  dogmas  of  Christianity.  Albertus 
Magnus  began  the  task,  Thomas  Aquinas,  his  greater  disciple,  the 
Maimonides  of  Christian  philosophy,  completed  it.  And  in  this  under- 
taking Maimonides  was  Thomas  Aquinas's  model. ^"^ 

The  Guide  of  the  Perplexed  was  translated  into  Latin  not  long  after 
its  composition.  ^°^  Before  Albertus  Magnus,  Alexander  of  Hales,  the 
Franciscan  leader,  and  William  of  Auvergne,  the  Bishop  of  Paris,  had 
read  and  made  use  of  Maimonides's  philosophical  masterpiece.  Al- 
bertus Magnus  was  still  more  diligent  in  his  adoption  of  Maimonidean 
views,  or  in  taking  account  of  them,  where  he  is  opposed  to  their 
adoption.  But  it  remained  for  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  made  the  most 
systematic  attempt  in  the  mediaeval  schools  to  harmonize  the  philos- 
ophy of  Aristotle  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Church,  to  use  Maimonides 
as  his  guide  and  model.  Like  Maimonides  he  employs  Aristotelian 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  proofs  based  on  the  eternity  of  motion; 
and  like  him  Aquinas  argues  that  if  motion  is  not  eternal  and  the  world 
was  made  in  time,  the  existence  of  God  is  still  more  readily  evident. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  divine  attributes,  of  angels,  of  Providence,  of 
Prophecy,  of  free  will,  of  the  ceremonial  laws  in  the  Pentateuch, 
Thomas  Aquinas  constantly  takes  account  of  Maimonides's  views, 
whether  he  agrees  with  them  or  not.  It  is  no  doubt  an  exaggeration 
to  say  that  there  would  have  been  no  Aquinas  if  Maimonides  had  not 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  307 

preceded  him.  For  Aquinas  had  access  to  the  works  of  Aristotle  and 
his  Arabian  commentators,  the  former  of  whom  he  studied  more  dil- 
igently than  Maimonides  himself.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
method  of  harmonizing  Aristotelian  doctrine  with  traditional  teaching 
so  far  as  the  common  elements  of  Judaism  and  Christianity  were  con- 
cerned was  suggested  to  Aquinas  by  his  Jewish  predecessor.  It  is  not 
our  province  here  to  go  into  details  of  the  system  of  Aquinas  to  show 
wherein  he  agrees  or  disagrees  with  Maimonides,  nor  is  it  possible  to  do 
more  than  mention  the  fact  that  after  Aquinas  also,  Duns  Scotus,  the 
head  of  the  Franciscan  school,  had  the  "Guide"  before  him,  and  in 
comparatively  modern  times,  such  celebrities  as  Scaliger  and  Leibnitz 
speak  of  the  Jewish  philosopher  with  admiration  and  respect. ^^" 

That  Maimonides's  influence  upon  Jewish  theology  and  thought  was 
deep  and  lasting  is  a  truism.  The  attitude  of  the  prominent  theologians 
and  philosophers  who  succeeded  him  will  appear  in  the  sequel  in  con- 
nection with  our  treatment  of  the  post-Maimonidean  writers.  Here  a 
word  must  be  said  of  the  general  effect  of  Maimonides's  teaching  upon 
Jews  and  Judaism  throughout  the  dispersion.  His  fame  as  the  greatest 
Jew  of  his  time — great  as  a  Talmudical  authority,  which  appealed  to 
all  classes  of  Jewish  students,  great  as  a  physician  with  the  added 
glory  of  being  a  favorite  at  court,  great  as  the  head  of  the  Jewish 
community  in  the  East,  and  finally  great  as  a  philosopher  and  sci- 
entist— all  these  qualifications,  never  before  or  after  united  in  the 
same  way  in  any  other  man,  served  to  make  him  the  cynosure  of  all 
eyes  and  to  make  his  word  an  object  of  notice  and  attention  throughout 
the  Jewish  diaspora.  What  he  said  or  wrote  could  not  be  ignored 
whether  people  liked  it  or  not.  They  could  afford  to  ignore  a  Gabirol 
even,  or  an  Ibn  Daud.  But  Maimonides  must  be  reckoned  with. 
The  greater  the  man,  the  greater  the  alertness  of  lesser,  though  not  less 
independent,  spirits,  to  guard  against  the  enslavement  of  all  Judaism 
to  one  authority,  no  matter  how  great.  And  in  particular  where  this 
authority  erred  in  boldly  adopting  views  in  disagreement  with  Jewish 
tradition,  as  it  seemed  to  many,  and  in  setting  up  a  new  source  of  truth 
alongside  of,  or  even  above,  the  revelation  of  the  Torah  and  the  author- 
ity of  tradition,  to  which  these  latter  must  be  bent  whether  they  will  or 
no — his  errors  must  be  strenuously  opposed  and  condemned  without 
fear  or  favor.    This  was  the  view  of  the  traditionalists,  whose  sole 


3o8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

authorities  in  all  matters  of  theology  and  related  topics  were  the  words 
of  Scripture  and  Rabbinic  literature  as  tradition  had  interpreted  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  rationalistic  development  during  the  past  three 
centuries,  which  we  have  traced  thus  far,  and  the  climax  of  that 
progress  as  capped  by  Maimonides  was  not  without  its  influence  on 
another  class  of  the  Jewish  community,  particularly  in  Spain  and 
southern  France;  and  these  regarded  Maimonides  as  the  greatest 
teacher  that  ever  lived.  Their  admiration  was  unbounded  for  his 
personaUty  as  well  as  his  method  and  his  conclusions.  His  opponents 
were  regarded  as  obscurantists,  who,  rather  than  the  object  of  their 
attack,  were  endangering  Judaism.  All  Jewry  was  divided  into  two 
camps,  the  Maimunists  and  the  anti-Maimunists;  and  the  polemic  and 
the  struggle  between  them  was  long  and  bitter.  Anathema  and  coun- 
ter anathema,  excommunication  and  counter  excommunication  was 
the  least  of  the  matter.  The  arm  of  the  Church  Inquisition  was  in- 
voked, and  the  altar  of  a  Parisian  Church  furnished  the  torch  which 
set  on  flame  the  pages  of  Maimonides's  "Guide"  in  the  French  capital. 
More  tragic  even  was  the  punishment  meted  out  to  the  Jewish  in- 
formers who  betrayed  their  people  to  the  enemy.  The  men  responsible 
had  their  tongues  cut  out. 

The  details  of  the  Maimunist  controversy  belong  to  the  general 
historian.^ ^^  Our  purpose  here  is  to  indicate  in  brief  outline  the 
general  effect  which  the  teaching  of  Maimonides  had  upon  his  and  sub- 
sequent ages.  'The  thirteenth  century  produced  no  great  men  in 
philosophy  at  aU  comparable  to  Moses  Ben  Maimon  or  his  famous 
predecessors.  The  persecutions  of  the  Jews  in  Spain  led  many  of 
them  to  emigrate  to  neighboring  countries,  which  put  an  end  to  the 
glorious  era  inaugurated  three  centuries  before  by  Hasdai  Ibn  Shap- 
rut.  The  centre  of  Jewish  liberal  studies  was  transferred  to  south 
France,  but  the  literary  activities  there  were  a  pale  shadow  compared 
with  those  which  made  Jewish  Spain  famous.  Philosophical  thought 
had  reached  its  perigee  in  Maimonides,  and  what  followed  after  was 
an  attempt  on  the  part  of  his  lesser  disciples  and  successors  to  follow 
in  the  steps  of  their  master,  to  extend  his  teachings,  to  make  them 
more  widespread  and  more  popular.  With  the  transference  of  the 
literary  centre  from  Spain  to  Provence  went  the  gradual  disuse  of 
Arabic  as  the  medium  of  philosophic  and  scientific  culture,  and  the 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  309 

age  of  translation  made  its  appearance.  Prior  to,  and  including, 
Maimonides  all  the  Jewish  thinkers  whom  we  have  considered,  with 
the  exception  of  Abraham  Bar  Hiyya  and  Abraham  Ibn  Ezra,  wrote 
their  works  in  Arabic.  After  Maimonides  Hebrew  takes  the  place 
of  Arabic,  and  in  addition  to  the  new  works  composed,  the  com- 
mentaries on  the  "Guide"  which  were  now  written  in  plenty  and  the 
philosophico-exegetical  works  on  the  Bible  in  the  Maimonidean  spirit, 
the  ancient  classics  of  Saadia,  Bahya,  Gabirol,  Halevi,  Ibn  Zaddik, 
Ibn  Daud  and  Maimonides  himself  had  to  be  translated  from  Arabic 
into  Hebrew.  In  addition  to  these  religio-philosophical  works,  it  was 
necessary  to  translate  those  writings  which  contained  the  purely  sci- 
entific and  philosophical  branches  that  were  preliminary  to  the  study 
of  religious  philosophy.  This  included  logic,  the  various  branches 
of  mathematics  and  astronomy,  medical  treatises  and  some  of  the 
books  of  the  Aristotelian  corpus  with  the  Arabic  compendia  and  com- 
mentaries thereon.  The  grammatical  and  lexical  treatises  of  Hayyuj 
and  Ibn  Janah  were  also  translated.  The  most  famous  of  the  host 
of  translators,  which  the  need  of  the  times  brought  forth,  were  the 
three  Tibbonides,  Judah  (11 20-1 190),  Samuel  (i  150-1230)  and  Moses 
(fl.  1240-1283),  Jacob  Anatoli  (fl.  1194-1256),  Shemtob  Falaquera 
(1225-1290),  Jacob  Ben  Machir  (1236-1304),  Moses  of  Narbonne 
(d.  after  1362),  and  others.  Some  of  these  wrote  original  works  besides. 
Samuel  Ibn  Tibbon  wrote  a  philosophical  treatise, "  Ma'amar  Yikkawu 
ha-Mayim,"  ^^^  and  commentaries  in  the  Maimonidean  vein  on  Ecclesi- 
astes  and  the  Song  of  Songs.  His  greater  fam.e  rests  on  his  translation 
of  the  "  Guide  of  the  Perplexed."  He  translated  besides  Maimonides's 
"Letter  on  Resurrection,"  the  "Eight  Chapters,"  and  other  Arabic 
writings  on  science  and  philosophy.  Moses  Ibn  Tibbon  was  prolific 
as  an  original  writer  as  well  as  a  translator.  Joseph  Ibn  Aknin 
(11 60-1 2 26),  the  favorite  pupil  of  Maimonides,  for  whom  the  latter 
wrote  his  "Guide,"  is  the  author  of  treatises  on  philosophical  topics, 
and  of  exegetical  works  on  certain  books  of  the  Bible  and  on  the 
Mishnic  treatise,  the  "Ethics  of  the  Fathers."^^2a  j^cob  Anatoli, 
in  addition  to  translating  Ptolemy's  Almagest  and  Averroes's  commen- 
taries on  Aristotle's  logic,  wrote  a  work,  "Malmad  ha-Talmidim," 
on  philosophical  homiletics  in  the  form  of  a  commentary  on  the  Penta- 
teuch. ^^^    Shemtob  Falaquera,  the  translator  of  portions  of  Gabirol's 


3IO  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

"Fons  Vitae,"  ^^^  is  the  author  of  a  commentary  on  the  "Guide,"  en- 
titled "Moreh  ha-Moreh,"  ^^^  and  of  a  number  of  ethical  and  psycho- 
logical works.^^®  Jacob  Ben  Machir  translated  a  number  of  scientific 
and  philosophical  works,  particularly  on  astronomy,  and  is  likewise 
the  author  of  two  original  works  on  astronomy.  Joseph  Ibn  Caspi 
(i 297-1340)  was  a  very  prolific  writer,  having  twenty-nine  works 
to  his  credit,  most  of  them  exegetical,  and  among  them  a  commentary 
on  the  "Guide."  ^^^  Moses  of  Narbonne  wrote  an  important  com- 
mentary on  the  "  Guide,"  ^^^  and  is  likewise  the  author  of  a  number  of 
works  on  the  philosophy  of  Averroes,  of  whom  he  was  a  great  admirer. 
The  translations  of  Judah  Ibn  Tibbon,  the  father  of  translators  as 
he  has  been  called,  go  back  indeed  to  the  latter  half  of  the  twelfth 
century,  and  Abraham  Ibn  Ezra  translated  an  astronomical  work  as 
early  as  1160.  But  the  bulk  of  the  work  of  translation  is  the  product 
of  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries.  The  result  of  these  trans- 
lations was  that  scientific  and  philosophical  works  became  accessible 
to  all  those  who  knew  Hebrew  instead  of  being  confined  to  the  lands 
of  Arabian  culture.  Another  effect  was  the  enlargement  of  the  He- 
brew language  and  the  development  of  a  new  Hebrew  dialect  with  a 
philosophical  and  scientific  terminology.  These  translations  so  far 
as  they  relate  to  pure  science  and  philosophy  were  neglected  in  the 
closing  centuries  of  the  middle  ages,  when  conditions  among  the  Jews 
were  such  as  precluded  them  from  taking  an  interest  in  any  but  purely 
religious  studies.  Continuous  persecutions,  the  estabhshment  of 
the  Ghettoes,  the  rise  of  the  Kabbala  and  the  opposition  of  the  pietists 
and  mystics  to  the  rationalism  of  the  philosophers  all  tended  to  the 
neglect  of  scientific  study  and  to  the  concentration  of  all  attention 
upon  the  Biblical,  Rabbmic  and  mystical  literature.  The  Jews  at 
the  close  of  the  middle  ages  and  the  beginning  of  modern  times  with- 
drew into  their  shell,  and  the  science  and  learning  of  the  outside  had 
Kttle  effect  on  them.  Hence,  and  also  for  the  reason  that  with  the 
begmning  of  modern  times  all  that  was  mediaeval  was,  in  the  secular 
world,  relegated,  figuratively  speaking,  to  the  ash-heap,  or  literally 
speaking  to  the  mouldering  dust  of  the  library  shelves — for  both  of 
these  reasons  the  very  large  number  of  the  translations  above  men- 
tioned were  never  printed,  and  they  are  still  buried  on  the  shelves  of  the 
great  European  libraries,  notably  of  the  British  Museum,  the  national 


MOSES  MAIMONIDES  3 II 

library  of  Paris,  the  Bodleian  of  Oxford,  the  royal  library  of  Munich, 
and  others.  The  reader  who  wishes  to  have  an  idea  of  the  translating 
and  commenting  activity  of  the  Jews  in  the  thirteenth  and  following 
centuries  in  the  domains  of  logic,  philosophy,  mathematics,  astronomy, 
medicine  and  folklore  is  referred  to  the  monumental  work  of  the  late 
Moritz  Steinschneider,  the  prince  of  Hebrew  Bibliographers,  "Die 
Hebraischen  Uebersetzungen  des  Mittelalters  und  die  Juden  als 
Dolmetscher, "  (The  Hebrew  translations  of  the  middle  ages,  and 
the  Jews  as  dragomen)  Berlin,  1893,  containing  1077  pages  of  lexicon 
octavo  size  devoted  to  brief  enumerations  and  descriptions  of  extant 
editions  and  manuscripts  of  the  translations  referred  to.^^^ 


CHAPTER  XIV 


HILLEL   BEN   SAMUEL 


In  the  post-Maimonidean  age  all  philosophical  thinking  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  commentary  on  Maimonides  whether  avowedly  or  not. 
The  circle  of  speculation  and  reflection  is  complete.  It  is  fixed  by  the 
"Guide  of  the  Perplexed,"  and  the  efforts  of  those  who  followed  Mai- 
monides are  to  elaborate  in  his  spirit  certain  special  topics  which  are 
treated  in  his  masterpiece  in  a  summary  way.  In  the  case  of  the  more 
independent  thinkers  like  Levi  ben  Gerson  we  find  the  further  attempt 
to  carry  out  more  boldly  the  implications  of  the  philosophical  point 
of  view,  which,  as  the  latter  thought,  Maimonides  left  implicit  by 
reason  of  his  predisposition  in  favor  of  tradition.  Hasdai  Crescas 
went  still  farther  and  entirely  repudiated  the  authority  of  Aristotle, 
substituting  will  and  emotion  for  rationalism  and  logical  inference. 
Not  knowledge  of  God  as  logically  demonstrated  is  the  highest  aim 
of  man,  but  love  of  God.  But  even  in  his  opposition  Crescas  leans  on 
Maimonides's  principles,  which  he  takes  up  one  by  one  and  refutes. 
Maimonides  was  thus  the  point  of  departure  for  his  more  rigorous 
followers  as  well  as  for  his  opponents.  In  the  matter  of  external 
sources  philosophical  reflection  after  Maimonides  was  enriched  in  re- 
spect to  details  by  the  works  of  Averroes  on  the  Arabic  side  and  those 
of  the  chief  Christian  scholastics  among  the  Latin  writers.  Albertus 
Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas  furnished  some  material  to  men  like 
Hillel  of  Verona  in  the  thirteenth  century  and  Don  Isaac  Abarbanel 
in  the  fifteenth.  Maimonides  was  limited  to  the  Aristotelian  exposi- 
tions of  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna.  The  works  of  Averroes,  his  contem- 
porary, he  did  not  read  until  toward  the  end  of  his  life.  After  his 
death  Averroes  gained  in  prestige  and  influence  until  he  succeeded  in 
putting  into  the  shade  his  Arabian  predecessors  and  was  regarded  by 
Jew  and  Christian  alike  as  the  Commentator  of  Aristotle  par  excellence. 
His  works  were  rapidly  translated  into  Hebrew  and  Latin,  and  the 
Jewish  writers  learned  their  Aristotle  from  Averroes.    The  knowledge 

312 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  313 

of  the  Arabic  language  was  gradually  disappearing  among  the  Jews  of 
Europe,  and  they  were  indebted  for  their  knowledge  of  science  and 
philosophy  to  the  works  translated.  Philosophy  was  dechning  among 
the  Arabs  themselves  owing  to  the  disfavor  of  the  powers  that  be,  and 
many  of  the  scientific  writings  of  the  Arabs  owe  their  survival  to  the 
Hebrew  translations  or  transcriptions  in  Hebrew  characters  which 
escaped  the  proscription  of  the  Mohammedan  authorities. 

The  one  problem  that  came  to  the  front  as  a  result  of  Averroes's 
teaching,  and  which  by  the  solution  he  gave  it  formed  an  important 
subject  of  debate  in  the  Parisian  schools  of  the  thirteenth  century, 
was  that  of  the  intellect  in  man,  whether  every  individual  had  his  own 
immortal  mind  which  would  continue  as  an  individual  entity  after  the 
death  of  the  body,  or  whether  a  person's  individuaUty  lasted  only  as 
long  as  he  was  alive,  and  with  his  death  the  one  human  intellect  alone 
survived.  This  was  discussed  in  connection  with  the  general  theory  of 
the  intellect  and  the  three  kinds  of  intellect  that  were  distinguished  by 
the  Arabian  Aristotelians,  the  material,  the  acquired  and  the  active. 
The  problem  goes  back  to  Aristotle's  psychology,  who  distinguishes 
two  intellects  in  man,  passive  and  active  (above.,  p.  xxxvi).  But  the 
treatment  there  is  so  fragmentary  and  vague  that  it  gave  rise  to 
widely  varying  interpretations  by  the  Greek  commentators  of  Aris- 
totle, Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  and  Themistius,  as  well  as  among  the 
Arabs,  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and  Averroes.  The  latter  insisted  on  the 
unity  of  the  intellect  for  the  human  race,  thereby  destroying  individual 
immortahty,  and  this  Averroistic  doctrine,  adopted  by  some  Masters 
of  Arts  at  the  University  of  Paris,  was  condemned  among  other  her- 
esies, and  refuted  in  the  writings  of  Albertus  Magnus  and  Thomas 
Aquinas.  Maimonides  does  not  discuss  these  problems  in  detail  in 
his  "Guide."  He  drops  a  remark  incidentally  here  and  there,  and  it 
would  appear  that  for  him  too,  as  for  Averroes,  the  intellect  when  in 
separation  from  the  body  is  not  subject  to  individual  distinction,  that 
there  cannot  be  several  human  intellects,  since  matter  is  the  principle 
of  individuation  and  the  immaterial  cannot  embrace  a  number  of  in- 
dividuals of  the  same  species.  ^^^  The  problem  of  immortality  he  does 
not  treat  ex  professo  in  the  "Guide."  Hence  this  was  a  matter  taken 
up  by  his  successors.  Hillel  ben  Samuel  as  well  as  Levi  ben  Gerson 
discuss  this  question  in  detail. 


314  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Hillel  ben  Samuel  does  not  tower  as  a  giant  in  mediaeval  Jewish 
literature.  His  importance  is  local,  as  being  the  first  devotee  of  Jewish 
learning  and  philosophy  in  Italy  in  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  cen- 
tury, at  the  close  of  a  period  of  comparative  ignorance.  The  Italian 
Jews  before  his  time  contributed  little  to  knowledge  and  learning 
despite  their  external  circumstances,  which  were  more  favorable  than 
in  some  other  countries.  Hillel  ben  Samuel  (12  20-1 295)  was  a  strong 
admirer  of  Maimonides  and  undertook  to  comment  on  the  "  Guide  of 
the  Perplexed."  He  defended  Maimonides  against  the  aspersions  of 
his  opponents,  and  was  so  confident  in  the  truth  of  his  master's  teach- 
ings that  he  proposed  a  conference  of  the  learned  men  of  Jewry  to 
judge  the  works  and  doctrines  of  Maimonides  and  to  decide  whether 
the  "Guide"  should  be  allowed  to  live  or  should  be  destroyed.  An- 
other interest  attaching  to  Hillel  ben  Samuel  is  that  he  was  among  the 
first,  if  not  the  first  Jew  who  by  his  knowledge  of  Latin  had  access  to 
the  writings  of  the  scholastics,  to  whom  he  refers  in  his  "Tagmule  ha- 
Nefesh"  (The  Rewards  of  the  Soul)  as  the  "wise  men  of  the  nations." 
He  was  also  active  as  a  translator  from  the  Latin. 

His  chief  work,  which  entitles  him  to  brief  notice  here,  is  the  "Tag- 
mule  ha-Nefesh"  just  mentioned.^-^  He  does  not  offer  us  a  system  of 
philosophy,  but  only  a  treatment  of  certain  questions  relating  to  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  its  immortality  and  the  manner  of  its  existence 
after  the  death  of  the  body,  questions  which  Maimonides  passes 
over  lightly.  With  the  exception  of  the  discussion  relating  to  the 
three  kinds  of  intellect  and  the  question  of  the  unity  of  the  ac- 
quired intellect  for  all  mankind,  there  is  not  much  that  is  new  or 
remarkable  in  the  discussion,  and  we  can  afford  to  pass  it  by  with 
a  brief  notice. 

Men  of  science  know,  he  tells  us  in  the  introduction,  that  the  valu- 
able possession  of  man  is  the  soul,  and  the  happiness  thereof  is  the  final 
purpose  of  man's  existence.  And  yet  the  number  of  those  who  take 
pains  to  investigate  the  nature  of  the  soul  is  very  small,  not  even  one 
in  a  hundred.  And  even  the  few  who  do  undertake  to  examine  this 
subject  are  hindered  by  various  circumstances  from  arriving  at  the 
truth.  The  matter  itself  is  difficult  and  requires  long  preparation  and 
preliminary  knowledge.  Then  the  vicissitudes  of  life  and  the  short- 
ness of  its  duration,  coupled  with  the  natural  indolence  of  man  when 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  315 

it  comes  to  study,  completely  account  for  the  lack  of  true  knowledge 
on  this  most  important  topic. 

Induced  by  these  considerations  Hillel  ben  Samuel  undertook  to 
collect  the  scattered  notices  in  the  extensive  works  of  the  philosophers 
and  arranged  and  expounded  them  briefly  so  as  not  to  discourage  those 
who  are  in  search  of  wisdom.  His  purpose  is  the  knowledge  of  truth, 
which  is  an  end  in  itself.  He  desires  to  explain  the  existence  of  the 
soul,  its  nature  and  reward.  The  soul  is  that  which  makes  man  man, 
hence  we  should  know  the  nature  of  that  which  makes  us  intelligent 
creatures,  else  we  do  not  deserve  the  name. 

Another  reason  for  the  importance  of  knowing  the  nature  of  the 
soul  is  that  error  in  this  matter  may  lead  to  more  serious  mistakes  in 
other  departments  of  knowledge  and  behef .  Thus  if  a  man  who  calls 
himself  pious  assumes  that  the  soul  after  parting  from  the  body  is 
subject  to  corporeal  reward  and  punishment,  as  appears  from  a  literal 
rendering  of  passages  in  Bible  and  Talmud,  he  will  be  led  to  think  that 
the  soul  itself  is  corporeal.  And  since  the  soul,  it  is  believed,  comes 
from  on  high,  the  upper  world  must  have  bodies  and  definite  places, 
and  hence  the  angels  too  are  bodies.  But  since  the  angels  are  emana- 
tions from  the  divine  splendor,  God  too  is  body!  Thus  you  see  how 
serious  are  the  consequences  of  a  belief,  in  itself  perhaps  not  so  danger- 
ous, as  that  of  the  corporeahty  of  the  soul.^^^ 

We  must  first  prove  the  existence  of  the  soul.  This  can  be  shown 
in  various  ways.  We  see  that  of  natural  bodies  some  take  food,  grow, 
propagate  their  like,  while  others,  Uke  stones,  do  not  do  these  things. 
This  shows  that  the  powers  and  functions  mentioned  cannot  be  due  to 
the  corporeal  part  of  the  objects  performing  them,  else  stones,  too, 
would  have  those  powers,  as  they  are  also  corporeal  like  the  rest. 
There  must  therefore  be  a  different  principle,  not  body,  which  is 
responsible  for  those  activities.    We  call  it  soul. 

As  all  existents  are  divided  into  substance  and  accident,  the  soul 
must  be  either  the  one  or  the  other.  Now  an  accident,  according  to 
Aristotle,  is  that  which  may  be  or  not  be  without  causing  the  being  or 
destruction  of  the  object  in  which  it  is.  But  the  body  cannot  be  a  living 
body  without  the  soul.  Hence  the  soul  is  not  an  accident;  it  is  there- 
fore a  substance.  Substance  may  be  corporeal  or  incorporeal.  The 
soul  cannot  be  a  corporeal  substance,  for  all  body  is  divisible,  and  sub- 


3i6  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ject  to  motion  and  change,  whereas  the  soul,  as  will  be  shown  later,  is 
not  movable,  not  changeable  and  not  divisible.  It  might  seem  that 
the  soul  is  subject  to  motion,  since  it  descends  into  the  body  and  rises 
again  when  it  leaves  the  body.  But  this  is  not  so.  Descent  and  ascent 
when  thus  applied  to  the  soul  are  metaphorical.  The  union  of  soul  and 
body  is  not  a  spatial  relation.  The  upper  world  from  which  the  soul 
comes  is  not  corporeal,  hence  there  is  no  such  thing  as  place  there,  nor 
anything  limited  by  space.  Hence  the  coming  of  the  soul  from  the 
spiritual  world  and  its  return  thither  are  not  motions  at  all.  The  rela- 
tion of  the  soul  to  the  body  is  as  that  of  form  to  matter,  as  Aristotle 
says. 

Granted  that  the  soul's  union  with  and  separation  from  the  body 
are  not  motions,  is  not  the  soul  subject  to  motion  while  in  the  body? 
Hillel's  answer  is  that  it  is  not,  and  he  proves  his  point  in  the  pre- 
scribed fashion  by  making  use  of  Aristotle's  classification  of  motion 
into  (i)  genesis  and  (2)  decay,  (3)  increase  and  (4)  diminution,  (5) 
qualitative  change  and  (6)  motion  proper,  or  motion  of  translation. 
He  then  undertakes  to  show  that  the  soul  can  have  none  of  the  kinds 
of  motion  here  enumerated.  The  arguments  ofier  nothing  striking 
or  interesting,  and  we  can  afford  to  omit  them.  It  is  worth  while, 
however,  to  refer  to  his  interpretation  of  emotion.  The  passage  of 
the  soul  from  joy  to  grief,  from  anger  to  favor,  might  seem  to  be  a 
kind  of  motion.  Hillel  answers  this  objection  by  saying  that  these 
emotions  do  not  pertain  to  the  soul  as  such.  Their  primary  cause  is 
the  state  of  mixture  of  the  humors  in  the  body,  which  affects  certain 
corporeal  powers  in  certain  ways;  and  the  soul  shares  in  these  affec- 
tions only  so  far  as  it  is  united  with  the  body.  In  its  own  nature  the 
soul  has  no  emotions. 

We  can  also  prove  that  the  soul  is  not  divisible.  For  a  divisible 
thing  must  have  parts.  Now  if  the  soul  is  divided  or  divisible,  this 
means  either  that  every  part  of  the  soul,  no  matter  how  small,  has 
the  same  powers  as  the  whole,  or  that  the  powers  of  the  soul  are  the 
resultant  of  the  union  of  the  parts.  The  first  alternative  is  impossible, 
for  it  leads  us  to  the  absurd  conclusion  that  instead  of  one  soul  every 
person  has  an  infinite  number  of  souls,  or  at  least  a  great  number  of 
souls.  The  second  alternative  implies  that  while  the  soul  is  not  actu- 
ally divided,  since  its  powers  are  the  summation  of  the  parts,  which 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  317 

form  a  unit,  it  is  potentially  divisible.  But  this  signifies  that  at  some 
time  this  potential  divisibility  will  be  realized  (or  potentiality  would 
be  vain  and  meaningless)  and  we  are  brought  back  to  the  absurdity 
of  a  multiplicity  of  souls  in  the  human  body. 

Having  shown  that  the  soul  is  not  movable,  changeable  or  divisible, 
we  are  certain  of  its  incorporeality,  and  we  are  ready  to  give  a  defini- 
tion of  the  soul.  Hillel  accordingly  defines  the  soul  as  "a  stage  of 
emanation,  consisting  of  a  formal  substance,  which  subsists  through 
its  own  perfection,  and  occupies  the  fourth  place  in  the  emanatory 
process,  next  to  the  Active  Intellect.  Its  ultimate  source  is  God 
himself,  who  is  the  ultimate  perfection  and  the  Good,  and  it  emanates 
from  him  indirectly  through  the  mediation  of  the  separate  Powers 
standing  above  it  in  the  scale  of  emanation.  The  soul  constitutes 
the  first  entelechy  of  a  natural  body."  ^^^ 

The  above  definition  is  interesting.  It  shows  that  Hillel  did  not 
clearly  distinguish  the  AristoteUan  standpoint  from  the  Neo-Platonic, 
for  in  the  definition  just  quoted,  the  two  points  of  view  are  combined. 
That  all  mediceval  Aristotelianism  was  tinged  with  Neo-Platonism, 
especially  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Active  Intellect,  is  well  known.  But 
in  Hillel's  definition  of  the  soul  we  have  an  extreme  form  of  this  pe- 
culiar combination,  and  it  represents  a  step  backward  to  the  stand- 
point of  Pseudo-Bahya  and  Ibn  Zaddik.  The  work  of  Ibn  Daud  and 
Maimonides  in  the  interest  of  a  purer  Aristotelianism  seems  not  to 
have  enlightened  Hillel.  The  Neo-Platonic  emanation  theory  is 
clearly  enunciated  in  Hillel's  definition.  The  soul  stands  fourth  in 
the  series.  The  order  he  has  in  mind  is  probably  (i)  God,  (2)  Separate 
Intelligences,  (3)  Active  Intellect,  (4)  Soul.  We  know  that  Hillel 
was  a  student  of  the  Neo-Platonic  "Liber  de  Causis"  {cf.  above, 
p.  xx),  having  translated  some  of  it  into  Hebrew,  and  he  might  have 
imbibed  his  Neo-Platonism  from  that  Proclean  book. 

Continuing  the  description  of  the  soul  in  man,  he  says  that  the 
noblest  part  of  matter,  viz.,  the  human  body,  is  endowed  with  the  ra- 
tional soul,  and  becomes  the  subject  of  the  powers  of  the  latter. 
Thereby  it  becomes  a  man,  z.  e.,  a  rational  animal,  distinguished  from 
all  other  animals,  and  similar  to  the  nature  of  the  angels. 

The  Active  Intellect  causes  its  light  to  emanate  upon  the  rational 
soul,  thus  bringing  its  powers  out  into  actuality.    The  Active  Intellect, 


3l8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

which  is  one  of  the  ten  degrees  of  angels,  is  related  to  the  rational 
power  in  man  as  the  sun  to  the  power  of  sight.  The  sun  gives  light, 
which  changes  the  potentially  seeing  power  into  actually  seeing,  and 
the  potentially  visible  object  into  the  actually  visible.  Moreover, 
this  same  light  enables  the  sight  to  see  the  sun  itself,  which  is  the  cause 
of  the  actualization  in  the  sight.  So  the  Active  Intellect  gives  some- 
thing to  the  rational  power  which  is  related  to  it  as  light  to  the  sight; 
and  by  means  of  this  something  the  rational  soul  can  see  or  under- 
stand the  Active  Intellect  itself.  Also  the  potentially  intelligible  ob- 
jects become  through  this  influence  actually  intelligible,  and  the  man 
who  was  potentially  intelligent  becomes  thereby  actually  intelligent. 

Intellect  ("sekel")  in  man  is  distinguished  from  wisdom  ("hokmah"). 
By  the  former  power  is  meant  an  immediate  understanding  of  abstract 
principles.  The  latter  is  mediate  understanding.  Wisdom  denotes 
speculation  about  universals  through  inference  from  particulars. 
Intellect  applies  directly  to  the  universals  and  to  their  influence 
upon  the  particulars.^^* 

Hillel  next  discusses  the  live  topic  of  the  day,  made  popular  by 
Averroes,  namely,  whether  there  are  in  essence  as  many  individual 
souls  as  there  are  human  bodies,  or,  as  Averroes  thought,  there  is 
only  one  universal  soul,  and  that  its  individualizations  in  different 
men  are  only  passing  incidents,  due  to  the  association  of  the  universal 
soul  with  the  hvmian  body,  and  disappear  when  the  body  dies.  The 
''sages  of  the  Gentiles,"  Hillel  tells  us,  regard  Averroes's  notion  as 
heretical,  and  leading  besides  to  the  absurd  conclusion  that  the  same 
soul  is  both  rewarded  and  punished;  a  view  which  upsets  all  religion. 
Averroes  employs  a  number  of  arguments  to  prove  his  point,  among 
them  being  the  following.  If  there  are  many  souls,  they  are  either 
all  existing  from  eternity  or  they  are  created  with  the  body.  The 
first  is  impossible,  for  since  the  soul  is  a  form  of  the  body,  we  should 
have  actually  an  infinite  number  of  forms,  and  this  would  necessitate 
the  actual  existence  of  an  infinite  number  of  bodies  also;  else  the 
existence  of  these  souls  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  bodies  would  be 
in  vain.  But  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  there  has  been  from  eternity 
an  infinite  number  of  bodies  created  like  the  number  of  souls,  and 
yet  they  have  not  become  real  bodies  with  souls  until  now. 

The  second  alternative  is  also  impossible.    For  if  there  are  many 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  319 

souls  which  came  into  being  with  the  bodies,  they  either  came  from 
nothing  or  from  something.  From  nothing  is  impossible,  for  nothing 
comes  from  nothing  except  by  way  of  creation,  which  is  a  miracle; 
and  we  do  not  believe  in  miracles  unless  we  have  to.  That  they  came 
from  something  is  also  impossible;  for  this  something  can  be  neither 
matter  nor  form.  It  cannot  be  matter,  for  form,  the  actual  and 
superior,  cannot  come  from  the  potential  and  inferior.  It  cannot  be 
form,  for  then  form  would  proceed  from  form  by  way  of  genesis  and 
dissolution,  which  is  not  true.  Matter  is  the  cause  of  generation  and 
dissolution,  not  form.  We  are  thus  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
soul  is  one  and  eternal,  one  in  substance  and  nimiber;  and  that  it 
becomes  many  only  per  accidens,  by  virtue  of  the  multiplicity  of  its 
receiving  subjects,  comparable  to  the  light  of  the  one  sun,  which 
divides  into  many  rays. 

The  Bible  cannot  help  us  to  decide  this  question,  for  its  expressions 
can  be  interpreted  either  way.  Hillel  then  undertakes  to  adjudicate 
between  the  contending  views  by  striking  a  compromise.  He  feels 
that  he  is  contributing  to  the  solution  of  an  important  problem  by 
an  original  suggestion,  which  he  says  is  to  be  found  nowhere  else 
expressed  with  such  clearness  and  brevity. 

Here  again  Hillel's  Neo-Platonic  tendencies  are  in  evidence.  For  he 
assumes  both  a  universal  soul  and  a  great  number  of  individual  souls 
emanating  from  it  in  a  descending  series.  The  objection  that  forms 
cannot  come  from  other  forms  by  way  of  generation  and  dissolution, 
Hillel  says,  is  not  valid,  for  no  such  process  is  here  involved.  Genera- 
tion and  dissolution  is  pecuhar  to  the  action  of  body  upon  body,  which 
is  by  contact.  A  spiritual  form  acts  upon  other  forms  not  through  con- 
tact, because  it  is  not  limited  by  time  or  place.  We  know  concerning 
the  Intelligences  that  each  comes  from  the  one  previous  to  it  by  way 
of  emanation,  and  the  same  thing  applies  to  the  issue  of  many  human 
souls  from  the  one  universal  soul.  After  death  the  rational  part  of 
every  soul  remains;  that  part  which  every  soul  receives  from  the 
Active  Intellect  through  the  help  of  the  possible  or  material  intellect, 
and  which  becomes  identified  with  the  Active  and  separate  Intellect. 
This  is  the  part  which  receives  reward  and  punishment,  whereas  the 
one  universal  soul  from  which  they  all  emanate  is  a  divine  emanation, 
and  is  not  rewarded  or  punished,^ ^^ 


320    .  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

We  must  now  discuss  further  the  nature  of  the  three  grades  of  in- 
tellect. For  this  it  will  be  necessary  to  lay  down  three  preliminary 
propositions. 

1.  There  must  be  an  intellect  whose  relation  to  the  material  intellect 
is  the  same  as  that  of  the  object  of  sense  perception  is  to  the  sense. 
This  means  that  just  as  there  must  be  a  real  and  actual  object  to 
arouse  the  sense  faculty  to  perceive,  so  there  must  be  an  actual  in- 
telligible object  to  stir  the  rational  power  to  comprehend. 

2.  It  follows  from  i  that  as  the  material  sense  has  the  power  of 
perceiving  the  sensible  object,  so  the  material  intellect  has  the  power 
of  perceiving  this  other  intellect. 

3.  If  it  has  this  power,  this  must  at  some  time  be  realized  in  aciu. 
Therefore  at  some  time  the  material  intellect  is  identified  with  the 
other  intellect,  which  is  the  Active  Intellect. 

We  must  now  prove  i.  This  is  done  as  follows:  We  all  know  that 
we  are  potentially  intelligent,  and  it  takes  effort  and  pains  and  study 
to  become  actually  intelligent.  In  fact  the  process  of  intellection  has 
to  pass  several  stages  from  sense  perception  through  imagination. 
Now  our  intellect  cannot  make  itself  pass  from  potentiality  to  ac- 
tuality. Hence  there  must  be  something  else  as  agent  producing  this 
change ;  and  this  agent  must  be  actually  what  it  induces  in  us.  Hence 
it  is  an  active  intellect. 

The  material  intellect  has  certain  aspects  in  common  with  the  sense 
faculty,  and  in  certain  aspects  it  differs.  It  is  similar  to  it  in  being 
receptive  and  not  active.  But  the  mode  of  receptivity  is  different 
in  the  two.  As  the  intellect  understands  all  forms,  it  cannot  be  a 
power  residing  in  a  body  in  the  sense  of  extending  through  it  and  being 
divided  with  the  division  of  the  body,  as  we  see  in  some  of  the  powers 
of  sense.    This  we  can  prove  as  follows: 

1.  If  the  intellect  were  receptive  in  the  same  manner  as  the  senses, 
it  would  receive  only  a  definite  kind  of  form,  as  for  example  the  sense 
of  sight  does  not  receive  taste. 

2.  If  the  intellect  were  a  power  in  body  and  had  a  special  form,  it 
could  not  receive  that  form,  just  as  for  example  if  the  eye  were  colored, 
it  could  not  perceive  colors. 

3.  If  the  intellect  were  a  corporeal  power,  it  would  be  affected  by 
its  object  and  injured  by  a  powerful  stimulus,  as  is  the  case  in  the 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  321 

senses  of  sight  and  hearing.  A  dazzling  light  injures  the  eye,  a  deafen- 
ing noise  injures  the  ear,  so  that  thereafter  neither  sense  can  perform 
its  normal  function  properly.  This  is -not  true  with  the  intellect. 
An  unusually  difficult  subject  of  thought  does  not  injure  the  intellect. 

4.  If  the  intellect  were  similar  in  its  activity  to  sense  perception, 
it  would  not  be  self-conscious,  as  the  sense  faculties  cannot  perceive 
themselves. 

5.  The  intellect,  if  it  were  like  sense,  would  not  be  able  to  compre- 
hend a  thing  and  its  opposite  at  the  same  time,  or  it  would  do  so  in 
a  confused  manner,  as  is  the  case  in  the  powers  of  sense. 

6.  The  intellect  perceives  universals;  the  sense,  particulars. 

This  being  the  case,  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  natvue 
of  the  material  intellect.  Some  say  that  it  has  no  definite  nature 
in  itself  except  that  of  possibiUty  and  capacity,  though  it  is  different 
from  other  possibilities  in  this  respect  that  it  is  not  resident  in,  and 
dependent  upon  a  material  subject  like  the  others.  That  is  why 
Aristotle  says  that  the  material  intellect  is  not  anything  before  it 
intellects;  that  it  is  in  its  essence  potential  with  reference  to  the 
intelUgibilia,  and  becomes  actual  when  it  understands  them  ac- 
tually. 

Themistius  says  it  is  not  any  of  the  existents  actually,  but  a  poten- 
tial essence  receiving  material  forms.  Its  nature  is  analogous  to 
that  of  prime  matter;  hence  it  is  called  material  intellect.  It  is  best 
to  call  it  possible  intellect.  Being  a  potential  existent  it  is  not  subject 
to  generation  and  dissolution  any  more  than  prime  matter. 

Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  thinks  the  material  intellect  is  only  a 
capacity,  i.  e.,  a  power  in  the  soul,  and  appears  when  the  soul  enters 
the  body,  hence  is  not  eternal  a  parte  ante. 

Averroes  holds  that  the  possible  intellect  is  a  separate  substance, 
and  that  the  capacity  is  something  it  has  by  virtue  of  its  being  con- 
nected with  the  body  as  its  subject.  Hence  this  capacity  is  neither 
entirely  distinct  from  it  nor  is  it  identical  with  it.  According  to  him 
the  possible  intellect  is  not  a  part  of  the  soul. 

Which  of  these  views  is  correct,  says  Hillel,  requires  discussion, 
but  it  is  clear  that  whichever  of  these  we  adopt  there  is  no  reason 
opposing  the  conjunction  of  the  possible  intellect  with  the  Active. 
For  if  it  is  an  eternal  substance,  potential  in  its  nature,  like  primary 


32  2  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

matter,  then  it  becomes  actual  when  it  understands  the  intelligible 
objects.    The  same  is  true  if  it  is  a  capacity  residing  in  the  soul. 

Hillel  is  thus  of  the  opinion  in  this  other  question  debated  in  those 
days,  whether  the  intellect  of  man  is  capable  of  conjunction  during 
life  with  the  angelic  Active  Intellect,  that  it  is.  The  Active  Intellect, 
he  says,  in  actualizing  the  material  intellect  influences  it  not  in  the 
manner  of  one  body  acting  upon  another,  i.  e.,  in  the  manner  of  an 
efficient  or  material  cause,  but  rather  as  its  formal  or  final  cause, 
leading  it  to  perfection.  It  is  like  the  influence  which  the  separate 
Intelligences  receive  from  one  another,  the  influence  of  emanation, 
and  not  a  material  influence  comparable  to  generation.  This  recep- 
tion of  influence  from  the  Active  Intellect  on  the  part  of  the  potential 
is  itself  conjunction.  It  means  that  the  agent  and  the  thing  acted 
upon  become  one,  and  the  same  substance  and  species.  The  material 
intellect  becomes  a  separate  substance  when  it  can  understand  it- 
self.326 

Before  taking  up  the  more  theological  problem  of  reward  and  pun- 
ishment, he  devotes  the  last  section  of  the  theoretical  part  of  his  book 
to  a  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  possible  or  material  intellect  to  the 
rest  of  the  human  soul.  This  problem  also  arose  from  Averroes's  inter- 
pretation of  the  Aristotelian  psychology,  and  is  closely  related  to  the 
other  one  of  the  unity  of  the  human  intellect.  It  is  needless  for  us  to 
enter  into  the  technical  details  which  are  a  weariness  to  the  flesh  of  the 
modern  student,  but  it  is  worth  while  to  state  briefly  the  motives 
underlying  the  opposing  views.  Averroes,  who  had  no  theological 
scruples,  interpreted  Aristotle  to  mean  that  the  part  of  the  soul  which 
was  intimately  associated  with  the  body  as  its  form,  constituting  an 
indissoluble  organism  in  conjunction  with  it,  embraced  its  lower  fac- 
ulties of  sense,  imagination  and  the  more  concrete  types  of  judgment. 
These  are  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the  life  of  the  body  that  they 
die  with  its  death.  The  reason  on  the  other  hand,  which  has  to  do  with 
immaterial  ideas,  or  intelligibles  as  they  called  them,  is  eternal  and 
is  not  the  form  of  the  body.  It  is  a  unitary  immaterial  substance  and 
is  not  affected  by  the  life  or  death  of  the  body.  To  be  sure  it  comes  in 
contact  with  the  human  soul  during  the  life  of  the  body,  thus  bringing 
into  existence  an  individualized  human  reason  as  a  passing  episode. 
But  this  individualized  phase  of  the  intellect's  life  is  dependent  upon 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  323 

the  body  and  ceases  when  the  body  dies,  or  is  reabsorbed  in  the  univer- 
sal intellect. 

The  theological  implications  of  this  view  were  that  if  there  is  any 
reward  and  punishment  after  death,  it  would  either  have  to  be  ad- 
ministered to  the  lower  faculties  of  the  soul,  which  would  have  to  be 
made  immortal  for  the  purpose,  or  if  the  rational  soul  is  the  subject  of 
retribution,  this  cannot  aflfect  the  individual,  as  there  is  no  individual 
rational  soul.  Hence  the  Christian  opponents  of  Averroes,  like  Al- 
bertus  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas  (Hillel  speaks  of  them  here  as  the 
"Rehgionists,"  or  the  "Sages  who  believe  in  religion"),  endeavored 
to  vindicate  for  the  Aristotehan  definition  of  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the 
body,  also  the  rational  part,  thus  maintaining  the  view  that  the  reason 
too  has  an  individual  existence  both  during  life  and  after  death. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  as  a  truer  interpreter  of  Aristotle,  goes  so  far  as  to 
maintain  that  the  Active  Intellect  itself  is  also  a  part  of  the  human 
soul,  and  not  one  of  the  angelic  separate  Intelligences.  Neither  Mai- 
monides  nor  Hillel  ben  Samuel,  nor  any  other  Jewish  philosopher  was 
able  to  depart  so  widely  from  their  Arabian  masters  or  to  undertake 
an  independent  study  of  Aristotle's  text,  as  to  come  to  a  similar  con- 
clusion. Hence  the  Active  Intellect  in  Jewish  Philosophy  is  unan- 
imously held  to  be  the  last  of  the  Angelic  substances,  and  the  proximate 
inspirer  of  the  prophet.  The  discussion  therefore  in  Hillel's  work  con- 
cerns the  possible  intellect,  and  here  he  ventures  to  disagree  with 
Averroes  and  decides  in  favor  of  the  possible  intellect  as  a  part  of  the 
soul  and  the  subject  of  reward  and  punishment. ^^'' 

Concerning  the  nature  of  reward  and  punishment  after  death 
opinions  are  divided.  Some  think  that  both  reward  and  punishment 
are  corporeal.  Some  say  reward  is  spiritual,  punishment  is  corporeal; 
while  a  small  number  are  of  the  opinion  that  both  are  spiritual.  Hillel 
naturally  agrees  with  the  latter  and  gives  reasons  for  his  opinion.  If 
the  soul,  as  was  shown  before,  is  incorporeal,  immaterial  and  a  formal 
substance,  it  cannot  be  influenced  by  corporeal  treatment.  For  cor- 
poreal influence  implies  motion  on  the  part  of  agent  and  patient,  and 
the  pervasion  of  the  influence  of  the  former  through  the  parts  of  the 
latter;  whereas  a  spiritual  substance  has  no  parts.  Besides,  if  reward 
and  punishment  are  corporeal,  and  Paradise  is  to  be  taken  literally, 
then  why  separate  the  soul  from  the  body,  why  not  reward  the  living 


324  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

person  with  eternal  life  and  give  him  the  enjoyment  of  paradise  while 
on  earth?  The  effect  would  be  much  greater  upon  the  rest  of  mankind, 
who  would  see  how  the  righteous  fare  and  the  wicked.  The  objection 
that  this  would  make  people  mercenary  does  not  hold,  for  they  are 
mercenary  in  any  case,  since  they  expect  reward;  whether  in  this  life 
or  in  the  next  makes  no  difference.  Reward  must  therefore  be  spir- 
itual, and  so  must  punishment,  since  the  two  go  together.  ^-^ 

When  God  in  his  kindness  favored  the  human  race  by  giving  them 
a  soul,  which  he  united  with  the  body,  he  also  gave  them  the  possibiUty 
of  attaining  eternal  happiness.  For  this  purpose  he  arranged  three 
grades  of  ascent,  viz.,  the  three  intellects  spoken  of  above,  the  material 
or  possible  intellect,  the  acquired  intellect  (this  is  the  actual  function- 
ing of  the  possible  intellect  and  the  result  thereof)  and  the  active  in- 
tellect. The  second  intellect  is  partly  speculative  or  theoretical  and 
partly  practical.  The  theoretical  intellect  studies  and  contemplates 
all  intelligible  existents  which  are  separate  from  matter.  There  is 
nothing  practical  in  this  contemplation,  it  is  just  the  knowledge  of 
existents  and  their  causes.  This  is  called  the  science  of  truth,  and  is 
the  most  important  part  of  philosophy. 

The  practical  intellect  is  again  divided  into  the  cogitative  and  the 
technological.  The  former  decides  whether  a  thing  should  be  done  or 
not,  and  discriminates  between  the  proper  and  the  improper  in  human 
actions  and  qualities.  It  is  important  as  a  guide  to  the  happiness  of 
the  soul  because  it  instructs  the  appetitive  power  in  reference  to  those 
things  which  are  subject  to  the  will,  and  directs  it  to  aim  at  the  good 
and  to  reject  the  evil. 

The  technological  intellect  is  that  by  which  man  learns  arts  and 
trades.  The  practical  intellect  is  also  theoretical  in  the  sense  that  it 
has  to  think  in  order  to  discriminate  between  the  proper  and  the  im- 
proper, and  between  the  beneficial  and  injurious  in  all  things  pertaining 
to  practice.  The  difference  between  the  speculative  and  practical 
intellects  is  in  the  respective  objects  of  their  comprehension,  and 
hence  is  accidental  and  not  essential.  The  objects  of  the  theoretical 
intellect  are  the  true  and  the  false;  of  the  practical,  the  good  and  the 
bad.  The  acquired  intellect  gives  these  intelligibles  to  the  soul  through 
the  possible  intellect,  and  is  intermediate  between  the  latter  and  the 
Active  Intellect,  which  is  one  of  the  separate  Intelligences  above  soul. 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  325 

The  Active  Intellect  watches  over  the  rational  animal  that  he  may 
attain  to  the  happiness  which  his  nature  permits. 

Men  differ  according  to  their  temperamental  composition  and  their 
human  conduct.  This  leads  to  differences  in  the  power  of  understand- 
ing and  in  the  amount  of  influence  received  from  the  Active  Intellect. 
Hillel  quotes  Maimonides  in  support  of  his  view  that  the  prophetic 
stage  is  an  emanation  of  glory  from  God  through  the  medium  of  the 
Active  Intellect,  which  exerts  its  influence  upon  the  rational  power 
and  upon  the  imagination,  so  that  the  prophet  sees  his  vision  objec- 
tified extra  animam.  The  three  conditions  requisite  for  prophecy  are 
perfection  in  theory,  perfection  in  imagination  and  perfection  in 
morals.  The  first  without  the  second  and  third  produces  a  philosopher; 
the  second  without  the  first  and  third  gives  rise  to  a  statesman  or 
magician. 

It  is  important  to  know,  he  tells  us,  that  the  cultivation  of  the  reason 
and  imagination  alone  is  not  sufl&cient.  Practice  of  the  command- 
ments is  very  important.  Hence  a  man  must  guide  properly  the  two 
powers  of  sense  perception  and  desire,  which  are  instruments  of  the 
rational  power.  For,  as  Maimonides  says  in  his  commentary  on 
Aboth  (c/.  p.  282),  all  observance  and  violation  of  the  commandments, 
good  and  bad  qualities  depend  upon  those  two  powers.  Without  a 
proper  training  of  these  the  influence  of  the  active  intellect  upon  the 
reason  and  imagination  may  lead  to  evil. 

Beginning  with  sense  perception  a  man  must  train  all  his  five  senses 
to  attend  only  to  what  is  good  and  to  turn  away  from  evil.  When  he 
satisfies  his  sensuous  desires,  he  must  do  this  in  order  to  preserve  his 
body  that  he  may  be  enabled  to  serve  God  in  the  best  possible 
way. 

The  same  applies  to  the  power  of  desire.  This  is  the  power  which 
directs  one  to  pursue  the  agreeable  and  shun  the  disagreeable.  From  it 
proceed  also  courage,  confidence,  anger,  good  will,  joy,  sorrow,  humil- 
ity, pride.  All  these  qualities  must  be  used  in  the  service  of  God.  If 
a  man  do  this,  he  will  attain  the  grade  of  an  angelic  being  even  during 
life,  and  will  be  able  to  perform  miracles  like  the  prophets  and  the 
sages  of  the  Talmud. 

After  death  the  souls  of  such  men  reach  even  a  higher  degree  than 
they  had  before  entering  the  body,  as  a  reward  for  not  allowing  them- 


326  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

selves  to  be  degraded  by  their  corporeal  desires,  but  on  the  contrary- 
directing  these  to  higher  aims.^-^ 

As  for  the  nature  of  reward  and  punishment  more  particularly,  we 
may  say  that  the  soul  of  the  wicked  loses  all  the  glory  promised  to  her 
and  descends  to  a  position  lower  than  was  hers  originally.  She  is  ex- 
pelled from  the  land  of  life  and  remains  in  darkness  forever,  without 
returning  to  her  original  station.  Knowing  what  she  has  lost,  she  will 
feel  continuous  distress,  sorrow  and  fear,  for  the  power  of  imagination 
remains  with  the  soul  after  death.  But  there  is  no  physical  burning 
with  fire.  On  the  other  hand,  the  soul  of  the  righteous  will  return  to 
God. 

The  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  and  the  explanation  for  it  are  a 
further  proof  that  the  soul  after  death  is  not  punished  corporeally. 
The  motive  of  the  resurrection  is  that  the  soul  and  body  may  receive 
their  compensation  together  as  in  life.  If  then  the  retribution  of  the 
soul  is  corporeal,  there  is  no  need  of  resurrection. ^^° 

Hillel  then  proceeds  to  show  that  the  words  of  the  Rabbis  which 
seem  to  speak  for  corporeal  retribution  are  not  to  be  taken  literally. 
In  this  connection  it  is  worth  while  to  reproduce  his  classification  of 
the  contents  of  the  Talmud  and  his  attitude  toward  them.  He  enu- 
merates six  classes. 

1.  Passages  in  the  Talmudic  and  Midrashic  literature  which  must 
be  taken  literally.  These  are  the  discussions  of  the  Halaka  (the  legal 
and  ceremonial  portions).  To  pervert  these  from  their  literal  meaning, 
or  to  maintain  that  the  intention  of  the  law  is  the  important  thing 
and  not  the  practice  of  the  ceremony,  is  heresy  and  infidelity;  though 
it  is  meritorious  to  seek  for  an  explanation  of  every  law,  as  the  Rabbis 
themselves  do  in  many  instances. 

2.  Passages  which  should  be  understood  as  parables  and  allegories 
with  a  deeper  meaning.  These  are  the  peculiar  Haggadahs,  or  the 
strange  interpretations  of  Biblical  verses  where  no  ceremonial  precept 
is  involved. 

3.  Statements  similar  to  those  of  the  Prophetical  books  of  the 
Bible,  which  were  the  result  of  the  influence  of  the  Active  Intellect 
and  came  to  the  sages  in  a  dream  or  in  the  waking  state,  speaking  of 
the  future  in  an  allegorical  manner.  These  are  the  extraordinary 
tales  found  in  the  Talmud,  which  cannot  be  understood  literally,  as 


HILLEL  BEN  SAMUEL  327 

they  involve  a  violation  of  the  order  of  nature;  and  no  miracle  must 
be  believed  unless  for  a  very  important  reason. 

4.  The  homilies  addressed  to  the  people  on  the  occasion  of  holidays 
for  the  purpose  of  exhorting  them  to  divine  worship  and  observance 
of  the  Law.  Many  of  these  are  hyperbolical  in  their  expression, 
especially  in  the  promises  concerning  the  future  blessings  in  store 
for  the  people.  These  were  in  the  nature  of  encouragement  to  the 
people  to  make  their  burdens  easier  to  bear.  Here  belong  also  unusual 
interpretations  of  Bibhcal  verses,  explanations  which  do  not  give  the 
original  meaning  of  the  verse  in  question,  but  are  suggested  in  order 
to  interest  the  people.  We  must  add,  too,  stories  of  the  good  things 
that  came  to  pious  people  in  return  for  their  piety.  These  must  be 
taken  for  the  most  part  literally,  unless  they  are  clearly  improbable. 

5.  Jokes  and  jests  by  way  of  relief  from  the  strain  of  study.  Hy- 
perboles belong  here. 

6.  Narratives  of  miracles  done  for  pious  people,  such  as  reviving 
the  dead,  punishing  with  death  by  means  of  a  word,  bringing  down 
rain,  and  so  on.  All  these  must  be  taken  literally.  To  disbelieve  is 
heresy.  This  is  true  only  where  the  alleged  miracles  were  done  for  a 
high  purpose,  otherwise  we  need  not  believe  them. 

The  reason  the  Bible  and  the  Talmud  express  themselves  in  corpo- 
real terms  concerning  reward  and  punishment  is  in  order  to  frighten 
the  people  and  to  impress  them  with  the  terrible  punishment  conse- 
quent upon  wrongdoing.  The  people  do  not  understand  any  reward 
and  punishment  unless  it  is  physical  and  corporeal.  In  reality  spirit- 
ual existence  is  more  real  than  physical.^^^ 


CHAPTER  XV 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON 


Among  the  men  who  devoted  themselves  to  philosophical  investi- 
gation in  the  century  and  a  half  after  Maimonides's  death,  the  greatest 
and  most  independent  was  without  doubt  Levi  ben  Gerson  or  Ger- 
sonides,  as  he  is  also  called.  There  were  others  who  were  active  as 
commentators,  translators  and  original  writers,  and  who  achieved 
a  certain  fame,  but  their  work  was  too  little  original  to  merit  more 
than  very  brief  notice  in  these  pages.  Isaac  Albalag^^^**  (second  half 
of  thirteenth  century)  owes  what  reputation  he  enjoys  to  the  boldness 
with  which  he  enunciated  certain  doctrines,  such  as  the  eternity  of 
the  world  and  particularly  the  notion,  well  enough  known  among  the 
Averroists  of  the  University  of  Paris  at  that  time  and  condemned 
by  the  Church,  but  never  before  aimounced  or  defended  in  Jewish 
philosophy — the  so-called  doctrine  of  the  twofold  truth.  This  was 
an  attitude  assumed  in  self-defence,  sincerely  or  not  as  the  case  may 
be,  by  a  number  of  scholastic  writers,  who  advanced  philosophic 
views  at  variance  with  the  dogma  of  the  Church.  They  maintained 
that  a  given  thesis  might  be  true  and  false  at  the  same  time,  true  for 
philosophy  and  false  for  theology,  or  vice  versa. ^^^  Shera  Tob  Fala- 
quera  (12 25-1 290)  is  a  more  important  man  than  Albalag.  He  was  a 
thorough  student  of  the  AristoteUan  and  other  philosophy  that  was 
accessible  to  him  through  his  knowledge  of  Arabic.  Munk's  success 
in  identifying  Avicebron  with  Gabirol  (p.  63)  was  made  possible 
by  Falaquera's  translation  into  Hebrew  of  extracts  from  the  "Fons 
Vitse."  Of  great  importance  also  is  Falaquera's  commentary  of  Mai- 
monides's "  Guide, "  which,  with  that  of  Moses  of  Narbonne  (d.  after 
1362),  is  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  Arabic  and  a  thorough  familiarity 
with  the  Aristotelian  philosophy  of  the  Arabs,  and  is  superior  to  the 
better  known  commentaries  of  Shemtob,  Ephodi,  and  Abarbanel, 
Falaquera  also  wrote  original  works  of  an  ethical  and  philosophical 
character. 

328 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  329 

Joseph  Ibn  Caspi  (i 297-1340)  is  likewise  a  meritorious  figure  as  a 
commentator  of  Maimonides  and  as  a  philosophical  exegete  of  Scrip- 
ture. But  none  of  these  men  stands  out  as  an  independent  thinker 
with  a  strong  individuahty,  carrying  forward  in  any  important  and 
authoritative  degree  the  work  of  the  great  Maimonides.  Great  Tal- 
mudic  knowledge,  which  was  a  necessary  qualification  for  national 
recognition,  these  men  seem  not  to  have  had;  and  on  the  other  hand 
none  of  them  felt  called  upon  or  able  to  make  a  systematic  synthesis 
of  philosophy  and  Judaism  in  a  large  way. 

Levi  ben  Gerson  (i 288-1344)  was  the  first  after  Maimonides  who 
can  at  all  be  compared  with  the  great  sage  of  Fostat.  He  was  a  great 
mathematician  and  astronomer;  he  wrote  supercommentaries  on 
the  Aristotelian  commentaries  of  Averroes,  who  in  his  day  had  become 
the  source  of  philosophical  knowledge  for  the  Hebrew  student;  he 
was  thoroughly  versed  in  the  Talmud  as  his  commentary  on  the 
Pentateuch  shows;  and  he  is  one  of  the  recognized  Biblical  exegetes 
of  the  middle  ages.  Finally  in  his  philosophical  masterpiece  "Mil- 
hamot  Adonai"  (The  Wars  of  the  Lord),^^^  he  undertakes  to  solve 
in  a  thoroughly  scholastic  manner  those  problems  in  philosophy  and 
theology  which  Maimonides  had  either  not  treated  adequately  or 
had  not  solved  to  Gersonides's  satisfaction.  That  despite  the  techni- 
cal character  and  style  of  the  "Milhamot,"  Gersonides  achieved  such 
great  reputation  shows  in  what  esteem  his  learning  and  critical  power 
were  held  by  his  contemporaries.  His  works  were  all  written  in  He- 
brew, and  if  he  had  any  knowledge  of  Arabic  and  Latin  it  was  very 
limited,  too  limited  to  enable  him  to  make  use  of  the  important  works 
written  in  those  languages.^^^  His  fame  extended  beyond  the  limits  of 
Jewish  thought,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  his  scientific  treatise  deal- 
ing with  the  astronomical  instrument  he  had  discovered  was  translated 
into  Latin  in  1377  by  order  of  Pope  Clement  VI,  and  his  supercom- 
mentaries on  the  early  books  of  the  Aristotelian  logic  were  incor- 
porated, in  Latin  translation,  in  the  Latin  editions  of  Aristotle  and 
Averroes  of  the  i6th  century.^^^ 

Levi  ben  Gerson's  general  attitude  to  philosophical  study  and  its 
relation  to  the  content  of  Scripture  is  the  same  as  had  become  common 
property  through  Maimonides  and  his  predecessors.  The  happiness 
and  perfection  of  man  are  the  purpose  of  religion  and  knowledge. 


330  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

This  perfection  of  man,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  the  perfection  of 
the  human  soul,  is  brought  about  through  perfection  in  morals  and 
in  theoretical  speculation,  as  will  appear  more  clearly  when  we  dis- 
cuss the  nature  of  the  human  intellect  and  its  immortality.  Hence 
the  purpose  of  the  Bible  is  to  lead  man  to  perfect  himself  in  these  two 
elements — morals  and  science.  For  this  reason  the  Law  consists  of 
three  parts.  The  first  is  the  legal  portion  of  the  Law  containing  the 
613  commandments,  mandatory  and  prohibitive,  concerning  belief 
and  practice.  This  is  preparatory  to  the  second  and  third  divisions 
of  the  Pentateuch,  which  deal  respectively  with  social  and  ethical 
conduct,  and  the  science  of  existence.  As  far  as  ethics  is  concerned 
it  was  not  practicable  to  lay  down  definite  commandments  and  pro- 
hibitions because  it  is  so  extremely  difi&cult  to  reach  perfection  in 
this  aspect  of  life.  Thus  if  the  Torah  gave  definite  prescriptions  for 
exercising  and  controlling  our  anger,  our  joy,  our  courage,  and  so  on, 
the  results  would  be  very  discouraging,  for  the  majority  of  men  would 
be  constantly  disobeying  them.  And  this  would  lead  to  the  neglect 
of  the  other  commandments  likewise.  Hence  the  principles  of  social 
and  ethical  conduct  are  inculcated  indirectly  by  means  of  narratives 
exemplifying  certain  types  of  character  in  action  and  the  consequences 
flowing  from  their  conduct.  The  third  division,  as  was  said  before, 
contains  certain  teachings  of  a  metaphysical  character  respecting  the 
nature  of  existence.  This  is  the  most  important  of  all,  and  hence 
forms  the  beginning  of  the  Pentateuch.  The  account  of  creation  is  a 
study  in  the  principles  of  philosophical  physics. ^^^ 

As  to  the  relations  of  reason  and  belief  or  authority,  Levi  ben 
Gerson  shares  in  the  optimism  of  the  Maimonidean  school  and  the 
philosophic  middle  age  generally,  that  there  is  no  opposition  between 
them.  The  priority  should  be  given  to  reason  where  its  demands 
are  unequivocal,  for  the  meaning  of  the  Scriptures  is  not  always  clear 
and  is  subject  to  interpretation.^^''  On  the  other  hand,  after  having 
devoted  an  entire  book  of  his  "Milhamot"  to  a  minute  investigation 
of  the  nature  of  the  human  intellect  and  the  conditions  of  its  immor- 
tality, he  disarms  in  advance  all  possible  criticism  of  his  position  from 
the  religious  point  of  view  by  saying  that  he  is  ready  to  abandon  his 
doctrine  if  it  is  shown  that  it  is  in  disagreement  with  religious  dogma. 
He  developed  his  views,  he  tells  us,  because  he  believes  that  they  are 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  331 

in  agreement  with  the  words  of  the  Torah,^^^  This  apparent  contra- 
diction is  to  be  explained  by  making  a  distinction  between  the  abstract 
statement  of  the  principle  and  the  concrete  application  thereof.  In 
general  Levi  ben  Gerson  is  so  convinced  of  man's  prerogative  as  a 
rational  being  that  he  cannot  believe  the  Bible  meant  to  force  upon 
him  the  behef  in  things  which  are  opposed  to  reason.  Hence,  since 
the  Bible  is  subject  to  interpretation,  the  demands  of  the  reason  are 
paramount  where  they  do  not  admit  of  doubt.  On  the  other  hand, 
where  the  traditional  dogma  of  Judaism  is  clear  and  outspoken,  it  is 
incumbent  upon  man  to  be  modest  and  not  to  claim  the  infallibility 
of  direct  revelation  for  the  Hmited  powers  of  logical  inference  and 
deduction. 

We  must  now  give  a  brief  account  of  the  questions  discussed  in  the 
"Milhamot  Adonai."  And  first  a  word  about  Gersonides's  style  and 
method.  One  is  reminded,  in  reading  the  Milhamot,  of  Aristotle  as 
well  as  Thomas  Aquinas.  There  is  no  rhetoric  and  there  are  no  super- 
fluous words.  All  is  precise  and  technical,  and  the  vocabulary  is  small. 
One  is  surprised  to  see  how  in  a  brief  century  or  so  the  Hebrew  lan- 
guage has  become  so  flexible  an  instrument  in  the  expression  of  Aris- 
totelian ideas.  Levi  ben  Gerson  does  not  labor  in  the  expression  of  his 
thought.  His  hnguistic  instrument  is  quite  adequate  and  yields  nat- 
urally to  the  manipulation  of  the  author.  Gersonides,  the  minute 
logician  and  analyst,  has  no  use  for  rhetorical  flourishes  and  figures 
of  speech.  The  subject,  he  says,  is  difficult  enough  as  it  is,  without 
being  made  more  so  by  rhetorical  obscuration,  unless  one  intends  to 
hide  the  confusion  of  one's  thought  under  the  mask  of  fine  writing. ^^^ 
Like  Aristotle  and  Thomas  Aquinas,  he  gives  a  history  of  the  opinions 
of  others  in  the  topic  under  discussion,  and  enumerates  long  lists  of 
arguments  pro  and  con  with  rigorous  logical  precision.  The  effect 
upon  the  reader  is  monotonous  and  wearisome.  Aristotle  escapes  this 
by  the  fact  that  he  is  groping  his  way  before  us.  He  has  not  all  his 
ideas  formulated  in  proper  order  and  form  ready  to  deliver.  He  is 
primarily  the  investigator,  not  the  pedagogue,  and  the  brevity  and 
obscurity  of  his  style  pique  the  ambitious  reader  and  spur  him  on  to 
puzzle  out  the  meaning.  Not  so  Thomas  Aquinas  and  the  scholastics 
generally.  As  the  term  scholastic  indicates,  they  developed  their 
method  in  the  schools.    They  were  expositors  of  what  was  ready  made, 


332  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

rather  than  searchers  for  the  new.  Hence  the  question  of  form  was  an 
important  one  and  was  determined  by  the  purpose  of  presenting  one's 
ideas  as  clearly  as  may  be  to  the  student.  Add  to  this  that  the  logic 
of  Aristotle  and  the  syllogism  was  the  universal  method  of  presenta- 
tion and  the  monotony  and  wearisomeness  becomes  evident.  Levi  ben 
Gerson  is  in  this  respect  like  Aquinas  rather  than  like  Aristotle.  And 
he  is  the  first  of  his  kind  in  Jewish  literature.  Since  the  larger  views 
and  problems  were  already  common  property,  the  efforts  of  Gersonides 
were  directed  to  a  more  minute  discussion  of  the  more  technical  de- 
tails of  such  problems  as  the  human  intellect,  prophecy.  Providence, 
creation,  and  so  on.  For  this  reason,  too,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for 
us  to  do  more  than  give  a  brief  resume  of  the  results  of  Gersonides's 
lucubrations  without  entering  into  the  really  bewildering  and  hair- 
splitting arguments  and  distinctions  which  make  the  book  so  hard  on 
the  reader. 

We  have  already  had  occasion  in  the  Introduction  (p.  xxxvi)  to  refer 
briefly  to  Aristotle's  theory  of  the  intellect  and  the  distinction  between 
the  passive  and  the  active  intellects  in  man.  The  ideas  of  the  Arabs 
were  also  referred  to  in  our  treatment  of  Judah  Halevi,  Ibn  Daud  and 
Maimonides  (pp.  i8o  f.,  213  f.,  282).  Hillel  ben  Samuel,  as  we  saw 
(p.  317  ff.),  was  the  first  among  the  Jews  who  undertook  to  discuss  in 
greater  detail  the  essence  of  the  three  kinds  of  intellect,  material,  ac- 
quired and  active,  as  taught  by  the  Mohammedan  and  Christian  Scho- 
lastics, and  devoted  some  space  to  the  question  of  the  unity  of  the  ma- 
terial intellect.  Levi  ben  Gerson  takes  up  the  same  question  of  the 
nature  of  the  material  intellect  and  discusses  the  various  views  with 
more  rigor  and  minuteness  than  any  of  his  Jewish  predecessors.  His 
chief  source  was  Averroes.  The  principal  views  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  possible  or  material  intellect  in  man  were  those  attributed  to 
Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  the  most  important  Greek  commentator  of 
Aristotle  (lived  about  200  of  the  Christian  Era),  Themistius,  another 
Aristotelian  Greek  commentator  who  lived  in  the  time  of  Emperor  Jul- 
ian, and  Averroes,  the  famous  Arabian  philosopher  and  contemporary 
of  Maimonides.  All  these  three  writers  pretended  to  expound  Aristotle's 
views  of  the  passive  intellect  rather  than  propound  their  own.  And 
Levi  ben  Gerson  discusses  their  ideas  before  giving  his  own. 

Alexander's  idea  of  the  passive  intellect  in  man  is  that  it  is  simply 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  7,7,$ 

a  capacity  residing  in  the  soul  for  receiving  the  universal  forms  of 
material  things.  It  has  no  substantiality  of  its  own,  and  hence  does 
not  survive  the  lower  functions  of  the  soul,  namely,  sensation  and 
imagination,  which  die  with  the  body.  This  passive  intellect  is  actual- 
ized through  the  Active  Intellect,  which  is  not  a  part  of  man  at  all,  but 
is  identified  by  Alexander  wdth  God.  The  Active  Intellect  is  thus  pure 
form  and  actuality,  and  enables  the  material  or  possible  intellect  in 
man,  originally  a  mere  potentiahty,  to  acquire  general  ideas,  and 
thus  to  become  an  intellect  with  a  content.  This  is  called  the  actual 
or  acquired  intellect,  which  though  at  first  dependent  on  the  data  of 
sense,  may  succeed  later  in  continuing  its  activity  unaided  by  sense 
perception.  And  in  so  far  as  the  acquired  intellect  thinks  of  the  purely 
immaterial  ideas  and  things  which  make  up  the  content  of  the  divine 
intellect  (the  Active  Intellect),  it  becomes  identified  with  the  latter 
and  is  immortal.  The  reason  for  supposing  that  the  material  intellect 
in  man  is  a  mere  capacity  residing  in  the  soul  and  not  an  independent 
substance  is  because  as  having  the  capacity  to  receive  all  kinds  of 
forms  it  must  itself  not  be  of  any  form.  Thus  in  order  that  the  sense 
of  sight  may  receive  all  colors  as  they  are,  it  must  itself  be  free  from 
color.  If  the  sight  had  a  color  of  its  own,  this  would  prevent  it  from 
recei\'ing  other  colors.  Applying  this  principle  to  the  intellect  we  make 
the  same  inference  that  it  must  in  itself  be  neutral,  not  identified  with 
any  one  idea  or  form,  else  this  would  color  all  else  knocking  for  admis- 
sion, and  the  mind  would  not  know  things  as  they  are.  Now  a  faculty 
which  has  no  form  of  its  owm,  but  is  a  mere  mirror  so  to  speak  of  all 
that  may  be  reflected  in  it,  cannot  be  a  substance,  and  must  be  simply 
a  power  inherent  in  a  substance  and  subject  to  the  same  fate  as  that 
in  which  it  inheres.  This  explains  the  motive  of  Alexander's  view  and 
is  at  the  same  time  a  criticism  of  the  doctrine  of  Themistius. 

This  commentator  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  passive  intellect  of 
which  Aristotle  speaks  is  not  a  mere  capacity  inherent  in  something 
else,  but  a  real  spiritual  entity  or  substance  independent  of  the  lower 
parts  of  the  soul,  though  associated  with  them  during  the  life  of  the 
body,  and  hence  is  not  subject  to  generation  and  destruction,  but 
is  eternal.  In  support  of  this  view  may  be  urged  that  if  the  passive 
intellect  were  merely  a  capacity  of  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul,  we 
should  expect  it  to  grow  weaker  as  the  person  grows  older  and  his 


334  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

sensitive  and  imaginative  powers  are  beginning  to  decline;  whereas  the 
contrary  is  the  case.  The  older  the  person  the  keener  is  his  intellect. 
The  difficulty,  however,  remains  that  if  the  human  intellect  is  a  real 
substance  independent  of  the  rest  of  the  soul,  why  is  it  that  at  its 
first  appearance  in  the  human  being  it  is  extremely  poor  in  content, 
being  all  but  empty,  and  grows  as  the  rest  of  the  body  and  the  soul  is 
developed? 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  Averroes  in  his  commentary  on  the 
De  Anima  of  Aristotle  practically  identifies  (according  to  Levi  ben 
Gerson's  view  of  Averroes)  the  material  intellect  with  the  Active 
Intellect.  The  Active  Intellect  according  to  him  is  neither  identical 
with  the  divine,  as  Alexander  maintains,  nor  is  it  a  part  of  man,  as 
Themistius  and  others  think,  but  is  the  last  of  the  separate  Intelh- 
gences,  next  to  the  spiritual  mover  of  the  lunar  sphere.  It  is  a  pure 
actuahty,  absolutely  free  from  matter,  and  hence  eternal.  This 
Active  Intellect  in  some  mysterious  manner  becomes  associated  with 
man,  and  this  association  results  in  a  temporary  phase  represented  by 
the  material  intellect.  As  a  result  of  the  sense  perceptions,  images  of 
the  external  objects  remain  in  the  imagination,  and  the  Active  Intel- 
lect takes  hold  of  these  images,  which  are  potentially  universal  ideas, 
and  by  its  illumination  produces  out  of  them  actual  ideas  and  an 
intellect  in  which  they  reside,  the  material  intellect.  The  material 
intellect  is  therefore  the  result  of  the  combination  of  the  Active  In- 
tellect with  the  memory  images,  known  as  phantasmata  {<^avrd(j[iaTa), 
in  the  human  faculty  of  imagination.  So  long  as  this  association  exists, 
the  material  intellect  receives  the  intelligible  forms  as  derived  from 
the  phantasmata,  and  these  forms  are  represented  by  such  ideas  as  "all 
animal  is  sensitive,"  "all  man  is  rational,"  i.  e.,  ideas  concerning  the 
objects  of  this  world.  This  phase  of  man's  mind  ceases  when  the  body 
dies,  and  the  Active  Intellect  alone  remains,  whose  content  is  free 
from  material  forms.  The  Active  Intellect  contemplates  itself,  a  pure 
intelligence.  At  the  same  time  it  is  possible  for  man  to  identify  him- 
seK  with  the  Active  Intellect  as  he  acquires  knowledge  in  the  material 
intellect,  for  the  Active  Intellect  is  like  light  which  makes  the  eye  see. 
In  seeing,  the  eye  not  merely  perceives  the  form  of  the  external  object, 
but  indirectly  also  receives  the  light  which  made  the  object  visible. 
In  the  same  way  the  human  soul  in  acquiring  knowledge  as  implicit 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  335 

in  its  phantasmata,  at  the  same  time  gets  a  glimpse  of  the  spiritual 
light  which  converted  the  phantasma  into  an  explicit  idea  (cf.  above, 
p.  320).  When  the  soul  in  man  perfects  itseK  with  all  the  knowledge 
of  this  world  it  becomes  identified  with  the  Active  Intellect,  which 
may  be  likened  to  the  intellect  or  soul  of  the  corporeal  world. 

In  this  combination  of  the  views  of  Alexander  and  Themistius 
Averroes  succeeds  in  obviating  the  criticisms  levelled  at  the  two 
former.  That  the  power  of  the  material  intellect  grows  keener  with 
age  though  the  corporeal  organs  are  weaker,  supports  Averroes's  doc- 
trine as  against  Alexander,  to  whom  it  is  a  mere  capacity  dependent 
upon  the  mixture  of  the  elements  in  the  human  body.  But  neither 
is  he  subject  to  the  objection  applying  to  Themistius's  view,  that  a 
real  independent  entity  could  scarcely  be  void  of  all  forms  and  a  mere 
receptacle.  For  the  material  intellect  as  it  really  is  in  itself  when  not 
in  combination  with  the  human  body  is  not  a  mere  receptacle  or 
empty  potentiality.  It  is  the  Active  Intellect,  which  combines  in 
itself  all  immaterial  forms  and  thinks  them  as  it  thinks  itself.  It  is 
only  in  its  individualized  aspect  that  it  becomes  a  potential  intellect 
ready  to  receive  all  material  forms. 

But  what  Averroes  gains  here  he  loses  elsewhere.  There  are  certain 
considerations  which  are  fatal  to  his  doctrine.  Thus  it  would  follow 
that  theoretical  studies  which  have  no  practical  aim  are  useless. 
But  this  is  impossible.  Nature  has  put  in  us  the  ability  as  well  as 
the  desire  to  speculate  without  reference  to  practical  results.  The 
pleasure  we  derive  from  theoretical  studies  is  much  greater  than  that 
afforded  by  the  practical  arts  and  trades.  And  nature  does  nothing 
in  vain.  Theoretical  studies  must  therefore  have  some  value.  But 
in  Averroes's  theory  of  the  material  intellect  they  have  none.  For 
all  values  may  be  divided  into  those  which  promote  the  life  of  the  body 
and  those  which  lead  to  the  final  happiness  of  man.  The  former  is 
clearly  not  served  by  those  theoretical  speculations  which  have  no 
practical  aim.  On  the  contrary,  they  hinder  it.  Deep  students  of  the 
theoretical  sciences  forego  all  bodily  pleasures,  and  often  do  without 
necessities.  But  neither  can  there  be  any  advantage  in  theoretical 
speculation  for  ultimate  human  happiness.  For  human  happiness 
according  to  Averroes  (and  he  is  in  a  sense  right,  as  we  shall  see  later) 
consists  in  union  with  the  Active  Intellect.     But  this  union  takes 


336  MEDIMVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

place  as  a  matter  of  course  according  to  his  theory  at  the  time  of  death, 
whether  a  man  be  wise  or  a  fool.  For  the  Active  Intellect  then  ab- 
sorbs the  material. 

Another  objection  to  Averroes's  theory  is  the  following.  If  the 
material  intellect  is  in  essence  the  same  as  the  Active  Intellect,  it  is 
a  separate,  immaterial  substance,  and  hence  is,  like  the  Active  In- 
tellect, one.  For  only  that  which  has  matter  as  its  substratum  can 
be  quantitatively  differentiated.  Thus  A  is  numerically  different  from 
B,  though  A  and  B  are  both  men  {i.  e.,  qualitatively  the  same),  because 
they  are  corporeal  beings.  Forms  as  such  can  be  differentiated  quali- 
tatively only.  Horse  is  different  from  ass  in  quality.  Horse  as  such 
and  horse  as  such  are  the  same.  It  follows  from  this  that  the  material 
intellect,  being  like  the  Active  Intellect  an  immaterial  form,  cannot 
be  numerically  multiplied,  and  therefore  is  one  only.  But  if  so,  no 
end  of  absurdities  follows.  For  it  means  that  all  men  have  the  same 
intellect,  hence  the  latter  is  wise  and  ignorant  at  the  same  time  in 
reference  to  the  same  thing,  in  so  far  as  A  knows  a  given  thing  and  B 
does  not  know  it.  It  would  also  follow  that  A  can  make  use  of  B's 
sense  experience  and  build  his  knowledge  upon  it.  All  these  inferences 
are  absurd,  and  they  all  follow  from  the  assumption  that  the  material 
intellect  is  in  essence  the  same  as  the  Active  Intellect.  Hence  Aver- 
roes's position  is  imtenable.^^ 

Gersonides  then  gives  his  own  view  of  the  material  intellect,  which 
is  similar  to  that  of  Alexander.  The  material  intellect  is  a  capacity, 
and  the  prime  matter  is  the  ultimate  subject  in  which  it  inheres.  But 
there  are  other  powers  or  forms  inhering  in  matter  prior  to  the  material 
intellect.  Prime  matter  as  such  is  not  endowed  with  intellect,  or  all 
things  would  have  human  reason.  Prime  matter  when  it  reaches  the 
stage  of  development  of  the  imaginative  faculty  is  then  ready  to 
receive  the  material  intellect.  We  may  say  then  that  the  sensitive 
soul,  of  which  the  imaginative  faculty  is  a  part,  is  the  subject  in  which 
the  material  intellect  inheres.  The  criticism  directed  against  Alexan- 
der, which  applies  here  also,  may  be  answered  as  follows.  The  material 
intellect  is  dependent  upon  its  subject,  the  sensitive  soul,  for  its  exist- 
ence only,  not  for  the  manner  of  receiving  its  knowledge.  Hence 
the  weakening  or  strengthening  of  its  subject  cannot  affect  it  directly 
at  all.    Indirectly  there  is  a  relation  between  the  two,  and  it  works 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  337 

in  the  reverse  direction.  When  the  sensitive  powers  are  weakened 
and  their  activities  diminish,  there  is  more  opportunity  for  the  in- 
tellect to  monopolize  the  one  soul  for  itself  and  increase  its  own  ac- 
tivity, which  the  other  powers  have  a  tendency  to  hinder,  since  the 
soul  is  one  for  all  these  contending  powers.  It  follows  of  course  that 
the  material  intellect  in  man  is  not  immortal.  As  a  capacity  of  the 
sensitive  soul,  it  dies  with  the  latter.  What  part  of  the  human  soul 
it  is  that  enjoys  immortality  and  on  what  conditions  we  shall  see  later. 
But  before  we  do  this,  we  must  try  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
Active  Intellect.  ^"^ 

We  know  now  that  the  function  of  the  Active  Intellect  is  to  actualize 
the  material  intellect,  i.  e.,  to  develop  the  capacity  which  the  latter 
has  of  extracting  general  ideas  from  the  particular  memory  images 
(phantasmata)  in  the  faculty  of  imagination,  so  that  this  capacity, 
originally  empty  of  any  content,  receives  the  ideas  thus  produced, 
and  is  thus  constituted  into  an  actual  intellect.  From  this  it  follows 
that  the  Active  Intellect,  which  enables  the  material  intellect  to  form 
ideas,  must  itself  have  the  ideas  it  induces  in  the  latter,  though  not 
necessarily  in  the  same  form.  Thus  an  artisan,  who  imposes  the  form 
of  chair  upon  a  piece  of  wood,  must  have  the  form  of  chair  in  his  mind, 
though  not  the  same  sort  as  he  realizes  in  the  wood.  Now  as  all  the 
ideas  acquired  by  the  material  intellect  constitute  one  single  activity 
so  far  as  the  end  and  purpose  is  concerned  (for  it  all  leads  to  the 
perfection  of  the  person),  the  agent  which  is  the  cause  of  it  all  must 
also  be  one.  Hence  there  are  not  many  Active  Intellects,  each  re- 
sponsible for  certain  ideas,  but  one  Intellect  is  the  cause  of  all  the  ideas 
realized  in  the  material  intellect.  Moreover,  as  this  Active  Intellect 
gives  the  material  intellect  not  merely  a  knowledge  of  separate  ideas, 
but  also  an  understanding  of  their  relations  to  each  other,  in  other 
words  of  the  systematic  unity  connecting  all  ideas  into  one  whole, 
it  follows  that  the  Active  Intellect  has  a  knowledge  of  the  ideas  from 
their  unitary  aspect.  In  other  words,  the  unity  of  purpose  and  aim 
which  is  evident  in  the  development  of  nature  from  the  prime  matter 
through  the  forms  of  the  elements,  the  plant  soul,  the  animal  soul 
and  up  to  the  human  reason,  where  the  lower  is  for  the  sake  of  the 
higher,  must  reside  as  a  unitary  conception  in  the  Active  Intellect. 

For  the  Active  Intellect  has  another  function  besides  developing 


338  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  rational  capacity  in  man.  We  can  arrive  at  this  insight  by  a  con- 
sideration undertaken  from  a  different  point  of  view.  If  we  consider 
the  wonderful  and  mysterious  development  of  a  seed,  which  is  only 
a  piece  of  matter,  in  a  purposive  manner,  passing  through  various 
stages  and  producing  a  highly  complicated  organism  with  psychic 
powers,  we  must  come  to  the  conclusion,  as  Aristotle  does,  that  there 
is  an  intellect  operating  in  this  development.  As  all  sublunar  nature 
shows  a  unity  of  purpose,  this  intellect  must  be  one.  And  as  it  can- 
not be  like  one  of  its  products,  it  must  be  eternal  and  not  subject  to 
generation  and  decay.  But  these  are  the  attributes  which,  on  grounds 
taken  from  the  consideration  of  the  intellectual  activity  in  man,  we 
ascribed  to  the  Active  Intellect.  Hence  it  is  the  Active  Intellect. 
And  we  have  thus  shown  that  it  has  two  functions.  One  is  to  endow 
sublunar  nature  with  the  intelligence  and  purpose  visible  in  its  proc- 
esses and  evolutions;  the  other  is  to  enable  the  rational  power  in  man 
to  rise  from  a  tabula  rasa  to  an  actual  intellect  with  a  content.  From 
both  these  activities  it  is  evident  that  the  Active  Intellect  has  a  knowl- 
edge of  sublunar  creation  as  a  systematic  unity. 

This  conception  of  the  Active  Intellect,  Levi  ben  Gerson  says,  will 
also  answer  all  the  difficulties  by  which  other  philosophers  are  troubled 
concerning  the  possibility  of  knowledge  and  the  nature  of  definition. 
The  problems  are  briefly  these.  Knowledge  concerns  itself  with  the 
permanent  and  universal.  There  can  be  no  real  knowledge  of  the 
particular,  for  the  particular  is  never  the  same,  it  is  constantly 
changing  and  in  the  end  disappears  altogether.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  universal  has  no  real  existence  outside  of  the  mind,  for  the  ob- 
jectively real  is  the  particular  thing.  The  only  really  existing  man  is 
A  or  B  or  C ;  man  in  general,  man  that  is  not  a  particular  individual 
man,  has  no  objective  extra-mental  existence.  Here  is  a  dilemma. 
The  only  thing  we  can  really  know  is  the  thing  that  is  not  real,  and  the 
only  real  thing  is  that  which  we  cannot  know.  The  Platonists  solve 
this  difficulty  by  boldly  declaring  that  the  universal  ideas  or  forms 
are  the  real  existents  and  the  models  of  the  things  of  sense.  This  is 
absurd.  Aristotle's  solution  in  the  Metaphysics  is  likewise  unsatisfac- 
tory. Our  conception,  however,  of  the  Active  Intellect  enables  us 
to  solve  this  problem  satisfactorily.  The  object  of  knowledge  is  not 
the  particular  thing  which  is  constantly  changing;  nor  yet  the  logical 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  339 

abstraction  which  is  only  in  the  mind.    It  is  the  real  unity  of  sublunar 
nature  as  it  exists  in  the  Active  Intellect. 

The  problem  of  the  definition  is  closely  related  to  that  of  knowledge. 
The  definition  denotes  the  essence  of  every  individual  of  a  given 
species.  As  the  individuals  of  a  given  species  have  all  the  same  def- 
inition, and  hence  the  same  essence,  they  are  all  one.  For  what  is 
not  in  the  definition  is  not  real.  Our  answer  is  that  the  definition 
represents  that  unitary  aspect  of  the  sublunar  individuals  which  is  in 
the  Active  Intellect.  This  aspect  is  also  in  a  certain  sense  present  in 
every  one  of  the  individual  objects  of  nature,  but  not  in  the  same 
manner  as  in  the  Active  Intellect. ^^^ 

We  are  now  ready  to  take  up  the  question  of  human  immortaHty. 
The  material  intellect  as  a  capacity  for  acquiring  knowledge  is  not 
immortal.  Being  inherent  in  the  sensitive  soul  and  dependent  for  its 
acquisition  of  knowledge  upon  the  memory  images  (phantasmata) 
which  appear  in  the  imagination,  the  power  to  acquire  knowledge 
ceases  with  the  cessation  of  sense  and  imagination.  But  the  knowl- 
edge already  acquired,  which,  we  have  shown  above,  is  identical  with 
the  conceptions  of  sublunar  nature  in  the  Active  Intellect,  is  indestruc- 
tible. For  these  conceptions  are  absolutely  immaterial;  they  are 
really  the  Active  Intellect  in  a  sense,  and  only  the  material  is  subject 
to  destruction.  The  sum  of  acquisition  of  immaterial  ideas  constitutes 
the  acquired  or  actual  intellect,  and  this  is  the  immortal  part  of  man. 

Further  than  this  man  cannot  go.  The  idea  adopted  by  some  that 
the  human  intellect  may  become  identified  completely  with  the  Active 
Intellect,  Levi  ben  Gerson  rejects.  In  order  to  accomphsh  this,  he 
says,  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  a  complete  and  perfect  knowledge 
of  all  nature,  and  that  too  a  completely  unified  and  wholly  immaterial 
knowledge  just  as  it  is  in  the  Active  Intellect.  This  is  clearly  im- 
possible. But  it  is  true  that  a  man's  happiness  after  death  is  dependent 
upon  the  amount  and  perfection  of  his  knowledge.  For  even  in  this 
life  the  pleasure  we  derive  from  intellectual  contemplation  is  greater 
the  more  nearly  we  succeed  in  completely  concentrating  our  mind  on 
the  subject  of  study.  Now  after  death  there  will  be  no  disturbing 
factors  such  as  are  supplied  in  this  world  by  the  sensitive  and  emo- 
tional powers.  To  be  sure  this  lack  will  also  prevent  the  acquisition 
of  new  knowledge,  as  was  said  before,  but  the  amount  acquired  wiU 


340  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

be  there  in  the  soul's  power  all  at  once  and  all  the  time.  The  more 
knowledge  one  has  succeeded  in  obtaining  during  life,  the  more  nearly 
he  will  resemble  the  Active  Intellect  and  the  greater  will  be  his  hap- 
piness.^^^ 

The  next  topic  Levi  ben  Gerson  takes  up  is  that  of  prognostication. 
There  are  three  ways  in  which  certain  persons  come  to  know  the 
future,  dreams,  divination  and  prophecy.  What  we  wish  to  do  is  to 
determine  the  kind  of  future  events  that  may  be  thus  known  before- 
hand, the  agency  which  produces  in  us  this  power,  and  the  bearing  this 
phenomenon  has  on  the  nature  of  events  generally,  and  particularly 
as  concerns  the  question  of  chance  and  free  will. 

That  there  is  such  knowledge  of  future  events  is  a  fact  and  not  a 
theory.  Experience  testifies  to  the  fact  that  there  are  certain  people 
who  are  able  to  foretell  the  future,  not  as  a  matter  of  accident  or 
through  a  chance  coincidence,  but  as  a  regular  thing.  Diviners  these 
are  called,  or  fortune  tellers.  This  power  is  even  better  authenticated 
in  prophecy,  which  no  one  denies.  We  can  also  cite  many  instances  of 
dreams,  in  which  a  person  sees  a  future  event  with  all  its  particulars, 
and  the  dream  comes  true.  All  these  cases  are  too  common  to  be 
credited  to  chance.  Now  what  does  this  show  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
events  thus  foreseen?  Clearly  it  indicates  that  they  carmot  be  chance 
happenings,  for  what  is  by  chance  cannot  be  foreseen.  The  only  con- 
clusion then  to  be  drawn  is  that  these  events  are  determined  by  the 
order  of  nature.  But  there  is  another  implication  in  man's  ability 
to  foretell  the  future,  namely,  that  what  is  thus  known  to  man  is  first 
known  to  a  higher  intellect  which  communicates  it  to  us. 

The  first  of  these  two  consequences  leads  us  into  difl&culties.  For  if 
we  examine  the  data  of  prognostication,  whether  it  be  of  dream, 
divination  or  prophecy,  we  find  that  they  concern  almost  exclusively 
such  particular  human  events  as  would  be  classed  in  the  category  of 
the  contingent  rather  than  in  that  of  the  necessary.  Fortune  tellers 
regularly  tell  people  about  the  kind  of  children  they  will  have,  the 
sort  of  things  they  will  do,  and  so  on.  In  prophecy  similarly  Sarah  was 
told  she  would  have  a  son  (Gen.  i8,  lo).  We  also  have  examples  of 
prognostication  respecting  the  outcome  of  a  battle,  announcement  of 
coming  rain, — events  due  to  definite  causes — as  well  as  the  prediction 
of  events  which  are  the  result  of  free  choice  or  pure  accident,  as  when 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  341 

Samuel  tells  Elisha  that  he  will  meet  three  men  on  the  way,  who  will 
give  him  two  loaves  of  bread,  which  he  will  accept;  or  when  the 
prophet  in  Samariah  tells  the  prophet  in  Bethel  that  he  will  be  killed 
by  a  lion.  The  question  now  is,  if  these  contingent  things  can  be 
known  in  advance,  they  are  not  contingent;  and  if  these  are  not,  none 
are.  For  the  uniform  events  in  nature  are  surely  not  contingent.  If 
then  those  events  usually  classed  as  contingent  and  voluntary  are  not 
such,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  chance  and  free  will  at  all,  which  is 
impossible. 

Our  answer  is  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  those  contingent  happenings 
we  call  luck  and  ill  luck  do  often  come  frequently  to  certain  persons, 
whom  we  call  lucky  or  unlucky,  which  shows  that  they  are  not  the 
result  of  pure  chance,  and  that  there  is  some  sort  of  order  determining 
them.  Moreover,  we  know  that  the  higher  in  the  scale  of  being  a 
thing  is,  the  more  nature  takes  care  to  guard  it.  Hence  as  man  is  the 
highest  being  here  below,  it  stands  to  reason  that  the  heavenly  bodies 
order  his  existence  and  his  fortune.  And  so  the  science  of  astrology, 
with  all  its  mistakes  on  account  of  the  imperfect  state  of  our  knowl- 
edge, does  say  a  great  many  things  which  are  true.  This,  however, 
does  not  destroy  freedom  and  chance.  For  the  horoscope  represents 
only  one  side  of  the  question.  Man  was  also  endowed  with  reason  and 
purpose,  which  enable  him  whenever  he  chooses  to  counteract  the 
order  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  In  the  main  the  heavenly  bodies  by 
their  positions  and  motions  and  the  consequent  predominance  of  cer- 
tain elemental  qualities  in  the  sublunar  world  over  others  affect  the 
temperaments  of  man  in  a  manner  tending  to  his  welfare.  The  social 
order  with  its  differentiation  of  labor  and  occupation  is  worked  out 
wonderfully  well — better  than  the  system  of  Plato's  Republic — by  the 
positions  and  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  If  not  for  this,  all  men 
would  choose  the  more  honorable  trades  and  professions,  there  would 
be  no  one  to  do  the  menial  work,  and  society  would  be  impossible. 
At  the  same  time  there  are  certain  incidental  evils  inherent  in  the 
rigid  system  which  would  tend  to  destroy  certain  individuals.  To 
counteract  these  unintended  defects,  God  endowed  man  with  reason 
and  choice  enabhng  him  to  avoid  the  dangers  threatening  him  in  the 
world  of  nature. 

The  solution  of  our  problem  then  is  this.    These  human  events  have 


342  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

a  twofold  aspect.  They  are  determined  so  far  as  they  follow  from  the 
order  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  and  in  so  far  they  can  be  foretold.  They 
are  undetermined  so  far  as  they  are  the  result  of  individual  choice,  and 
in  so  far  they  cannot  be  known  beforehand.  There  are  also  pure  chance 
events  in  inanimate  nature,  bearing  no  relation  to  human  fortune. 
These  cannot  be  foretold.^^^ 

We  said  above  that  there  must  be  an  intellect  which  knows  these 
contingent  events  predicted  in  dreams,  divination  and  prophecy  and 
imparts  a  knowledge  of  them  to  these  men.  This  can  be  no  other  than 
the  Active  Intellect,  whose  nature  we  discussed  above.  For  the  Ac- 
tive Intellect  knows  the  order  of  sublunar  things,  and  gives  us  a  knowl- 
edge of  them  in  the  ideas  of  the  material  intellect.  Moreover,  he  is 
the  agent  producing  them  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  Hence  the  heavenly  bodies  are  also  his  instrument  in  ordering 
those  contingent  events  which  are  predicted  in  dreams  and  prophetic 
visions. 

The  purpose  of  this  information  is  to  protect  man  against  the  evil 
destined  for  him  in  the  order  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  or  in  order  that 
he  may  avail  himself  of  the  good  in  store  for  him  if  he  knows  of  it. 

There  is  a  difference  in  kind  between  prophecy  on  the  one  hand  and 
divination  and  dream  on  the  other.  Prophecy  comes  from  the  Active 
Intellect  directly  acting  on  the  material  intellect.  Hence  only  intel- 
ligent men  can  be  prophets.  Divination  and  dream  come  from  the 
Active  Intellect  indirectly.  They  are  caused  by  the  heavenly  bodies, 
and  the  action  is  on  the  imagination.  The  imagination  is  more  easily 
isolated  from  the  other  parts  of  the  soul  in  young  people  and  simple- 
tons.  Hence  we  find  examples  of  dreams  and  divination  among  them.  ^^^ 

In  discussing  the  problem  of  God's  knowledge,  Gersonides  takes 
direct  issue  with  Maimonides.  The  reader  will  recall  that  the  question 
turns  upon  the  knowledge  of  particulars.  Some  philosophers  go  so  far 
as  to  deny  to  God  any  knowledge  of  things  other  than  his  own  essence; 
for  the  known  is  in  a  sense  identified  with  the  knower,  and  to  bring 
in  a  multiplicity  of  ideas  in  God's  knowledge  would  endanger  his 
unity.  Others,  however,  fell  short  of  this  extreme  opinion  and  ad- 
mitted God's  knowledge  of  things  other  than  himself,  but  maintained 
that  God  cannot  know  particulars  for  various  reasons.  The  particular 
is  perceived  by  sense,  a  material  faculty,  whereas  God  is  immaterial. 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  343 

Particulars  are  infinite  and  cannot  be  measured  or  embraced,  whereas 
knowledge  is  a  kind  of  measuring  or  embracing.  The  particulars  are 
not  always  existing,  and  are  subject  to  change.  Hence  God's  knowl- 
edge would  be  subject  to  change  and  disappearance,  which  is  impos- 
sible. If  God  knows  particulars  how  is  it  that  there  is  often  a  viola- 
tion of  right  and  justice  in  the  destinies  of  individual  men?  This 
would  argue  in  God  either  inability  or  indifference,  both  of  which  are 
impossible. 

Maimonides  insists  on  God's  knowledge  of  all  things  of  which  he  is 
the  creator,  including  particulars.  And  he  answers  the  arguments 
of  the  philosophers  by  saying  that  their  objections  are  valid  only  if 
we  assume  that  God's  knowledge  is  similar  to  ours,  and  since  with  us 
it  is  impossible  to  know  the  material  except  through  a  material  organ, 
it  is  not  possible  in  God.  As  we  cannot  comprehend  the  infinite; 
as  we  cannot  know  the  non-existent,  nor  the  changing  without  a  change 
in  our  knowledge,  God  cannot  do  so.  But  it  is  wrong  to  assume  this. 
God's  knowledge  is  identical  with  his  essence,  which  these  same 
philosophers  insist  is  unlike  anything  else,  and  unknowable.  Surely 
it  follows  that  his  knowledge  is  also  without  the  least  resemblance 
to  our  knowledge  and  the  name  alone  is  what  they  have  in  common. 
Hence  all  the  objections  of  the  philosophers  fall  away  at  one  stroke. 
We  cannot  in  one  act  of  knowing  embrace  a  number  of  things  differing 
in  species;  God  can,  because  his  knowledge  is  one.  We  cannot  know 
the  non-existent,  for  our  knowledge  depends  upon  the  thing  known. 
God  can.  We  cannot  know  the  infinite,  for  the  infinite  cannot  be 
embraced;  God  can.  We  cannot  know  the  outcome  of  a  future  event 
unless  the  event  is  necessary  and  determined.  If  the  event  is  contin- 
gent and  undetermined  we  can  only  have  opinion  concerning  it, 
which  may  or  may  not  be  true;  we  are  imcertain  and  may  be  mistaken. 
God  can  know  the  outcome  of  a  contingent  event,  and  yet  the  event 
is  not  determined,  and  may  happen  one  way  or  the  other.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  a  given  thing  changes  as  the  thing  itself  undergoes  a  change, 
for  if  our  knowledge  should  remain  the  same  while  the  object  changes, 
it  would  not  be  knowledge  but  error.  In  God  the  two  are  compatible. 
He  knows  in  advance  how  a  given  thing  will  change,  and  his  knowledge 
never  changes,  even  though  that  which  was  at  one  moment  potential 
and  implicit  becomes  later  actual  and  explicit. 


344  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

At  this  point  Gersonides  steps  in  in  defence  of  human  logic  and 
sanity.  He  accuses  Maimonides  of  not  being  quite  honest  with  him- 
self. Maimonides,  he  intimates,  did  not  choose  this  position  of  his 
own  free  will — a  position  scientifically  quite  untenable — he  was  forced 
to  it  by  theological  exigencies. ^^^  He  felt  that  he  must  vindicate,  by 
fair  means  or  foul,  God's  knowledge  of  particulars.  And  so  Gersonides 
proceeds  to  demolish  Maimonides's  position  by  reducing  it  adabsurdum. 

What  does  Maimonides  mean  by  saying  that  God  knows  the  con- 
tingent? If  he  means  that  God  knows  that  the  contingent  may  as 
contingent  happen  otherwise  than  as  he  knows  it  will  happen,  we  do 
not  call  this  in  us  knowledge,  but  opinion.  If  he  means  that  God 
knows  it  will  happen  in  a  certain  way,  and  yet  it  may  turn  out  that 
the  reverse  will  actually  take  place,  then  we  call  this  in  our  case  error, 
not  knowledge.  And  if  he  means  that  God  merely  knows  that  it  may 
happen  one  way  or  the  other  without  knowing  definitely  which  will 
happen,  then  we  call  this  in  our  experience  imcertainty  and  perplexity, 
not  knowledge.  By  insisting  that  all  this  is  in  God  knowledge  because, 
forsooth,  God's  knowledge  is  not  like  our  knowledge,  is  tantamount 
to  saying  that  what  is  in  us  opinion,  uncertainty,  error,  is  in  God 
knowledge — a  solution  far  from  complimentary  to  God's  knowledge. 

Besides,  the  entire  principle  of  Maimonides  that  there  is  no  relation 
of  resemblance  between  God's  attributes  and  ours,  that  the  terms  wise, 
just,  and  so  on,  are  pure  homonyms,  is  fundamentally  wrong.  We  at- 
tribute knowledge  to  God  because  we  know  in  our  own  case  that  an 
intellect  is  perfected  by  knowledge.  And  since  we  have  come  to  the 
conclusion  on  other  grounds  that  God  is  a  perfect  intellect,  we  say 
he  must  have  knowledge.  Now  if  this  knowledge  that  we  ascribe  to 
God  has  no  resemblance  whatsoever  to  what  we  understand  by  knowl- 
edge in  our  own  case,  the  ground  is  removed  from  our  feet.  We 
might  as  well  argue  that  man  is  rational  because  solid  is  continuous. 
If  the  word  knowledge  means  a  totally  different  thing  in  God  from 
what  it  means  in  us,  how  do  we  know  that  it  is  to  be  found  in  God? 
If  we  have  absolutely  no  idea  what  the  term  means  when  applied  to 
God,  what  reason  have  we  for  preferring  knowledge  as  a  divine  attri- 
bute to  its  opposite  or  negative?  If  knowledge  does  not  mean  knowl- 
edge, ignorance  does  not  mean  ignorance,  and  it  is  just  the  same 
whether  we  ascribe  to  God  the  one  or  the  other. 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  345 

The  truth  is  that  the  attributes  we  ascribe  to  God  do  have  a  resem- 
blance to  the  same  attributes  in  ourselves;  only  they  are  primary  in 
God,  secondary  in  ourselves,  i.  e.,  they  exist  in  God  in  a  more  perfect 
manner  than  in  us.  Hence  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  what  would  be  in 
us  error  or  uncertainty  is  in  God  knowledge.  Our  problem  must  be 
solved  more  candidly  and  differently.  There  are  arguments  in  favor 
of  God's  knowing  particulars  (Maimonides  gives  some),  and  there 
are  the  arguments  of  the  philosophers  against  the  thesis.  The  truth 
must  be  between  the  two,  that  God  knows  them  from  one  aspect 
and  does  not  know  them  from  another.  Having  shown  above  that 
human  events  are  in  part  ordered  and  determined  by  the  heavenly 
bodies,  and  in  part  undetermined  and  dependent  upon  the  individ- 
ual's choice,  we  can  now  make  use  of  this  distinction  for  the  solution 
of  our  problem.  God  knows  particulars  in  so  far  as  they  are  ordered, 
he  does  not  know  them  in  so  far  as  they  are  contingent.  He  knows 
that  they  are  contingent,  and  hence  it  follows  that  he  does  not  know 
which  of  the  two  possibilities  will  happen,  else  they  would  not  be 
contingent.  This  is  no  defect  in  God's  nature,  for  to  know  a  thing 
as  it  is  is  no  imperfection.  In  general  God  does  not  know  particulars 
as  particulars  but  as  ordered  by  the  universal  laws  of  nature.  He 
knows  the  universal  order,  and  he  knows  the  particulars  in  so  far  as 
they  are  united  in  the  universal  order. 

This  theory  meets  all  objections,  and  moreover  it  is  in  agreement 
with  the  views  of  the  Bible.  It  is  the  only  one  by  which  we  can  har- 
monize the  apparent  contradictions  in  the  Scriptures.  Thus  on  the 
one  hand  we  are  told  that  God  sends  Prophets  and  commands  people 
to  do  and  forbear.  This  implies  that  a  person  has  freedom  to  choose, 
and  that  the  contingent  is  a  real  category.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find 
that  God  foretells  the  coming  of  future  events  respecting  human  des- 
tiny, which  signifies  determination.  And  yet  again  we  find  that  God 
repents,  and  that  he  does  not  repent.  All  these  apparent  contradic- 
tions can  be  harmonized  on  our  theory.  God  foretells  the  coming  of 
events  in  so  far  as  they  are  determined  in  the  universal  order  of  nature. 
But  man's  freedom  may  succeed  in  coimteracting  this  order,  and  the 
events  predicted  may  not  come.  This  is  signified  by  the  expression 
that  God  repents. 3^^ 

Levi  ben  Gerson's  solution,  whatever  we  may  think  of  its  scientific 


346  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

or  philosophic  value,  is  surely  very  bold  as  theology,  we  might  almost 
say  it  is  a  theological  monstrosity.  It  practically  removes  from  God 
the  definite  knowledge  of  the  outcome  of  a  given  event  so  far  as  that 
outcome  is  contingent.  Gersonides  will  not  give  up  the  contingent, 
for  that  would  destroy  freedom.  He  therefore  accepts  free  will  with 
its  consequences,  at  the  risk  of  limiting  God's  knowledge  to  events 
which  are  determined  by  the  laws  of  nature.  Maimonides  was  less 
consistent,  but  had  the  truer  theological  sense,  namely,  he  kept  to 
both  horns  of  the  dilemma.  God  is  omniscient  and  man  is  free.  He 
gave  up  the  solution  by  seeking  refuge  in  the  mysteriousness  of  God's 
knowledge.    This  is  the  true  religious  attitude. 

The  question  of  Providence  is  closely  related  to  that  of  God's  knowl- 
edge. For  it  is  clear  that  one  cannot  provide  for  those  things  of  which 
he  does  not  know.  Gersonides's  view  in  this  problem  is  very  similar 
to  that  of  Maimonides,  and  like  him  he  sees  in  the  discussions  between 
Job  and  his  friends  the  representative  opinions  held  by  philosophers 
in  this  important  problem. 

There  are  three  views,  he  says,  concerning  the  nature  of  Providence. 
One  is  that  God's  providence  extends  only  to  species  and  not  to  in- 
dividuals. The  second  opinion  is  that  God  provides  for  every  individ- 
ual of  the  human  race.  The  third  view  is  that  some  individuals  are 
specially  provided  for,  but  not  all.  Job  held  the  first  view,  which  is 
that  of  Aristotle.  The  arguments  in  favor  of  this  opinion  are  that 
God  does  not  know  particulars,  hence  cannot  provide  for  them. 
Besides,  there  would  be  more  justice  in  the  distribution  of  goods 
and  evils  in  the  world  if  God  concerned  himself  about  every  in- 
dividual. Then  again  man  is  too  insignificant  for  God's  special 
care. 

The  second  view  is  that  of  the  majority  of  our  people.  They  argue 
that  as  God  is  the  author  of  all,  he  surely  provides  for  them.  And 
as  a  matter  of  fact  experience  shows  it;  else  there  would  be  much  more 
violence  and  bloodshed  than  there  is.  The  wicked  are  actually  pun- 
ished and  the  good  rewarded.  This  class  is  divided  into  two  parts. 
Some  think  that  while  God  provides  for  all  men,  not  all  that  happens 
to  a  man  is  due  to  God;  there  are  also  other  causes.  The  others 
think  that  every  happening  is  due  to  God.  This  second  class  may 
again  be  divided  according  to  the  manner  in  which  they  account  for 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  347 

those  facts  in  experience  which  seem  to  militate  against  their  view. 
Maintaining  that  every  incident  is  due  to  God,  they  have  to  explain 
the  apparent  deviation  from  justice  in  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked 
and  the  adversity  of  the  righteous.  One  party  explains  the  phenome- 
non by  saying  that  the  prosperity  and  the  adversity  in  these  cases 
are  only  seeming  and  not  real;  that  they  in  fact  are  the  opposite  of 
what  they  seem,  or  at  least  lead  to  the  opposite.  The  second  party 
answers  the  objection  on  the  ground  that  those  we  think  good  may 
not  really  be  such,  and  similarly  those  we  think  bad  may  not  really 
be  bad.  For  the  way  to  judge  a  person's  character  is  not  merely  by 
his  deeds  alone,  but  by  his  deeds  as  related  to  his  temperament  and 
disposition,  which  God  alone  knows.  Eliphaz  the  Temanite  belonged 
to  those  who  think  that  not  all  which  happens  is  due  to  God;  that 
folly  is  responsible  for  a  man's  misfortune.  Bildad  the  Shuchite 
beheved  that  all  things  are  from  God,  but  not  all  that  seems  good  and 
evil  is  really  so.  Zophar  the  Naamathite  thought  we  do  not  always 
judge  character  correctly;  that  temperament  and  disposition  must  be 
taken  into  account. 

Of  these  various  opinions  the  first  one,  that  of  Aristotle,  cannot  be 
true.  Dreams,  divination,  and  especially  prophecy  contradict  it 
flatly.  All  these  are  given  to  the  individual  for  his  protection  (cf. 
above,  p.  342).  The  second  opinion,  namely,  that  God's  providence 
extends  to  every  individual,  is  likewise  disproved  by  reason,  by  ex- 
perience and  by  the  Bible.  We  have  already  proved  (p.  345)  that 
God's  knowledge  does  not  extend  to  particulars  as  such.  He  only 
knows  things  as  ordered  by  the  heavenly  bodies;  and  knows  at  the 
same  time  that  they  may  fail  to  happen  because  of  man's  free  will. 
Now  if  God  punishes  and  rewards  every  man  according  to  his  deeds, 
one  of  two  things  necessarily  follows.  Either  he  rewards  and  punishes 
according  to  those  deeds  which  the  individual  is  determined  to  do  by 
the  order  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  or  according  to  the  deeds  the  in- 
dividual actually  does.  In  the  first  case  there  would  be  often  injus- 
tice, for  the  person  might  not  have  acted  as  the  order  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  indicated  he  would  act,  for  he  is  free  to  act  as  he  will.  The 
second  case  is  impossible,  for  it  would  mean  that  God  knows  partic- 
ulars as  particulars — a  thesis  we  have  already  disproved.  Besides, 
evil  does  not  come  from  God  directly,  since  he  is  pure  form  and  evil 


348  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

comes  only  from  matter.  Hence  it  cannot  be  said  that  he  punishes 
the  evil  doer  for  his  sin. 

Experience  also  testifies  against  this  view,  for  we  see  the  just  suffer 
and  the  wicked  prosper.  The  manner  in  which  Eliphaz,  Bildad  and 
Zophar  wish  to  defend  God's  justice  will  not  hold  water.  Man's  own 
folly  will  account  perhaps  for  some  evils  befalling  the  righteous  and 
some  good  coming  to  the  wicked.  But  it  will  not  account  for  the 
failure  of  the  good  man  to  get  the  reward  he  deserves,  and  of  the 
wicked  to  receive  the  punishment  which  is  his  due.  The  righteous  man 
often  has  troubles  all  his  life  no  matter  how  careful  he  is  to  avoid  them, 
and  correspondingly  the  same  is  true  of  the  wicked,  that  he  is  prosper- 
ous, despite  his  lack  of  caution  and  good  sense.  To  avoid  these  objec- 
tions as  Eliphaz  does  by  saying  that  if  the  wicked  man  himself  is  not 
punished,  his  children  will  be,  is  to  go  from  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire. 
For  it  is  not  just  either  to  omit  to  punish  the  one  deserving  it,  or  to 
punish  another  innocent  man  for  him.  Nor  is  Zophar's  defence  any 
better.  For  the  same  man,  with  the  same  temperament  and  disposi- 
tion, often  suffers  more  when  he  is  inclined  to  do  good,  and  is  prosper- 
ous when  he  is  not  so  scrupulous.  Bildad  is  no  more  successful  than 
the  other  two.  The  evils  coming  to  the  righteous  are  often  real  and 
permanent.  But  neither  does  the  Bible  compel  us  to  believe  that  God 
looks  out  for  all  individuals.  This  is  especially  true  in  reference  to 
punishment,  as  can  be  gathered  from  such  expressions  as  "I  will  hide 
my  face  from  them,  and  they  shall  be  given  to  be  devoured"  (Deut.  31, 
17),  or  "As  thou  hast  forgotten  the  law  of  thy  God,  so  will  I  myself 
also  forget  thy  children"  (Hosea  4,  6).  These  expressions  indicate 
that  God  does  not  punish  the  individuals  directly,  but  that  he  leaves 
them  to  the  fate  that  is  destined  for  them  by  the  order  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  True  there  are  other  passages  in  Scripture  speaking  of  direct 
punishment,  but  they  may  be  interpreted  so  as  not  to  conflict  with 
our  conclusions. 

Having  seen  that  neither  of  the  two  extreme  views  is  correct,  it 
remains  to  adopt  the  middle  course,  namely,  that  some  individuals  are 
provided  for  specially,  and  others  not.  The  nearer  a  person  is  to  the 
Active  Intellect,  the  more  he  receives  divine  providence  and  care. 
Those  people  who  do  not  improve  their  capabilities,  which  they  possess 
as  members  of  the  species,  are  provided  for  only  as  members  of  the 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  349 

species.  The  matter  may  be  put  in  another  way  also.  God  knows 
all  ideas.  Man  is  potentially  capable  of  receiving  them  in  a  certain 
manner.  God,  who  is  actual,  leads  man  from  his  potentiality  to 
actuality.  When  a  man's  potentialities  are  thus  realized,  he  becomes 
similar  to  God,  because  when  ideas  are  actualized  the  agent  and  the 
thing  acted  upon  are  one.  Hence  the  person  enjoys  divine  providence 
at  that  time.  The  way  in  which  God  provides  for  such  men  is  by 
giving  them  knowledge  through  dream,  divination  or  prophecy  or 
intuition  or  in  some  other  unconscious  manner  on  the  individual's  part, 
which  knowledge  protects  him  from  harm.  This  view  is  not  in  con- 
flict with  the  truth  that  God  does  not  know  particulars  as  such.  For 
it  is  not  to  the  individual  person  as  such  that  providence  extends  as  a 
conscious  act  of  God.  The  individualization  is  due  to  the  recipient 
and  not  to  the  dispenser.  One  may  object  that  after  all  since  it  is 
possible  that  bad  men  may  have  goods  as  ordered  by  the  heavenly 
bodies,  and  good  men  may  have  misfortune  as  thus  ordered,  when 
their  attachment  to  God  is  loosened  somewhat,  there  is  injustice  in 
God  if  he  could  have  arranged  the  heavenly  spheres  differently  and 
did  not,  or  incapacity  if  he  could  not.  The  answer  is  briefly  that  the 
order  of  the  spheres  does  a  great  deal  of  good  in  maintaining  the 
existence  of  things.  And  if  some  Httle  evil  comes  also  incidentally, 
this  does  not  condemn  the  whole  arrangement.  In  fact  the  evils  come 
from  the  very  agencies  which  are  the  authors  of  good.  The  view  of 
providence  here  adopted  is  that  of  Elihu  the  son  of  Barachel  the 
Buzite  in  the  book  of  Job  (ch.  32),  and  it  agrees  also  with  the  opinion 
of  Maimonides  in  the  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed"  (c/.  above,  p.  292).^'*^ 
Instead  of  placing  his  cosmology  at  the  beginning  of  his  system  and 
proceeding  from  that  as  a  basis  to  the  other  parts  of  his  work,  the 
psychology  and  the  ethics,  Levi  ben  Gerson,  whose  "Milhamot 
Hash  em"  is  not  so  much  a  systematic  work  as  an  aggregation  of  dis- 
cussions, reversed  the  process.  He  begins  as  we  have  seen  with  a 
purely  psychological  analysis  concerning  the  nature  of  the  human 
reason  and  its  relation  to  the  Active  Intellect.  He  follows  up  this 
discussion  with  a  treatment  of  prognostication  as  exhibiting  some  of 
the  effects  of  the  Active  Intellect  upon  the  reason  and  imagination  of 
man.  This  is  again  followed  by  a  discussion  of  God's  knowledge  and 
providence.    And  not  until  all  these  psychological  (and  in  part  ethical) 


350  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

questions  have  been  decided,  does  Levi  ben  Gerson  undertake  to  give 
us  his  views  of  the  constitution  of  the  universe  and  the  nature  and 
attributes  of  God.  In  this  discussion  he  takes  occasion  to  express  his 
dissatisfaction  with  Aristotle's  proofs  of  the  existence  of  the  spheral 
movers  and  of  the  unmoved  mover  or  God,  as  inadequate  to  bear  the 
structure  which  it  is  intended  to  erect  upon  them.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  the  innovation  of  Abraham  Ibn  Daud  and  Maimonides  in 
making  Jewish  philosophy  more  strictly  Aristotelian  than  it  had  been 
consisted  in  a  great  measure  in  just  this  introduction  of  the  Aristotelian 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God  as  derived  from  the  motions  of  the  heav- 
enly bodies.  Levi  ben  Gerson 's  proofs  are  teleological  rather  than 
mechanical.  Aristotle  said  a  moving  body  must  have  a  mover  out- 
side of  it,  which  if  it  is  again  a  body  is  itself  in  motion  and  must  have  a 
mover  in  turn.  And  as  this  process  cannot  go  on  ad  infinitum,  there 
must  be  at  the  end  of  the  series  an  unmoved  mover.  As  unmoved 
this  mover  cannot  be  body;  and  as  producing  motion  eternally,  it  can- 
not be  a  power  residing  in  a  body,  a  physical  or  material  power,  for  no 
such  power  can  be  infinite.  Gersonides  is  not  satisfied  with  this  proof. 
He  argues  that  so  far  as  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  are  con- 
cerned there  is  no  reason  why  a  physical  power  cannot  keep  on  moving 
them  eternally.  The  reason  that  motions  caused  by  finite  forces  in 
our  world  come  to  a  stop  is  because  the  thing  moved  is  subject  to 
change,  which  alters  its  relation  to  its  mover;  and  secondly  because 
the  force  endeavors  to  move  the  object  in  opposition  to  its  own  tend- 
ency, in  opposition  to  gravity.  In  the  case  of  the  heavenly  bodies 
neither  of  these  conditions  is  present.  The  relation  of  the  mover  to  the 
moved  is  always  the  same,  since  the  heavenly  bodies  are  not  subject 
to  change;  and  as  they  are  not  made  of  the  four  terrestrial  elements 
they  have  no  inherent  tendency  to  move  in  any  direction,  hence  they 
offer  no  opposition  to  the  force  exerted  upon  them  by  the  mover.  A 
finite  power  might  therefore  quite  conceivably  cause  eternal  motion. 
Similarly  an  unmoved  mover  cannot  be  body,  to  be  sure,  but  it  may 
be  a  physical  power  like  a  soul,  which  in  moving  the  body  is  not  itself 
moved  by  that  motion.  Aristotle's  proofs  therefore  are  not  sufiScient 
to  produce  the  conviction  that  the  movers  of  the  spheres  and  God 
himself  are  separate  Intelligences. ^^^ 

Gersonides  accordingly  follows  a  different  method.     He   argues 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  351 

that  if  a  system  of  things  and  events  exhibits  perfection  not  here  and 
there  and  at  rare  intervals  but  regularly,  the  inference  is  justified 
that  there  is  an  intelligent  agent  who  had  a  definite  purpose  and  de- 
sign in  establishing  the  system.  The  world  below  is  such  a  system. 
Hence  it  has  an  intelligent  agent  as  its  author.  This  agent  may  be 
a  separate  and  immaterial  intelligence,  or  a  corporeal  power  like  a 
soul.  He  then  shows  that  it  cannot  be  a  corporeal  power,  for  it  would 
have  to  reside  in  the  animal  sperm  which  exhibits  such  wonderful 
and  purposive  development,  or  in  the  parent  animal  from  which  the 
sperm  came,  both  of  which,  he  argues,  are  impossible.  It  remains 
then  that  the  cause  of  the  teleological  life  of  the  sublunar  world  is  an 
immaterial  power,  a  separate  intellect.  This  intellect,  he  argues 
further,  acts  upon  matter  and  endows  it  with  forms,  the  only  mediat- 
ing power  being  the  natural  heat  which  is  found  in  the  seed  and  sperm 
of  plants  and  animals.  Moreover,  it  is  aware  of  the  order  of  what  it 
produces.  It  is  the  Active  Intellect  of  which  we  spoke  above  (p.  337). 
The  forms  of  terrestrial  things  come  from  it  directly,  the  heat  residing 
in  the  seed  comes  from  the  motions  of  the  spheres.  This  shows  that 
the  permanent  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  are  also  intelligent 
motions,  for  they  tend  to  produce  perfection  in  the  terrestrial  world 
and  never  come  to  a  standstill,  which  would  be  the  case  if  the  motions 
were  "natural"  like  those  of  the  elements,  or  induced  against  their 
nature  like  that  of  a  stone  moving  upward.  We  are  justified  in  saying 
then  that  the  heavenly  bodies  are  endowed  with  intellects  and  have 
no  material  soul.  Hence  their  movers  are  pure  Intelligences,  and 
there  are  as  many  of  them  as  there  are  spheres,  i.  e.,  forty-eight,  or 
fifty-eight  or  sixty-four  according  to  one's  opinion  on  the  astronomical 
question  of  the  number  of  spheres. 

Now  as  the  Active  Intellect  knows  the  order  of  sublunar  existence 
in  its  unity,  and  the  movers  of  the  respective  spheres  know  the  order 
of  their  effects  through  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  it  follows 
that  as  all  things  in  heaven  above  and  on  the  earth  beneath  are  re- 
lated in  a  unitary  system,  there  is  a  highest  agent  who  is  the  cause 
of  all  existence  absolutely  and  has  a  knowledge  of  all  existence  as  a 
unitary  system.  ^^° 

The  divine  attributes  are  derived  by  us  from  his  actions,  and  hence 
they  are  not  pure  homonyms  (cf.  p.  240).     God  has  a  knowledge  of 


352  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  complete  order  of  sublunar  things,  of  which  the  several  movers 
have  only  a  part.  He  knows  it  as  one,  and  knows  it  eternally  without 
change.  His  joy  and  gladness  are  beyond  conception,  for  our  joy  also 
is  very  great  in  understanding.  His  is  also  the  perfect  Life,  for  under- 
standing is  life.  He  is  the  most  real  Substance  and  Existent,  and  he 
is  One.  God  is  also  the  most  real  Agent,  as  making  the  other  movers 
do  their  work,  and  producing  a  complete  and  perfect  whole  out  of 
their  parts.  He  is  also  properly  called  Bestower,  Beneficent,  Gracious, 
Strong,  Mighty,  Upright,  Just,  Eternal,  Permanent.  All  these  at- 
tributes, however,  do  not  denote  multiplicity.^^^ 

From  God  we  now  pass  again  to  his  creation,  and  take  up  the  prob- 
lem which  caused  Maimonides  so  much  trouble,  namely,  the  question 
of  the  origin  of  the  world.  It  will  be  remembered  that  dissatisfied 
with  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God  advanced  by  the  Mutakal- 
limun,  Maimonides,  in  order  to  have  a  firm  foundation  for  the  central 
idea  of  religion,  tentatively  adopted  the  Aristotelian  notion  of  the 
eternity  of  motion  and  the  world.  But  no  sooner  does  Maimonides 
establish  his  proof  of  the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  of  God 
than  he  returns  to  the  attack  of  the  Aristotelian  view  and  points  out 
that  the  problem  is  insoluble  in  a  strictly  scientific  manner;  that 
Aristotle  himself  never  intended  his  arguments  in  favor  of  eternity 
to  be  regarded  as  philosophically  demonstrated,  and  that  they  all 
labor  under  the  fatal  fallacy  that  because  certain  laws  hold  of  the 
world's  phenomena  once  it  is  in  existence,  these  same  laws  must  have 
governed  the  estabUshment  of  the  world  itself  in  its  origin.  Besides, 
the  assumption  of  the  world's  eternity  with  its  corollary  of  the  neces- 
sity and  immutability  of  its  phenomena  saps  the  foundation  of  all 
religion,  makes  miracles  impossible,  and  reduces  the  world  to  a  ma- 
chine. Gersonides  is  on  the  whole  agreed  with  Maimonides.  He 
admits  that  Aristotle's  arguments  are  the  best  yet  advanced  in  the 
problem,  but  that  they  are  not  convincing.  He  also  agrees  with  Mai- 
monides in  his  general  stricture  on  Aristotle's  method,  only  modifying 
and  restricting  its  generality  and  sweeping  nature.  With  all  this, 
however,  he  finds  it  necessary  to  take  up  the  entire  question  anew 
and  treats  it  in  his  characteristic  manner,  with  detail  and  rigor,  and 
finally  comes  to  a  conclusion  different  from  that  of  Maimonides, 
namely,  that  the  world  had  an  origin  in  time,  to  be  sure,  but  that  it 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  353 

came  not  ex  nihilo  in  the  absolute  sense  of  the  word  nihil,  but  devel- 
oped from  an  eternal  formless  matter,  which  God  endowed  with  form. 
This  is  the  so-called  Platonic  view. 

We  cannot  enter  into  all  his  details  which  are  technical  and  fatigu- 
ing in  the  extreme,  but  we  must  give  a  general  idea  of  his  procedure 
in  the  investigation  of  this  important  topic. 

The  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  world,  he  says,  is  very  difficult. 
First,  because  in  order  to  learn  from  the  nature  of  existing  things 
whether  they  were  created  out  of  a  state  of  non-existence  or  not,  we 
must  know  the  essence  of  existing  things,  which  is  not  easy.  Secondly, 
we  must  know  the  nature  of  God  in  order  to  determine  whether  he 
could  have  existed  first  without  the  world  and  then  have  created  it, 
or  whether  he  had  to  have  the  world  with  him  from  eternity.  The 
fact  of  the  great  difference  of  opinion  on  this  question  among  thinkers, 
and  the  testimony  of  Maimonides  that  Aristotle  himself  had  no  valid 
proof  in  this  matter  are  additional  indications  of  the  great  difficulty 
of  the  subject. 

Some  think  the  world  was  made  and  destroyed  an  infinite  number 
of  times.  Others  say  it  was  made  once.  Of  these  some  maintain 
it  was  made  out  of  something  (Plato) ;  others,  that  it  was  made  out  of 
absolute  nothing  (Philoponus,  the  Mutakallimun,  Maimonides  and 
many  of  our  Jewish  writers).  Some  on  the  other  hand,  namely,  Aris- 
totle and  his  followers,  hold  the  world  to  be  eternal.  They  all  have 
their  defenders,  and  there  is  no  need  to  refute  the  others  since  Aris- 
totle has  already  done  this.  His  arguments  are  the  best  so  far,  and 
deserve  investigation.  The  fundamental  fallacy  in  all  his  proofs  is 
that  he  argues  from  the  laws  of  genesis  and  decay  in  the  parts  of  the 
world  to  the  laws  of  these  processes  in  the  world  as  a  whole.  This 
might  seem  to  be  the  same  criticism  which  Maimonides  advances, 
but  it  is  not  really  quite  the  same,  Maimonides's  assertion  being 
more  general  and  sweeping.  Maimonides  says  that  the  origin  of  the 
world  as  a  whole  need  not  be  in  any  respect  like  the  processes  going 
on  within  its  parts;  whereas  Gersonides  bases  his  argmnent  on  the 
observed  difference  in  the  world  between  wholes  and  parts,  admitting 
that  the  two  may  be  ahke  in  many  respects. 

In  order  to  determine  whether  the  world  is  created  or  not,  it  is 
best  to  investigate  first  those  things  in  the  world  which  have  the  ap- 


354  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

pearance  of  being  eternal,  such  as  the  heavenly  bodies,  time,  motion, 
the  form  of  the  earth,  and  so  on.  If  these  are  proven  to  be  eternal, 
the  world  is  eternal;  if  not,  it  is  not.  A  general  principle  to  help  us 
distinguish  a  thing  having  an  origin  from  one  that  has  not  is  the  fol- 
lowing: A  thing  which  came  into  being  in  time  has  a  purpose.  An 
eternal  thing  has  no  purpose.  Applying  this  principle  to  the  heavens 
we  find  that  all  about  them  is  with  a  purpose  to  ordering  the  sublunar 
world  in  the  best  way  possible.  Their  motions,  their  distances,  their 
positions,  their  numbers,  and  so  on  are  all  for  this  purpose.  Hence 
they  had  a  beginning.  Aristotle's  attempts  to  explain  these  condi- 
tions from  the  nature  of  the  heavens  themselves  are  not  successful, 
and  he  knew  it.  Again,  as  the  heavenly  bodies  are  all  made  of  the 
same  fifth  element  (the  Aristotelian  ether),  the  many  varieties  in 
their  forms  and  motions  require  special  explanation.  The  only  satis- 
factory explanation  is  that  the  origin  of  the  heavenly  bodies  is  not 
due  to  nature  and  necessity,  which  would  favor  eternity,  but  to  will 
and  freedom,  and  the  many  varieties  are  for  a  definite  purpose.  Hence 
they  are  not  eternal. ^^^ 

Gersonides  then  analyzes  time  and  motion  and  proves  that  Aris- 
totle to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  they  are  both  finite  and  not 
infinite.  Time  belongs  to  the  category  of  quantity,  and  there  is  no 
infinite  quantity.  As  time  is  dependent  on  motion,  motion  too  is 
finite,  hence  neither  is  eternal.  Another  argument  for  creation  in 
time  is  that  if  the  world  is  eternal  and  governed  altogether  by  neces- 
sity, the  earth  should  be  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  water  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  lighter  element  to  be  above  the  heavier.  Hence 
the  appearance  of  parts  of  the  earth's  surface  above  the  water  is  an 
indication  of  a  break  of  natural  law  for  a  special  purpose,  namely, 
in  order  to  produce  the  various  mineral,  plant  and  animal  species. 
Hence  once  more  purpose  argues  design  and  origin  in  time. 

Finally  if  the  world  were  eternal,  the  state  of  the  sciences  would 
be  more  advanced  than  it  is.  A  similar  argument  may  be  drawn  from 
language.  Language  is  conventional;  which  means  that  the  people 
existed  before  the  language  they  agreed  to  speak.  But  man  being 
a  social  animal  they  could  not  have  existed  an  infinite  time  without 
language.     Hence  mankind  is  not  eternal. ^^^ 

We  have  just  proved  that  the  world  came  into  being,  but  it  does 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  355 

not  necessarily  follow  that  it  will  be  destroyed.  Nay,  there  are  reasons 
to  show  that  it  will  not  be  destroyed.  For  there  is  no  destruction  ex- 
cept through  matter  and  the  predominance  of  the  passive  powers 
over  the  active.  Hence  the  being  that  is  subject  to  destruction  must 
consist  of  opposites.  But  the  heavenly  bodies  have  no  opposites, 
not  being  composite;  hence  they  cannot  be  destroyed.  And  if  so, 
neither  can  the  sublunar  order  be  destroyed,  which  is  the  work  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.  There  is  of  course  the  abstract  possibility  of 
their  being  destroyed  by  their  maker,  not  naturally,  but  by  his  will, 
as  they  were  made;  but  we  can  find  no  reason  in  God  for  wishing  to 
destroy  them,  all  reasons  existing  in  man  for  destroying  things  being 
inapplicable  to  God.^^^ 

That  the  world  began  in  time  is  now  established.  The  question 
still  remains,  was  the  world  made  out  of  something  or  out  of  nothing? 
Both  are  impossible.  The  first  is  impossible,  for  that  something  out 
of  which  the  world  was  made  must  have  had  some  form,  for  matter 
never  is  without  form,  and  if  so,  it  must  have  had  some  motion,  and 
we  have  a  kind  of  world  already,  albeit  an  imperfect  one.  The  second 
supposition  is  also  impossible;  for  while  form  may  come  out  of  noth- 
ing, body  cannot  come  from  not-body.  We  never  see  the  matter  of 
any  object  arise  out  of  nothing,  though  the  form  may.  Nature  as 
well  as  art  produces  one  corporeal  thing  out  of  another.  Hence  the 
generally  accepted  principle,  "ea:  nihilo  nihil  fit.'^  Besides  it  would 
follow  on  this  supposition  that  before  the  world  came  into  existence 
there  was  a  vacuum  in  its  place,  whereas  it  is  proved  in  the  Physics 
that  a  vacuum  is  impossible.  The  only  thing  remaining  therefore  is 
to  say  that  the  world  was  made  partly  out  of  something,  partly  out 
of  nothing,  i.  e.,  out  of  an  absolutely  formless  matter. 

It  may  be  objected  that  to  assume  the  existence  of  a  second  eternal 
thing  beside  God  is  equivalent  to  a  belief  in  dualism,  in  two  gods. 
But  this  objection  may  be  easily  answered.  Eternity  as  such  does 
not  constitute  divinity.  If  all  the  world  were  eternal,  God  would 
still  be  God  because  he  controls  everything  and  is  the  author  of  the 
order  obtaining  in  the  world.  In  general  it  is  the  qualitative  essence 
that  makes  the  divine  character  of  God,  his  wisdom  and  power  as 
the  source  of  goodness  and  right  order  in  nature.  The  eternal  matter 
of  which  we  are  speaking  is  the  opposite  of  all  this.    As  God  is  the 


356  MEDimVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

extreme  of  perfection  so  is  matter  the  extreme  of  imperfection  and 
defect.  As  God  is  the  source  of  good,  so  is  matter  the  source  of  evil. 
How  then  can  anyone  suppose  for  a  moment  that  an  eternal  formless 
matter  can  in  any  way  be  identified  with  a  divine  being? 

Another  objection  that  may  be  offered  to  our  theory  is  that  it  is 
an  estabhshed  fact  that  matter  cannot  exist  at  all  without  any  form, 
whereas  our  view  assumes  that  an  absolutely  formless  matter  existed 
an  infinite  length  of  time  before  the  world  was  made  from  it.  This 
may  be  answered  by  saying  that  the  impossibiUty  of  matter  existing 
without  form  applies  only  to  the  actual  objects  of  nature.  God  put 
in  sublunar  matter  the  nature  and  capacity  of  receiving  all  forms  in 
a  certain  order.  The  primary  qualities,  the  hot  and  the  cold  and  the 
wet  and  the  dry,  as  the  forms  of  the  elements,  enable  this  matter  to 
receive  other  higher  forms.  The  very  capacity  of  receiving  a  given 
form  argues  a  certain  form  on  the  part  of  the  matter  having  this 
capacity;  for  if  it  had  no  form  there  would  be  no  reason  why  it  should 
receive  one  form  rather  than  another;  whereas  we  find  that  the  re- 
ception of  forms  is  not  at  random,  but  that  a  given  form  comes  from  a 
definite  other  form.  Man  comes  only  from  man.  But  this  does  not 
apply  to  the  prime  matter  of  which  we  are  speaking.  It  may  have 
been  without  form.  Nay,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  as  we  find 
matter  and  form  combined,  and  we  also  find  pure  forms  without  mat- 
ter, m.,  in  the  separate  Intelligences, — it  is  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  there  is  also  matter  without  form. 

Finally  one  may  ask  if  the  world  has  not  existed  from  eternity, 
what  determined  the  author  to  will  its  existence  at  the  time  he  did 
and  not  at  another?  We  cannot  say  that  he  acquired  new  knowledge 
which  he  had  not  before,  or  that  he  needed  the  world  then  and  not 
before,  or  that  there  was  some  obstacle  which  was  removed.  The 
answer  to  this  would  be  that  the  sole  cause  of  the  creation  was  the 
will  of  God  to  benefit  his  creatures.  Their  existence  is  therefore  due 
to  the  divine  causality,  which  never  changes.  Their  origin  in  time 
is  due  to  the  nature  of  a  material  object  as  such.  A  material  object 
as  being  caused  by  an  external  agent  is  incompatible  with  eternity. 
It  must  have  a  beginning,  and  there  is  no  sense  in  asking  why  at  this 
time  and  not  before  or  after,  for  the  same  question  would  apply  to 
any  other  time.    Gersonides  cites  other  objections  which  he  answers, 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON 


357 


and  then  he  takes  up  one  by  one  the  AristoteUan  arguments  in  favor 
of  eternity  and  refutes  them  in  detail.  We  cannot  afford  to  reproduce 
them  here  as  the  discussions  are  technical,  lengthy  and  intricate. ^^^ 

Having  given  his  philosophical  cosmology,  Gersonides  then  under- 
takes to  show  in  detail  that  the  Biblical  story  of  creation  teaches  the 
same  doctrine.  Nay,  he  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  it  was  the  Biblical 
account  that  suggested  to  him  his  philosophical  theory.  It  would  be 
truer  to  say  that  having  approached  the  Bible  with  Aristotelian 
spectacles,  and  having  no  suspicion  that  the  two  attitudes  are  as  far 
apart  as  the  poles,  he  did  not  scruple  to  twist  the  expressions  in  Gen- 
esis out  of  all  semblance  to  their  natural  meaning.  The  Biblical  text 
had  been  twisted  and  turned  ever  since  the  days  of  Philo,  and  of  the 
Mishna  and  Talmud  and  Midrash,  in  the  interest  of  various  schools 
and  sects.  Motives  speculative,  religious,  theological,  legal  and 
ethical  were  at  the  basis  of  Biblical  interpretation  throughout  its  long 
history  of  two  millennia  and  more — the  end  is  not  yet — and  Gersonides 
was  swimming  with  the  current.  The  Bible  is  not  a  law,  he  says,  which 
forces  us  to  beheve  absurdities  and  to  practice  useless  things,  as  some 
people  think.  On  the  contrary  it  is  a  law  which  leads  us  to  our  per- 
fection. Hence  what  is  proved  by  reason  must  be  found  in  the  Law, 
by  interpretation  if  necessary.  This  is  why  Maimonides  took  pains 
to  interpret  all  BibHcal  passages  in  which  God  is  spoken  of  as  if  he 
were  corporeal.  Hence  also  his  statement  that  if  the  eternity  of  the 
world  were  strictly  demonstrated,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  inter- 
pret the  Bible  so  as  to  agree.  But  in  the  matter  of  the  origin  of  the 
world,  Gersonides  continues,  it  was  not  necessary  for  me  to  force  the 
Biblical  account.  Quite  the  contrary,  the  expressions  in  the  Bible 
guided  me  to  my  view.^^^ 

Accordingly  he  finds  support  for  his  doctrine  that  the  world  was 
not  created  ex  nihilo,  in  the  fact  that  there  is  not  one  miracle  in  the 
Bible  in  which  anything  comes  out  of  nothing.  They  are  all  instances 
of  something  out  of  a  pre-existent  something.  The  miracle  of  the  oil 
in  the  case  of  Ehsha  is  no  exception.  The  air  changed  into  oil  as  it 
entered  the  partly  depleted  vessel.  The  six  days  of  creation  must  not 
be  taken  literally.  God's  creation  is  timeless,  and  the  six  days  in- 
dicate the  natural  order  and  rank  in  existing  things  proceeding  from 
the  cause  to  the  effect  and  from  the  lower  to  the  higher.    Thus  the 


358  MEDIyEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

movers  of  the  heavenly  bodies  come  before  the  spheres  which  they 
move  as  their  causes.  The  spheres  come  before  the  terrestrial  elements 
for  the  same  reason.  The  elements  are  followed  by  the  things  com- 
posed of  them.  And  among  these  too  there  is  a  certain  order.  Plants 
come  before  animals,  aquatic  animals  before  aerial,  aerial  before 
terrestrial,  and  the  last  of  all  is  man,  as  the  most  perfect  of  sublunar 
creatures.  All  this  he  reads  into  the  account  of  creation  in  Genesis. 
Thus  the  light  spoken  of  in  the  first  day  represents  the  angels  or  sep- 
arate Intelligences  or  movers  of  the  spheres,  and  they  are  distinguished 
from  the  darkness  there,  which  stands  for  the  heavenly  bodies  as  the 
matters  of  their  movers,  though  at  the  same  time  they  are  grouped 
together  as  one  day,  because  the  form  and  its  matter  constitute  a  unit. 
The  water,  which  was  divided  by  the  firmament,  denotes  the  prime 
formless  matter,  part  of  which  was  changed  into  the  matter  of  the 
heavenly  bodies,  and  part  into  the  four  terrestrial  elements.  Form 
and  matter  are  also  designated  by  the  terms  "Tohu"  and  ''Bohu"  in 
the  second  verse  in  Genesis,  rendered  in  the  Revised  Version  by  "with- 
out form"  and  "void."  And  so  Gersonides  continues  throughout  the 
story  of  creation,  into  the  details  of  which  we  need  not  follow  him.^^'^ 

The  concluding  discussion  in  the  Milhamot  is  devoted  to  the  prob- 
lem of  miracles  and  its  relation  to  prophecy.  Maimonides  had  said 
that  one  reason  for  opposing  the  Aristotelian  theory  of  the  eternity 
of  the  world  is  that  miracles  would  be  an  impossibility  on  that  assump- 
tion. Hence  Maimonides  insists  on  creation  ex  nihilo,  though  he  ad- 
mits that  the  Platonic  view  of  a  pre-existent  matter  may  be  reconciled 
with  the  Torah.  Gersonides,  who  adopted  the  doctrine  of  an  eternal 
matter,  finds  it  necessary  to  say  by  way  of  introduction  to  his  treat- 
ment of  miracles  that  they  do  not  prove  creation  ex  nihilo.  For  as  was 
said  before  all  miracles  exhibit  a  production  of  something  out  of  some- 
thing and  not  out  of  nothing. 

To  explain  the  nature  of  miracles,  he  says,  and  their  authors,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  what  miracles  are.  For  this  we  must  take  the 
Biblical  records  as  our  data,  just  as  we  take  the  data  of  our  senses  in 
determining  other  matters.  On  examining  the  miracles  of  the  Bible 
we  find  that  they  may  be  classified  into  those  which  involve  a  change 
of  substance  and  those  in  which  the  substance  remains  the  same  and 
the  change  is  one  of  quality  or  quantity.    An  example  of  the  former  is 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  359 

the  change  of  Moses's  rod  into  a  serpent  and  of  the  water  of  Egypt 
into  blood;  of  the  latter,  Moses's  hand  becoming  leprous,  and  the 
withering  of  the  hand  of  Jeroboam.  We  may  further  divide  the  mir- 
acles into  those  in  which  the  prophet  was  told  in  advance,  as  Moses  was 
of  the  ten  plagues,  and  those  in  which  he  was  not,  as  for  example  the 
reviving  of  the  dead  by  Elijah  and  many  other  cases.  Our  examina- 
tion also  shows  us  that  all  miracles  are  performed  by  prophets  or  in  re- 
lation to  them.  Also  that  they  are  done  with  some  good  and  useful 
purpose,  namely,  to  inculcate  behef  or  to  save  from  evil. 

These  data  will  help  us  to  decide  who  is  the  author  of  miracles. 
Miracles  cannot  be  accidental,  as  they  are  performed  with  a  purpose; 
and  as  they  involve  a  knowledge  of  the  sublunar  order,  they  must 
have  as  their  author  one  who  has  this  knowledge,  hence  either  God  or 
the  Active  Intellect  or  man,  i.  e.,  the  prophet  himself.  Now  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  God  is  the  author  of  miracles,  for  miracles 
come  only  rarely  and  are  of  no  value  in  themselves  but  only  as  a  means 
to  a  special  end,  as  we  said  before.  The  laws  of  nature,  however, 
which  control  all  regular  events  all  the  time,  are  essentially  good  and 
permanent.  Hence  it  is  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  Active 
Intellect  who,  as  we  know,  orders  the  sublunar  world,  has  more  im- 
portant work  to  do  than  God.  Besides  if  God  were  the  author  of 
miracles,  the  prophet  would  not  know  about  them,  for  prophetic 
inspiration,  as  we  know  (p.  342),  is  due  to  the  Active  Intellect  and 
not  directly  to  God. 

Nor  do  we  need  waste  words  in  proving  that  man  cannot  be  the 
author  of  miracles,  for  in  that  case  the  knowledge  of  them  would  not 
come  to  him  through  prophetic  inspiration,  since  they  are  due  to  his 
own  will.  Besides  man,  as  we  have  seen,  cannot  have  a  complete 
knowledge  of  the  sublunar  order,  and  hence  it  is  not  likely  that  he  can 
control  its  laws  to  the  extent  of  changing  them. 

There  is  therefore  only  one  alternative  left,  namely,  that  the  author 
of  miracles  is  the  same  as  the  inspirer  of  the  prophets,  the  controlling 
spirit  of  the  sublunar  world,  whose  intellect  has  as  its  content  the 
unified  system  of  sublunar  creation  as  an  immaterial  idea,  namely,  the 
Active  Intellect,  of  whom  we  have  spoken  so  often.  The  prophet 
knows  of  the  miracles  because  the  Active  Intellect,  who  is  the  author 
of  them,  is  also  the  cause  of  the  prophetic  inspiration.     This  will 


360  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

account  too  for  the  fact  that  all  miracles  have  to  do  with  events  in  the 
sublunar  world  and  are  not  found  in  the  relations  and  motions  of  the 
heavenly  bodies.  The  case  of  Joshua  causing  the  sun  and  moon  to 
stand  still  is  no  exception.  There  was  no  standing  stiU  of  the  sun  and 
moon  in  that  case.  What  is  meant  by  the  expressions  in  Joshua  10  is 
that  the  Israehtes  conquered  the  enemy  in  the  short  time  that  the 
sun  occupied  the  zenith,  whUe  its  motion  was  not  noticeable  for  about 
an  hour,  as  is  usually  the  case  about  noon.  In  the  case  of  Isaiah 
moving  the  sun  ten  degrees  back  for  Hezekiah  (Isai.  38,  8),  there  was 
likewise  no  change  in  the  motion  of  the  sun,  but  only  in  that  of  the 
cloud  causing  the  shadow. 

Miracles  cannot  be  of  regular  occurrence,  for  if  natural  phenomena 
and  laws  were  changed  by  miracle  as  a  regular  thing,  it  would  signify 
a  defect  in  the  original  order.  Miracles  cannot  take  place  to  violate 
the  principle  of  contradiction,  hence  there  can  be  no  miracles  in  ref- 
erence to  mathematical  truths,  nor  in  matters  relating  to  the  past. 
Thus  a  miracle  cannot  make  a  thing  black  and  white  at  the  same  time; 
nor  a  plane  triangle  whose  angles  are  less  than  two  right  angles;  nor 
is  it  possible  by  miracle  now  to  make  it  not  to  have  rained  in  Jeru- 
salem yesterday,  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  did  rain.  For  all  these 
involve  a  denial  of  the  logical  law  of  contradiction  that  a  thing  cannot 
be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time.^^^ 

A  prophet  is  tested  (i)  by  being  able  to  foretell  miracles  before 
they  come,  and  (2)  by  the  realization  of  his  prophetic  messages.  The 
question  is  raised  concerning  the  statement  of  Jeremiah  that  one  may 
be  a  true  prophet  and  yet  an  evil  prophecy  may  remain  unfulfilled 
if  the  people  repent.  Does  this  mean  that  a  good  prophecy  must 
always  come  true?  In  that  case  a  good  deal  of  what  comes  within 
the  category  of  the  possible  and  contingent  becomes  determined  and 
necessary!  The  answer  is  that  a  good  prophecy  too  sometimes  fails 
of  realization,  as  is  illustrated  in  Jacob's  fear  of  Esau  after  he  was 
promised  protection  by  God.  But  this  happens  more  rarely  on  account 
of  the  fact  that  a  man  endeavors  naturally  to  see  a  good  prophecy 
realized,  whereas  he  does  his  best  to  counteract  an  evil  prophecy.  ^^* 

Gersonides's  entire  discussion  of  miracles  shows  a  deep  seated 
motive  to  minimize  their  extent  and  influence.  The  study  of  science 
and  philosophy  had  the  effect  of  planting  in  the  minds  of  the  mediaeval 


LEVI  BEN  GERSON  361 

philosophers  a  great  respect  for  reason  on  the  one  hand  and  natural 
law  on  the  other.  A  study  of  history,  archaeology  and  literary  criti- 
cism has  developed  in  modern  times  a  spirit  of  scepticism  regarding 
written  records  of  antiquity.  This  was  foreign  to  mediaeval  theologi- 
ans generally.  No  one  doubted  for  a  moment  the  accuracy  of  the 
Biblical  records  as  well  as  their  inspiration  in  every  detail.  Hence 
prophecy  and  miracles  had  to  be  explained  or  explained  away.  Inter- 
pretation held  the  place  of  criticism. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA 

The  chronological  treatment  of  Jewish  philosophy  which  we  have 
followed  makes  it  necessary  at  this  point  to  take  up  a  Karaite  work 
of  the  fourteenth  century  that  is  closely  modelled  upon  the  "Guide 
of  the  Perplexed."  In  doing  this  we  necessarily  take  a  step  backward 
as  far  as  the  philosophical  development  is  concerned.  For  while  it 
is  true  that  the  early  Rabbanite  thinkers  like  Saadia,  Bahya,  Ibn 
Zaddik  and  others  moved  in  the  circle  of  ideas  of  the  Mohammedan 
Mutakallimun,  that  period  had  long  since  been  passed.  Judah  Halevi 
criticized  the  Kalam,  Ibn  Daud  is  a  thorough  Aristotelian,  and  Mai- 
monides  gave  the  Kalam  in  Jewish  literature  its  deathblow.  No 
Rabbanite  after  Maimonides  would  think  of  going  back  to  the  old 
arguments  made  popular  by  the  Mutakallimun — the  theory  of  atoms, 
of  substance  and  accident  in  the  Kalamistic  sense  of  accident  as  a 
quality  which  needs  continuous  creation  to  exist  any  length  of  time, 
the  denial  of  law  and  natural  causation,  the  arguments  in  favor  of 
creation  and  the  existence  of  God  based  upon  creation,  the  doctrine 
of  the  divine  will  as  eternal  or  created,  residing  in  a  subject  or  existing 
without  a  subject,  the  world  as  due  to  God's  will  or  to  his  wisdom, 
the  nature  of  right  and  wrong  as  determined  by  the  character  and 
purpose  of  the  act  or  solely  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  God — these  and 
other  topics,  which  formed  the  main  ground  of  discussion  between  the 
Mu'  tazilites  and  the  Ashariya,  and  were  taken  over  by  the  Karaites 
and  to  a  less  extent  by  the  early  Rabbanites  in  the  tenth  and  eleventh 
centuries,  had  long  lost  their  significance  and  their  interest  among 
the  Rabbanite  followers  of  Maimonides.  Aristotelianism,  introduced 
by  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and  Averroes  among  the  Arabs,  and  Ibn  Daud 
and  Maimonides  among  the  Jews,  dominated  all  speculative  thought, 
and  the  old  Kalam  was  obsolete  and  forgotten.  Gersonides  no  longer 
regards  the  Kalamistic  point  of  view  as  a  living  issue.  He  ignores  it 
entirely.    His  problems  as  we  have  seen  are  those  raised  by  the  Aver- 

362 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  363 

roistic  system.  In  this  respect  then  a  reading  of  Aaron  ben  Ehjah's 
"Ez  Hayim"  (Tree  of  Life)  ^^°  affects  us  like  a  breath  from  a  foreign 
clime,  like  the  odor  of  a  thing  long  buried.  And  yet  Aaron  ben  Elijah 
was  a  contemporary  of  Levi  ben  Gerson.  He  was  born  about  1300, 
and  died  in  1369.  He  lived  in  Nicomedia,  Cairo,  Constantinople. 
The  reason  for  the  antiquated  appearance  of  his  work  lies  in  the  fact 
that  he  was  a  Karaite,  and  the  Karaites  never  got  beyond  the  Mu'  ta- 
zilite  point  of  view.  Karaism  was  only  a  sect  and  never  showed  after 
the  days  of  Saadia  anything  like  the  life  and  enthusiastic  activity 
of  the  great  body  of  Rabbanite  Judaism,  which  formed  the  great 
majority  of  the  Jewish  people.  The  Karaites  had  their  important 
men  in  Halaka  as  well  as  in  religious  philosophy  and  Biblical  exegesis. 
Solomon  ben  Yeroham,  Joseph  Ha-Maor  (Al-Kirkisani),  Joseph  Al 
Basir  (p.  48  ff.),  Jeshua  ben  Judah  (p.  55  ff.),  Yefet  Ha-Levi,  Judah 
Hadassi,  Aaron  ben  Joseph — all  these  were  prominent  in  Karaitic 
literature.  But  they  cannot  be  compared  to  the  great  men  among 
the  Rabbanites.  There  was  no  Maimonides  among  them.  And  Aaron 
ben  Elijah  cherished  the  ambition  of  being  to  the  Karaites  what 
Maimonides  was  to  the  Rabbanites.  Accordingly  he  undertook  to 
compose  three  works  representing  the  three  great  divisions  of  Karaitic 
Judaism — a  book  of  Laws,  a  work  on  Biblical  exegesis  and  a  treatise 
on  religious  philosophy.  The  last  was  written  first,  having  been  com- 
posed in  1346.  The  "Sefer  Ha-Mizvot,"  on  the  religious  command- 
ments, was  written  in  1354,  and  his  exegetical  work,  known  as  "Keter 
Torah"  (The  Crown  of  the  Law)  was  published  in  1362.  It  is  the 
first  that  interests  us,  the  *'Ez  Hayyim."  As  was  said  before,  this 
book  is  closely  modelled  upon  the  "More  Nebukim,"  though  the 
arrangement  is  different,  being  more  logical  than  that  of  the  "Guide." 
Instead  of  beginning,  as  Maimonides  does,  with  interpreting  the 
anthropomorphic  expressions  in  the  Bible,  which  is  followed  by  a 
treatment  of  the  divine  attributes,  long  before  the  existence  of  God 
has  been  proved  or  even  the  fundamental  principles  laid  down  upon 
which  are  based  the  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God,  Aaron  ben  Elijah 
more  naturally  begins  with  the  basal  doctrines  of  physics  and  meta- 
physics, which  he  then  utilizes  in  discussing  the  existence  of  God. 
As  Maimonides  brought  to  a  focus  all  the  speculation  on  philosophy 
and  religion  as  it  was  handed  down  to  him  by  Arab  and  Jew,  and 


364  MEDIMVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

gave  it  a  harmonious  and  systematic  form  in  his  masterpiece;  so  did 
Aaron  ben  EUjah  endeavor  to  sum  up  all  Karaitic  discussion  in  his 
work,  and  in  addition  declare  his  attitude  to  Maimonides.  The 
success  with  which  he  carried  out  this  plan  is  not  equal.  As  a  source 
of  information  on  schools  and  opinions  of  Arabs  and  Karaites,  the 
"Ez  Hayyim"  is  of  great  importance  and  interest.  But  it  cannot 
in  the  least  compare  with  the  "Guide"  as  a  constructive  work  of 
religious  philosophy.  It  has  not  the  same  originality  or  any  degree 
remotely  approaching  it.  The  greater  part  of  the  Aristotelian  mate- 
rial seems  bodily  taken  from  Maimonides,  and  so  is  the  part  dealing 
with  the  anthropomorphic  expressions  in  the  Bible.  There  is  a  differ- 
ent point  of  view  in  his  exposition  of  the  Mu'taziHte  physics,  which 
he  presents  in  a  more  systematic  and  favorable  light  than  Maimonides, 
defending  it  against  the  strictures  of  the  latter.  But  everywhere 
Aaron  ben  Elijah  lacks  the  positiveness  and  commanding  mastery 
of  Maimonides.  He  is  not  clear  what  side  of  a  question  to  espouse. 
For  the  most  part  he  places  side  by  side  the  opposed  points  of  view 
and  only  barely  intimates  his  own  attitude  or  preference.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  us  to  reproduce  his  ideas 
in  extenso.  It  will  be  sufficient  if  we  indicate  his  relation  to  Mai- 
monides in  the  problems  common  to  both,  adding  a  brief  statement 
of  those  topics  which  Aaron  ben  Elijah  owes  to  his  Karaite  predeces- 
sors, and  which  Maimonides  omits. 

His  general  attitude  on  the  relation  of  religion  or  revelation  to 
reason  and  philosophy  is  somewhat  inconsistent.  For  while  he  en- 
deavors to  rationalize  Jewish  dogma  and  Scriptural  teaching  like 
IMaimonides,  and  in  doing  so  utilizes  Aristotelian  terminology  in 
matters  physical,  metaphysical,  psychological,  ethical  and  logical, 
he  nevertheless  in  the  beginning  of  his  work  condemns  philosophy 
as  well  as  philosophers,  meaning  of  course  the  Aristotelians. ^^^  He 
nowhere  expressly  indicates  the  manner  of  reconciling  this  apparent 
contradiction.  But  it  would  seem  as  if  he  intended  to  distinguish 
between  the  philosophical  method  and  the  actual  teachings  of  the 
Aristotelians.  Their  method  he  approves,  their  results  he  condemns. 
The  Aristotelians  taught  the  eternity  of  the  world,  the  immutability 
of  natural  law,  God's  ignorance  of  particulars  and  the  absence  of 
special  Providence.    These  doctrines  must  be  condemned.    Maimon- 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  365 

ides  too  rejects  these  extreme  teachings  while  praising  Aristotle  and 
maintaining  that  philosophy  was  originally  a  possession  of  the  Israelit- 
ish  people,  which  they  lost  in  the  exile.  Aaron  ben  Ehjah  is  not  willing 
to  follow  the  philosophers  as  far  as  Maimonides.  He  admits  positive 
attributes  in  God,  which  Maimonides  rejects;  he  admits  an  absolute 
will  in  God  and  not  merely  a  relative  like  Maimonides;  he  extends 
God's  providence  to  all  individuals  including  irrational  creatures, 
whereas  Maimonides  limits  special  providence  to  the  individuals  of 
the  human  species,  and  so  on.  And  so  he  condemns  the  philosophers, 
though  he  cannot  help  using  their  method  and  even  their  fundamental 
doctrines,  so  far  as  they  are  purely  theoretical  and  scientific.  He  is 
willing  to  go  the  full  length  of  the  Aristotehans  only  in  the  unity  and 
incorporeality  of  God,  though  here  too  he  vindicates  sense  perception 
to  God,  i.  e.,  the  knowledge  of  that  which  we  get  through  our  sense 
organs.  He  too  like  the  philosophers  insists  on  the  importance  of 
the  reason  as  the  instrument  of  truth  and  knowledge.  Abraham  was 
the  first,  he  tells  us,  who  proved  the  existence  of  God  with  his  intellect. 
Then  came  the  law  of  Moses,  which  strengthened  the  same  idea.  The 
Gentiles  hated  and  envied  Israel  for  their  superiority  and  their  true 
opinions;  hence  they  endeavored  to  refute  their  ideas  and  establish 
others  in  their  stead.  This  was  the  work  of  the  ancient  Greek  philoso- 
phers, who  are  called  enemies  in  the  Bible  (Psalms  139,  21).  At  the 
time  of  the  second  Temple,  seeing  that  the  Jewish  religion  and  its 
teachings  were  true,  they  took  advantage  of  the  advent  of  Jesus  to 
adopt  his  false  teachings,  thus  showing  their  hatred  and  envy  of  Israel. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  they  were  obliged  to  borrow  some  views 
and  methods  of  proof  from  Israel,  for  religion  as  such  is  opposed  to 
philosophy.  StiU  the  true  nature  of  God  was  unknown  to  them. 
Then  came  the  Arabs,  who  imitated  the  Christians  in  adopting  a 
belief  different  from  Judaism,  at  the  same  time  borrowing  views  from 
the  Bible.  These  are  the  Mu'tazila  and  the  Ashariya.  Later  when 
on  account  of  the  exile  differences  arose  among  the  Jews,  there  were 
formed  the  two  parties  of  the  Karaites  and  the  Rabbanites.  The 
Karaites  followed  the  Mu'  tazila,  and  so  did  some  of  the  Rabbanites, 
because  their  views  coincided  with  those  of  the  Bible,  from  which 
they  were  borrowed.  The  views  of  the  philosophers  as  being  opposed 
to  the  Bible  they  naturally  rejected.    Nevertheless  some  Rabbanites 


366  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

adopted  the  views  of  the  philosophers,  though  beheving  in  the  Bible. 
This  is  a  mistake,  for  even  the  Christians  rejected  the  views  of  the 
philosophers.  ^^^ 

Here  we  see  clearly  the  difference  in  general  attitude  between  Aaron 
ben  Elijah  and  Maimonides.  The  latter  has  no  use  whatsoever  for 
the  Mu'  tazila.  He  realizes  the  immeasurable  superiority  of  the  Aris- 
totelians (this  is  the  meaning  of  the  word  philosophers  in  mediaeval 
Jewish  and  Arabic  literature).  His  task  is  therefore  to  harmonize 
the  Bible  with  Aristotelian  doctrine  wherever  possible.  Aaron  ben 
Elijah  is  still,  in  the  fourteenth  century,  a  follower  of  the  Kalam,  and 
believes  the  Mu' tazila  are  closer  to  Scripture  than  Aristotle.  He  is 
two  centuries  behind  Maimonides  philosophically,  and  yet  he  has 
the  truer  insight  because  less  debauched  by  Aristotelian  learning. 

As  was  said  before,  Aaron  ben  Elijah  follows  a  more  logical  arrange- 
ment in  the  disposition  of  his  work  than  Maimonides.  In  reality  it  is 
the  old  arrangement  of  the  Kalamistic  works  (c/.  p.  24).  The  pur- 
pose of  all  Jewish  investigators,  he  says,  is  the  same,  namely,  to  prove 
the  existence  and  nature  of  God,  but  there  is  a  difference  among  them 
in  the  method  of  proving  God's  existence.  Some  base  their  proofs 
on  the  assumption  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  others  on  that  of  the 
world's  eternity.  The  Mutakallimun  follow  the  former  method,  the 
philosophers,  the  latter.  Their  respective  views  of  the  origin  of  the 
world  are  determined  by  their  opinions  concerning  the  principles  of  ex- 
istence and  the  existent,  that  is,  the  fundamental  principles  of  physics 
and  metaphysics.  Accordingly  Aaron  ben  Elijah  finds  it  necessary 
to  give  a  preliminary  account  of  the  Kalamistic  as  well  as  the  philo- 
sophic theories,  as  Maimonides  did  before  him  (p.  249  ff.).  It  is  not 
necessary  for  us  to  reproduce  here  his  sketch  of  the  philosophical 
views,  as  we  know  them  sufficiently  from  our  studies  of  Ibn  Daud  and 
Maimonides.  But  it  will  be  of  value  to  refer  to  his  account  of  the 
Kalamistic  principles,  though  we  have  already  discussed  them  in  the 
introduction  (p.  xxi)  and  in  our  study  of  Maimonides  (p.  249  ff.).  This 
is  due  principally  to  the  fact  that  Aaron  ben  Elijah  endeavors  to  de- 
fend the  Mutakallimun  against  Maimonides's  charge  that  they  were 
influenced  by  preconceived  notions  and  allowed  their  religious  views 
to  dictate  to  them  their  interpretation  of  nature,  instead  of  letting 
the  latter  speak  for  itself.     Thus  Maimonides  specifically  accuses 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  367 

them  of  having  adopted  the  atomic  theory  of  the  pre-Aristotehan 
philosophers  not  because  they  were  really  and  independently  con- 
vinced of  its  scientific  truth — how  could  that  be  since  Aristotle  proved 
it  impossible? — but  because  on  this  theory  they  could  prove  the  crea- 
tion of  the  world,  which  they  must  at  all  hazards  maintain  as  a  re- 
ligious dogma  fundamental  in  its  nature,  since  upon  it  is  based  the 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  denies  this  charge,  maintaining  the  philosophical 
honesty  of  the  Mutakallimun.  Epicurus  too,  he  says,  believed  in 
the  atomic  theory,  though  he  regarded  the  world  as  eternal.  Hence 
there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  atoms  and  creation.^®^  The 
atomic  theory  is  defensible  on  its  own  merits,  and  the  motives  of  the 
Mutakallimun  in  adopting  it  are  purely  scientific,  as  follows:  Accord- 
ing to  the  Mutakallimun  there  are  only  body  or  substance  and  its 
accidents  or  qualities.  This  is  the  constitution  of  material  objects. 
There  are,  however,  two  kinds  of  qualities  or  attributes,  viz.,  "char- 
acters," and  accidents.  Characters  are  such  attributes  as  are  essential 
to  body  and  without  which  it  cannot  exist.  Accidents  may  disappear, 
while  body  continues.  Since,  then,  body  may  exist  with  or  without 
accidents,  there  must  be  a  cause  which  is  responsible  for  the  attach- 
ment of  accidents  to  body  when  they  are  so  attached.  This  cause  we 
call  "union."  When  a  body  is  "united  "  with  accidents  it  owes  this 
to  the  existence  of  a  certain  something,  a  certain  property,  let  us  say, 
in  it  which  we  have  called  "union."  Hence  when  the  body  is  "sepa- 
rated "  from  accidents,  when  it  is  without  accidents,  it  is  because  there 
is  no  "imion."  Further,  every  body  possessed  of  magnitude  or  ex- 
tension is  divisible,  hence  it  must  have  "union"  to  hold  its  parts  to- 
gether. But  this  "union"  is  not  essential  to  all  existents;  for  we  have 
seen  that  its  function  is  to  unite  accidents  with  body.  And  as  acci- 
dents are  separable  while  body  may  continue  to  exist  without  them, 
"union"  disappears  together  with  the  accidents.  Bodies  without 
"union  "  are  therefore  possible  and  real.  But  we  have  just  seen  that 
all  bodies  possessing  magnitude  have  "union."  It  follows  therefore 
that  if  there  are  "union  "-less  bodies,  they  are  without  magnitude, 
and  hence  atoms.  This  is  the  proof  of  the  atomic  theory  and  it  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  matter  of  the  origin  of  the  world.^^^  As  a 
matter  of  fact  the  Mutakallimun  believe  that  the  atoms  were  created 


368  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ex  nihilo.  But  the  creation  of  the  world  can  be  proved  whichever  \'iew 
we  adopt  concerning  the  nature  of  the  existent,  whether  it  be  the  atomic 
theory  of  the  Mutakallimun  or  the  principles  of  matter  and  form  of 
the  Aristotelians.  The  important  principle  at  the  basis  of  this  proof 
is  the  well-known  Kalamistic  one  that  if  an  object  cannot  do  without 
an  attribute  originating  in  time,  the  object  itself  has  its  origin  in  time. 
Now  on  either  view  of  the  constitution  of  the  existent,  body  must 
have  form  or  accidents  respectively,  and  as  the  latter  are  constantly 
changing,  body  or  matter  has  its  origin  in  time,  hence  the  world  is  not 
eternal. 

Besides,  not  to  speak  of  the  inconclusive  character  of  the  philosoph- 
ical arguments  in  favor  of  eternity  and  the  positive  arguments  for 
creation  (all  or  most  of  which  we  have  already  met  in  our  previous 
studies,  and  need  not  therefore  reproduce  Aaron  ben  Elijah's  version 
of  them),  the  philosophers  themselves  without  knowing  it  are  led  to 
contradict  themselves  in  their  very  arguments  from  the  assumption 
of  eternity.  The  doctrine  of  creation  follows  as  a  consequence  from 
their  own  presuppositions.  Thus  on  the  basis  of  eternity  of  motion 
they  prove  that  the  heavenly  spheres  are  endowed  with  soul  and  in- 
tellect, and  their  motions  are  volimtary  and  due  to  conceptions  which 
they  endeavor  to  realize  {cf.  p.  267).  This  makes  the  sphere  a  com- 
posite object,  containing  the  elements,  sphericity,  soul,  intellect.  Every- 
thing composite  is  a  possible  existent,  because  its  existence  depends 
upon  the  existence  of  its  parts.  What  is  a  possible  existent  may  also 
not  exist.  Moreover,  that  which  is  possible  must  at  some  time  become 
actual.  Hence  the  sphere  must  at  some  time  have  been  non-existent, 
and  it  required  an  agent  to  bring  it  into  being.  We  are  thus  led  to  con- 
tradict our  hypothesis  of  eternity  from  which  we  started.^^^ 

Creation  is  thus  established,  and  this  is  the  best  way  to  prove  the 
existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  of  God.  Maimonides  attempts 
to  prove  creation  from  the  peculiarities  of  the  heavenly  motions, 
which  cannot  be  well  accounted  for  on  the  theory  of  natural  causes. 
Adopting  the  latter  in  the  main,  he  makes  an  exception  in  the  case  of 
the  spherical  motions  because  the  philosophers  cannot  adequately  ex- 
plain them,  and  jumps  to  the  conclusion  that  here  the  philosophical 
appeal  to  mechanical  causation  breaks  down  and  we  are  dealing  with 
teleology,  with  intelligent  design  and  purpose  on  the  part  of  an  in- 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  369 

telligent  agent.  This  leads  to  belief  in  creation.  But  this  argument 
of  Maimonides  is  very  weak  and  inconclusive.  Ignorance  of  causes 
in  a  special  case,  due  to  the  limitations  of  our  reason,  proves  nothing. 
Mechanical  causes  may  be  the  sole  determinants  of  the  heavenly 
motions  even  though  the  philosophers  have  not  yet  discovered  what 
they  are  (c/.  above,  p.  270  ff.).^^^ 

Nor  is  Maimonides  to  be  imitated,  who  bases  his  proof  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  on  the  theory  of  eternity.  The  Bible  is  opposed  to  it. 
The  Bible  begins  with  creation  as  an  indication  that  this  is  the  basis  of 
our  knowledge  of  God's  existence,  revelation  and  providence.  This 
is  the  method  Abraham  followed  and  this  is  what  he  meant  when  he 
swore  by  the  "most  high  God,  the  creator  of  heaven  and  earth  "  (Gen. 
14,  22).  Abraham  arrived  at  this  behef  through  ratiocination  and 
endeavored  to  convince  others.  The  same  thing  is  evident  in  the 
words  of  Isaiah  (40,  26),  "Lift  up  your  eyes  on  high  and  see  who 
created  these."  He  was  arguing  with  the  people  who  believed  in 
eternity,  and  proved  to  them  the  existence  of  God  by  showing  that 
the  world  is  created.  All  these  indications  in  the  Bible  show  that  the 
doctrine  of  creation  is  capable  of  apodeictic  proof.  ^^'' 

The  reader  will  see  that  all  this  is  directed  against  Maimonides, 
though  he  is  not  mentioned  by  name.  Maimonides  claimed  against 
the  Mutakallimun  that  it  is  not  safe  to  base  the  existence  of  God  upon 
the  theory  of  creation,  because  the  latter  cannot  be  strictly  demon- 
strated. And  while  he  believed  in  it  himself  and  gave  reasons  to  show 
why  it  is  more  plausible  than  eternity,  he  admitted  that  others  might 
think  differently;  and  hence  based  his  proofs  of  God's  existence  on  the 
Aristotelian  theory  of  eternity  in  order  to  be  on  the  safe  side.  It  is 
never  too  late  to  prove  God's  existence  if  the  world  is  created.  We 
must  be  sure  of  his  existence,  no  matter  what  the  fate  of  our  cosmolog- 
ical  theories  might  be.  This  did  not  appeal  to  the  Karaite  and  Muta- 
kallim,  Aaron  ben  Elijah.  His  idea  is  that  we  must  never  for  a  mo- 
ment doubt  the  creation  of  the  world.  To  follow  the  procedure  of 
Maimonides  would  have  the  tendency  of  making  people  believe  that 
the  world  may  be  eternal  after  all,  as  happened  in  fact  in  the  case  of 
Gersonides.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  will  not  leave  a  way  open  to  such  a 
heresy. 

In  the  doctrine  of  attributes  Aaron  ben  Elijah  likewise  maintains 


370  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  views  of  the  Mu'tazilite  Karaites  against  the  philosophers,  and 
especially  against  Maimonides.  The  general  problem  is  sufficiently 
familiar  to  us  by  this  time,  and  we  need  only  present  the  sahent  points 
in  the  controversy.  The  question  is  whether  there  are  any  positive 
attributes  which  may  be  applied  to  God  as  actually  denoting  his 
essence — hence  positive  essential  attributes.  Maimonides  denied  it, 
the  Karaites  affirmed  it.  The  arguments  for  Maimonides's  denial  we 
saw  before  (p.  262  f.).  And  his  conclusion  is  that  the  only  attributes 
that  may  be  apphed  to  God  are  the  negative,  and  those  positive  ones 
which  do  not  denote  any  definite  thing  corresponding  to  them  in  God's 
essence,  but  are  derived  from  the  effects  of  God's  unitary  and  simple 
being  on  the  life  of  man  and  nature.  He  is  the  author  of  these  effects, 
and  we  characterize  him  in  the  way  in  which  we  would  characterize 
a  human  being  who  would  do  similar  things;  but  this  must  not  be 
done. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  insists  that  there  are  positive  essential  attributes, 
which  are  the  following  five:  Omnipotent,  Omniscient,  Acting  with 
Will,  Living,  Existent.  He  agrees  with  Maimonides  that  these  essen- 
tial attributes  must  be  understood  in  a  manner  not  to  interfere  with 
God's  simpHcity  and  unity,  but  is  satisfied  that  this  can  be  done.  For 
we  must  not  conceive  of  them  as  additions  to  God's  essence,  nor  as  so 
many  distinct  elements  composing  God's  essence,  but  as  representing 
the  multiplicity  of  powers  issuing  from  him  without  detriment  to  his 
unity.  We  call  them  essential  attributes,  meaning  that  they  are  the 
essence  of  God,  but  not  that  they  are  different  from  each  other  and 
each  makes  up  part  of  God's  essence.  We  do  not  know  God's  essence, 
and  these  terms  are  simply  transferred  from  our  human  experience, 
and  do  not  indicate  that  God's  activity  can  be  compared  to  ours  in 
any  sense. 

The  five  attributes  above  named  are  all  identical  with  God's  simple 
essence.  "Livmg"  denotes  ability  to  perceive,  hence  is  identical  with 
"Omniscient."  "Acting  with  will"  likewise  denotes  just  and  proper 
action,  which  in  turn  involves  true  insight.  Hence  identity  of  will  and 
knowledge.  "Omnipotent"  also  in  the  case  of  an  intellectual  being 
denotes  the  act  of  the  intellect  par  excellence,  which  is  knowledge. 
And  surely  God's  existence  is  not  distinct  from  his  essence,  else  his 
existence  would  be  caused,  and  he  would  not  be  the  necessary  existent 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  371 

all  agree  him  to  be.    It  follows  then  that  God  is  one,  and  his  essence  is 
nevertheless  all  these  five  attributes. 

There  are  all  the  reasons  in  the  world  why  we  should  apply  attri- 
butes to  God.  The  same  reason  as  we  have  for  applying  names  to 
anything  else  exists  for  giving  names  to  God.  In  fact  it  would  be 
correct  to  say  that  we  should  have  more  names  for  God  than  for  any- 
thing else,  since  in  other  things  we  can  avoid  naming  them  by  point- 
ing to  them,  as  they  can  be  perceived  by  the  senses.  Not  so  God. 
We  are  forced  to  use  words  in  talking  about  him.  God  has  given  him- 
self names  in  the  Bible,  hence  we  may  do  the  same. 

Maimonides  and  his  school  endeavor  to  obviate  the  criticisms  of  the 
philosophers,  who  are  opposed  to  all  attributes,  by  excluding  all  but 
negative  terms.  But  this  does  not  help  the  matter  in  the  least.  A 
negative  attribute  is  in  reahty  no  different  from  a  positive,  and  in  the 
end  leads  to  a  positive.  Thus  if  we  say  "not  mineral,"  "not  p^ant," 
we  clearly  say  "animal."  The  advocates  of  negative  attributes  an- 
swer this  criticism  by  saying  that  they  understand  pure  negation 
without  any  positive  implications,  just  as  when  we  say  a  stone  is  "not 
seeing,"  we  do  not  imply  that  it  is  blind.  But  this  cannot  be,  for 
when  they  say  God  is  "not  ignorant,"  they  do  not  mean  that  he  is  not 
"knowing"  either,  for  they  insist  that  he  is  power  and  knowledge  and 
life,  and  so  on.  This  being  the  case,  it  is  much  more  proper  to  use  pos- 
itive attributes,  seeing  that  the  Prophets  do  so.  When  they  say  that 
the  Prophets  meant  only  to  exclude  the  negative;  that  by  saying, 
"Able,"  "Knowing,"  they  meant  to  exclude  "weak"  "ignorant,"  they 
ipso  facto  admit  that  by  excluding  the  latter  we  posit  the  former. 

The  arguments  against  positive  essential  attributes  we  can  easily 
answer.  By  saying  that  certain  attributes  are  essential  we  do  not 
claim  to  know  God's  essence.  All  we  know  is  God's  existence,  which 
we  learn  from  his  effects,  and  according  to  these  same  effects  we  char- 
acterize God's  existence  by  means  of  attributes  of  which  also  we  know 
only  the  existence,  not  the  essence.  For  we  do  not  mean  to  indicate 
that  these  terms  denote  the  same  thing  in  God  as  they  denote  in  us. 
They  are  homonyms,  since  in  God  they  denote  essence,  whereas  in 
us  they  are  accidents.  The  plurality  of  attributes  does  not  argue 
plurality  in  God,  for  one  essence  may  perform  a  great  many  acts,  and 
hence  we  may  characterize  the  essence  in  accordance  with  those  acts. 


372  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

The  error  of  composition  arises  only  if  we  suppose  that  the  various 
acts  point  to  various  elements  in  their  author.  Of  the  various  kinds  of 
terms  those  only  are  applicable  to  God  which  denote  pure  essence  or 
substance  like  knowledge,  power;  and  those  denoting  activity  like 
creating,  doing,  and  so  on.^^^ 

In  reference  to  the  will  of  God  Aaron  ben  Elijah  refuses  to  agree 
with  the  peculiar  view  of  the  Mutakallimun;  but  unlike  Maimonides, 
who  can  afford  to  ignore  their  discussions  entirely  and  dismiss  their 
fanciful  notion  with  a  word  (  Guide,"  I.  75,  proof  3),  Aaron  ben 
Elijah  takes  up  the  discussion  seriously.  The  Mutakallimun  (or  the 
Ashariya,  according  to  Aaron  ben  Elijah)  were  in  dread  of  anything 
that  might  lend  some  semblance  to  eternity  of  the  world.  Hence 
they  argued,  If  the  will  of  God  is  identical  with  his  essence  like  the 
other  essential  attributes,  it  follows  that  as  his  essence  is  eternal  and 
unchangeable  so  is  his  will.  And  if  we  grant  this,  then  the  objects 
of  his  will  too  must  be  eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  we  have  the 
much  abhorred  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of  the  world.  To  avoid  this 
objectionable  conclusion  they  conceived  of  God's  voluntary  acts 
as  due  to  an  external  will.  But  this  external  will  also  offered  diffi- 
ficulties.  It  cannot  be  a  power  or  quality  residing  in  God  as  its  sub- 
ject, for  God  is  not  a  material  substance  bearing  accidents.  It  can- 
not be  a  quality  inherent  in  another  subject,  for  then  it  would  not 
be  God's  will  at  all;  it  would  be  the  will  of  this  other  being,  and  God's 
acts  would  be  determined  by  someone  else.  They  were  thus  forced  to 
assume  a  subject-less  will  newly  created  with  every  act  of  God.  This 
notion  Aaron  ben  Elijah  rejects  on  the  ground  that  a  subject-less  will 
is  an  impossibility.  An  accident  must  have  a  subject,  and  will  im- 
plies life  as  its  subject.  Besides,  the  relation  between  God  and  this 
subject-less  accident,  will,  would  be  the  cause  of  much  logical  difficulty. 
Aaron  ben  Elijah  therefore  accepts  the  ordinary  sane  view  that  the 
will  of  God  is  identical  with  his  essence;  that  God  wills  through  his 
own  essence.  And  he  does  not  fear  that  this  will  lead  to  eternity  of  the 
world.  He  identifies  God's  will  with  his  wisdom,  and  God's  wisdom 
with  right  action.  As  we  do  not  know  the  essence  of  God's  wisdom, 
so  we  do  not  know  how  it  is  that  it  prompts  him  to  realize  his  will  at 
one  time  and  not  at  another,  though  his  will  is  always  the  same.^^^ 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  also  follows  his  party  in  attributing  to  God  sense 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  373 

perception,  not,  to  be  sure,  the  same  kind  of  perception  as  we  have, 
acquired  by  means  of  corporeal  organs;  for  this  is  impossible  in  God 
for  many  reasons.  God  is  not  corporeal,  and  he  cannot  be  affected 
or  changed  by  a  corporeal  stimulus.  But  it  is  clear  beyond  a  doubt 
that  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to  suppose  that  the  creator  of 
the  sense  organs  does  not  understand  the  purpose  which  they  serve 
and  the  objects  which  they  perceive.  What  we  mean  then  is  that  the 
objects  which  we  perceive  with  our  senses  God  also  perceives,  though  in 
an  incorporeal  manner.  Hence  it  does  not  follow  that  there  is  any 
change  in  God  due  to  the  external  object  he  perceives,  nor  that  the 
multiplicity  of  objects  involves  plurality  in  God;  for  even  our  power 
of  perception  is  one,  though  it  perceives  many  things  and  opposite. 
We  conclude  then  that  God  has  perception  as  well  as  intelligence,  but 
they  are  not  two  distinct  powers  in  him.  It  is  the  object  perceived 
that  determines  the  power  percipient.  Hence  one  and  the  same  power 
may  be  called  perception  when  we  are  dealing  with  a  sensible  ob- 
ject, and  intelligence  when  it  has  an  intelligible  as  its  object.^'^" 

In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  evil  we  once  more  are  brought  in 
contact  with  Kalamistic  views  recalling  the  old  Karaite  works  of  the 
eleventh  century  {cf.  pp.  52,  57).  Thus  the  notion  that  good  and  bad 
are  adjectives  applied  to  acts  not  in  view  of  their  inherent  character, 
which  is  per  se  neither  good  nor  bad,  but  solely  to  indicate  that  they 
have  been  commanded  or  forbidden;  the  idea  that  only  the  dependent 
subject  can  do  wrong,  but  not  the  master,  since  his  will  is  the  source 
of  all  right  and  wrong — these  views  are  frequently  discussed  in  the 
Mu'tazilite  works  of  Arabs  and  Karaites.  The  Rabbanites  scarcely 
ever  mention  them.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  enumerates  six  views  on  the 
nature  of  evil,  with  all  of  which  except  the  last  he  disagrees.  The 
opinion  named  above  that  an  act  is  made  good  or  bad  by  being  com- 
manded or  prohibited,  he  refutes  as  follows:  Such  a  view  removes  the 
very  foundation  of  good  and  bad.  For  if  the  person  in  authority 
chooses  to  reverse  his  order,  the  good  becomes  bad,  and  the  bad  good, 
and  the  same  thing  is  then  good  and  bad,  which  is  absurd.  Besides, 
if  there  are  two  authorities  giving  opposite  orders,  the  same  act  is 
good  and  bad  at  the  same  time.  To  say  that  God's  command  alone 
determines  the  character  of  an  act  is  incorrect,  because  as  long  as 
commanding  and  prohibiting  as  such  determine  the  goodness  or  bad- 


374  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ness  of  an  act,  the  person  issuing  the  command  is  immaterial.  We  do 
say  quite  generally  that  an  act  which  God  commands  is  good,  and  one 
which  he  prohibits  is  bad ;  but  we  mean  by  this  merely  that  the  com- 
mand or  prohibition  is  an  indication  to  us,  who  are  ignorant  of  the 
true  nature  of  acts. 

Again,  on  this  theory  of  the  value  of  acts,  what  will  you  do  with 
such  an  act  as  the  investigation  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  God? 
Surely  such  an  important  matter  cannot  be  indifferent.  It  must  be 
good  or  bad.  And  yet  we  cannot  apply  to  it  the  above  test  of  com- 
mand and  prohibition,  for  this  test  implies  the  existence  of  God, 
which  the  act  endeavors  to  prove.  It  follows  therefore  that  the  value 
of  an  act  is  inherent  in  it  and  not  determined  and  created  by  command 
and  prohibition. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  is  similarly  dissatisfied  with  another  view,  which 
regards  evil  as  a  negation.  We  have  heard  this  opinion  before  and 
we  know  that  Maimonides  adopted  it  (p.  288).  Its  motive  as  we 
know  is  to  remove  from  God  the  responsibility  for  evil.  If  evil  is 
nothing  positive  it  is  not  caused  by  the  activity  of  an  agent.  All 
essential  activity  is  good,  and  all  the  acts  of  God  are  good.  Evil 
consists  in  the  absence  of  good ;  it  is  due  to  matter,  and  does  not  come 
from  God.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  objects  properly  that  as  good  is  a  positive 
act,  a  doing  of  something  positive,  so  is  evil,  even  on  the  theory  of  its 
negative  character,  a  removal  of  something  positive,  hence  a  positive 
act.  Besides,  granting  all  that  the  opponent  claims,  the  argument 
should  work  both  ways,  and  if  God  is  not  held  responsible  for  the 
evil  in  the  world  because  it  is  mere  privation,  why  should  man  be 
held  responsible  for  doing  evil,  i.  e.,  for  removing  the  positive?  He 
clinches  his  argument  by  quoting  Isaiah  (5,  20),  "Woe  unto  those  who 
say  of  evil  it  is  good,  and  of  good  it  is  evil  .  .  .  that  put  bitter 
for  sweet,  and  sweet  for  bitter."  Good  and  evil  are  placed  parallel 
with  sweet  and  bitter,  which  are  both  positive.  Hence  the  Bible  is 
opposed  to  the  negative  conception  of  evil. 

His  own  view  is  that  good  and  evil  are  qualities  pertaining  to  an 
act  by  reason  of  its  own  nature,  but  these  are  not  absolute  concep- 
tions like  true  and  false.  The  good  and  the  bad  are  conventional 
constructs,  and  the  value  of  an  act  is  relative  to  the  end  or  purpose  it 
serves.    The  purpose  of  human  convention  in  regarding  certain  acts 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  375 

as  good  and  others  as  bad  is  the  protection  of  the  human  race.  An  act 
which  conduces  to  human  welfare  is  good,  one  that  mihtates  against 
it  is  bad.  Still  there  are  instances  in  which  an  act  generally  regarded 
as  bad  may  assume  a  different  character  when  in  the  given  instance 
it  serves  a  good  purpose,  as  for  example  when  pain  is  inflicted  to  ob- 
viate more  serious  danger.  The  surgeon,  who  amputates  a  leg  to  save 
the  patient's  life,  does  good,  not  evil.  The  Judge,  who  punishes  the 
criminal  with  imprisonment  or  death  for  the  protection  of  society  and 
to  reahze  justice,  does  good,  not  evil.  In  this  way  we  must  explain 
the  evil  which  God  brings  upon  man.  God  cannot  be  the  cause  of 
evil.  For  evil  in  man  is  due  to  want  or  ignorance.  Neither  is  found 
in  God,  hence  he  has  no  motive  to  do  wrong.  All  the  evil  of  which  we 
complain  is  only  apparent.  In  reality  it  is  good,  because  it  is 
either  brought  upon  us  to  prevent  still  greater  evils,  or  it  is  in  the 
nature  of  just  punishment  for  wrongdoing.  In  either  case  it  is  a 
good.^'''^ 

Aaron  ben  Elijah's  discussion  of  Providence  follows  closely  the 
plan  of  the  corresponding  arguments  in  Maimonides.  The  problem 
is  treated  by  both  in  connection  with  God's  knowledge,  and  both 
maintain  that  the  real  motive  of  those  who  denied  God's  knowledge 
of  particulars  is  their  observation  of  apparent  injustice  in  the  happen- 
ings of  this  world  {cf.  above,  p.  289).  Both  again  preface  their  own 
views  of  the  question  of  Providence  by  a  preliminary  statement  of 
the  various  opinions  held  by  other  sects.  Here  too  the  two  accounts 
are  in  the  main  similar,  except  that  Aaron  ben  Ehjah  is  somewhat 
more  detailed  and  names  a  few  sects  not  mentioned  by  Maimonides, 
among  them  being  the  Manicheans  and  the  followers  of  the  Syrian 
Gnostic  Bardesanes.  In  their  own  views,  however,  Aaron  ben  Elijah 
and  Maimonides  differ;  the  latter  approaching  the  view  of  Aristotle, 
the  former  that  of  the  Mu'tazUa. 

Maimonides  as  we  know  (p.  292)  denies  special  providence  for  the 
individuals  of  the  sublunar  world  with  the  exception  of  man.  In  the 
case  of  the  lower  animals,  the  species  alone  are  protected  by  divine 
providence,  hence  they  will  continue  forever,  whereas  the  individual 
animals  are  subject  to  chance.  Man,  as  a  rational  animal,  is  an  ex- 
ception. He  is  a  free  and  responsible  agent,  hence  he  is  under  divine 
guidance  and  is  rewarded  and  punished  for  his  conduct.    The  extent 


376  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  divine  care  depends  upon  the  degree  to  which  the  individual 
develops  his  reason,  actualizing  his  potential  intellect. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  argues  that  this  view  is  erroneous,  for  it  is  not 
proper  to  make  a  distinction  between  God's  knowledge  and  his  provi- 
dence. If  it  would  argue  imperfection  in  God  not  to  know  certain 
things,  the  same  objection  applies  to  limiting  his  providence,  and  the 
two  should  be  coextensive.  To  say  that  God's  providence  extends  to 
superior  and  important  things  and  ignores  the  inferior  is  to  make  God 
guilty  of  injustice.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  believes  therefore  that  Provi- 
dence extends  to  all  individuals,  including  animals.  And  he  quotes 
the  Bible  in  his  support,  ''The  Lord  is  good  to  all,  and  his  mercies  are 
over  all  his  works,"  (Ps.  145,  9),  and,  "Thou  shalt  not  plough  with 
an  ox  and  an  ass  together  "  (Deut.  22, 10).  Maimonides,  he  says,  was 
led  to  his  opinion  by  his  idea  that  death  and  suffering  always  involve 
sin;  and  not  being  able  to  apply  this  dictum  to  the  suffering  of  animals 
that  are  slaughtered,  he  removed  Providence  from  their  individuals 
entirely.  When  the  Bible  orders  us  to  consider  the  feelings  of  the  ani- 
mal, he  says  the  object  is  to  train  our  own  faculties  in  mercy,  and  pre- 
vent the  formation  of  habits  of  cruelty,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  animal. 
But  he  cannot  remove  all  difficulties  in  this  way.  What  will  he  do 
with  the  case  of  a  person  born  crippled,  and  the  sufferings  of  little 
children?  The  idea  that  death  and  suffering  in  all  cases  involve  sin 
must  be  given  up.  Maimonides  is  also  wrong  when  he  says  that  re- 
ward is  purely  intellectual  and  is  dependent  upon  the  development  of 
the  "acquired  intellect."  It  would  follow  from  this  that  right  con- 
duct as  such  is  not  rewarded;  that  it  serves  merely  as  a  help  to  realizing 
the  acquired  intellect.    All  this  is  opposed  to  Biblical  teaching. ^'^^ 

The  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the  adversity  of  the  righteous 
Aaron  ben  Elijah  endeavors  to  explain  as  follows.  The  prosperity  of 
the  wicked  may  be  due  to  former  good  deeds;  or  by  way  of  punish- 
ment, that  he  may  continue  in  his  evil  deeds  and  be  punished  more 
severely.  It  may  be  in  order  that  he  may  use  the  good  fortune  he 
has  in  whatever  way  he  pleases,  for  good  or  ill.  Finally  his  good 
fortune  may  be  given  him  as  a  matter  of  grace,  like  his  creation. 
Correspondingly  we  may  explain  the  adversity  of  the  righteous  in  a 
similar  manner.  It  may  be  due  to  former  sins.  If  he  has  no  sins,  his 
sufferings  may  be  intended  to  test  him  in  order  to  add  to  his  reward. 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  N I  COM  EDI  A  377 

If  he  dies  without  having  enjoyed  life,  he  will  be  rewarded  in  the 
next  world.  The  pleasures  of  this  world  must  not  be  considered. 
For  since  they  are  given  as  a  matter  of  grace,  they  may  come  or  not 
without  involving  any  injustice.  When  a  man  has  both  good  deeds 
and  sins,  he  may  be  rewarded  for  his  good  deeds  and  punished  for 
his  bad,  or  he  may  be  paid  according  to  the  element  which  predomi- 
nates. Those  who  are  born  crippled  and  the  sufferings  of  children 
will  be  rewarded  later.  In  reference  to  the  slaughter  of  animals, 
Aaron  ben  Ehjah  does  not  agree  with  the  Mu'  tazila  that  the  animals 
will  be  recompensed  for  their  undeserved  sufferings.  There  is  no 
immortal  part  in  animals,  hence  no  reward  after  death.  He  can  assign 
no  reason  for  their  sufferings  except  that  men  need  them  for  food, 
but  he  sees  nothing  wrong  in  taking  an  animal's  life  for  food,  for  as 
the  life  of  animals  was  given  to  them  as  a  matter  of  grace,  there  is 
no  wrong  in  taking  it  away.  However,  to  inflict  pain  in  a  way  dif- 
ferent from  the  manner  permitted  by  God  is  wrong. '^^ 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  lays  great  stress  upon  what  he  considers  an  im- 
portant difference  of  opinion  between  the  Rabbanites  and  the  Karaites 
concerning  the  nature  and  purpose  of  divine  punishment.  The  Rab- 
banites according  to  him  insist  that  "there  is  no  death  without  sin, 
nor  suffering  without  guilt,"  whereas  the  Karaites  admit  that  some 
of  the  sufferings  of  the  righteous  are  not  in  the  nature  of  punishment 
at  all,  but  are  what  are  known  as  ''chastisements  of  love."  Their 
purpose  is  to  increase  the  man's  reward  later  in  the  future  world, 
and  at  the  same  time  they  have  a  pedagogical  value  in  themselves 
in  strengthening  the  person  spiritually.  Accordingly  Aaron  ben 
Elijah,  who  in  the  main  follows  the  opinions  of  the  Karaites,  differs 
with  the  Rabbanites  and  particularly  Maimonides  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  "trials"  of  Adam,  Abraham,  Job. 

So  far  as  Job  is  concerned,  we  know  the  opinions  of  Maimonides 
on  the  subject.  In  his  "Guide  of  the  Perplexed"  he  interprets  the 
book  of  Job  in  connection  with  his  discussion  of  Providence  {cf.  above, 
p.  304).  In  the  general  nature  of  suffering  the  idea  of  "chastisement 
of  love"  is  quite  famihar  to  the  Rabbis,  though  Maimonides  does 
not  care  to  insist  on  it,  claiming  that  there  is  no  support  for  it  in  the 
Bible.  The  idea  of  "trial"  according  to  him  is  neither  that  God  may 
know  what  he  did  not  know  before;  nor  is  it  to  make  a  man  suffer 


378  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

that  he  may  be  rewarded  later.  The  purpose  of  trial  is  that  mankind 
may  know  whatever  it  is  desired  to  teach  them  in  a  given  case.  In 
the  trial  of  Abraham  when  he  was  told  to  sacrifice  Isaac,  there  was  a 
two-fold  reason;  first,  that  all  may  know  to  what  extent  the  love  of 
God  may  go  in  a  pious  man;  and  second  to  show  that  a  prophet  is 
convinced  of  the  reality  of  his  visions  as  an  ordinary  person  is  of  the 
data  of  his  senses.^^* 

The  book  of  Job  is  to  Maimonides  a  treatise  on  Providence,  and 
the  five  characters  in  the  drama  represent  the  various  opinions  on 
the  nature  of  Providence  as  they  were  held  by  different  schools  of 
philosophy  and  theology  in  Maimonides's  day.  Job  has  the  Aristote- 
lian view  that  God  cares  nothing  for  man.  Eliphaz  represents  the 
correct  Jewish  view  that  everything  is  reward  or  punishment  for 
merit  and  demerit.  Bildad  maintains  the  Mu'tazilite  opinion  that 
many  misfortunes  are  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  reward  in  the 
world  to  come.  Zophar  stands  for  the  view  of  the  Ashariya  that 
all  is  to  be  explained  by  reference  to  the  will  of  God,  and  no  questions 
should  be  asked.  Elihu  finally  insists  that  the  individual  man  is  the 
object  of  the  divine  care,  but  that  we  must  not  compare  God's  provi- 
dence with  our  own  interest  in,  and  care  for  things;  that  there  is  no 
relation  at  all  between  them  except  in  name  {cj.  above,  p.  304).  The 
Rabbis,  who  do  not  make  of  Job  a  philosopher,  naturally  do  not  under- 
stand the  matter  as  Maimonides  does,  but  they  nevertheless  agree 
with  him  that  Job  deserved  the  punishment  he  received.  The  Karaites 
on  the  other  hand  classed  Job's  sufferings  with  "chastisements  of  love," 
which  would  mean  that  Job  was  a  perfect  man  and  did  not  deserve 
any  punishment.  The  sole  motive  for  inflicting  pain  and  tribulation 
upon  him  was  to  reward  him  the  more  later. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  agrees  in  the  main  with  his  Karaite  predecessors 
that  Job  was  not  punished  for  any  fault  he  had  committed.  He  does 
not  see  in  the  arguments  of  Job's  friends  any  difference  of  opinion 
on  the  general  question  of  Providence,  and  Job  was  not  an  Aristotelian. 
Unlike  Aristotle,  he  did  beheve  in  God's  care  for  man,  as  is  evident 
from  such  statements  as  (Job  10,  10),  Behold  like  milk  didst  thou 
pour  me  out,  and  like  cheese  didst  thou  curdle  me."  The  Karaites,  he 
holds,  are  correct  in  their  main  contention  that  Job's  sufferings  were 
not  in  the  nature  of  punishment  for  previous  guilt  and  wrongdoing, 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  379 

but  they  are  mistaken  in  supposing  that  Job  was  altogether  right  in 
his  conception  of  the  meaning  and  reason  of  his  sufferings;  that  they 
had  no  other  purpose  except  to  increase  his  reward  in  the  future. 
Aaron  ben  EHjah  then  explains  his  own  view  of  "trial." 

Man,  he  says,  is  composed  of  body  and  soul,  and  must  therefore 
endeavor  to  gain  this  world  and  the  next.  If  he  is  punished  for  guilt 
or  offence,  the  punishment  corresponds  to  the  offence.  Corporeal 
guilt  is  followed  by  corporeal  punishment,  spiritual  guilt  by  spiritual 
punishment.  Adam  offended  spiritually  and  was  punished  spiritually 
by  being  driven  from  the  Garden  of  Eden  as  will  be  explained  later. 
Abraham  endeavored  to  do  justice  to  both  the  constituent  parts  of 
his  being;  and  hence  God  in  his  kindness,  wishing  to  strengthen  Abra- 
ham spiritually,  gave  him  the  opportunity  in  the  trial  of  Isaac.  At 
the  same  time  the  physical  suffering  was  compensated  by  the  promise 
to  Abraham  of  the  continuity  of  Isaac's  descendants.  Job's  sufferings 
were  of  the  same  kind,  except  that  they  came  to  him  without  his 
knowledge  and  without  his  being  told  their  purpose.  And  at  first 
he  thought  they  were  in  order  to  give  him  future  reward,  but  without 
any  use  in  themselves.  Later  he  discovered  that  they  benefited  him 
directly  by  increasing  his  spiritual  strength. ^''^ 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  differs  also  from  Maimonides  in  reference  to  the 
purpose  of  the  world.  Maimonides  maintains  that  while  there  is 
sense  in  inquiring  for  the  purpose  of  the  parts  of  the  world,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  ultim.ate  purpose  of  the  world  as  a  whole  is  meaningless. 
The  purpose  of  a  given  event  or  law  of  nature  lies  in  its  relation  to 
the  other  events  and  laws,  hence  there  is  a  relative  purpose  in  particu- 
lar things;  thus,  given  the  existence  of  animals  they  must  have  food, 
sense  perception,  and  so  on.  But  if  we  ask  why  the  universe  as  a 
whole,  the  only  answer  that  can  be  given  is  God's  wisdom,  which 
we  do  not  understand.  In  particular  Maimonides  will  not  admit 
that  the  world  is  for  the  sake  of  man,  as  this  view  clashes  with  ex- 
perience and  makes  it  impossible  to  explain  a  great  many  phenomena 
in  nature,  which  are  distinctly  of  no  benefit  to  man  and  take  no  cogni- 
zance of  his  interests. ^'^^  Aaron  ben  Elijah  agrees  with  Maimonides 
that  God's  wisdom  rather  than  his  arbitrary  will,  as  the  Ashariya 
maintain,  must  be  appealed  to  in  answering  the  question  of  the  pur- 
pose of  the  world.    But  he  is  inclined  to  regard  man  as  the  purpose 


380  MEDI/BVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  lower  world,  admitting  that  we  cannot  know  the  purpose  of  the 
higher  worlds  of  the  spheres  and  Intelligences,  as  they  transcend  the 
powers  of  our  comprehension.^''^ 

We  can  pass  over  Aaron  ben  Elijah's  discussion  of  prophecy  very 
briefly  because  there  is  no  new  attitude  or  contribution  in  his  views. 
Without  saying  it,  he  reluctantly  perhaps,  leans  upon  Maimonides, 
and  with  apparent  variations  in  form  really  adopts  the  classification 
of  the  "Guide"  (p.  277).  He  gives  no  psychological  explanation  of 
prophecy  because  he  disagrees  with  the  philosophers,  to  whom  proph- 
ecy is  a  purely  natural  gift  which  cannot  fail  to  manifest  itself  when 
the  requisite  conditions  are  there,  namely,  perfection  in  intellect  and 
imagination.  In  fact  when  he  gives  the  different  views  on  the  nature 
of  prophecy,  he  refuses  to  identify  what  seems  to  stand  in  his  book 
for  the  view  of  Maimonides  (the  fourth  view)  with  that  of  the  fol- 
lowers of  the  Mosaic  law.  Whereas  Maimonides  following  the  philoso- 
phers insists  on  the  two  important  elements  in  prophecy,  namely, 
intellect  and  imagination,  adding  thereto  also  moral  perfection, 
Aaron  ben  Elijah  in  giving  the  opinion  of  those  who  follow  the  law 
of  Moses,  says  nothing  of  the  imagination.  He  insists  only  on  per- 
fection in  intellect  and  in  ethical  character.  This  difference  is,  how- 
ever, only  apparent;  and  further  on  he  refers  to  the  imagination  as 
an  important  element,  which  determines,  in  its  relation  to  the  reason, 
the  character  of  a  man  as  a  prophet  or  a  mere  statesman  or  philosopher 
— all  in  the  manner  of  Maimonides. 

His  idea  of  the  purpose  of  prophecy  he  develops,  as  it  seems,  with  an 
eye  to  the  criticism  of  the  Brahmins  of  India,  whom  he  quotes  as 
denying  prophecy,  though  admitting  Providence,  on  the  ground  that 
it  can  serve  no  purpose.  The  reason  alone,  they  say,  is  sufficient  to 
decide  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong.  Accordingly  Aaron  ben  Elijah 
meets  their  objection  as  follows:  It  is  true  that  man  might  have  gotten 
along  without  prophecy  through  the  laws  which  his  own  reason  estab- 
lished for  right  and  wrong,  good  and  evil.  Those  who  followed  these 
rational  laws  would  have  attained  long  life,  and  the  others  would  have 
perished.  But  a  good  man  living  in  a  bad  environment  would  have 
been  involved  in  the  downfall  of  the  majority,  which  would  not  be  just. 
Hence  it  was  necessary  that  God  should  warn  the  man,  that  he  might 
save  himself.    This  is  the  first  beginning  of  prophecy.    Witness  Noah 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  381 

and  Lot.  Abraham  was  a  great .  advance  on  his  predecessors.  He 
endeavored  to  follow  God's  will  in  respect  to  both  body  and  soul. 
Hence  God  saved  him  from  the  danger  to  which  he  was  exposed  in  Ur 
of  the  Chaldees,  and  wanted  to  benefit  his  descendants  also  that  they 
should  perfect  their  bodies  and  their  souls.  This  is  impossible  for  a 
whole  nation  without  special  laws  to  guide  them.  This  is  particularly 
true  of  the  "traditional"  laws  (ceremonial),  which  are  not  in  them- 
selves good  or  bad,  but  are  disciplinary  in  their  nature. 

A  prophet  must  have  both  intellectual  and  ethical  perfection.  For 
he  must  understand  the  nature  of  God  in  order  to  communicate  his 
will;  and  this  cannot  be  had  without  previous  ethical  perfection. 
Hence  the  twofold  requirement.  This  is  the  reason,  he  says,  why  we 
do  not  believe  in  the  religions  of  Jesus  and  Mohammed,  because  they 
were  not  possessed  of  intellectual  perfection.  And  besides  they  tend  to 
the  extinction  of  the  human  species  by  reason  of  their  monastic  and 
celibate  ideal.  They  were  misled  by  the  asceticism  of  the  prophets, 
who  meant  it  merely  as  a  protest  against  the  material  self-indulgence 
of  the  time,  and  called  attention  to  the  higher  life.  But  those  people 
in  their  endeavor  to  imitate  the  prophets  mistook  the  means  for  the 
end,  with  the  result  that  they  missed  both,  perfection  of  soul  as  well  as 
of  body,  and  merely  mortified  the  flesh,  thinking  it  the  will  of  God. 
Hence,  Aaron  ben  Elijah  continues,  we  shall  never  accept  a  religion 
which  does  not  preach  the  maintenance  of  this  world  as  well  as  of  the 
next.  Not  even  miracles  can  authenticate  a  religion  which  preaches 
monasticism  and  celibacy. 

Moses  was  superior  to  the  other  prophets.  All  the  others  received 
their  messages  in  a  vision  or  a  dream,  Moses  had  his  inspiration  while 
awake.  The  others  were  inspired  through  the  medium  of  an  angel, 
i.  e.,  through  the  imagination,  hence  their  language  abounds  in  alle- 
gories and  parables.  Moses  did  not  use  the  imagination,  hence  the 
plain  character  of  his  speech.  The  others  were  overcome  by  the  vision 
and  physically  exhausted,  as  we  read  in  Daniel  (10,  17),  "There  re- 
mained no  strength  in  me,  and  no  breath  was  left  in  me."  Moses  was 
free  from  this  weakness — "And  the  Lord  spoke  unto  Moses  face  to 
face,  as  a  man  speaketh  unto  his  neighbor  "  (Exod.  33, 11).  The  others 
required  preparation,  Moses  did  not.  Moses's  testimony,  too,  was 
stronger  than  that  of  all  the  rest.    His  authority  in  the  end  was  made 


382  MEDIMVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

plain  to  all  the  people  directly  and  openly,  so  that  there  remained  not 
a  shred  of  a  doubt.  This  is  why  we  accept  his  law  and  no  other,  be- 
cause none  is  so  well  authenticated.  The  Law  cannot  change  without 
implying  that  the  standard  of  perfection  has  changed,  or  the  world  has 
changed,  or  God's  knowledge  has  changed.  All  this  is  impossible. 
The  Law  says  besides,  "Thou  shalt  not  add  thereto,  and  thou  shalt 
not  diminish  therefrom"  (Deut.  13,  i).  Therefore,  concludes  Aaron 
ben  Elijah  the  Karaite,  we  do  not  believe  in  the  oral  or  traditional  law 
because  of  the  additions  to,  and  subtractions  from,  the  written  law 
which  it  contains.^^^ 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  agrees  with  Maimonides  that  all  the  command- 
ments of  the  Bible,  including  the  ceremonial  laws,  have  a  purpose  and 
are  not  due  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  The  ceremonial  laws  are 
for  the  sake  of  the  rational,  serving  a  pedagogical  and  disciplinary 
purpose,  and  the  Law  as  a  whole  is  for  the  purpose  of  teaching  the 
truth  and  inculcating  the  good.  He  goes  further  than  Maimonides 
in  vindicating  the  rational  and  ethical  purpose  of  all  the  details  of  the 
various  laws,  and  not  merely  of  the  several  commandments  as  a  whole 
{cj.  above,  p.  294).^'^^ 

A  problem  that  occupied  the  minds  of  the  Mutakallimun,  Arabs 
as  well  as  Karaites,  but  which  Maimonides  does  not  discuss,  is  the 
piupose  of  God's  giving  commandments  to  those  who  he  knew  would 
remain  unbelievers,  and  refuse  to  obey.  That  God's  knowledge  and 
man's  freedom  co-exist  and  neither  destroys  the  other,  has  already 
been  shown.^^"  If  then  God  knows,  as  we  must  assume,  that  a  given 
person  will  refuse  to  obey  the  commandments,  what  is  the  use  of 
giving  them  to  him?  And  granting  that  for  some  reason  unknown  to 
us  they  have  been  given,  is  it  just  to  pimish  him  for  disobedience  when 
the  latter  might  have  been  spared  by  not  giving  the  man  in  question 
any  commandments? 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  answers  these  questions  by  citing  the  following 
parallel.  A  man  prepares  a  meal  for  two  guests  and  one  does  not  come. 
The  absence  of  the  guest  does  not  make  the  preparation  improper,  for 
the  character  of  the  act  does  not  depend  upon  the  choice  of  the  guest 
to  do  or  not  to  do  the  desire  of  the  host.  The  invitation  was  proper 
because  the  host  meant  the  guest's  benefit.  To  be  sure,  the  case  is  not 
quite  parallel,  and  to  make  it  so  we  must  assume  that  the  host  expects 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  383, 

that  the  guest  will  not  come.  His  intention  being  good,  the  invitation 
is  proper.  In  our  problem  knowledge  takes  the  place  of  expectation. 
God  does  not  merely  expect,  he  knows  that  the  man  will  not  obey. 
But  as  God's  desire  is  to  benefit  mankind  and  arouse  them  to  higher 
things,  the  command  is  proper,  no  matter  what  the  person  chooses  to  do. 

To  punish  the  man  for  disobedience  is  not  unjust  because  God  in- 
tended to  benefit  him  by  the  command.  If  he  disobeyed,  that  is  his 
lookout.  If  the  benefit  could  have  been  had  without  the  command, 
then  the  punishment  would  be  unjust,  but  not  otherwise. 

If  only  good  men  were  commanded  and  the  rest  ignored,  the  danger 
would  be  that  the  former  being  thereby  assured  of  reward,  might  be 
tempted  to  do  wrong;  and  the  others  in  despair  might  be  worse  than 
they  would  be  imder  ordinary  circumstances.  God  saw  that  man  has 
evil  tendencies,  and  needs  warning  and  guidance  from  without.  And 
just  as  he  gave  men  understanding  and  ability  to  believe  though  he 
knew  that  a  given  person  would  not  avail  himself  thereof,  so  he  gave 
all  men  commandments,  though  he  knew  that  some  would  not  obey.^^^ 

The  rest  of  the  book  is  devoted  to  such  questions  as  reward  and 
punishment  after  death,  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  problem  of  the 
soul's  pre-existence,  the  nature  of  the  future  life,  repentance — ques- 
tions which  Maimonides  left  untouched  in  the  '  Guide  "  on  the  ground 
that  whatever  religion  and  tradition  may  say  about  them,  they  are  not 
strictly  speaking  scientific  questions,  and  are  not  susceptible  to  phil- 
osophical demonstration. 

Aaron  ben  Elijah  proves  that  there  must  be  reward  and  punishment 
after  death.  For  as  man  is  composed  of  body  and  soul,  there  must  be 
reward  for  each  according  as  man  endeavors  to  maintain  and  perfect 
them.  Thus  if  a  man  cares  for  his  body  alone,  he  will  be  rewarded  in 
his  body,  i.  e.,  in  this  world.  The  other  man  who  looks  out  for  both 
body  and  soul  must  have  the  same  reward  in  this  world  as  the  other, 
since  their  physical  efforts  were  similar.  At  the  same  time  he  must 
have  something  over  and  above  the  other  in  the  nature  of  compensa- 
tion for  his  soul,  and  this  must  be  in  the  next  world. 

The  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the  misery  of  the  righteous  are 
also  to  be  explained  in  part,  as  we  have  seen  (p.  376),  by  reference  to 
their  respective  destinies  in  the  next  world,  where  the  inequalities  of 
this  world  will  be  adjusted. 


384  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Finally,  material  reward  cannot  be  the  consequence  of  intellectual 
and  spiritual  merit;  it  would  mean  doing  the  greater  for  the  sake  of  the 
smaller.  And  besides  the  soul  is  not  benefited  by  physical  goods  and 
pleasures,  and  would  remain  without  reward.  Hence  there  must  be 
another  kind  of  reward  after  death.  In  order  to  deserve  such  reward 
the  soul  must  become  wise.  At  the  same  time  the  common  people, 
who  observe  the  ceremonial  commandments,  are  not  excluded  from  a 
share  in  the  world  to  come,  because  the  purpose  of  these  laws  is  also 
intellectual  and  spiritual,  as  we  said  before  (p.  382),  and  hence  their 
observance  makes  the  soul  wise,  and  gives  it  immortality.  This  last 
comment  is  clearly  directed  against  the  extreme  intellectualism  of 
Maimonides  and  Gersonides,  according  to  whom  rational  activity 
alone  confers  immortality  (p.  339).^^^ 

The  considerations  just  adduced  imply  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
to  which  they  lend  indirect  proof.  But  Aaron  ben  Elijah  endeavors 
besides  to  furnish  direct  proof  of  the  soul's  continuance  after  the  death 
of  the  body.  And  the  first  thing  he  does  is  to  disarm  the  criticism  of 
the  philosophers,  who  deny  immortality  on  the  ground  that  the  soul 
being  the  form  of  the  body,  it  must  like  other  material  forms  cease 
with  the  dissolution  of  the  things  of  which  they  are  the  forms.  He 
answers  this  by  showing  that  the  soul  as  the  cause  of  knowledge  and 
wisdom — immaterial  faculties — is  itself  immaterial.  Being  also  the 
cause  of  the  body's  motion,  it  is  not  itself  subject  to  motion,  hence  not 
to  time,  and  therefore  not  destructible  like  a  natural  form.  Besides 
the  composition  of  body  and  soul  is  different  from  that  of  matter  and 
form  in  the  ordinary  sense.  For  in  the  former  case  each  of  the  con- 
stituent parts  is  already  a  composite  of  matter  and  form.  The  body 
has  both  matter  and  form,  and  the  soul  has  likewise.  For  the  acquired 
intellect  is  the  form  of  the  soul,  which  is  the  matter.  Other  proofs 
are  as  follows:  The  rational  soul  performs  its  functions  without  help 
from  the  body,  hence  it  is  independent  in  its  existence.  The  proof  of 
the  last  statement  is  that  the  power  of  the  rational  soul  is  not  limited, 
and  does  not  become  weary,  as  a  corporeal  power  does.  Hence  it 
can  exist  without  the  body.  Again,  as  the  corporeal  powers  grow 
stronger,  the  intellectual  powers  grow  weaker,  and  vice  versa  as 
the  corporeal  powers  grow  weaker  in  old  age,  the  intellect  grows 
stronger.     Hence  the  soul  is  independent  of  the  body,  and  when 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  385 

the  physical  powers  cease  entirely  in  death,  the  intellect  is  at  its 
height.  ^^^ 

The  question  of  the  soul's  pre-existence  before  coming  in  contact 
with  the  body,  Aaron  ben  Elijah  answers  in  the  affirmative,  though 
his  arguments  in  favor  of  the  opposite  view  are  stronger.  His  sole 
argument  in  favor  of  its  pre-existence  is  that  the  soul,  being  a  self- 
subsisting  substance  and  not  an  accident,  is  not  dependent  upon  the 
body,  and  must  have  existed  before  the  body.  The  consequence  which 
some  have  drawn  from  this  supposition  combined  with  the  soul's 
immortality,  namely,  that  the  soul  is  eternal,  he  refuses  to  adopt. 
The  soul  existed  before  the  body,  but  like  all  things  which  are  not 
God  it  was  created  in  time. 

Though  we  have  thus  seen  that  the  soul  existed  before  the  body,  it 
is  mistaken  to  suppose  that  it  was  completely  developed.  For  though 
the  gradual  progress  in  knowledge  and  understanding  as  the  individual 
matures  proves  nothing  for  the  soul's  original  imperfection,  as  we  may 
account  for  this  progress  by  the  gradual  adaptation  of  the  physical 
elements  to  the  functions  of  the  soul,  there  is  a  more  vahd  objection. 
If  the  soul  was  perfectly  developed  before  entering  the  body,  all  souls 
should  be  alike  when  they  leave  it,  which  is  not  the  case.  We  come  to 
the  conclusion  therefore  that  the  soul  does  acquire  knowledge  while 
in  contact  with  the  body.  The  human  soul  is  a  unit,  and  from  its 
connection  with  the  body  arise  the  various  powers,  such  as  growth, 
life,  reason.  When  the  soul  is  separated  from  the  body,  those  powers 
which  functioned  with  the  aid  of  the  body  perish;  the  others  remain.^^^ 

In  the  matter  of  eschatology  Aaron  ben  Elijah  gives  a  number  of 
views  without  declaring  himself  definitely  for  any  of  them.  The  main 
difference  among  the  three  points  of  view  quoted  concerns  the  possi- 
bility of  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
"revival  of  the  dead"  ("Tehiyat  ha-metim")  and  "the  world  to  come" 
("01am  ha-ba").  Aaron  ben  Elijah  seems  to  incline  to  the  first,  in 
favor  of  resurrection. 

We  must  endeavor,  he  says,  to  get  some  notion  of  final  reward  and 
punishment.  For  without  any  idea  of  its  nature  a  man's  hope  or  fear 
is  taken  away  from  him,  and  he  has  no  motive  for  right  conduct.  To 
be  sure  it  is  not  possible  to  get  a  clear  understanding  of  the  matter,  but 
some  idea  we  must  have.    The  first  view  which  he  seems  to  favor  is 


386  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

that  revival  oj  the  dead  and  world  to  come  are  the  same  thing;  that  the 
end  of  man  is  the  resurrection  of  the  body  and  its  reunion  with  the 
soul.  This  is  the  future  Hfe,  and  this  is  meant  by  reward  and  punish- 
ment. There  is  Bibhcal  support  for  this  view  in  such  expressions  as, 
"Thy  dead  shall  live,  thy  dead  bodies  shall  arise"  (Isa.  26,  ig).  "The 
Lord  killeth,  and  maketh  alive;  he  bringeth  down  to  the  grave  and 
bringeth  up  "  (i  Sam.  2,  6).  There  is  nothing  to  object  in  this,  he  says, 
for  the  same  God  who  made  man  of  the  dust  can  revive  him  after 
death.  Besides,  there  seems  to  be  a  logical  propriety  in  bringing  soul 
and  body  together  for  reward  and  punishment  just  as  they  were  during 
conduct  in  life.  When  the  soul  is  once  reunited  with  the  body  in  the 
resurrection,  it  is  never  separated  again.  The  expression  ^^  garden  of 
Eden  "  for  paradise  is  a  figure  of  speech  for  eternal  life  free  from  pain. 

The  second  opinion  is  expressed  by  those  who  do  not  believe  in 
bodily  resurrection.  The  end  of  man  according  to  these  is  the  return 
of  the  soul  to  the  world  of  souls.  This  is  the  meaning  of  "world  to 
come";  and  "revival  of  the  dead"  means  the  same  thing.  For  it  is 
not  possible  that  the  soul  should  be  reunited  with  the  body,  which  is 
temporary  in  its  nature  and  subject  to  dissolution.  Besides,  the  body 
has  organs,  such  as  those  of  food  and  reproduction,  which  would  be 
useless  in  the  future  life.  The  advocates  of  this  theory  also  believe  in 
transmigration  of  souls  as  a  punishment.  Aaron  ben  Elijah  rejects 
metempsychosis  on  the  ground  that  there  is  some  relation  between  a 
soul  and  its  body,  and  not  every  body  can  receive  every  soul. 

Aaron  ben  Ehjah  also  quotes  without  comment  the  classification, 
already  familiar  to  us  (p.  119),  of  himian  souls  into  (i)  dead,  (2)  alive, 
(3)  healthy,  and  (4)  sick.  Death  denotes  evil  deeds;  life,  good  deeds; 
health,  intellectual  knowledge;  disease,  ignorance.  This  classification 
is  applied  in  determining  the  destiny  of  the  soul  after  death.  If  one  is 
alive  and  healthy,  i.  e.,  has  knowledge  and  good  deeds,  he  has  a  share 
in  the  world  to  come.  If  he  is  healthy  and  dead  (knowledge  +  evil 
deeds),  the  soul  is  kept  in  an  intermediate  world  forever.  If  he  is  alive 
and  sick  (good  deeds  +  ignorance),  the  soul  rises  to  the  upper  air, 
whence  it  returns  again  and  again  to  the  body  until  it  acquires  wisdom 
to  be  able  to  rise  to  the  world  of  angels.  If  he  is  dead  and  sick  (evil 
deeds  +  ignorance),  the  soul  dies  like  an  animal. 

Finally,  the  third  opinion  is  a  combination  of  resurrection  and 


AARON  BEN  ELIJAH  OF  NICOMEDIA  387 

"future  world."  Seeing  that  some  of  the  functions  of  the  soul  are  per- 
formed with  the  help  of  the  body,  while  others  are  not,  the  advocates 
of  this  view  maintain  that  the  soul  will  be  rewarded  in  both  condi- 
tions— with  the  body,  in  resurrection,  without  the  body,  in  the  world 
to  come. 

If  a  man  has  merits  and  demerits,  his  good  and  evil  deeds  are  bal- 
anced against  each  other,  and  the  surplus  determines  his  reward  or 
punishment  according  to  its  nature.^^^ 


CHAPTER  XVII 

HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  (1340-1410) 

The  influence  of  Aristotle  on  Jewish  thought,  which  began  as  early 
as  Saadia  and  grew  in  intensity  as  the  Aristotelian  writings  became 
better  known,  reached  its  high  water  mark  in  Ibn  Daud,  Maimonides 
and  Gersonides.  To  Maimonides  Aristotle  was  the  indisputable 
authority  for  all  matters  pertaining  to  sublunar  existence,  but  he  re- 
served the  right  to  differ  with  the  Stagirite  when  the  question  con- 
cerned the  heavenly  spheres  and  the  influences  derived  from  them. 
Hence  he  denied  the  eternity  of  motion  and  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple at  the  basis  of  this  Aristotelian  idea,  that  necessity  rules  all 
natural  phenomena.  In  his  doctrine  of  creation  in  time,  Maimonides 
endeavored  to  defend  God's  personality  and  voluntary  and  purposeful 
activity.  For  the  same  reason  he  defended  the  institution  of  miracles. 
Gersonides  went  further  in  his  rationalistic  attitude,  carried  the 
Aristotelian  principles  to  their  inevitable  conclusions,  and  did  not 
shrink  from  adopting  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  eternity  of  the 
world  (strictly  speaking  the  eternity  of  matter),  and  the  limitation  of 
God's  knowledge  to  universals.  Aristotle's  authority  was  now  su- 
preme, and  the  Bible  had  to  yield  to  Aristotelian  interpretations,  as 
we  have  seen  abundantly.  Maimonides  and  Gersonides  were  the 
great  peaks  that  stood  out  above  the  rest;  but  there  was  any  number 
of  lesser  lights,  some  who  wrote  books  and  still  more  who  did  not 
write,  taking  the  great  men  as  their  models  and  looking  at  Jewish 
literatiire  and  belief  through  Aristotelian  spectacles.  Intellectualism 
is  the  term  that  best  describes  this  attitude.  It  had  its  basis  in  psychol- 
ogy, and  from  there  succeeded  in  establishing  itself  as  the  ruling 
principle  in  ethics  and  metaphysics.  As  reason  and  intellect  is  the 
distinguishing  trait  of  man — the  part  of  man  which  raises  him  above 
the  beast — and  as  the  soul  is  the  form  of  the  living  body,  its  essence  and 
actuating  principle,  it  was  argued  that  the  most  important  part  of 
man  is  his  rational  soul  or  intellect,  and  immortality  was  made  de- 

388 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  389 

pendent  upon  theoretical  ideas.  Speculative  study  made  the  soul; 
and  an  intellect  thus  constituted  was  immortal,  for  it  was  immaterial. 
The  heavenly  world,  consisting  of  the  separate  Intelligences  and  cul- 
minating in  God,  was  also  in  its  essence  reason  and  intellect.  Hence 
thought  and  knowledge  formed  the  essence  of  the  universe.  By 
thought  is  man  saved,  and  through  thought  is  he  united  with  the 
Most  High.  All  else  that  is  not  pure  thought  acquires  what  value  it 
has  from  the  relation  it  bears  to  thought.  In  this  way  were  judged 
those  divisions  of  Judaism  that  concerned  ceremony  and  ethical  prac- 
tice. Their  value  consisted  in  their  function  of  promoting  the  ends  of 
the  reason. 

Judah  Halevi,  influenced  by  Al  Gazali,  had  already  before  Mai- 
monides  protested  against  this  intellectualistic  attitude  in  the  name 
of  a  truer  though  more  naive  understanding  of  the  Bible  and  Jewish 
history.  But  Judah  Halevi's  nationalism  and  the  expression  of  his 
poetical  and  religious  feelings  and  ideas  could  not  vie  with  the  dom- 
inating personality  of  Maimonides,  whose  rationalistic  and  intellectual- 
istic attitude  swept  everything  before  it  and  became  the  dominant 
mode  of  thinking  for  his  own  and  succeeding  ages.  It  remained  for 
Hasdai  Crescas  (born  in  Barcelona,  in  1340),  who  flourished  in  Chris- 
tian Spain  two  centuries  after  Maimonides  and  over  a  half  century 
after  Gersonides,  to  take  up  the  cudgels  again  in  behalf  of  a  truer 
Judaism,  a  Judaism  independent  of  Aristotle,  and  one  that  is  based 
more  upon  the  spiritual  and  emotional  sides  of  man  and  less  upon  the 
purely  intellectual,  theoretical  and  speculative.  Himself  devoid  of 
the  literary  power  and  poetic  feeling  of  Judah  Halevi,  Crescas  had  this 
in  common  with  the  mediaeval  national  poet  that  he  resented  the 
domination  of  Jewish  belief  and  thought  by  the  alien  Greek  specula- 
tion. In  a  style  free  from  rhetoric,  and  characterized  rather  by  a  severe 
brevity  and  precision,  he  undertakes  to  undermine  the  Aristotelian 
position  by  using  the  Stagirite's  own  weapons,  logical  analysis  and 
proof.    His  chief  work  is  the  "Or  Adonai,"  Light  of  the  Lord.^^^ 

Agreeing  with  all  other  Jewish  writers  that  the  existence  of  God  is 
the  basis  of  Judaism,  he  sees  in  this  very  fact  a  reason  why  this  prin- 
ciple cannot  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  six  hundred  and  thirteen  com- 
mandments. For  a  commandment  implies  the  existence  of  one  who 
commands.    Hence  to  regard  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  as  a 


390  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

commandment  implies  the  very  thing  which  the  commandment  ex- 
presses. The  existence  of  God  therefore  as  the  basis  of  all  command- 
ments cannot  itself  be  a  commandment.  Besides  only  those  things 
can  form  the  objects  of  a  command  which  can  be  controlled  by  the  wUl. 
But  a  matter  of  belief  Hke  the  existence  of  God  is  not  subject  to  will, 
it  is  a  matter  of  fact  and  of  proof.  ^^'^ 

Maimonides,  as  we  know,  based  his  proofs  of  the  existence,  unity 
and  incorporeality  of  God  upon  twenty-six  philosophical  propositions 
taken  from  the  works  of  Aristotle  and  his  Arabian  interpreters.  As 
he  was  not  writing  a  book  on  general  philosophy,  Maimonides  simply 
enumerates  twenty-five  propositions,  which  he  accepts  as  proved  by 
Aristotle  and  his  followers.  To  these  he  adds  provisionally  another 
proposition,  number  twenty-six,  concerning  the  eternity  of  motion, 
upon  which  he  bases  his  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  in  order  to  be 
safe  from  all  criticism.  In  the  sequel  he  discusses  this  last  proposition 
and  shows  that  unlike  the  other  twenty-five,  it  is  not  susceptible  of 
rigid  demonstration,  and  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  origin  of  mo- 
tion and  the  world  in  time  are  more  plausible. 

Crescas  goes  further  than  Maimonides,  and  controverts  most  of  the 
other  propositions  as  well,  maintaining  in  particular  against  Aristotle 
and  Maimonides  that  an  infinite  magnitude  is  possible  and  exists 
actually;  that  there  is  an  infinite  fullness  or  void  outside  of  this  world, 
and  hence  there  may  be  many  worlds,  and  it  need  not  follow  that  the 
elements  would  pour  in  from  one  world  into  the  next,  so  that  all  earth 
should  be  together  in  the  centre,  all  fire  together  in  the  outer  circum- 
ference, and  the  intermediate  elements,  air  and  water,  between  these 
two.  The  elements  may  stay  in  their  respective  worlds  in  the  places 
assigned  to  them.  It  will  not  be  worth  our  while  to  wade  through 
all  the  technical  and  hair-splitting  discussions  of  these  points.  The 
results  will  be  sufiicient  for  our  purpose. 

The  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  unmoved  mover  in  Aristotle  and 
Maimonides  is  based  upon  the  impossibility  of  a  regress  to  infinity. 
If  Hasdai  Crescas  admits  the  infinite,  the  Aristotehan  proof  fails. 
Similarly  God's  unity  in  Maimonides  is  among  other  things  based 
upon  the  finiteness  of  the  world  and  its  unity.  If  infinite  space  is 
possible  outside  of  this  world,  and  there  may  be  many  worlds,  this 
proof  fails  for  God's  unity.    So  Crescas  takes  up  in  detail  all  the  Mai- 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  391 

monidean  proofs  of  the  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality  of  God  and 
points  out  that  they  are  not  vahd  because  in  the  first  place  they  are 
based  upon  premises  which  Crescas  has  refuted,  and  secondly  were 
the  premises  granted  Maimonides's  results  do  not  follow  from  them.^^^ 
It  remains  then  for  Crescas  to  give  his  own  views  on  this  problem 
which,  he  says,  the  philosophers  are  unable  to  solve  satisfactorily, 
and  the  Bible  alone  is  to  be  relied  upon.  At  the  same  time  he  does 
give  a  logical  proof  which  in  reality  is  not  different  from  one  of  the 
proofs  given  by  Maimonides  himself.  It  is  based  upon  the  distinction 
insisted  upon  by  Alfarabi  and  Avicenna  between  the  "possible  exist- 
ent" and  the  "necessary  existent."  Whatever  is  an  effect  of  a  cause 
is  in  itself  merely  possible,  and  owes  the  necessity  of  its  existence  to 
its  cause.  Now,  argues  Crescas,  whether  the  number  of  causes  and 
effects  is  finite  or  infinite,  there  must  be  one  cause  of  all  of  them  which 
is  not  itself  an  effect.  For  if  all  things  are  effects  they  are  "possible 
existents"  as  regards  their  own  nature,  and  require  a  cause  which  will 
make  them  exist  rather  than  not.    This  self -subsisting  cause  is  God.^^^ 

He  then  endeavors  to  prove  the  unity  of  God  in  the  two  senses  of 
the  term;  unity  in  the  sense  of  simplicity,  and  unity  in  the  sense  of 
uniqueness.  Unity  as  opposed  to  composition — the  former  sense  of 
the  term — is  neither  the  same  as  the  essence  of  a  thing,  nor  is  it  an 
accident  added  to  the  essence.  It  cannot  be  essence,  for  in  that  case 
all  things  called  one  would  have  the  same  essence.  Nor  is  it  accident, 
for  that  which  defines  and  separates  the  existing  thing  is  truly  called 
substance  rather  than  accident;  and  this  is  what  unity  does.  Accord- 
ingly Crescas  defines  unity  as  something  essential  to  everything  ac- 
tually existing,  denoting  the  absence  of  plurality.  This  being  true,  that 
existent  which  is  before  all  others  is  most  truly  called  one.  Also  that 
being  which  is  most  separated  from  other  things  is  best  called  one.^^'' 

Crescas  disagrees  with  Maimonides's  opinion  that  no  positive  at- 
tributes can  be  applied  to  God,  such  as  indicate  relation  to  his  crea- 
tures, and  so  on.  His  arguments  are  that  we  cannot  avoid  relation 
to  creatures  even  in  the  term  "cause,"  which  Maimonides  admits;  and 
in  the  attributes  of  action — the  only  kind  of  positive  attributes  al- 
lowed by  Maimonides — it  is  implied  that  before  a  given  time  God  did 
not  do  a  particular  thing,  which  he  did  later,  a  condition  in  God  which 
Maimonides  will  not  admit.    Besides,  if  there  are  no  positive  attri- 


392  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

butes,  what  could  be  the  meaning  of  the  tetragrammaton,  about 
which  Maimonides  has  so  much  to  say?  If  it  expressed  a  negative  at- 
tribute, why  was  its  meaning  kept  so  secret?  Crescas's  own  view  is 
that  there  are  positive  attributes,  and  that  there  is  a  relation  between 
God  and  his  creatures,  though  not  a  similarity,  as  they  are  far  apart, 
the  one  being  a  necessary  existent,  the  other  a  possible  existent;  one 
being  infinite,  the  other  finite.^^^ 

We  must  now  try  to  show  that  God  is  one  in  the  sense  that  there 
are  no  other  Gods  besides.  We  may  proceed  as  follows:  If  there  are 
two  Gods,  one  of  them  controls  only  part  of  the  world  or  he  does  not 
control  it  at  all.  The  first  is  impossible  because  the  unitary  world 
must  be  due  to  one  agent.  But  there  may  be  more  than  one  world 
and  hence  more  than  one  agent.  This  is,  however,  answered  by  the 
thought  that  being  infinite  in  power  one  could  control  them  all.  There 
is  still  another  alternative,  viz.,  that  one  agent  controls  the  whole 
world  and  the  other  does  nothing.  Here  speculation  can  go  no  further, 
and  we  must  have  recourse  to  Scripture,  which  says,  "Hear,  O  Israel, 
the  Lord  our  God,  the  Lord  is  One."  ^^^  We  see  here  that  Crescas  is 
interested  in  discrediting  the  logic  chopping  of  the  philosophers. 
No  merely  logical  argument,  is  his  idea,  can  give  us  absolute  certainty 
even  in  so  fundamental  a  doctrine  as  the  unity  of  God.  Like  Judah 
Halevi,  Crescas  took  his  inspiration  from  Algazali,  whose  point  of 
view  appealed  to  him  more  than  that  of  Maimonides  and  Gersonides, 
who  may  be  classed  with  Alfarabi,  Avicenna  and  Averroes. 

Having  discussed  the  fundamental  principles  of  all  religion  and 
philosophy,  namely,  the  existence  and  nature  of  God,  Crescas  next 
takes  up  the  following  six  fundamental  dogmas  of  Judaism,  God's 
knowledge  of  existing  things,  Providence,  Power,  Prophecy,  Freedom, 
Purpose. 

There  are  three  things  to  be  remembered  in  the  matter  of  God's 
knowledge.  He  knows  the  infinite,  for  he  knows  particulars.  He 
knows  the  non-existent,  as  he  knows  the  future;  and  his  knowledge 
of  the  contingent  does  not  remove  its  contingent  character.  Mai- 
monides and  Gersonides  had  difficulty  with  this  problem  and  we  know 
their  respective  solutions.  Gersonides,  for  reasons  metaphysical  as 
well  as  ethical,  does  not  scruple  to  limit  God's  knowledge  to  universals. 
Maimonides  endeavors  to  reconcile  the  dilemma  by  throwing  the 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  393 

blame  upon  our  limited  understanding.  In  God's  knowledge  which 
is  toto  cosh  different  from  ours,  and  of  which  we  have  no  conception, 
all  oppositions  and  contradictions  find  their  ultimate  harmony. 
Crescas,  as  we  might  naturally  expect,  agrees  with  Maimonides  in 
this  matter  rather  than  with  Gersonides.  To  limit  God's  knowledge 
is  opposed  to  the  Bible,  and  would  involve  us  in  greater  difficulties 
than  those  we  endeavor  to  escape. ^^^ 

Related  to  the  question  of  God's  knowledge  is  the  problem  of  Provi- 
dence. For  God  must  know  the  individual  or  thing  for  which  he  pro- 
vides, and  if  God  has  no  knowledge  of  particulars,  there  can  be  no 
such  thing  as  special  providence.  This  latter  as  we  know  is  virtually 
the  opinion  of  Gersonides  {cf.  p.  345).  Crescas,  we  have  seen,  defends 
God's  knowledge  of  particulars,  hence  he  sees  no  difficulty  in  special 
providence  on  this  score.  He  takes,  however,  the  term  in  a  broad 
sense.  All  evidence  of  design  in  nature,  all  powers  in  plant  and  animal 
which  guide  their  growth,  reproduction  and  conservation  are  due 
to  God's  providence.  Providence,  he  says,  is  sometimes  exercised 
by  God  directly,  without  an  intermediate  voluntary  agent,  some- 
times with  such  mediation.  God's  relations  to  Moses  and  to  the 
Israelites  in  Egypt  at  the  time  of  the  tenth  plague  were  without  inter- 
mediate agency.  In  all  other  cases  there  is  mediation  of  angels,  or 
prophets,  or  wise  men,  or,  according  to  some,  the  heavenly  bodies, 
which  are  living  and  intelligent  beings. 

Providence  itself  is  of  different  kinds.  There  is  the  most  general 
and  natural  exhibited  in  the  equipment  of  the  various  species  of  plant 
and  animal  life  for  their  protection  and  growth  and  conservation. 
There  are  the  more  special  powers  found  in  the  human  race.  These 
forms  of  providence  have  httle  to  do  with  the  person's  deserts.  They 
are  purely  dependent  upon  the  constitution  and  influence  of  the  stars. 
Then  there  is  the  more  special  providence  of  the  Jewish  nation,  then 
of  the  male  members  of  this  nation,  and  of  the  priests  and  the  levites. 
Finally  comes  the  special  providence  of  the  individual,  who  is  rewarded 
and  punished  according  to  his  conduct.  The  reward  and  punishment 
of  this  world  are  not  strictly  controlled  by  conduct,  the  reward  and 
punishment  of  the  next  world  are.  In  this  last  remark  Crescas  cuts 
the  knot  which  has  been  the  cause  of  so  much  discussion  in  religious 
philosophy.     If  the  real  reward  and  punishment  are  in  the  next  world. 


394  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

the  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the  adversity  of  the  righteous  in 
this  world  do  not  form  so  great  a  problem.  At  the  same  time  an 
explanation  of  this  pecuhar  phenomenon  is  still  wanting.  For  surely 
the  righteous  man  does  not  deserve  to  suffer  for  his  righteousness, 
even  though  his  good  deeds  will  not  go  unrewarded  in  the  next  world. 
In  this  discussion  also  Crescas  takes  issue  with  the  intellectualistic 
point  of  view  of  Maimonides  and  particularly  Gersonides.  The 
solution  of  these  men  that  evil  does  not  come  from  God  directly 
but  by  accident  and  by  reason  of  matter,  and  the  corollary  drawn 
therefrom  that  God  does  not  punish  the  wicked  directly,  that  he  merely 
neglects  them,  leaving  them  to  the  accidents  of  nature  and  chance, 
Crescas  does  not  approve.  Nor  is  he  more  favorably  inclined  to  the 
theory  that  the  good  man  is  provided  for  because  the  more  he  culti- 
vates his  mind,  the  more  closely  he  comes  in  contact  with  God,  in 
whom  are  contained  actually  all  the  ideas  of  which  man  has  some 
potentially.  His  main  criticism  is  that  the  theory  is  opposed  to  clear 
statements  in  the  Bible,  which  imply  special  and  individual  reward 
and  punishment  in  a  miraculous  and  supernatural  manner,  which 
cannot  be  due  to  intellectual  perfection,  nor  to  the  order  of  the  heav- 
enly bodies.  Besides,  if  a  man  who  is  highly  intellectual  did  much 
wrong,  he  should  be  punished  in  his  soul,  but  on  the  intellectuahst 
theory  such  a  soul  is  immortal  and  cannot  be  destroyed. 

Accordingly  Crescas  goes  back  to  the  religious  doctrine  of  reward 
and  punishment  as  ordinarily  understood.  God  rewards  and  punishes 
because  man  obeys  or  disobeys  his  will  and  command.  The  com- 
plaint raised  on  account  of  the  misery  of  the  good  and  the  prosperity 
of  the  wicked  he  answers  by  saying  that  real  reward  and  punishment 
are  in  the  next  world.  The  goods  and  evils  of  this  world  are  also  to  be 
considered,  and  he  gives  the  ordinary  excuses  for  the  apparent  devi- 
ation from  what  ought  to  be,  such  as  that  evil  is  sometimes  a  good  in 
disguise  and  vice  versa;  that  one  sometimes  inherits  evil  and  good  from 
one's  parents;  that  the  individual  is  sometimes  involved  in  the  des- 
tinies of  the  majority,  and  so  on,  and  so  on.  Evil  in  the  sense  of  moral 
evil,  i.  e.,  wrong,  does  not  come  from  God,  it  is  true,  but  punishment 
does  come  from  God,  and  as  its  aim  is  justice,  it  is  a  good,  not  an 
evil.  The  providence  extended  to  Israel  is  greatest.  There  is  more 
Providence  in  Palestine  than  elsewhere,  not  because  there  is  any 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  395 

difference  in  the  relation  on  God's  side,  but  there  is  on  the  side  of  the 
man  enjoying  this  providence.  His  character  and  disposition  change 
with  the  place,  and  similarly  with  the  time  and  the  season.  Hence 
certain  seasons  of  the  year,  like  that  about  the  time  of  the  Day  of 
Atonement,  are  more  propitious  for  receiving  God's  providence.  ^^* 

Another  fundamental  doctrine  of  Judaism  is  God's  omnipotence. 
Weakness  would  be  a  defect.  Hence  God  can  do  everything  except 
the  contradictory.  His  power  is  infinite  not  merely  in  duration,  but 
also  in  intensity.  From  Aristotle's  proof  of  the  necessity  of  an  im- 
movable mover  as  based  upon  the  eternity  of  motion  (p.  256  f.),  we 
gather  only  that  God's  power  is  infinite  in  duration;  whereas  our 
doctrine  of  creation  ex  nihilo  shows  that  there  is  no  relation  at  all  be- 
tween God's  power  and  the  work  he  does;  hence  his  power  is  infinite. 
This  is  shown  also  in  the  miracles,  some  of  which  took  place  instan- 
taneously, as  the  destruction  of  the  first  born  in  Egypt  at  midnight 
precisely.  Crescas  insists  that  the  ass  of  Balaam  did  speak,  and  refers 
with  disapproval  to  those  who  doubt  it  and  say  it  was  in  a  vision 
(Gersonides).^^^ 

In  his  discussion  of  Prophecy  the  interest  lies  once  more  in  his 
anti-intellectualistic  attitude.  Maimonides  agrees  with  the  philoso- 
phers that  the  prophetic  power  is  a  psychological  process  attainable 
by  the  man  who  in  addition  to  moral  perfection  possesses  a  highly 
developed  intellect  and  power  of  imagination.  To  anticipate  the  ob- 
jection that  if  this  be  so,  why  are  there  no  prophets  among  the  philoso- 
phers, Maimonides  adds  that  divine  grace  is  necessary  besides,  and 
that  if  this  is  lacking,  one  may  have  all  the  qualifications  and  yet 
not  be  a  prophet.  Crescas  sees  the  forced  nature  of  this  explanation, 
and  once  more  frankly  returns  to  the  plain  intent  of  Scripture  and 
Jewish  tradition  that  the  prophet  is  the  man  chosen  by  God  because 
he  is  a  student  of  the  Torah  and  follows  its  commandments,  and  be- 
cause he  cleaves  to  God  and  loves  him.  The  prophet  receives  his 
inspiration  from  God  directly  or  through  an  intermediate  agent,  and 
the  information  received  may  concern  any  topic  whatsoever.  It  is 
not  to  be  limited  to  certain  topics  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  as  Ger- 
sonides  tries  to  make  out;  and  its  purpose  is  to  give  guidance  to  the 
prophet  himself  or  to  others  through  him.'^^ 

The  most  original  contribution  of  Crescas  to  philosophical  theory 


396  MEDIjEFAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

is  his  treatment  of  the  ever  living  problem  of  freedom.  So  fundamental 
has  it  seemed  for  Judaism  to  maintain  the  freedom  of  the  will  that  no 
one  hitherto  had  ventured  to  doubt  it.  Maimonides  no  less  than  Judah 
Halevi,  and  with  equal  emphasis  Gersonides,  insist  that  the  individual 
is  not  determined  in  his  conduct.  This  seemed  to  be  the  only  way  to 
vindicate  God's  justice  in  reward  and  punishment.  But  the  idea 
of  man's  freedom  clashed  with  the  doctrine  of  God's  omniscience. 
If  nothing  in  the  past  determines  a  man's  will  in  a  given  case,  then  up 
to  the  moment  of  the  act  it  is  undetermined,  and  no  one  can  know 
whether  a  given  act  will  take  place  or  its  opposite.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  God  does  know  everything  in  the  future  as  well  as  in  the  past,  man 
is  no  longer  free  to  act  in  a  manner  contrary  to  God's  foreknowledge. 
This  difficulty  was  recognized  by  Maimonides  as  well  as  by  Gerson- 
ides, and  they  solved  it  in  different  ways.  Maimonides  gives  up  neither 
God's  omniscience  nor  man's  absolute  freedom,  and  escapes  the  di- 
lemma by  taking  refuge  in  his  idea  of  God's  transcendence.  Human 
knowledge  is  incompatible  with  human  freedom;  God's  knowledge  is 
not  like  human  knowledge,  and  we  have  no  conception  what  it  is.  But 
it  is  consistent  with  human  freedom.  Gersonides,  who  objects  to 
Maimonides's  treatment  of  the  divine  attributes,  and  insists  that  they 
must  resemble  in  kind  though  not  in  degree  the  corresponding  human 
attributes,  can  avoid  the  difficulty  only  by  a  partial  blunting  of  the 
sharp  points  of  either  horn  of  the  dilemna.  Accordingly  he  maintains 
freedom  in  all  its  rigor,  and  mitigates  the  conception  of  omniscience. 
God's  omniscience  extends  only  to  the  universal  and  its  consequences; 
the  contingent  particular  is  by  definition  not  subject  to  foreknowledge, 
and  hence  it  argues  no  defect  in  God's  knowledge  if  it  does  not  extend 
to  the  undetermined  decisions  of  the  will. 

Crescas  embraces  the  other  horn  of  the  dilemma.  God's  omnis- 
cience must  be  maintained  in  all  its  rigor.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose 
that  the  first  universal  and  absolute  cause  should  be  ignorant  of  any- 
thing pertaining  to  its  effects.  Is  man  then  not  free?  Has  he  no 
choice  at  all,  no  freedom  in  the  determination  of  his  conduct?  If  so 
how  justify  God's  reward  and  punishment,  if  reward  and  punishment 
are  relative  to  conduct  and  imply  responsibility?  Crescas's  answer 
is  a  compromise.  Determinism  is  not  fatalism.  It  does  not  mean  that 
a  given  person  is  preordained  from  eternity  to  act  in  a  given  way,  no 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  397 

matter  what  the  circmnstances  are.  It  does  not  mean  that  command 
and  advice  and  warning  and  education  and  effort  and  endeavor  are 
useless  and  without  effect.  This  is  contradicted  by  experience  as  well 
as  by  the  testimony  of  Scripture.  But  neither  is  it  true  on  the  other 
hand  that  a  person's  will  and  its  conduct  are  causeless  and  undeter- 
mined until  the  moment  of  action.  This  idea  is  equally  untrue  to 
reason  and  experience.  We  know  that  every  effect  has  a  cause  and  the 
cause  has  a  cause,  and  this  second  cause  has  again  a  cause,  until  we 
reach  the  first  necessary  cause.  Two  individuals  similar  in  every  re- 
spect would  have  the  same  will  unless  there  is  a  cause  which  makes 
them  different.  We  have  already  intimated  that  God's  foreknowledge, 
which  we  cannot  deny,  is  incompatible  with  absolute  freedom,  and 
in  the  Bible  we  have  instances  of  God's  knowing  future  events  which 
are  the  results  of  individual  choice,  as  in  the  case  of  Pharaoh.  The  onl^ 
solution  then  is  that  the  act  of  will  is  in  a  sense  contingent,  in  a  sense 
determined.  It  is  contingent  in  respect  to  itself,  it  is  determined  by 
its  cause,  i.  e.,  the  act  is  not  fated  to  take  place,  cause  or  no  cause.  If  it 
were  possible  to  remove  the  cause,  the  act  would  not  be;  but  given 
the  cause,  the  effect  is  necessary.  Effort  is  not  in  vain,  for  effort  is 
itself  a  cause  and  determines  an  effect.  Commandments  and  pro- 
hibitions are  not  useless,  for  the  same  reason.  Reward  and  punish- 
ment are  not  unjust,  even  though  antecedent  causes  over  which  man 
has  no  control  determine  his  acts,  any  more  than  it  is  unjust  that  fire 
burns  the  one  who  comes  near  it,  though  he  did  so  without  intention. 
Reward  and  punishment  are  a  necessary  consequence  of  obedience 
and  disobedience. 

This  is  a  bold  statement  on  the  part  of  Crescas,  and  the  analogy 
between  a  man's  voluntary  act  in  ethical  and  religious  conduct  and 
the  tendency  of  fire  to  burn  irrespective  of  the  person's  responsibility 
in  the  matter  can  be  valid  only  if  we  reduce  the  ethical  and  religious 
world  to  an  impersonal  force  on  a  plane  with  the  mechanism  of  the 
physical  world  order.  This  seems  a  risky  thing  to  do  for  a  religionist. 
And  Crescas  feels  it,  saying  that  to  make  this  view  public  would  be 
dangerous,  as  the  people  would  find  in  it  an  apology  for  evil  doers,  not 
understanding  that  punishment  is  a  natural  consequence  of  evil. 
This  latter  statement  Crescas  does  not  wish  to  be  taken  in  its  literal 
strictness,  nor  should  the  analogy  with  the  burning  fire  be  pressed 


398  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

too  far.  For  it  would  then  follow  even  if  a  person  is  physically  com- 
pelled to  do  evil  that  he  would  be  punished,  just  as  the  fire  would  not 
refrain  from  burning  a  person  who  was  thrown  into  it  by  force.  The 
determination  of  the  will,  he  says,  must  not  be  felt  by  the  agent  as  a 
constraint  and  compulsion,  else  the  act  is  not  free  and  no  punish- 
ment should  follow;  for  command  and  prohibition  can  have  no  effect 
on  a  will  constrained.  Reward  and  punishment  have  a  pedagogical 
value  generally,  even  if  in  a  given  case  they  are  not  deserved.  Even 
though  in  reality  every  act  is  determined,  still  where  there  is  no  ex- 
ternal compulsion  the  person  is  so  identified  with  the  deed  that  it  is 
in  a  real  sense  the  product  of  his  own  soul,  bringing  about  a  union 
with,  or  separation  from  God;  and  hence  reward  and  punishment  are 
necessarily  connected  with  it.  Where  there  is  external  compulsion, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  act  is  not  in  reality  his  own  and  hence  no  reward 
or  punishment. 

The  question  arises,  however,  why  should  there  be  punishment  for 
erroneous  belief  and  opinion?  These  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  will, 
and  are  determined  if  anything  is,  i.  e.,  the  person  having  them  is 
constrained  to  believe  as  he  does  by  the  arguments,  over  which  he  has 
no  control.  This  matter  offers  no  difficulty  to  those  who,  like  Mai- 
monides  and  Gersonides,  regard  intelligence  as  the  essence  of  the  soul, 
and  make  immortality  dependent  upon  intellectual  ideas.  A  soul 
acquiring  true  ideas,  they  say,  becomes  ipso  facto  immortal.  It  is  not 
a  question  of  right  and  wrong  or  of  reward  and  punishment.  But  this 
is  not  the  Biblical  view,  and  if  it  were  true,  there  would  be  no  need  of 
the  many  ceremonial  regulations.  Geometry  would  play  a  greater 
role  in  immortality  than  the  Torah.  Crescas's  answer  is  that  reward 
and  punishment  in  this  case  are  not  for  the  beHef  itself,  but  rather 
for  the  pleasure  one  finds  in  it  and  the  pains  one  takes  to  examine  it 
carefully.  Even  in  conduct  one  is  not  rewarded  or  punished  for  deeds 
directly,  but  for  the  intention  and  desire.  Deed  without  intention  is 
not  punished.  Intention  without  deed  is;  though  the  two  together 
call  for  the  greatest  punishment  or  reward.  "A  burnt  offering,"  say 
the  Rabbis,  "atones  for  sinful  thoughts;  sin  committed  through  com- 
pulsion is  not  punished."  ^^^ 

It  is  of  interest  here  to  know  that  Spinoza,  as  has  been  shown  by 
Joel,''^^  owed  his  idea  of  man's  freedom  to  Crescas.  He  also  like  Crescas 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  399 

denies  the  absolute  indeterminism  of  a  person's  conduct  that  is  in- 
sisted upon  by  the  majority  of  the  mediaeval  Jewish  philosophers.  And 
Joel  shows  moreover  that  Spinoza's  final  attitude  to  this  question 
as  found  in  his  Ethics  was  the  outcome  of  a  gradual  development,  and 
the  result  of  reading  Crescas.  In  some  of  his  earUer  writings  he  in- 
sists that  anything  short  of  absolute  omniscience  in  God  is  unthink- 
able. He  sees  the  difficulty  of  reconciling  this  with  man's  freedom, 
but  is  not  ready  to  sacrifice  either,  and  like  Maimonides  decides  that 
we  must  not  deny  it  simply  because  we  cannot  understand  it.  Later, 
however,  he  maintains  that  God's  omniscience  and  man's  freedom  are 
absolutely  incompatible,  and  solves  the  difficulty  in  a  manner  similar 
to  that  of  Crescas  by  curtailing  freedom  as  formerly  understood. 

The  next  topic  of  which  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  clear  idea  for  a 
complete  understanding  of  Judaism,  is  the  purpose  of  the  Law,  and  in 
general  the  purpose  of  man.  Here  also  appears  clearly  the  anti- 
intellectualism  of  Crescas  and  his  disagreement  with  Maimonides  and 
Gersonides.  The  final  purpose  of  the  Law  is  of  course,  he  says,  a 
good.  The  Bible  teaches  us  to  perfect  our  morals;  it  inculcates  true 
beliefs  and  opinions;  and  it  promises  by  means  of  these  happiness  of 
body  and  happiness  of  soul.  Which  of  these  four  is  the  ultimate  end? 
Clearly  it  must  be  the  best  and  most  worthy.  And  it  seems  as  if  this 
quality  pertains  to  the  eternal  happiness  of  the  soul,  to  which  as  an 
end  the  other  three  tend.  Corporeal  happiness  is  a  means  to  the 
perfection  of  the  soul  since  the  latter  acts  through  the  means  of 
bodily  organs.  Similarly  moral  perfection  assists  in  purifying  the  soul. 
As  for  perfection  in  ideas,  some  think  that  it  alone  makes  the  soul 
immortal  by  creating  the  acquired  intellect,  which  is  immaterial  and 
separate,  and  enjoys  happiness  in  the  next  world  incomparably 
greater  than  the  joy  we  feel  here  below  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge. 
There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  subject-matter  which  bestows 
immortality.  According  to  some  it  is  all  knowledge,  whether  of  sub- 
lunar things  or  of  the  separate  substances.  According  to  others  it  is 
only  the  knowledge  of  God  and  the  angels  that  confers  immortality. 
All  these  views  are  wrong  from  the  Scriptural  as  well  as  the  philosophi- 
cal point  of  view. 

The  Bible  makes  it  clear  repeatedly  that  eternal  life  is  obtained  by 
performance  of  the  commandments;  whereas  according  to  the  others 


400  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

practical  observance  is  only  a  means  and  a  preparation  to  theory, 
without  which  practice  alone  is  inadequate.  According  to  Scripture 
and  tradition  certain  offences  are  punished  with  exclusion  from  eternal 
life,  and  certain  observances  confer  immortality,  which  have  nothing 
to  do  with  theoretical  truths. 

But  philosophically  too  their  views  are  untenable.  For  it  would 
follow  from  their  opinions  that  the  purpose  of  the  Law  is  for  something 
other  than  man,  for  the  acquired  intellect  is  "separate,"  and  hence 
cannot  be  the  form  of  man.  It  is  different  in  kind  from  man,  for  unlike 
him  it  is  eternal  as  an  individual.  Besides  it  is  not  true  that  the  ac- 
quired intellect  is  made  as  a  substance  by  its  ideas,  whUe  being  sep- 
arate from  the  material  intellect;  for  as  immaterial  it  has  no  matter  as 
its  subject  from  which  it  could  come  into  being.  It  must  therefore 
come  into  being  ex  nihilo,  which  is  absurd. 

And  there  are  other  reasons  against  their  view.  For  if  aU  knowledge 
confers  immortality,  one  may  acquire  it  by  studying  geometry,  which 
is  absurd.  And  if  this  privilege  can  be  gained  only  by  a  knowledge  of 
God  and  the  separate  substances,  the  objection  is  still  greater;  for,  as 
Maimonides  has  shown,  the  only  knowledge  that  may  be  had  of  these 
is  negative;  and  it  is  not  likely  that  such  imperfect  knowledge  should 
make  an  eternal  intellect. 

If  then  theoretical  knowledge  does  not  lead  to  immortality  as  they 
thought,  and  the  other  perfections  are  preparatory  to  theoretical,  it 
follows  that  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  Law  and  of  man  is  attained 
primarily  neither  by  theory  alone  nor  by  practice  alone,  but  by  some- 
thing else,  which  is  neither  quite  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  is  the  love 
and  fear  of  God.  This  is  demanded  alike  by  Scripture,  tradition  and 
philosophy.  That  it  is  the  view  of  religion  is  clear  enough  from  the 
many  passages  in  the  Bible  urging  love  of  God.  But  it  is  also  de- 
manded by  philosophy.  For  the  soul  is  a  spiritual  substance,  hence  it  is 
capable  of  separation  from  the  body  and  of  existing  by  itself  forever, 
whether  it  has  theoretical  knowledge  or  not;  since  it  is  not  subject  to 
decay,  not  being  material.  Further,  the  perfect  loves  the  good  and  the 
perfect;  and  the  greater  the  good  and  the  perfection  the  greater  the 
love  and  the  desire  in  the  perfect  being.  Hence  the  perfect  soul  loves 
God  with  the  greatest  love  of  which  it  is  capable.  Similarly  God's 
love  for  the  perfect  soul,  though  the  object  as  compared  with  him  is 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  401 

low  indeed,  is  great,  because  his  essence  and  perfection  are  great. 
Now  as  love  is  the  cause  of  unity  even  in  natural  things,  the  love  of 
God  in  the  soul  brings  about  a  unity  between  them;  and  unity  with 
God  surely  leads  to  happiness  and  inunortahty.  As  love  is  different 
from  intellectual  apprehension,  the  essence  of  the  soul  is  love  rather 
than  intelligence. 

There  are  many  Talmudical  passages  confirming  this  view  logically 
derived.  We  are  told  that  the  souls  of  the  righteous  enjoy  the  splendor 
of  the  Shekinah,  and  the  wicked  suffer  correspondingly.  This  agrees 
with  our  conception  of  immortality  and  not  with  theirs.  For  enjoy- 
ment is  impossible  on  their  showing,  though  they  try  to  make  it 
plausible.  Pleasure  is  different  from  apprehension;  and  as  the  essence 
of  the  acquired  intellect  is  apprehension,  there  is  no  room  for  the 
pleasure,  the  intellect  being  simple.  According  to  our  view  love  is  re- 
warded with  pleasure.  The  pleasure  we  feel  here  below  in  intellectual 
work  (Gersonides,  p.  339)  proves  nothing,  for  it  is  due  to  the  eff'ort 
and  the  passing  from  potential  knowledge  to  actual  knowledge,  i.  e., 
to  the  process  of  learning.  Proof  of  this  is  that  we  find  no  pleasure  in 
axioms  and  first  principles,  which  we  know  without  effort.  But  the 
acquired  intellect  after  the  death  of  the  body  does  not  learn  any  new 
truths,  hence  can  have  no  pleasure. 

The  Rabbis  also  speak  of  definite  places  of  reward  and  punishment, 
which  cannot  apply  to  the  acquired  intellect,  since  it  is  a  "separate" 
substance  and  can  have  no  place.  The  soul  as  we  understand  it  can 
have  a  place,  just  as  it  is  connected  with  the  body  during  life. 

The  Rabbis  often  speak  of  the  great  reward  destined  for  school 
children.  But  surely  the  acquired  intellect  cannot  amount  to  much 
in  children.  The  truth  is  that  the  soul  becomes  mature  and  complete 
as  soon  as  it  acquires  the  rational  faculty  in  the  shape  of  the  first 
principles  or  axioms.  Then  it  is  prepared  for  immortaUty  as  a  natural 
thing  without  regard  to  reward. 

The  purpose  of  the  soul  as  we  showed  is  to  love  God.  This  object 
the  Bible  attains  by  the  commandments,  which  may  be  classified  with 
reference  to  their  significance  in  seven  groups.  They  exalt  God;  they 
show  his  great  kindness  to  us;  they  give  us  true  ideas  concerning  the 
nature  of  God;  they  call  our  attention  to  his  providence;  they  give 
us  promises  of  corporeal  and  spiritual  reward;  they  call  our  attention 


402  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

to  God's  miracles  in  order  to  keep  our  attention  from  flagging;  and 
finally  they  command  love  of  God  and  union  with  him  as  the  final  aim 
of  man.^^^ 

In  addition  to  the  six  fundamental  doctrines  of  Judaism  mentioned 
above  (p.  392),  there  are  true  beliefs  which  are  essential  to  Judaism, 
and  the  denial  of  which  constitutes  heresy;  though  they  are  not  as 
fundamental  as  the  other  six,  in  the  sense  that  the  Law  would  con- 
tinue to  exist  without  them.  They  are  (i)  Creation,  (2)  Immortality, 
(3)  Reward  and  Punishment,  (4)  Resurrection,  (5)  Eternity  of  the 
Law,  (6)  The  superiority  of  Moses  to  the  other  prophets,  (7)  The 
priest's  learning  the  future  through  the  Urim  and  Tumim,  (8)  Belief  in 
the  Messiah.  The  list  of  thirteen  articles  of  the  creed  given  by  Mai- 
monides  (c/.  below,  p,  409)  is  open  to  criticism.  If  he  meant  fundamen- 
tal dogmas,  there  are  not  as  many  as  thirteen;  there  are  no  more  than 
seven  or  eight — the  six  mentioned  before  (p.  392),  and,  if  one  chooses, 
the  existence  of  God,  making  seven,  and  revelation  as  the  eighth.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  Maimonides  meant  to  include  "true  beliefs,"  there 
are  more  than  fifteen,  the  six  enumerated  above  (p.  392),  existence  of 
God  and  revelation,  and  the  eight  "true  beliefs"  named  at  the  head 
of  this  section,  not  counting  a  great  many  specific  commandments.'*'"' 

Having  made  this  criticism  of  Maimonides's  thirteen  articles,  Cres- 
cas  proceeds  to  discuss  every  one  of  the  eight  true  beliefs  named  at 
the  beginning  of  the  last  paragraph.  For  our  purpose  it  will  not  be 
necessary  to  reproduce  the  minute  arguments  here.  We  will  select 
a  few  of  the  more  important  topics  and  state  briefly  Crescas's  attitude. 

The  doctrine  of  creation  formed  the  central  theme  in  Maimonides 
and  Gersonides.  It  was  here,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Maimonides 
stopped  short  in  his  devotion  to  Aristotle  and  took  pains  to  show  that 
the  arguments  of  the  latter  in  favor  of  eternity  are  not  valid,  and  that 
Aristotle  knew  it.  He  endeavored  to  show,  moreover,  that  the  doc- 
trine of  creation  can  be  made  more  plausible  than  its  opposite,  and 
hence  since  creation  is  essential  to  Judaism,  it  must  be  regarded  as  a 
fundamental  dogma.  Gersonides  could  not  see  his  way  clear  to  accept- 
ing creation  ex  nihilo,  among  other  things  because  as  matter  cannot 
come  from  form,  the  material  world  cannot  come  from  God.  Accord- 
ingly he  compromised  by  saying  that  while  the  present  world  as  it  is 
is  not  eternal,  it  came  from  a  primitive  "hyle"  or  matter,  which  was 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  403 

eternal.  Thus  our  world  is  dependent  for  its  forms  upon  God,  for  its 
matter  upon  the  prime  and  eternal  "hyle." 

Here  Crescas  takes  up  the  problem  and  points  out  that  whether  we 
accept  or  not  an  eternal  "hyle,"  everything  that  exists  must  be  de- 
pendent upon  God  as  the  only  necessary  existent.  Everything  out- 
side of  him,  be  it  eternal  matter  or  not,  is  only  a  possible  existent  and 
owes  its  existence  to  God.  Creation  ex  nihilo  means  no  more.  To  be 
sure,  if  we  assume  that  the  existence  of  the  world  and  its  emanation 
from  God  is  eternal,  because  his  relation  to  his  product  is  the  same  at 
all  times,  it  will  follow  that  the  emanation  of  the  world  from  God  is  a 
necessary  process.  But  necessity  in  this  case  does  not  exclude  will, 
nay  it  implies  it.  For  the  only  way  in  which  anything  can  come  from 
a  rational  cause  is  by  way  of  conception.  The  rational  cause  forms  a 
conception  of  the  world  order  and  of  himself  as  giving  existence  to 
this  world  order  as  a  whole  and  in  its  parts.  Will  means  no  more 
than  this.  This  will  also  solve  the  old  philosophic  difficulty,  how  can 
the  many  come  from  the  One.  Our  answer  is  that  the  good  God 
created  a  good  world.  The  goodness  of  the  world  is  its  unity,  i.  e., 
the  parts  contribute  to  making  a  whole  which  is  good.  On  the  other 
hand,  an  agent  is  perfectly  good  when  he  acts  with  will.  God's  will 
also  makes  miracles  possible.  Moreover,  eternal  creation  is  not  in- 
consistent with  continued  creation,  and  we  have  creation  ex  nihilo 
every  moment.  Maimonides  is  wrong  therefore  when  he  thinks  that 
eternity  would  upset  Judaism  and  make  miracles  impossible.  Creation 
in  time  is  therefore  not  a  fundamental  dogma  with  which  Judaism 
stands  and  falls.  At  the  same  time  it  is  a  true  belief  as  taught  in  the 
first  verse  of  Genesis. '^''^ 

Another  of  the  true  beliefs  is  reward  and  punishment.  This  con- 
sists of  two  kinds,  corporeal  and  spiritual.  Corporeal  is  spoken  of  in 
the  Bible  and  is  not  opposed  to  reason.  For  as  the  purpose  of  creation 
is  to  do  man  good  and  enable  him  to  achieve  perfection,  it  stands  to 
reason  that  God  would  remove  any  obstacles  in  the  way  of  man's 
perfecting  himself,  and  this  is  the  kind  of  reward  mentioned  first,  "All 
the  diseases  which  I  put  upon  the  Egyptians  I  shall  not  put  upon  thee, 
for  I  the  Lord  am  thy  healer"  (Exod.  15,  26).  Punishment  is  pri- 
marily for  the  same  purpose. 

As  for  spiritual  reward  and  punishment,  they  are  not  mentioned 


404  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

specifically  in  the  Bible,  but  the  Talmud  is  full  of  it.  Rationally  they 
can  be  explained  as  follows.  As  the  soul  is  spiritual  and  intellectual, 
it  enjoys  great  pleasure  from  being  in  contact  with  the  world  of  spirit 
and  apprehending  of  the  nature  of  God  what  it  could  not  apprehend 
while  in  the  body.  On  the  other  hand,  being  restrained  from  the  world 
of  spirit  and  kept  in  darkness  gives  it  pain;  and  this  may  lead  to  its 
ultimate  destruction.  The  essence  of  the  soul,  as  was  said  above,  is 
not  intellectuality,  but  love  and  desire;  hence  pain  may  destroy  it. 

The  reason  spiritual  reward  and  punishment,  which  is  the  more 
important  of  the  two,  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Bible,  is  because  it  was 
taken  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Corporeal  reward  and  punishment  was 
not  so  regarded,  hence  the  need  of  specifying  it. 

A  difficulty  that  presents  itself  is.  How  is  it  consistent  with  justice  to 
punish  the  soul  by  itself,  when  it  was  the  composite  of  body  and  soul 
that  sinned?  This  may  be  answered  by  saying  that  the  soul  is  the  form 
of  the  body  and  does  not  change  when  separated.  Hence,  being  the 
more  important  of  the  two  elements  composing  man,  it  receives  the 
more  important  punishment,  namely,  spiritual. 

Besides,  it  is  true  that  the  composite  also  receives  compensation. 
And  this  is  the  purpose  of  resurrection.^*^^ 

Resurrection  of  the  body  is  not  universal,  but  is  reserved  only  for 
some,  as  is  clear  from  the  passage  in  Daniel  (12,  2),  "And  many  of 
those  that  sleep  in  the  dust  of  the  earth  shall  awake,  some  to  ever- 
lasting life,  and  some  to  disgrace  and  everlasting  abhorrence."  At 
the  same  time  it  is  difficult  to  know  who  these  some  are.  It  cannot 
be  the  perfect  and  the  good  only,  since  some  of  those  rising  will  go  "to 
disgrace  and  everlasting  abhorrence."  We  can  decide  this  better 
later,  when  we  have  learned  more  of  resurrection. 

The  variety  of  opinions  concerning  the  time  of  the  resurrection 
Crescas  endeavors  to  reconcile  by  supposing  that  all  agreed  it  would 
take  place  as  soon  as  the  Temple  was  built,  but  that  the  Messiah 
would  precede  the  building  of  the  Temple  by  some  length  of 
time. 

The  purpose  of  the  resurrection  is  to  strengthen  behef  in  those  who 
have  it  and  to  impress  it  upon  those  who  have  it  not.  At  the  time  of 
the  resurrection  those  who  come  back  to  life  will  tell  the  Hving  how 
they  fared  when  their  souls  left  their  bodies.    Another  purpose  of 


HASDAI  BEN  ABRAHAM  CRESCAS  405 

resurrection  is,  as  mentioned  above,  in  order  to  reward  and  punish  the 
composite  of  body  and  soul  which  acted  during  life. 

The  dogma  of  resurrection  is  regarded  so  seriously  by  the  Rabbis, 
who  exclude  the  unbehever  in  it  from  a  portion  in  the  world  to  come, 
because  in  this  act  is  completed  the  form  of  man;  and  because  thereby 
is  realized  the  justice  of  God,  and  the  faith  is  strengthened  in  the 
minds  of  the  believers. 

It  seems  at  first  sight  impossible  that  the  elements  of  the  body, 
which  were  dispersed  at  the  time  of  the  body's  death  and  formed  part 
of  other  substances,  can  be  gathered  together  again.  But  it  is  not 
really  so  strange,  for  in  the  first  place  God  may  so  arrange  matters 
that  these  elements  may  be  in  a  position  to  return.  Besides,  this  is  not 
really  necessary.  It  is  quite  suflBcient  that  God  create  a  body  exactly 
like  the  first  in  temperament  and  form,  and  endow  it  with  the  old  soul, 
which  will  then  behave  like  the  old  person;  and  being  endowed  with 
memory  besides,  the  identity  of  personality  will  be  complete. 

For  the  purpose  of  showing  God's  justice  and  strengthening  man's 
faith  it  is  sufficient  to  resurrect  the  perfectly  good  and  the  completely 
bad.  The  intermediate  classes  do  not  deserve  this  extraordinary 
miracle,  and  their  spiritual  reward  will  be  sufficient.  ^^^ 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

JOSEPH  ALBO    (1380-I444) 

Of  the  post-Maimonidean  philosophers  Crescas  is  the  last  who  con- 
tributes original  views  of  philosophical  value.  Joseph  Albo,  of  Mon- 
real  in  Aragon,  is  of  Uttle  importance  as  a  philosopher.  He  rehashes 
the  problems  which  occupied  a  Maimonides,  a  Gersonides  and  a 
Crescas,  and  sides  now  with  one,  now  with  the  other.  He  benefited  by 
the  writings  of  his  predecessors,  particularly  Maimonides,  Crescas,  and 
Simon  Duran;  ^^^  and  the  philosophical  discussions  in  the  last  three 
sections  of  his  "  Book  of  Roots  "  ("  Sefer  Ikkarim  ")  give  the  impression 
of  an  eclectic  compilation  in  the  interest  of  a  moderate  conservatism. 
The  style  is  that  of  the  popularizer  and  the  homilist;  and  to  this  he  owes 
his  popularity,  which  was  denied  his  more  original  teacher,  Crescas. 

But  philosophy  as  such  was  not  Albo's  forte,  nor  was  it  his  chief 
interest.  While  it  is  true  that  all  the  Jewish  thinkers  of  the  middle 
ages  were  for  a  great  part  apologetes,  this  did  not  prevent  a  Mai- 
monides or  a  Gersonides  from  making  a  really  thorough  and  dis- 
interested study  of  science  and  philosophy;  and  often  their  scientific 
and  philosophic  conviction  was  so  strong  that  the  apologia  was  pro 
philosophia  sua  rather  than  pro  Judaismo.  The  central  theme  there- 
fore in  the  majority  of  Albo's  philosophical  predecessors  was  the 
equally  metaphysical  and  theological,  of  God  and  his  attributes. 
These  were  proved  by  reason  and  confirmed  by  Scripture  and  tradi- 
tion. Judaism  had  to  be  formulated  and  defended  with  a  view  not  so 
much  to  the  dangers  threatening  from  Christianity  and  Moham- 
medanism as  to  those  endangering  all  religions  alike,  namely,  the 
opinions  of  science  and  philosophy  as  taught  especially  by  the  Aristote- 
lians. Hence  Maimonides  treated  for  the  most  part  of  the  same  prob- 
lems as  the  Mohammedan  Mutakallimun  before  him,  and  Thomas 
Aquinas  the  Christian  had  no  scruple  in  making  the  Jewish  philos- 
opher's method  his  own  when  he  undertook  to  defend  the  Catholic 
faith  "contra  Gentiles." 

406 


JOSEPH  ALBO  407 

Different  were  the  circumstances  as  well  as  the  attitude  of  Joseph 
Albo.  The  purely  philosophic  interest  was  not  strong  in  his  day.  He 
was  not  confronted  by  the  necessity  of  proving  the  existence  and  in- 
corporeality  of  God  by  reason.  No  one  doubted  these  things  and  they 
had  been  abundantly  written  about  in  times  gone  by.  In  the  interest 
of  completeness  and  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  were  not  trained  in 
technical  philosophy,  Albo  found  it  desirable  to  restate  the  results 
of  previous  discussions  of  these  topics  in  a  style  more  accessible  to  the 
readers  of  his  day.  But  the  central  interest  in  his  age  was  shifted.  It 
was  a  time  of  religious  disputations  and  forced  conversions.  Albo  him- 
self had  taken  part  in  such  a  disputation  held  at  Tortosa  in  14 13- 14, 
and  he  had  to  defend  Judaism  against  Christianity.  He  had  to  show 
his  own  people  that  Judaism  was  the  true  religion  and  Christianity 
spurious.  Hence  it  was  religion  as  such  he  had  to  investigate,  in  order 
to  find  what  marks  distinguished  a  divine  law  from  a  human,  and  a 
genuine  divine  law  from  one  that  pretended  to  be  such.  To  make 
this  investigation  logically  complete  he  had  to  show  that  there  must 
be  such  a  thing  as  a  divine  law,  and  that  no  such  law  can  be  conceived 
without  assuming  certain  basal  beliefs  or  dogmas.  A  discussion  of 
rehgious  dogma  was  essential,  for  upon  the  nature  of  these  funda- 
mental behefs  depended  one's  judgment  of  a  given  law  and  its  char- 
acter as  divine  or  human,  genuine  or  spurious.  Hence  the  title  of 
Albo's  treatise,  "Book  of  [religious]  Roots  [dogmas]."  And  while 
it  is  true  that  Maimonides,  the  systematizer  and  codifier,  could  not 
fail  to  put  down  in  his  commentary  on  the  Mishna  a  list  of  articles 
of  the  Jewish  creed,  nothing  is  said  of  this  in  his  philosophical  work, 
the  '  Guide  of  the  Perplexed."  With  Albo  the  estabUshment  of  the 
fundamental  dogmas  is  the  central  theme. 

At  the  same  time  Albo  was  anticipated  even  in  this,  his  more  origi- 
nal contribution.  Crescas,  his  teacher,  had  written,  beside  the  "Or 
Adonai,"  a  work  against  Christianity.^"'*  And  in  the  "Or  Adonai" 
itseK  he  devotes  considerable  space  to  the  question  of  the  fundamental 
dogmas  of  Judaism,  and  takes  occasion  to  criticize  Maimonides  for 
his  faulty  method  in  the  selection  of  the  thirteen  articles,  on  the 
ground  that  he  did  not  distinguish  between  what  was  fundamental 
and  what  was  derivative.  This  suggestion  gave  Albo  his  cue,  which 
he  developed  in  his  own  way.^''*^ 


4o8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Human  happiness,  Albo  tells  us,  depends  upon  theory  and  practice, 
as  Aristotle  says.  But  the  human  mind  is  inadequate  to  know  by 
itself  the  truth  touching  these  two.  Hence  there  is  need  of  something 
superior  to  the  human  mind  which  will  define  right  practice  and  the 
true  ideas.  This  can  be  only  by  divine  guidance.  Hence  everyone 
must  be  able  to  tell  the  divine  legislation  from  those  which  are  not 
divine.  For  this  it  is  necessary  to  know  what  are  the  principles  with- 
out which  a  divine  law  cannot  exist.  This  is  the  purpose  of  the  book, 
to  explain  the  essential  principles  of  a  divine  law.^"^ 

A  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  religion  would  seem  easy,  for  all 
people  profess  some  religion  or  other,  and  hence  are  presumed  to 
know  upon  what  their  religions  are  based.  But  this  question  has  not 
been  treated  adequately  before,  and  there  is  no  agreement  among 
previous  writers  about  the  number  of  the  principles  or  their  identity. 
Some  say  there  are  thirteen  (Maimonides),  some  say  twenty-six,  some 
six  (Crescas),  without  investigating  what  are  the  principles  of  divine 
religion  generally.  For  we  must  distinguish  between  the  general 
principles  which  pertain  to  divine  legislation  as  such  and  hence  are 
common  to  all  religions,  and  special  principles  which  are  peculiar  to  a 
particular  religion. 

Seeing  the  importance  of  this  subject,  Albo  continues,  I  undertook 
this  investigation.  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  there  are  three  general 
principles  of  divine  religion,  existence  of  God,  Revelation,  and  Reward 
and  Punishment  after  death.  Then  there  are  special  principles  pecul- 
iar to  a  particular  religion.  From  the  general  principles  ("Ikkarim") 
follow  particular  or  derivative  principles  ("Shorashim.")  ^^ 

The  investigation  of  the  principles  of  religion  is  a  delicate  matter 
because  one  is  in  danger  of  being  reckoned  an  infidel  if  he  denies 
what  is  considered  by  others  a  fundamental  dogma.  Thus  according 
to  Maimonides  the  belief  in  the  Messiah  is  fundamental,  and  he  who 
denies  it  is  a  heretic  and  has  no  share  in  the  world  to  come.  And  yet 
Rabbi  Hillel  in  the  Talmud  (Sanhedrin,  99a)  said,  "Israel  need  expect 
no  Messiah,  for  they  had  the  benefit  of  one  in  the  days  of  Hezekiah, 
King  of  Judah."  On  the  other  hand,  Maimonides  does  not  regard 
creation  ex  nihilo  as  fundamental,  whereas  others  do;  and  to  their 
mind  Maimonides  is  open  to  the  charge  of  unbelief. 

The  truth  is  that  only  he  is  an  unbeliever  who  deliberately  and  know- 


JOSEPH  ALBO  409 

ingly  contradicts  the  Bible.  A  person  who  believes  in  the  Bible  but 
is  led  mistakenly  to  misinterpret  it,  and  denies  real  principles  because 
he  thinks  the  Bible  does  not  require  us  to  believe  them  as  principles,  or 
does  not  require  us  to  believe  them  at  all,  is  guilty  of  error  and  in  need 
of  forgiveness,  but  is  not  a  heretic.^ 

Having  thus  defined  his  attitude  and  purpose,  Albo  proceeds  to 
criticize  the  list  of  dogmas  laid  down  by  Maimonides  and  modified 
by  Crescas,  and  then  defends  his  own  view.  A  fundamental  principle 
("Ikkar,"  lit.  root)  is  one  upon  which  something  else  depends  and 
without  which  this  latter  cannot  exist.  Maimonides  counts  thirteen 
principles  of  Judaism  as  follows;  (i)  Existence  of  God,  (2)  Unity,  (3) 
IncorporeaUty,  (4)  Eternity,  (5)  He  alone  must  be  worshipped,  (6) 
Prophecy,  (7)  Superiority  of  the  prophecy  of  Moses,  (8)  Revelation, 
(9)  Immutability  of  the  Law,  (10)  God's  Omniscience,  (11)  Reward 
and  Punishment,  (12)  Messiah,  (13)  Resurrection.^"^  This  list  is  open 
to  criticism.  If  Maimonides  intended  to  admit  strict  principles  only 
without  which  Judaism  cannot  exist,  we  understand  why  he  named 
(i)>  (6),  (8),  (10),  (11),  which  are  general  principles  of  any  divine 
religion,  and  (7)  and  (9)  as  special  principles  of  Judaism.  But  we  can- 
not see  why  he  included  (2)  and  (3).  For  while  they  are  true,  and  every 
Jew  should  believe  them,  Judaism  can  be  conceived  as  existing  with- 
out them.  It  is  still  more  strange  that  (5)  should  be  counted  as  a 
principle.  To  be  sure,  it  is  one  of  the  ten  commandments,  "  Thou  shalt 
have  no  other  Gods  before  me.  .  .  .  Thou  shalt  not  bow  thyself  down 
to  them,  nor  serve  them"  .  .  .  (Exod.  20,  35),  but  Judaism  can  be 
conceived  to  exist  even  with  the  belief  in  a  mediator.  Similarly  it  is 
not  clear  why  (13)  should  be  considered  as  a  fundamental  dogma. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  omitted  Tradition  and  Free  Will  as  beliefs  es- 
sential to  any  divine  religion. 

If,  in  defence  of  Maimonides,  we  say  that  he  intended  to  name  not 
only  fundamental  principles,  but  also  true  beliefs,  whether  fundamental 
or  derivative,  then  there  are  many  others  he  might  have  mentioned, 
such  as  creation  ex  nihilo,  belief  in  miracles,  that  God  rests  in  Israel 
through  the  Torah,  and  so  on. 

Another  writer  counts  twenty-six  principles,  including  everything 
that  occurred  to  his  mind,  such  as  the  attributes  of  eternity,  wisdom, 
life,  power,  will  and  others,  counting  paradise  and  hell  as  two,  and  other 


4IO  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

absurd  ideas.  Others  again,'*"^  criticizing  Maimonides's  principles, 
reduce  them  to  six,  viz.  (i)  God's  knowledge,  (2)  Providence,  (3) 
Power,  (4)  Prophecy,  (5)  Free  Will,  (6)  Purpose,  adding  thereto  the 
three  proved  by  Maimonides,  God's  existence,  unity  and  incorporeality. 
The  objection  to  this  list  is  that  it  does  not  contain  the  special  dogmas 
of  Judaism,  and  does  not  give  us  a  principle  by  which  we  can  distin- 
gmsh  between  the  genuine  and  spurious  divine  religion.  For  the  dog- 
mas named  in  the  above  list  give  us  the  necessary  requirements  for  a 
divine  law,  but  not  the  sufficient.  We  may  have  all  these  principles  and 
yet  not  have  a  divine  religion.  As  to  Free  Will  and  Purpose,  they  are 
essential  to  divine  legislation  to  be  sure,  but  not  qua  divine;  they  are 
also  essential  to  a  conventional  human  law.  Divine  religion  has  a 
special  purpose  peculiar  to  it.^^° 

Having  laid  bare  the  defects  in  the  attempts  at  a  list  of  fundamental 
dogmas  of  Judaism  made  by  his  predecessors,  Albo  categorically  lays 
down  the  following  three  principles  as  fundamental  to  divine  religion : 
(i)  Existence  of  God,  (2)  Providence,  and  reward  and  punishment, 
(3)  Revelation. 

To  justify  this  statement  Albo  finds  it  necessary  to  make  clear 
what  is  meant  by  divine  law  or  religion,  and  what  relation  it  bears 
to  other  laws,  not  divine.  This  necessitates  an  explanation  of  exist- 
ing laws  and  their  motives  and  causes. 

Animal  life,  we  are  told,  may  be  divided  into  three  classes  according 
to  the  mode  of  Uving  adopted  by  each.  Beasts  of  prey  live  separately 
and  not  in  groups.  Mankind  must  live  in  communities,  as  one  individ- 
ual is  dependent  upon  the  work  of  another,  and  social  life  is  essential 
to  their  existence.  Intermediate  between  beast  of  prey  and  man  are- 
the  gregarious  animals,  which  keep  together  not  as  a  matter  of  neces- 
sity, as  is  the  case  in  man,  but  for  convenience,  for  the  sake  of  being 
together.  Man  is  social  by  nature;  and  in  order  to  make  communal 
life  possible,  there  must  be  some  order  in  the  community  which  pro- 
hibits violence,  robbery,  and  so  on.  This  is  known  as  "natural  law." 
In  addition  to  this  there  are  in  many  places  "conventional  laws," 
made  by  kings  and  emperors,  regulating  more  carefully  and  with 
greater  detail  than  the  natural  law  the  affairs  of  the  members  of  the 
community. 

But  this  is  not  all.    There  is  still  another  kind  of  law  due  directly 


JOSEPH  ALBO  411 

to  God's  providence.  The  providence  of  God  is  seen  even  in  the 
lower  animals,  in  the  constitution  of  their  bodies,  not  merely  in  mat- 
ters essential  to  the  preservation  of  the  animal,  but  also  in  the  interest 
of  comfort  and  convenience,  as  for  example  the  duplication  of  the 
sense  organs.  It  stands  to  reason  therefore  that  there  is  a  divine 
influence  which  provides  for  man  even  to  a  greater  degree.  This 
providence  may  extend  only  to  one  individual,  but  this  person  brings 
about  the  perfection  of  the  race;  just  as  in  the  individual  man  the  heart 
is  instrumental  in  giving  life  to  all  the  other  limbs.  The  law  which 
is  promulgated  through  this  person  is  a  "divine  law." 

The  term  "law"  ("Dat")  applies  to  any  system  of  directions  em- 
bracing a  large  aggregate  of  men,  whether  it  contains  many  commands 
or  one.  There  are  thus  three  kinds  of  law,  natural,  conventional 
and  divine.  Natural  law  is  the  same  for  all  persons,  times  and  places. 
Conventional  law  is  ordered  by  a  wise  man  or  men  in  conformity  with 
the  necessity  of  the  persons,  times  and  places,  as  the  reason  dictates, 
without  special  divine  suggestion.  Divine  law  is  ordered  by  God 
through  a  prophet.  The  purpose  of  natural  law  is  to  remove  wrong 
and  promote  right,  keeping  men  from  robbery  and  theft  so  that  so- 
ciety may  be  able  to  exist.  Conventional  law  goes  further  and  tends 
to  remove  the  unseemly  and  to  promote  the  becoming.  Divine  law 
has  for  its  purpose  to  guide  men  to  true  happiness,  which  is  the  happi- 
ness of  the  soul  and  its  eternal  life.  It  points  out  the  way  to  follow 
to  reach  this  end,  showing  what  is  the  true  good  for  man  to  pursue, 
and  what  is  the  real  evil  which  one  must  shun;  though  it  also  lays 
down  the  law  of  right  and  wrong  like  the  other  two,"*^^ 

The  conventional  law  is  inferior  to  the  divine  in  a  number  of  ways. 

The  conventional  law  only  orders  human  conduct  for  the  purpose 
of  improving  social  life,  but  does  not  concern  itself  with  perfection 
in  theoretical  speculation  and  knowledge,  which  leads  the  soul  to 
eternal  life.  The  divine  law  embraces  both  the  parts  upon  which 
human  perfection  depends,  conduct  and  theory.  It  embraces  the 
becoming  and  unbecoming  (practice) ,  and  the  true  and  untrue  (theory). 
As  the  Psalmist  has  it,  "The  Law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect,  restoring 
the  soul"  (Psal.  19,  8). 

The  conventional  law,  being  human,  cannot  always  decide  with 
certainty  what  is  becoming  and  what  unbecoming.     It  is  liable  to 


412  MEDIAEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

error.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  matters  of  theory,  such  as  the 
creation  or  eternity  of  the  world.  The  divine  law  gives  us  certainty 
in  all  things,  "The  testimony  of  the  Lord  is  sure,  making  wise  the 
simple"  {ih.). 

The  person  guided  by  the  conventional  law  is  not  sure  that  he  is 
always  guided  aright;  hence  he  cannot  feel  the  satisfaction  and  the 
joy  of  the  man  whose  guide  is  the  divine  law,  making  him  certain 
of  being  right — "The  precepts  of  the  Lord  are  upright,  rejoicing  the 
heart"  {ib.  9). 

The  conventional  law  can  give  general  rules  only,  but  is  unable  to 
advise  in  a  particular  case.  So  Aristotle  in  the  Ethics  points  out  that 
virtue  is  a  mean,  but  he  cannot  determine  exactly  the  proper  measure 
at  a  given  time.  This  is  the  function  of  the  divine  law — "The  com- 
mandment of  the  Lord  is  clear,  enlightening  the  eyes"  {ib.). 

The  conventional  law  is  subject  to  change  in  the  course  of  time. 
Witness  the  marriage  of  sisters  in  the  early  period  of  Adam  and  Abel. 
The  divine  law  alone  does  not  change — "The  fear  of  the  Lord  is  pure, 
enduring  for  ever"  {ib.  10). 

The  conventional  law  cannot  estimate  exactly  the  merited  amount 
and  kind  of  reward  and  punishment;  whereas,  "The  ordinances  of 
the  Lord  are  the  truth;  they  are  just  altogether"  {ib.).^^"^ 

Freedom  and  Purpose  are  principles  of  conventional  law.  Without 
freedom  there  is  no  sense  in  giving  orders.  For  this  reason  Freedom 
and  Purpose  are  not  correctly  given  as  fundamental  dogmas  of  divine 
law,  for  while  the  latter  cannot  get  along  without  them,  they  are  not 
peculiar  to  divine  law  as  such,  but  are  common  also  to  conventional 
law.  This  is  why  Maimonides  omitted  Freedom  in  his  creed.  The 
same  is  true  of  Purpose  in  general.  The  divine  law,  however,  has  a 
special  purpose,  perfection  and  eternal  life,  hence  Maimonides  did 
include  it  in  his  list.^^^ 

The  fundamental  dogmas  of  divine  law  are,  as  we  said  before, 
Existence  of  God,  Revelation,  Reward  and  Punishment.  It  is  evident 
that  there  cannot  be  a  divine  law  without  the  first  two.  The  third 
is  also  necessary;  for  the  purpose  of  divine  law  must  be  a  perfection 
greater  than  the  conventional  law  can  accomplish.  This  is  eternal 
life,  and  is  signified  by  Reward  and  Punishment. 

As  all  agree  that  the  Law  of  Moses  is  divine,  it  is  proper  to  use  it  as 


JOSEPH  ALBO  413 

a  standard  in  order  to  discover  what  a  divine  law  must  have.  Accord- 
ingly if  we  examine  the  first  four  chapters  of  Genesis,  we  find  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  existence  of  God  in  chapter  one,  describing  creation.  The 
second  and  third  chapters  give  evidence  of  revelation,  or  communi- 
cation of  God  with  man  for  the  purpose  of  directing  his  conduct. 
Finally  in  the  Cain  incident  in  chapter  four  is  illustrated  the  third 
dogma  of  Reward  and  Punishment.^  ^^ 

Creation  ex  nihilo  is  a  true  belief  but  not  a  fundamental  principle. 
For  though  the  Aristotelian  view  of  eternity  is  heretical,  as  it  takes 
away  the  possibility  of  miracles,  nay  even  the  possibility  of  Moses  and 
the  Messiah  (for  these  could  exist  only  after  the  lapse  of  an  infinite 
munber  of  individuals),  one  who  believes  like  Plato  in  a  primitive 
matter  is  not  necessarily  in  contradiction  with  the  Biblical  miracles, 
for  they  were  not  ex  nihilo  '^^^  (cf.  above,  p.  358). 

It  is  not  sufiicient  to  believe  in  the  three  principles  mentioned  to  be 
considered  a  believer  and  to  be  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  world  to  come. 
One  must  believe  also  in  the  derivative  principles  following  from  them. 
Thus  from  the  existence  of  God  follow  his  unity  and  incorporeaiity. 
And  if  a  man  does  not  believe  in  incorporeaiity,  he  disbelieves  in  the 
real  nature  of  God,  and  it  is  as  if  he  denied  the  original  principle. 

The  derivative  principles  ("  Shorashim  "=  roots)  are  as  follows. 
From  existence  of  God  are  derived  four:  (i)  Unity,  (2)  Incorporeaiity, 
(3)  Independence  of  time,  (4)  Freedom  from  defects.  From  Revelation 
are  derived  three:  (i)  God's  knowledge,  (2)  Prophecy,  (3)  Authenticity 
of  God's  messenger.  From  Reward  and  Punishment  is  derived  one — 
Providence  in  the  sense  of  special  Providence.  In  all  there  are  eleven 
dogmas.^^® 

A  particular  commandment  of  the  Law  is  not  reckoned  either  as  a 
fundamental  principle  or  as  a  derivative.  He  who  trangresses  it  is  a 
sinner  and  is  punished  for  his  misdeed,  but  is  not  a  heretic  who  loses  his 
share  in  the  world  to  come,  xmless  he  denies  that  the  commandment  in 
question  is  from  God.  In  that  case  he  comes  in  the  category  of  those 
who  deny  revelation.  Similarly  the  belief  in  tradition  is  not  a  principle 
because  it  is  a  particular  commandment.  Unity  of  God  is  a  principle 
though  it  is  apparently  a  special  commandment,  because  the  term 
unity  contains  two  concepts;  first,  that  God  is  one  and  there  is  not 
another  like  him;  second,  that  being  one  and  free  from  any  multiplicity 


414  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

or  composition,  he  is  the  cause  of  all  the  multiplicity  in  the  world. 
The  latter  is  not  a  particular  commandment,  but  a  principle  derived 
from  the  existence  of  God.  The  former  is  a  particular  commandment. 
If  particular  commandments  were  regarded  as  principles,  we  should 
have  as  many  principles  as  there  are  commandments  in  the  Bible.^^^ 

The  above  distinction  between  the  two  senses  of  the  term  unity,  one 
of  which  is  rationally  derived  from  the  existence  of  God,  whereas  the 
other  not  being  so  derivable  is  not  a  principle,  and  is  given  in  the 
Bible  as  a  special  commandment,  is  clearly  due  to  Crescas,  who  after 
a  few  attempts  at  proving  the  unity  of  God  in  the  sense  of  excluding 
duaUsm,  gives  it  up  as  incapable  of  proof  logically,  and  falls  back  upon 
the  testimony  of  Scripture,  "Hear,  0  Israel,  the  Lord  our  God,  the 
Lord  is  One."  The  other  sense  of  the  word  unity  Crescas  proves  by 
reason.  Hence  Albo  counts  it  among  the  derivative  principles  {cf. 
above,  p.  392). 

If  a  particular  commandment  is  not  a  principle,  which  means  that  a 
fundamental  or  derivative  dogma  cannot  itself  be  a  commandment, 
but  must  he  at  the  basis  of  all  commandments,  the  question  arises 
whence  come  these  principles,  and  who  is  to  warrant  their  truth.  In 
the  sciences  we  know  that  the  basal  principles  of  a  given  science  are 
not  proved  in  that  science  itself,  but  are  borrowed  from  another 
science  in  which  they  are  proved.  Thus  physics  takes  the  concepts  of 
substance  and  accident  from  metaphysics.  In  turn  the  latter  takes 
the  idea  of  a  first  mover  from  physics.  Among  the  laws,  too,  the  con- 
ventional law  takes  its  principles,  freedom  and  purpose,  from  political 
philosophy.  Whence  does  divine  law  take  its  principles?  The  exist- 
ence of  God  can  be  demonstrated  philosophically  from  premises  going 
back  to  axioms  and  first  principles.  But  this  is  not  true  of  Prophecy 
and  Providence. 

The  answer  Albo  gives  to  this  question  is  that  of  Judah  Halevi  and 
Crescas.  The  principles  of  the  divine  law  are  known  empirically, 
i.  e.,  by  experience.  Adam  knew  of  the  existence  of  God,  of  prophecy 
and  reward  and  punishment  from  personal  experience.  Similarly 
Noah  and  Abraham.  Nowadays  we  know  the  law  by  tradition,  but  the 
majority  of  the  principles  thus  known  are  so  certain  that  there  is 
neither  difference  of  opinion  nor  doubt  entertained  by  anyone  con- 
cerning them.     Such  is  the  status  for  example  of  the  principle  of 


JOSEPH  ALBO  415 

Revelation.  Other  principles  again,  like  the  existence  of  God,  are,  as 
was  said  before,  known  by  theoretical  speculation.'*^^ 

To  find  out  whether  a  religion  professing  to  be  of  divine  origin  is 
really  so  or  not,  it  must  be  examined  first  with  reference  to  the  three 
fundamental,  and  the  other  derivative  principles.  If  it  opposes  them, 
it  is  spurious  and  not  genuine.  If  it  is  not  opposed  to  the  principles  in 
question,  it  must  be  further  examined  with  a  view  to  determining 
whether  the  promulgator  is  a  genuine  messenger  of  God  or  not.  And 
the  test  here  must  be  a  direct  one.  Miracles  and  signs  are  no  conclu- 
sive proof  of  prophecy,  and  still  less  do  they  prove  that  the  person 
performing  them  is  a  messenger  sent  by  God  to  announce  a  law.  They 
merely  show  that  the  person  is  considered  worthy  of  having  miracles 
performed  through  him,  provided  the  miracles  are  genuine  and  not 
performed  through  magic.  The  test  of  the  prophet  and  the  messenger 
of  God  must  be  as  direct  as  it  was  in  the  case  of  Moses,  where  the 
people  actually  saw  that  he  was  addressed  by  God  and  commissioned 
with  a  message  for  them."*^^ 

This  opinion  of  Albo  is  clearly  intended  as  a  defence  of  Judaism 
against  Christianity's  claim  that  Jesus  performed  miracles,  a  claim 
which  the  Rabbis  of  the  middle  ages  were  incHned  to  recognize. 

In  addition  to  the  three  fundamental  and  eight  derivative  principles 
of  divine  legislation,  there  are  six  dogmas,  which  every  follower  of 
the  Mosaic  law  must  beUeve.  They  are  (i)  Creation  ex  nihilo,  (2)  Supe- 
riority of  Moses  to  other  prophets,  (3)  Immutabihty  of  the  Law,  (4) 
That  human  perfection  can  be  attained  by  any  one  of  the  command- 
ments of  the  Law,  (5)  Resurrection,  (6)  Messiah. 

Creation  ex  nihilo  is  neither  a  fundamental  nor  a  derivative  prin- 
ciple of  religion  generally  or  of  Judaism  specially  because,  as  we  saw 
before  (p.  413),  they  can  exist  without  this  dogma.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  a  truth  which  it  behooves  every  religionist  and  particularly  every 
Jew  to  believe.  It  follows  from  the  principle  of  the  existence  of  God. 
If  God  cannot  create  ex  nihilo,  there  is  a  defect  in  him.  For  creation 
ex  nihilo  is  admitted  in  a  certain  sense  even  by  those  who  hold  that 
the  world  is  eternal.  They  admit  that  God  is  the  cause  of  everything 
else;  hence  matter  is  his  effect  through  the  mediation  of  the  separate 
Intellect.  But  how  can  a  separate  Intellect  be  the  cause  of  matter  if 
there  is  no  creation  ex  nihilo.    This  is  ex  nihilo  as  much  as  anything 


4i6  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

ca.n  be.  To  say  that  we  can  find  no  reason  why  he  should  create  at  a 
particular  time  rather  than  at  another,  and  hence  the  world  must  be 
eternal,  is  no  argument;  for  this  reasoning  can  apply  only  to  action 
from  necessity.  Voluntary  action  is  just  of  this  kind,  that  it  takes 
place  at  a  particular  time. 

In  the  above  argument  for  creation  the  reader  will  not  fail  to  see 
reminiscences  of  Maimonides  as  well  as  Crescas  {cj.  pp.  271  and  403). 

The  superiority  of  Moses  to  other  prophets  is  not  essential  to  Juda- 
ism, nevertheless  it  behooves  every  Jew  to  believe  it,  as  it  is  included 
in  the  principle  of  Revelation,  and  the  Bible  tells  us,  "  And  there 
arose  not  a  prophet  since  then  in  Israel  like  unto  Moses"  (Deut.  34, 
10). 

The  Immutability  of  the  Law  will  be  treated  in  detail  later.  Here 
it  will  suffice  to  say  that  while  it  is  not  a  sine  qua  non  of  Judaism,  every 
Jew  should  believe  it,  as  it  is  included  in  the  derivative  principle  of  the 
Authenticity  of  God's  messenger. 

It  stands  to  reason  that  human  perfection  can  be  attained  by  the 
performance  of  any  one  of  the  commandments  of  the  Law.  For  if  it 
requires  the  performance  of  all  the  commandments  for  this  purpose, 
then  the  Law  of  Moses  makes  it  more  difficult  to  reach  perfection 
than  the  previous  laws,  which  is  not  in  consonance  with  the  statement 
of  the  Rabbis  that  "God  gave  Israel  so  many  laws  and  command- 
ments because  he  wished  to  make  them  meritorious"  (Tal.  Bab. 
Makkot,  23  b). 

Resurrection  wiU  be  treated  more  at  length  later.  It  must  be  be- 
lieved because  it  has  been  accepted  by  Israel  and  has  come  down  to 
us  by  tradition.  The  same  thing  applies  to  the  belief  in  the  Messiah. 
This  is  also  a  traditional  belief  and  is  related  to  the  principle  of  Re- 
ward and  Punishment,  though  it  is  not  like  the  latter  indispensable 
either  to  religion  in  general  or  to  Judaism  in  particular.  ^^^ 

The  difference,  it  will  be  seen,  between  Albo  and  Maimonides  in  the 
question  of  Jewish  dogmas  is  simply  one  of  classification  and  grading. 
Albo  includes  in  his  enumeration  all  the  thirteen  dogmas  of  Mai- 
monides with  the  exception  of  the  fifth,  namely,  that  God  alone  be 
worshipped,  but  instead  of  placing  them  all  on  the  same  level  of  im- 
portance as  equally  essential  to  the  structure  of  Judaism,  as  Mai- 
monides apparently  intended,  Albo  divides  them  into  three  categories 


JOSEPH  ALBO  41) 

of  descending  rank  as  follows:  fundamental  principles,  derived  prin- 
ciples, true  beliefs.  Of  Maimonides's  list  the  last  two,  Messiah  and 
Resurrection,  belong  to  the  last  category.  None  the  less  Albo  believed 
strictly  in  both  and  held  it  incumbent  upon  every  Jew  to  believe  in 
them.  It  was  only  a  question  of  the  status  of  a  person  who  mistakenly 
denies  these  true  beliefs.  According  to  Maimonides,  it  would  seem, 
he  would  be  called  a  heretic  and  be  excluded  from  a  share  in  the  world 
to  come  equally  with  one  who  denied  the  existence  of  God;  whereas 
according  to  Albo  a  person  so  guilty  is  a  sinner  and  needs  forgiveness, 
but  is  not  a  heretic.  Of  the  other  eleven  dogmas  of  Maimonides,  (i), 
(8)  and  (11)  are  placed  by  Albo  in  his  first  class,  (2),  (3),  (4),  (6)  and 
'^lo)  belong  to  the  second  class,  while  (7)  and  (9)  come  under  true  be- 
liefs along  with  Messiah  and  Resurrection.  The  difference  between 
the  first  and  the  second  class  is  purely  logical  and  not  practical.  As 
we  saw  before  (p.  413),  one  who  denies  incorporeality  (a  principle  of 
the  second  class)  disbeheves  in  the  true  nature  of  God,  which  is  tan- 
tamount to  denying  the  principle  of  the  existence  of  God. 

Before  concluding  this  general  discussion  of  the  fundamental  dog- 
mas of  religion  and  Judaism,  Albo  undertakes  to  answer  two  questions 
which  must  have  been  near  his  heart,  and  which  were  on  the  tongues 
no  doubt  of  a  great  many  honest  people  in  those  days  of  religious 
challenge  and  debate.  The  first  question  is.  Is  it  proper,  or  perhaps 
obligatory,  to  analyze  the  fundamental  principles  of  one's  religion, 
to  see  if  they  are  true;  and  if  one  finds  another  rehgion  which  seems  to 
him  better,  is  one  permitted  to  adopt  it  in  place  of  his  own?  Albo 
sees  arguments  against  both  sides  of  the  dilemma.  If  a  man  is  allowed 
to  analyze  his  religion  and  to  choose  the  one  that  seems  best  to  him, 
it  will  follow  that  a  person  is  never  stable  in  his  behef,  since  he  is 
doubting  it,  as  is  shown  by  his  examination.  And  if  so,  he  does  not 
deserve  reward  for  belief,  since  belief,  as  Albo  defines  it  elsewhere 
(Pt.  I,  ch.  19),  means  that  one  cannot  conceive  of  the  opposite  being 
true.  Again,  if  he  finds  another  religion  which  he  thinks  better  and  is 
allowed  to  exchange  his  own  religion  for  the  new  one,  he  will  never  be 
sure  of  any  religion;  for  he  may  find  a  third  still  better,  and  a  fourth, 
and  so  on,  and  as  he  cannot  examine  all  the  possible  religions,  he  will 
remain  without  any  religious  convictions. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  he  is  not  allowed  to  investigate  the  foundations 


4i8  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

of  his  belief,  it  follows  either  that  all  religions  alike  bring  their  believer 
happiness,  no  matter  how  contradictory  they  are,  which  is  absurd; 
or  God  would  seem  unfair  if  only  one  religion  leads  its  devotees  to 
happiness  and  no  one  is  allowed  to  change  his  religion  for  one  that 
seems  to  him  the  true  one. 

The  answer  of  Albo  to  this  interesting  question  is  characteristic. 
It  shows  that  he  armored  himself  in  advance,  before  he  risked  such  a 
delicate  question.  He  makes  it  clear  that  it  really  does  not  expose 
to  any  danger  the  religion  of  Judaism,  the  mother  of  the  other  two, 
which  they  came  to  supersede.  If  all  religions  in  the  world,  Albo  tells 
us,  were  opposed  to  one  another,  and  regarded  each  other  as  untrue, 
the  above  difficulty  would  be  real.  But  it  is  not  so.  All  religions 
agree  in  respect  to  one  of  them  that  it  is  divine;  but  they  say  that  it 
is  superseded.  Hence  every  religionist  who  is  not  a  Jew  must  investi- 
gate his  religion  to  see  if  it  is  justified  in  opposing  the  religion  which 
is  acknowledged  to  be  divine.  Similarly  the  professor  of  the  admit- 
tedly divine  religion  should  investigate  to  see  if  his  religion  is  tempo- 
rary or  eternal.  In  this  investigation  he  must  first  see  if  the  religion 
conforms  to  the  principles  of  divine  religion  above  mentioned.  If 
it  does  this  and  in  addition  endeavors  to  order  human  affairs  in  ac- 
cordance with  justice,  and  leads  its  devotees  to  human  perfection, 
it  is  divine.  It  is  still,  however,  possible  that  it  is  the  work  of  a  wise 
man  of  good  character.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  investigate  the 
character  of  the  promulgator,  to  find  out  whether  he  is  a  genuine 
divine  messenger  or  not.  This  test,  as  was  said  above  (p.  415),  must 
be  a  direct  test  and  not  an  indirect.^^^ 

The  other  question  is  whether  there  can  be  more  than  one  divine 
religion.  Apparently  there  can  be  only  one,  since  the  giver  is  one, 
and  the  recipients  are  of  one  species.  But  in  reality  the  receivers  vary 
in  temperament  according  to  difference  in  inheritance  and  environ- 
ment. Hence  there  may  be  a  difference  in  the  law  according  to  the 
character  of  the  people  for  whom  it  is  intended.  Since,  however,  the 
difference  is  due  to  the  receiver  and  not  to  the  giver,  it  must  reside 
in  those  elements  which  are  dependent  upon  the  receiver,  i.  e.,  in 
particulars  and  details,  not  in  the  principles,  fundamental  or  derived. 
So  the  Noachite  and  the  Mosaic  laws  differ  only  in  details,  not  in 
fundamental  principles. ^^^ 


JOSEPH  ALBO  419 

We  have  now  completed  the  exposition  of  the  part  of  Albo's  teach- 
ing that  may  be  called  distinctly  his  own.  And  it  seems  he  was  aware 
that  he  had  nothing  further  to  teach  that  was  new,  and  would  have 
been  content  to  end  his  book  with  the  first  part,  of  which  we  have 
just  given  an  account.  But  his  friends,  he  tells  us  in  the  concluding 
remarks  to  the  first  part  of  the  "Ikkarim,"^^^  urged  him  to  proceed 
further  and  discuss  in  detail  the  principles,  fundamental  and  derived, 
the  true  beliefs  and  the  so-called  "branches,"  which  he  barely  enu- 
merated in  the  first  part.  He  was  persuaded  by  their  advice  and  added 
the  other  three  sections,  each  devoted  to  one  of  the  three  fundamental 
dogmas  and  the  corollaries  following  from  it.  Here  Albo  has  nothing 
new  to  teach.  He  follows  the  beaten  track,  reviews  the  classic  views 
of  Maimonides,  takes  advantage  of  the  criticisms  of  Gersonides  and 
Crescas,  and  settles  the  problems  sometimes  one  way  sometimes 
another,  without  ever  suggesting  anything  new.  Accordingly  it 
will  not  be  worth  our  while  to  reproduce  his  discussions  here.  It  will 
suffice  briefly  to  indicate  his  position  on  the  more  important  problems. 

The  second  section  deals  with  the  existence  of  God  and  the  derived 
principles  and  branches  growing  out  from  this  root.  In  proving  the  ex- 
istence of  God  he  refers  to  Maimonides's  four  proofs  {cf.  p.  257  ff.),  and 
selects  the  third  and  fourth  as  really  valid  and  beyond  dispute.  The 
first  and  second  are  not  conclusive;  the  one  because  it  is  based  upon 
the  eternity  of  motion,  which  no  Jew  accepts;  the  other  because  the 
major  premise  is  not  true.  It  does  not  follow  if  one  of  the  two  elements 
a,  b,  of  a  composite  a-\-b  \s>  found  separately,  that  the  other  must  be 
found  existing  separately  likewise.^^* 

We  have  seen  that  from  the  principle  of  the  existence  of  God  follow 
four  derivative  dogmas,  unity,  incorporeal! ty,  independence  of  time, 
freedom  from  defects.  We  are  now  told  that  from  these  secondary 
roots  issue  a  number  of  branches.  From  Unity  it  follows  that  no  at- 
tributes either  essential  or  accidental  can  be  applied  to  God,  such  as 
wisdom,  strength,  generosity,  and  so  on,  for  they  would  cause  multi- 
plicity. From  incorporeality  we  infer  that  God  is  not  subject  to  cor- 
poreal affections  like  fear,  sorrow,  joy,  grudge,  and  so  on.  Independ- 
ence of  time  implies  infinite  power  and  want  of  resemblance  to  other 
things.  Freedom  from  defect  implies  absence  of  such  qualities  as 
ignorance,  weakness,  and  so  on.^^^ 


420  MEDIjEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

In  the  discussion  of  the  divine  attributes  Albo  has  nothing  new  to 
ofifer,  but  instead  he  argues  forward  and  backward,  now  with  Mai- 
monides,  now  against  him,  reproducing  a  good  deal  of  Maimonides's 
classification,  embodying  some  material  of  Bahya  on  unity,  and  after 
this  rambling  and  not  very  consistent  discussion,  he  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  none  but  active  and  negative  attributes  are  applicable  to 
God;  and  yet  some  essential  attributes  too  must  be  his,  but  these 
must  be  understood  as  implying  only  the  aspect  of  perfection,  and  not 
that  other  aspect  of  attribute  which  is  responsible  for  multiplicity.^-^ 

He  asks  the  question  so  often  asked  before,  How  can  multiplicity 
come  from  unity?  And  after  giving  Ibn  Sina's  scheme  of  the  emana- 
tion of  the  Intelligences  one  after  the  other,  and  criticizing  it  in  the 
manner  of  Gazali  and  Maimonides,  he  gives  his  own  solution  that  the 
variety  and  multiplicity  of  the  world  tends  to  one  end,  which  is  the 
order  of  the  world.  And  thus  are  reconciled  plurality  and  unity. 
{cf.  Gersonides  above,  p.  351).^^^ 

He  discusses  the  question  of  angels  or  Intellects,  gives  the  views  of 
the  philosophers  concerning  their  nature  and  number,  each  being  the 
effect  of  the  superior  and  the  cause  of  the  inferior,  and  objects  to  their 
idea  on  the  ground  that  these  cannot  be  the  same  as  the  Biblical  angels, 
who  are  messengers  of  God  to  mankind.  He  then  gives  his  own  view 
that  the  number  of  angels  is  infinite,  not  as  the  philosophers  say  ten  or 
fifty,  and  that  they  are  not  related  to  each  other  as  cause  and  efifect, 
but  that  though  they  are  immaterial  Intellects  they  are  individuated 
and  differentiated  according  to  the  degree  of  understanding  they  have 
of  God.428 

In  discussing  the  second  fundamental  principle.  Revelation,  Albo 
argues  in  the  good  old  fashion  that  man  is  the  noblest  creature  of  the 
sublunar  world,  and  the  most  distinctive  and  noblest  part  of  man — 
his  form  and  essence — is  the  theoretical  reason.  Hence  the  purpose  of 
man  must  be  the  realization  of  the  theoretical  intellect.  At  the  same 
time,  and  with  little  consistency,  Albo  takes  the  part  of  Judah  Halevi 
and  Crescas,  employing  their  arguments,  without  naming  them,  that 
the  philosophers  and  the  philosophizing  theologians  are  wrong  who 
make  human  immortality,  perfection  and  happiness  depend  solely 
upon  intellectual  activity.  He  comes  to  the  conclusion,  therefore,  that 
spiritual  understanding,  which  gives  perfection  of  soul  when  in  com- 


JOSEPH  ALBO  421 

bination  with  practice,  is  not  acquisition  of  ideas  but  the  intention  of 
doing  the  will  of  God  in  the  performance  of  good  deeds,  and  not  that  of 
pleasure  or  reward. ^"^ 

This  being  so,  it  becomes  an  important  question  what  are  the  prac- 
tices which  tend  to  human  perfection,  and  what  are  those  which  tend 
the  other  way.  In  general  we  may  conclude,  as  like  desires  and  re- 
joices in  like,  that  those  deeds  which  give  the  soul  pleasiue  before  and 
after  performance  are  good  and  helpful,  while  those  which  cause 
subsequent  pain,  regret  and  sorrow  are  bad,  and  tend  away  from  the 
soul's  perfection. 

But  the  criterion  of  pleasure  and  pain  just  suggested  is  not  sufficient 
as  a  guide  in  conduct,  for  a  great  deal  depends  upon  a  man's  tempera- 
ment. What  a  hot-blooded  man  may  commend  and  find  pleasure  in, 
the  phlegmatic  temperament  will  object  to,  and  will  feel  discomfort  in 
doing.  Besides,  as  the  good  deed  is  always  a  mean  between  two  ex- 
tremes, which  it  is  hard  to  measure  precisely;  and  as  the  good  deed  is 
that  which  pleases  God,  and  beyond  generalities  we  cannot  tell  what 
does,  and  what  does  not  please  God,  since  we  do  not  know  his  essence, 
it  was  necessary  for  man's  sake  that  God  should  reveal  his  will  to  man- 
kind through  a  prophet.     Thus  Revelation  is  proved  by  reason.^^'' 

This  leads  to  the  problem  of  prophecy,  one  of  the  derivative  prin- 
ciples of  Revelation.  The  divine  influence  from  which  man  gets  a 
knowledge  of  the  things  pleasing  and  displeasing  to  God,  he  cannot 
obtain  without  the  divine  will.  Instead  of  magic,  divination,  and 
communication  with  evil  spirits  and  the  dead,  which  the  ancient 
heathen  employed  in  order  to  learn  the  future,  God  sent  prophets  to 
Israel,  to  tell  the  people  of  the  will  of  God.  Foretelling  the  future  was 
only  secondary  with  them.  Prophecy  is  a  supernatural  gift,  whether 
it  takes  place  with  the  help  of  the  imagination  or  not.  If  it  were  a 
natural  phenomenon  dependent  upon  the  intellectual  power  of  the 
individual  and  his  faculty  of  imagination,  as  the  philosophers  and  some 
Jewish  theologians  think,  there  should  have  been  prophets  among  the 
philosophers. 

Here  again  we  see  Albo  adopt  the  view  of  Halevi  and  Crescas  against 
the  intellectualism  of  Maimonides  and  Gersonides.  His  further 
classification  of  the  grades  of  prophecy  is  based  upon  Maimonides, 
though  Albo  simplifies  it.     Instead  of  eleven  Albo  recognizes  four 


422  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

grades  in  all,  including  that  of  Moses.  The  great  majority  of  man- 
kind, he  says,  stop  with  the  ability  to  analyze,  such  as  is  exhibited  in 
the  analysis  of  things  into  matter  and  form,  and  so  on,  though  not  all 
of  them  go  so  far.  But  there  are  some  few  who  go  farther  and  are 
enabled  to  speak  words  of  wisdom  and  to  sing  praises  to  God  without 
being  able  to  account  for  the  power.  This  is  the  holy  spirit  ("Ruah 
ha-Kodesh").  Some  go  still  farther,  and  through  the  strength  of  their 
reason  and  imagination  they  dream  true  dreams  and  receive  prophe- 
cies; though,  the  imagination  having  the  upper  hand,  they  struggle 
very  hard  and  tremble  and  faint,  almost  losing  their  soul.  This  is 
the  first  stage  of  prophecy.  The  second  stage  is  when  the  imagination 
and  reason  are  equal.  In  that  case  there  is  no  struggle  or  fainting. 
Visions  come  to  the  prophet  at  night  in  dreams,  or  in  a  revery  at  day- 
time. The  forms  that  appear  are  not  real,  but  the  meanings  they 
convey  are.  Such  are  the  figures  of  women,  horses,  basket  of  summer 
fruit,  and  so  on,  in  the  visions  of  Zechariah  and  Amos.  The  third 
stage  is  when  the  reason  gets  the  better  of  the  imagination  and  there 
are  no  forms  or  images,  but  real  essences  and  ideas,  like  the  visions  of 
Ezekiel,  which  represent  real  things  in  the  secrets  of  nature  and  divinity. 
The  prophet  in  this  stage  also  hears  an  angel  speaking  to  him  and  giv- 
ing him  information  of  importance  to  himself  or  others.  In  all  these 
cases  the  will  of  God  is  essential.  No  preparation  can  replace  it. 
Finally  the  fourth  stage  is  reached  when  the  imagination  does  not 
come  into  play  at  all.  In  this  stage  there  is  no  angel  or  form,  and  the 
message  comes  to  the  prophet  at  daytime  while  he  is  awake.  He  hears 
a  voice  telling  him  what  he  desires  to  know;  and  whenever  he  chooses 
he  can  summon  this  power.  Moses  alone  attained  to  this  final  stage. 
Outside  of  the  prophets,  the  righteous  and  the  pious  have  various 
degrees  of  power  according  to  the  degree  of  their  union  with  God. 
Some  can  in  this  way  influence  the  powers  of  nature  to  obey  them,  as 
a  person  can,  by  thinking  of  food,  make  his  mouth  water.  So  they 
can  by  taking  thought  cause  rain  and  storm.  Others  can  bring  down 
fire  from  above  and  revive  the  dead. 

Through  the  influence  of  a  prophet  the  gift  of  prophecy  may  some- 
times rest  upon  individuals  who  are  themselves  unprepared  and  un- 
worthy. Witness  the  revelation  on  Sinai  where  the  entire  people,  six 
hundred  thousand  in  number,  were  endowed  with  the  spirit  of  prophecy, 


JOSEPH  ALSO  423 

and  that  too  of  the  highest  degree,  like  Moses  himself.  The  prophetic 
medium  reflects  the  spirit  of  prophecy  on  others  as  a  smooth  surface 
reflects  the  light  of  the  sun  upon  dark  bodies.  This  is  why  prophecy 
is  found  only  in  Israel  and  in  Palestine,  because  the  ark  and  the  Tables 
of  Stone,  upon  which  the  Shekinah  rests,  reflect  the  divine  spirit 
upon  those  who  are  worthy  and  have  in  them  something  resembling 
the  contents  of  the  ark,  namely,  the  Torah  and  the  commandments.^^^ 

Among  the  true  beliefs  we  have  seen  (p.  416)  that  Immutability 
of  the  Law  is  related  to  the  principle  of  Revelation.  Hence  this  is 
the  place  to  discuss  this  question.  Can  a  divine  religion  change  with 
time  or  not?  It  would  seem  at  first  sight  that  it  cannot.  For  the  giver 
expresses  his  will  in  the  Law,  and  his  will  never  changes.  The  receivers 
are  the  same,  i.  e.,  the  same  nation,  and  a  nation  does  not  change.  Fi- 
nally the  purpose  of  the  Law  or  religion  is  to  give  people  true  opinions, 
and  these  never  change. 

And  yet  on  further  reflection  there  seems  no  reason  why  religion 
should  not  change  with  the  change  of  the  recipient,  as  the  physician 
changes  his  prescription  with  the  progress  of  the  patient,  and  as  a 
matter  of  fact  we  find  that  the  commandments  given  to  Adam  were 
different  from  those  given  to  Noah  and  to  Abraham  and  to  Moses. 
Adam  was  not  allowed  to  eat  meat,  Noah  was.  Abraham  was  com- 
manded circumcision.  High  places  were  at  first  permitted  and  later 
forbidden.  Maimonides  makes  the  immutability  of  the  Law  a  funda- 
mental dogma,  relying  upon  the  commandment,  "Thou  shalt  not  add 
thereto,  and  thou  shalt  not  diminish  therefrom"  (Deut.  13,  i).  But  in 
the  first  place  the  verse  refers  to  changes  in  the  mode  of  observing  the 
laws;  and  besides,  it  says  nothing  about  God  himself  changing  the 
Law. 

The  phrases  "an  eternal  statute,"  "throughout  your  generations," 
"it  is  a  sign  for  ever,"  are  no  proof  of  the  eternity  of  the  Law;  for 
not  all  commandments  have  these  expressions  attached,  and  this 
shows  rather  that  the  others  are  subject  to  change.  Besides,  the  ex- 
pressions, for  eternity,"  and  so  on,  are  not  to  be  taken  absolutely. 
They  are  often  used  to  express  finite  periods  of  time. 

After  the  Babylonian  Exile  two  changes  were  made.  They  changed 
the  characters  in  which  the  Bible  was  written,  and  the  order  and  names 
of  the  months,  beginning  with  Tishri  instead  of  Nisan.    There  is  no 


424  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

reason,  therefore,  why  other  laws  might  not  change,  too.  We  i^eed 
not,  then,  regard  Immutability  of  the  Law  as  a  fundamental  dogma 
with  Maimonides.  Hasdai  Crescas  also  classes  it  with  true  beliefs 
and  not  with  fundamental  principles. 

Albo  resolves  the  problem  as  follows:  A  matter  that  is  revealed  by 
God  himself  cannot  be  changed  by  a  prophet  unless  it  is  changed  by 
God  himself.  The  first  two  commandments,  "I  am  the  Lord  thy  God, 
&c.,"  and  "Thou  shalt  not  have  other  gods,  &c.,"  were  heard  by  the 
people  directly  from  God  without  the  intervention  of  Moses,  hence 
they  cannot  be  changed  by  any  prophet.  It  follows  therefore  that 
the  three  fundamental  dogmas,  existence  of  God,  Revelation  and 
Reward  and  Punishment  can  never  be  changed  by  a  prophet,  for 
they  are  implied  in  the  first  two  commandments,  which  were  heard 
from  God  himself.  The  rest  of  the  commandments,  as  they  were 
heard  from  God  through  the  interpretation  of  Moses,  can  be  changed 
by  a  prophet  as  a  temporary  measure.  The  other  laws  which  were 
given  by  Moses  may  be  changed  by  a  later  prophet  even  permanently. 
But  the  prophet  must  be  greater  than  Moses,  and  he  must  show  this 
by  the  greatness,  number,  publicity  and  permanence  of  his  miracles, 
which  must  excel  those  of  Moses.  He  must  likewise  show  that  he  was 
sent  by  God  to  change  the  Law,  as  clearly  as  Moses  proved  that  he 
was  sent  to  give  it.  But  it  is  unlikely  that  any  such  prophet  will 
come,  for  the  Torah  says  that  there  never  was  or  will  be  any  prophet 
like  Moses. ^^2 

Before  discussing  the  third  fundamental  dogma,  Albo  finds  it  de- 
sirable to  dispose  first  of  a  few  other  problems  imphed  by  this  dogma, 
one  of  which,  God's  knowledge,  was  postponed  to  this  place,  though  it 
is  connected  with  Revelation,  because  it  cannot  well  be  separated  in  dis- 
cussion from  the  problem  of  Freedom.  Providence  is  the  other  related 
problem,  which  is  derived  from  the  dogma  of  Reward  and  Punishment. 

There  is  nothing  that  is  new  in  Albo's  treatment  of  knowledge  and 
Freedom.  He  insists  like  Maimonides  that  God  must  be  omniscient, 
and  on  the  other  hand  the  contingent  cannot  be  denied,  and  neither 
can  freedom.  He  gives  the  stock  arguments,  which  it  is  not  necessary 
to  reproduce  at  this  late  hour.  And  his  solution  is  that  of  Maimonides 
that  in  God  human  freedom  and  divine  Omniscience  are  reconcilable 
because  God's  knowledge  is  not  our  knowledge.  ^^^ 


JOSEPH  ALBO  425 

Nor  is  there  anything  original  in  Albo's  discussion  of  the  problem 
of  Providence.  He  recognizes  with  Maimonides  and  others  that  a 
strong  argument  against  special  Providence  is  the  observed  inequality 
between  the  destinies  of  men  and  their  apparent  merits.  And  he  en- 
deavors in  the  well  worn  method  to  give  reasons  and  explanations 
for  this  inequality  which  will  not  touch  unfavorably  God's  justice  or 
his  special  Providence.  The  reasons  are  such  as  we  met  before  and 
we  shall  not  repeat  them.  Albo  also  gives  a  few  positive  arguments 
to  prove  the  reahty  of  special  Providence  for  man.  He  sees  in  various 
natural  and  human  phenomena  evidence  of  deviation  from  the  merely 
"natural"  as  demanded  by  the  principles  of  Aristotle's  Physics  or 
the  laws  of  uniformity.  This  shows  special  Providence.  Thus  the 
existence  of  dry  earth,  the  heaviest  element,  above  water,  cannot  be 
accounted  for  by  the  laws  of  Physics.  The  phenomenon  of  rain  can- 
not be  reduced  to  law,  hence  it  argues  will  and  purpose  and  Providence. 
Admonition  in  dreams  is  direct  evidence  of  special  Providence,  and 
it  is  scarcely  likely  that  man,  who  has  special  equipment  above  the 
other  animals  in  his  reason,  should  not  also  receive  special  care  above 
that  which  the  lower  animals  have.  Now  they  are  protected  in  the 
species,  hence  man  is  provided  for  as  an  individual. ^^* 

Having  disposed  of  the  auxiliary  dogmas,  Albo  takes  up  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  Reward  and  Punishment.  He  cites  various 
opinions  on  the  subject,  which  are  dependent  upon  the  idea  one  enter- 
tains concerning  the  nature  of  the  soul.  Thus  if  one  holds  that  the 
human  soul  is  not  different  in  kind  from  the  animal  soul,  it  follows  that 
as  there  is  no  reward  and  punishment  for  the  animal,  there  is  none  for 
man.  And  if  one  regards  the  human  soul  as  merely  a  capacity  or 
possibility  of  intelligence  he  must  necessarily  conclude  that  the  soul 
perishes  with  the  body  and  there  is  no  spiritual  reward  and  punish- 
ment after  death.  The  only  reward  there  is  must  therefore  be  cor- 
poreal, during  life.  On  the  other  hand,  our  general  experience,  which 
brings  before  us  many  cases  of  good  men  suffering  and  bad  men  en- 
joying prosperity,  wovJd  seem  to  argue  against  corporeal  reward  and 
punishment  in  this  world.  This  taken  together  with  the  philosophical 
opinion  that  the  soul  is  an  immaterial  and  indestructible  substance 
gives  rise  to  the  third  view  that  the  only  recompense  is  spiritual  after 
death.    None  of  these  views  is  satisfactory  to  Albo.    The  first  two 


426  MEDIJEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

because  they  are  based  upon  an  erroneous  notion  of  the  soul.  All 
agree,  philosophers  as  well  as  theologians,  that  the  human  soul  is 
different  in  kind  from  the  soul  of  the  animal;  and  it  is  likewise  admitted 
that  the  human  soul  is  immortal.  His  criticism  of  the  third  view  so 
far  as  it  is  based  upon  the  intellectuahst  idea  that  the  thing  of  highest 
value  is  intellectual  effort,  and  the  only  reward  is  immortahty  which 
intellectual  activity  engenders,  is  similar  to  that  of  Halevi  and  Crescas 
in  its  endeavor  to  refute  this  notion  and  to  substitute  for  it  the  reli- 
gious view  that  the  soul  is  an  independent  substance  having  a  capacity 
for  intelligence  in  God's  service.  The  degree  in  which  a  person  realizes 
this  service  determines  his  reward  and  punishment.  The  argument 
from  experience  Albo  does  not  answer  here,  but  we  may  suppose  he 
regards  it  as  answered  by  what  he  said  in  his  discussion  of  Providence, 
where  he  tries  to  account  for  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the 
adversity  of  the  righteous. 

Albo's  own  view  accordingly  is  that  which  he  also  attributes  to 
the  Bible  that  there  is  a  twofold  reward,  in  this  world  and  in  the  next. 
There  is  still  a  difference  of  opinion  concerning  the  nature  of  the  true 
and  ultimate  reward,  whether  it  is  given  to  the  soul  alone,  or  to  body 
and  soul  combined  in  resiurection.  He  quotes  Maimonides's  opinion, 
with  whom  he  agrees,  that  the  real  reward  is  purely  spiritual  enjoyed 
by  the  soul  alone.  To  be  sure,  after  the  coming  of  the  Messiah  the 
bodies  of  the  righteous  will  be  resurrected  to  make  known  abroad 
God's  wonders,  or  to  give  these  people  bodily  pleasure  for  the  pain 
they  suffered  during  life,  or  to  give  them  additional  opportunity  to 
acquire  perfection  so  that  they  may  have  a  greater  reward  later.  But 
this  state  of  resurrected  life  will  last  only  for  a  time,  and  then  all  will 
die  again,  and  the  souls  will  enjoy  spiritual  life  forever. 

The  other  opinion,  held  by  Nachmanides,  is  that  the  real  and  ul- 
timate reward  is  that  of  body  and  soul  united  to  everlasting  life. 
Albo  is  not  satisfied  with  this  view,  his  objections  being  among  others 
that  if  only  the  perfect  are  resurrected,  the  rest  will  remain  without 
any  reward  at  all,  not  to  mention  the  difficulty  that  it  is  not  likely 
that  the  human  body — a  perishable  thing — will  change  into  a  matter 
that  will  last  forever. 

As  to  the  natiure  of  reward  and  punishment  after  death,  Albo  tells 
us  that  reward  will  consist  in  the  soul's  realization  that  its  endeavors 


JOSEPH  ALSO  427 

in  this  world  were  correct,  and  in  the  next  world  it  will  be  prepared  to 
join  the  spiritual  beings,  which  will  give  it  great  joy.  The  erring 
soul  will  find  itself  in  a  position  where  it  will  still  desire  the  corporeal 
pleasures  of  this  world,  but  will  not  be  able  to  have  them  for  want  of 
corporeal  organs.  At  the  same  time  it  will  also  entertain  the  other 
more  natural  desire  of  a  spiritual  substance  to  join  the  other  spiritual 
beings  in  the  other  world.  This  feeling  too  it  will  not  be  able  to  satisfy 
because  of  its  want  of  perfection.  This  division  of  desires  unsatisfied 
wUl  cause  the  soul  excruciating  torture,  and  this  is  its  punishment. ^^^ 


CONCLUSION 

Our  task  is  done.  We  have  now  reached  the  limit  we  have  assigned 
ourselves.  We  have  traced  objectively  and  with  greater  or  less  detail 
the  rationalistic  movement  in  mediaeval  Jewry  from  its  beginnings  in 
the  ninth  and  tenth  centuries  in  Babylon  among  the  Karaites  and 
Rabbanites  to  its  decline  in  Spain  and  south  France  in  the  fifteenth 
century.  We  have  followed  its  ascending  curve  from  Saadia  through 
Gabirol,  Bahya  and  Ibn  Daud  to  its  highest  point  in  Maimonides, 
and  we  likewise  traced  its  descent  through  Gersonides,  Crescas  and 
Albo.  We  took  account  of  its  essential  nature  as  being  a  serious  and 
conscientious  attempt  to  define  a  Jewish  Weltanschauung  in  the  midst 
of  conflicting  claims  of  religions  and  philosophies.  The  Jewish  sacred 
writings  had  to  be  studied  and  made  consistent  with  themselves  in 
regard  to  certain  ethical  and  metaphysical  questions  which  forced 
themselves  upon  the  minds  of  thinking  men.  In  this  endeavor  it 
was  necessary  to  have  regard  to  the  system  of  doctrine  that  was  grow- 
ing up  among  their  Mohammedan  neighbors  and  masters — itself 
inherited  from  Greece — and  adjust  its  teachings  to  those  of  Judaism. 
The  adjustment  took  various  forms  according  to  the  temperament 
of  the  adjuster.  It  embraced  the  extremes  of  all  but  sacrificing  one  of 
the  two  systems  of  doctrine  to  the  other,  and  it  counted  among  its 
votaries  those  who  honestly  endeavored  to  give  each  claim  its  due. 
The  system  of  Judaism  was  the  same  for  all  throughout  the  period 
of  our  investigation,  excepting  only  the  difference  between  Karaites 
and  Rabbanites.  This  was  not  the  case  with  the  system  of  philosophic 
doctrine.  There  we  can  see  a  development  from  Kalam  through  Neo- 
Platonism  to  Aristotelianism,  and  we  accordingly  classified  the  Jewish 
thinkers  as  Mutakallimun,  Neo-Platonists  or  Aristotelians,  or  com- 
binations in  varying  proportions  of  any  two  of  the  three  systems 
mentioned. 

It  was  not  our  province  to  treat  of  the  mystic  movement  in  mediaeval 
Jewry  as  it  developed  in  the  Kabbalistic  works  and  gained  the  ground 
5delded  in  the  course  of  time  by  the  healthier  rationalism.    To  com- 

428 


CONCLUSION  429 

plete  the  picture  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  as  the  political  and  economic 
conditions  of  the  Jews  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  dete- 
riorated, and  freedom  and  toleration  were  succeeded  by  persecution 
and  expulsion,  the  Jews  became  more  zealous  for  their  own  spiritual 
heritage  as  distinguished  from  foreign  importations;  philosophy  and 
rationalism  began  to  be  regarded  askance,  particularly  as  experience 
showed  that  scientific  training  was  not  favorable  to  Jewish  steadfast- 
ness and  loyalty.  In  suffering  and  persecution  those  who  stuck  to 
their  posts  were  as  a  rule  not  the  so-called  enlightened  who  played 
with  foreign  learning,  but  the  simple  folk  who  believed  in  Torah  and 
tradition  in  the  good  old  style.  The  philosophical  and  the  scientific 
devotees  were  the  first  to  yield,  and  many  of  them  abandoned  Juda- 
ism."^^^  Thus  it  was  that  mysticism  and  obscurantism  took  the  place 
of  enlightenment  as  a  measure  of  self-defence.  The  material  walls  of 
the  Ghetto  and  the  spiritual  walls  of  the  Talmud  and  the  Kabbala 
kept  the  remnant  from  being  overwhelmed  and  absorbed  by  the  hos- 
tile environment  of  Christian  and  Mohammedan.  The  second  half  of 
the  fourteenth,  and  the  fifteenth  century  were  not  favorable  to  phil- 
osophical studies  among  the  Jews,  and  the  few  here  and  there  who 
still  show  an  interest  in  science  and  philosophy  combine  with  it  a  belief 
in  Kabbala  and  are  not  of  any  great  influence  on  the  development  of 
Judaism. 

Shemtob  ben  Joseph  ibn  Shemtob  (ab.  1440)  author  of  a  work  en- 
titled ''Emunot,"  ^^^  is  a  strong  opponent  of  Greek  science  and  phil- 
osophy. He  is  not  content  with  attacking  the  lesser  lights  and  ex- 
tremists like  Albalag  or  Gersonides  or  Abraham  ibn  Ezra.  He  goes 
to  the  very  fountain-head  of  Jewish  Aristotehanism  and  holds  Mai- 
monides  responsible  for  the  heresies  which  invaded  the  Jewish  camp. 
He  takes  up  one  doctrine  after  another  of  the  great  Jewish  philosopher 
and  points  out  how  dangerous  it  is  to  the  true  Jewish  faith.  Judah 
Halevi  and  Nachmanides  represent  to  him  the  true  Jewish  attitude. 
The  mysteries  of  the  Jewish  faith  are  revealed  not  in  philosophy  but 
in  the  Kabbala,  which  Maimonides  did  not  study,  and  which  he  would 
not  have  understood  if  he  had  studied  it,  for  he  had  no  Kabbalistic 
tradition. 

Unlike  Shemtob,  his  son  Joseph  ben  Shemtob  (d.  1480)  ^^^  shows 
great  admiration  for  Aristotle  and  Maimonides.    But  he  is  enabled  to 


43©  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

do  so  by  lending  credence  to  a  legend  that  Aristotle  in  his  old  age  re- 
canted his  heretical  doctrines,  in  particular  that  of  the  eternity  of  the 
world.  Joseph  ben  Shemtob  made  a  special  study  of  Aristotle's  Ethics, 
to  which  he  wrote  a  commentary,  and  endeavored  to  show  that  the 
Stagirite's  ethical  doctrines  had  been  misunderstood;  that  the  highest 
good  of  man  and  his  ultimate  happiness  are  to  be  sought  according 
to  Aristotle  not  in  this  world  but  in  the  next.  It  was  likewise  a  mis- 
understanding, he  thinks,  when  Maimonides  and  others  make  Aris- 
totle deny  special  Providence.  True  science  is  not  really  opposed  to 
Judaism.  At  the  same  time  he  too  like  his  father  realizes  the  danger 
of  too  much  scientific  study,  and  hence  agrees  with  Solomon  ben  Adret 
that  the  study  of  philosophy  should  be  postponed  to  the  age  of  matu- 
rity when  the  student  is  already  imbued  with  Jewish  learning  and 
religious  faith. 

The  son  of  Joseph,  bearing  the  name  of  his  grandfather,  Shem- 
tob ben  Joseph  (fl.  ab.  1461-89),  followed  in  his  father's 
footsteps,^^^  and  wrote  a  commentary  on  the  "Guide  of  the 
Perplexed"  of  Maimonides,  whom  he  defends  against  the  attacks  of 
Crescas. 

Isaac  ben  Moses  Arama  (1420-1494)  ^^^  is  the  author  of  a 
philosophico-homiletical  commentary  on  the  Pentateuch  entitled, 
"Akedat  Yizhak,"  and  a  small  treatise  on  the  relations  of  philosophy 
and  theology.  He  was  also  interested  in  Kabbala  and  placed  Jewish 
revelation  above  philosophy. 

Don  Isaac  Abarbanel  (1437-1508),*^^  the  distinguished  Jewish  states- 
man who  went  with  his  brethren  into  exile  at  the  time  of  the  expulsion 
of  the  Jews  from  Spain  in  1492,  was  a  prolific  writer  on  Biblical  ex- 
egesis and  religious  philosophy.  Though  a  great  admirer  of  Maimon- 
ides, on  whose  "Guide"  he  wrote  a  commentary,  and  whose  thirteen 
articles  of  the  creed  he  defended  against  the  strictures  of  Crescas  and 
Albo,  he  was  nevertheless  an  outspoken  opponent  of  the  rationalistic 
attitude  and  has  no  phrases  strong  enough  for  such  men  as  Albalag, 
Gersonides,  Moses  of  Narbonne  and  others,  whom  he  denounces  as 
heretics  and  teachers  of  dangerous  doctrines.  He  does  not  even  spare 
Maimonides  himself  when  the  latter  attempts  to  identify  the  tradi- 
tional "Maase  Bereshit"  and  "Maase  Merkaba"  with  the  Aristo- 
telian Physics  and  Metaphysics  (c/.  above,  p.  303  f.),  and  adopts  Kab- 


CONCLUSION  431 

balistic  views  along  with  philosophic  doctrines.  He  is  neither  original 
nor  thoroughly  consistent. 

His  son  Judah  Leo  Abarbanel  (1470-1530)  ^^^  is  the  author  of  a 
philosophical  work  in  Italian,  "Dialoghi  di  Amore,"  (Dialogues  of 
Love),  which  breathes  the  spirit  of  the  Renaissance  of  the  fifteenth  and 
sixteenth  centuries  in  Italy.  It  is  under  the  influence  of  Plato  and 
Plotinus  and  identifies  God  with  love,  which  is  regarded  as  the  essential 
principle  of  all  life  and  activity  in  the  world,  including  even  the  in- 
organic natural  processes.  There  is  no  attempt  made  to  construct 
a  Jewish  philosophy,  and  though  all  evidence  is  against  it,  some  have 
made  it  out  that  Judah  Abarbanel  was  a  convert  to  Christianity. 

In  the  same  country,  in  Italy,  Judah  ben  Yechiel  Messer  Leon  of 
Mantua  ^^^  (1450-1490)  made  a  name  for  himself  as  a  student  of 
Cicero  and  of  mediaeval  Latin  scholasticism.  He  wrote  a  rhetoric  in 
Hebrew  based  upon  Cicero  and  Lactantius,  and  composed  logical  works 
based  upon  Aristotle's  Latin  text  and  Averroes.  As  an  original  student 
of  philosophy  he  is  of  no  importance. 

Two  members  of  the  Delmedigo  family  of  Crete,  Elijah  (1460- 1498) 
and  Joseph  Solomon, ^^^  are  well  known  as  students  of  philosophy  and 
writers  on  philosophical  and  scientific  subjects. 

Thus  the  stream  of  philosophical  thought  which  rose  among  the 
Jews  in  Babylonia  and  flowed  on  through  the  ages,  ever  widening  and 
deepening  its  channel,  passing  into  Spain  and  reaching  its  high  water 
mark  in  the  latter  half  of  the  twelfth  century  in  Maimonides,  began  to 
narrow  and  thin  out  while  spreading  into  France  and  Italy,  until  at 
last  it  dried  up  entirely  in  that  very  land  which  opened  up  a  new  world 
of  thought,  beauty  and  feeling  in  the  fifteenth  century,  the  land  of  the 
Renaissance.  Jewish  philosophy  never  passed  beyond  the  scholastic 
stage,  and  the  freedom  and  light  which  came  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
in  the  revival  of  ancient  learning  and  the  inventions  and  discoveries 
of  the  modem  era  found  the  Jews  incapable  of  benefiting  by  the  bless- 
ings they  afforded.  Oppression  and  gloom  caused  the  Jews  to  retire 
within  their  shell  and  they  sought  consolation  for  the  freedom  denied 
them  without  in  concentrating  their  interests,  ideals  and  hopes  upon 
the  Rabbinic  writings,  legal  as  well  as  mystical.  There  have  appeared 
philosophers  among  the  Jews  in  succeeding  centuries,  but  they  either 
philosophized  without  regard  to  Judaism  and  in  opposition  to  its 


432  MEDIEVAL  JEWISH  PHILOSOPHY 

fundamental  dogmas,  thus  incurring  the  wrath  and  exclusion  of  the 
synagogue,  or  they  sought  to  dissociate  Judaism  from  theoretical 
speculation  on  the  ground  that  the  Jewish  religion  is  not  a  philosophy 
but  a  rule  of  conduct.  In  more  recent  times  Jewry  has  divided  itself 
into  sects  and  under  the  influence  of  modern  individuahsm  has  lost 
its  central  authority  making  every  group  the  arbiter  of  its  own  belief 
and  practice  and  narrowing  the  religious  influence  to  matters  of 
ceremony  and  communal  activity  of  a  practical  character.  There  are 
Jews  now  and  there  are  philosophers,  but  there  are  no  Jewish  phi- 
losophers and  there  is  no  Jewish  philosophy. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


GENERAL  WORKS 

Solomon  Munk,  Melanges  de  Philosophic  Juive  et  Arabe,  Paris  1859,  pp. 

461-51 1.    A  brief  historical  resume  of  philosophical  authors  and  books. 

German  translation  by  Beer,  Philosophie  und  philosophische  Schrift- 

steUer  der  Juden,  Leipzig,  1852.    English  translation  by  Isidor  KaUsch, 

Philosophy  and  Philosophical  Authors  of  the  Jews,  Cincinnati,  1881. 
A.  ScHMEEDL,  Studien  liber  jiidische,  insonders  jiidisch-arabische  ReUgions- 

philosophie,  Wien,  1869. 
MoRiTZ  EiSLER,  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  jiidischen  Philosophen  des  Mittel- 

alters  (3  parts),  Wien,  1870-84. 
David    Kaufmann,    Geschichte    der    Attributenlehre    in    der    jiidischen 

Religionsphilosophie  des  Mittelalters  von  Saadia  bis  Maimuni,  Gotha, 

1877. 

Simeon  Bernfeld,  !3N-iB>^n  riTnn  N^DiDi^Jsn  nnijin,  wnhi^  nyn,    Warsaw, 

1897. 

S.  HoROViTZ,  Die  Psychologic  bei  den  judischen  Religions-Philosophen 

des  Mittelalters,  von  Saadia  bis  Maimuni,  Breslau,  1898-1912  (includes 

so  far  Saadia,  Gabirol,  Ibn  Zaddik,  Abraham  ibn  Daud). 
J.  PoLLAK,  "Entwicklung  der  arabischen  und  judischen   Philosophie  im 

Mittelalter"  in   Archiv  fur  Geschichte    der  Philosophie,   vol.   XVII 

(1904),  pp.  196-236,  433-459- 
Ueberweg-Baumgartner,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vol. 

II,  loth  ed.,  Berhn,  1915,  pp.  385-403. 
David  Neumark,  Geschichte  der  judischen  Philosophie  des  Mittelalters, 

nach   Problemen  dargesteUt,   vol.  I,   Berlin,   1907,  vol.   II,   part  I, 

Berhn,  1910. 
Ignaz  Goldziher,  Die  jiidische  Philosophie  in  Allgemeine  Geschichte  der 

Philosophie,  von  W.  Wundt,  etc.  (Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart  I,  5), 

pp.  70-77  (2nd  ed.,  pp.  301-337). 

Kalam  in  Jewish  Philosophy 

Martin   Schreiner,   Der    Kalam    in    der   judischen  Literatur,    Berlin, 

1895. 

^  This  bibliography  contains  a  selection  of  the  more  important  works  of  exposi- 
tion.    For  original  sources  see  the  notes. 

433 


434  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Isaac  Israeli 

Jacob  Guttmann,  Die  philosophischen  Lehren  des  Isaak  ben  Salomon 
Israeli,  Miinster  i.  W.  191 1. 

Al  Mukammas 
Abraham  Harkavy,  in  Russian  periodical  Woskhod,  Sept.  1898. 

Saadia 

Jacob  Guttmann,  Die  Religionsphilosophie  des  Saadia,  Gottingen,  1882. 
D.  J.  Engelkemper,  Saadja  Gaon's  religionsphUosophische  Lehre  iiber 
die  heilige  Schrift,  iibersetzt  und  erklart,  Miinster,  1903. 

Joseph  Al  Basir 

P.  F.  Frankl,  Ein  Mu'tazilitischer  Kalam  aus  dem  10.  Jahrhundert,  Wien, 

1872. 
MiKSA  Klein,  Juszuf  Al-Baszir,  Al-Kitab  Al-Muhtavi,  Budapest,  1913. 
Erno  Morgenstern,  Juszuf  Al-Baszir,  Al  Kitab  Al  Muhtavi,  Budapest, 

1913- 

Jeshda  ben  Judah 

Martin  Schreiner,  Studien  iiber  Jeschu'a  ben  Jehuda,  Berlin,  1900. 

Solomon  ibn  Gabirol 

S.  Munk,  Melanges,  etc.,  Paris,  1859,  pp.  151-306. 

Seyerlen,  in  Zeller's  Theologische  Jahrbiicher,  vols.  XV  and  XVI. 

Jacob  Guttmann,  Die  PhUosophie  des  Salomon  ibn  Gabirol,  Gottingen, 

1889. 
David  Kaufmann,  Studien  iiber  Salomon  ibn  Gabirol,  Budapest,  1899. 

Bahya  ibn  Pakuda 

David  Kaufmann,  "Die  Theologie  des  Bachja  Ibn  Pakuda,"  in  "  Gesam- 
melte  Schriften  von  David  Kaufmann  "  (ed.  Brann),  vol.  II,  Frank- 
furt a.  M.,  1910,  pp.  1-98. 

J.  H.  Hertz,  Bachya,  The  Jewish  Thomas  a  Kempis,  New  York,  1898  (in 
Sixth  Biennial  Report  of  the  Jewish  Theological  Seminary  Association). 

Pseudo-Bahya 

Jacob  Guttmann,  "Eine  bisher  unbekannte,  dem  Bachja  ibn  Pakuda 
zugeignete  Schrift,"  Monatschrijt  /,  G.  u.  W.  d.  J.,  vol.  XLI  (1897), 
p.  241  ff. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  435 

Abraham  bar  Hiyya 
Jacob  Guttmann,  in  Monatschrift  f.  G.  u.  W.  d.  J.,  1900. 

Joseph  ibn  Zaddik 

Max  Doctor,  Die  Philosophic  des  Joseph  Ibn  Zaddik,  nach  ihren  Quellen, 
insbesondere  nach  ihren  Beziehxingen  zu  den  Lauteren  Briidern  und  zu 
Gabirol  untersucht,  Miinster,  1895. 

Leopold  Weinsberg,  Der  Mikrokosmos,  ein  angeblich  im  12.  Jahrhundert 
von  dem  Cordubenser  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik  verfasstes  philosophisches 
System,  nach  seiner  Echtheit  untersucht,  Breslau,  1888. 

JUDAH  HaLEVI 

Ad.  Frankl-Grun,  Die  Ethik  des  Juda  Halevi,  Bihn,  s.  a. 

Davh)  Kauemann,  Jehuda  Halewi,  Versuch  einer  Charakteristik,  Breslau, 

1877;  reprinted  in  "  Gesammelte  Schriften  "  (ed.  Brann),  Frankfurt 

a.  M.,  1910,  vol.  II,  pp.  99-151. 
David  Neumark,  Jehuda  Hallevi's  Philosophy  in  its  Principles,  Cincinnati, 

1908. 
Julius  Guttmann,  Das  Verhaltniss  von  ReHgion  und  Philosophic  bei  Jehuda 

Halewi,  in  Israel  Lewy's  Festschrift  (ed.  Brann  and  Elbogen),  Breslau, 

1911,  pp.  327-358. 

Abraham  ibn  Ezra 

Nachman  Krochmal,  ptn  ^3nj  miO,  Warsaw,  1894,  p.  266  ff. 

David  Rosin,  Die  Religionsphilosophie  Abraham  ibn  Esras,  in  Monatschrift 

/.  G.  u.  W.  d.  J.  vols.  XLII  (1898)  and  XLIII  (1899). 
G.  Orschansky,  Abraham  ibn  Esra  als  PhUosoph,  Breslau,  1900. 

Abraham  ibn  Daud 

GuGENHEiMER,  Die  Rcligionsphilosophic  des  R.  Abraham  ben  David  ha- 
Levi  nach  dessen  noch  ungedruckter  Schrift  Emuna  Rama  in  ihrem 
inneren  imd  historischen  Zusammenhangc  entwickelt,  Augsburg,  1850. 

Jacob  Guttmann,  Die  Rehgionsphilosophie  des  Abraham  ibn  Daud  aus 
Toledo,  Gottingen,  1879. 

Maimonides 

M.  Joel,  Die  Rehgionsphilosophie  des  Mosc  ben  Maimon,  Breslau,  1876. 

SmoN  B.  ScHEYER,  Das  Psychologische  System  des  Maimonides,  Frank- 
furt a.  M.,  1845. 

David  Rosin,  Die  Ethik  des  Maimonides,  Breslau,  1876. 

Moses  ben  Maimon,  sein  Leben,  seine  Werkc  imd  sein  Einfluss,  heraus- 
gegeben  von  der  GeseUschaft  zur  Forderung  der  Wissenschaft  des  Ju- 
denthimis,  Band  I,  Leipzig,  1908. 


436  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Louis-Germain  Levy,  Maimonide,  Paris,  191 1  (Les  Grands  Philosophes). 
J.  MiJNZ,  Moses  ben  Maimon,  sein  Leben  und  seine  Werke,  Frankfurt  a. 

M.,  1912. 
M.  Joel,  Verhaltniss  Albert  des  Grossen  zu  Moses  Maimonides,  Breslau, 

1876. 
Jacob  Guttmann,  Der  Einfluss  der  Maimonidischen  Philosophic  auf  das 

christliche  Abendland,  in  Moses  ben  Maimon  (see  above),  pp.  135-230. 
David  Kaufmann,  Der  "Fiihrer"  Maimuni's  in  der  Weltliteratur,  Archiv 

fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vol.  XI  (1898),  pp.  335-376;  reprinted 

in  "  Gesammelte  Schriften  "  (ed.  Brann),  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1910,  vol.  II, 

pp.  152-189. 
J.  P.  Wickersham  Crawford,  The  Vision  Delectable  of  Alfonso  de  la  Torre 

and  Maimonides'  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,  Publications  of  the  Modern 

Language  Association  of  America,  XXVIII,  2  (1913),  pp.  188-212. 
Isaac  Husik,  An  Anonymous  Medieval  Christian  Critic  of  Maimonides, 

Jewish  Quarterly  Review,  New  Series,  vol.  II,  1911,  pp.  159-190. 

Gersonides 

M.  Joel,  Lewi  ben  Gerson  als  ReHgionsphilosoph,  Breslau,  1862. 

Isidore  Weil,  Philosophie  Religieuse  de  Levi  ben  Gerson,  Paris,  1868. 

Benzion  Kellermann,  Die  Kampfe  Gottes  von  Lewi  ben  Gerson, 
Uebersetzung  und  Erklarung  des  handschriftlich  revidierten  Textes, 
Erster  Teil,  Berlin,  1914.  Contains  the  German  translation  of  the 
first  book  of  the  "  MiUiamot  Adonai."  The  translation  is  faulty  in 
many  places,  as  the  present  writer  has  shown  in  an  article  entitled, 
"  Studies  in  Gersonides,"  which  will  appear  in  the  Jewish  Quarterly 
Review,  New  Series,  in  the  course  of  the  year  191 7. 

Hasdai  Crescas 

M.  Joel,  Don  Chasdai  Creskas'  rehgionsphilosophische  Lehren  in  ihrem 
geschichtlichen  Einflusse  dargestellt,  Breslau,  1866. 

Philipp  Block,  Die  Willensfreiheit  von  Chasdai  Kreskas,  Miinchen,  1879. 

Julius  Wolfsohn,  Der  Einfluss  Gazali's  auf  Chisdai  Crescas,  Frankfurt 
a.  M.,  1905. 

David  Neumark,  "Crescas  and  Spinoza,"  in  Commemoration  of  the  Fifth 
Centenary  of  the  Publication  of  the  "Or  Adonai";  in  Year  Book  of  the 
Central  Conference  of  American  Rabbis,  XVIII,  1908,  pp.  277-318. 

Joseph  Also 

Samuel  Back,  Joseph  Albo's  Bedeutung  in  der  Geschichte  der  jiidischen 
Religionsphilosophie,  Breslau,  1869. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  437 

Jaulus,  in  Monatschrift  f.  G.  u.  W.  d.  J.,  1874,  p.  462  ff. 
A,  Tanzer,  Die  Religionsphilosophie  Joseph  Albo's  nach  seinem  Werke  "Ik- 
karim"  systematisch  dargestellt  und  erlautert,  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1896. 

Biblical  Exegesis 

W.   Bacher,   Die  Bibelexegese  \  der  judischen   Religionsphilosophen  des 

Mittelalters  vor  Maimuni,  Budapest,  1892. 
ID.,  Die  Jiidische  Bibelexegese  vom  Anfange  des  zehnten  bis  zum  Ende  des 

fiinfzehnten  Jahrhunderts,  Treves,  1892,  reprinted  from  Winter  und 

Wiinsche,  Die  jiidische  Literatur  seit  Abschluss  des  Kanons,  II,  239- 

339,  where  a  full  bibliography  is  given. 
ID.,  Jewish  Encyclopedia,  s.  v.  Bible  Exegesis,  §§  14-16. 

Influence  of  Jewish  Philosophy  on  Scholasticism 

The  works  of  Joel,  Guttmann,  Kaufmann,  Crawford  and  Husik  mentioned 

above  under  Maimonides;  and  besides 
Jacob  Guttmann,  Das  Verhaltniss  des  Thomas  von  Aquino  zum  Judenthum 

und  zur  jiidischen  Litteratur,  Gottrngen,  1891. 
id..  Die  Scholastik  des  dreizehnten  Jahrhunderts  in  ihren  Beziehungen  zum 

Judenthum  und  zur  jiidischen  Literatur,  Breslau,  1902. 
For  further  references  see  the  notes. 


NOTES 


[Black  figures  denote  the  page,  the  Hght  figures  the  notes] 


XV,  I.  See  below,  p.  395  £f. 
xvi,  2.  Talm.  Bab.  Hagiga  iib. 

3.  Ibid. 

4.  See  Zeller,  Die  Philosophie  der 
Griechen,  III,  2,  3d  ed.  p.  347;  Mai- 
monides,  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,  I,  ch. 
71,  beginning. 

xvii,  5.  See  Wenrich,  De  Auctorum 
Graecorum  Versionibus  et  Commen- 
tariis  Syriacis,  Arabicis,  Armeniacis 
Persicisque,  Leipzig,  1842,  p.  4  ff;  De 
Boer,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  im 
Islam,  Stuttgart,  1901,  p.  i7ff  (EngUsh 
translation  by  Jones,  London,  1903,  pp. 
1 1-30) .  Duval,  La  Litterature  Syriaque 
2nd  ed.,  Paris,  1900,  ch.  XIV,  §  2,  p. 

253  ff- 

XX,  6.  See  Dieterid,  Die  Theologie 
des  Aristotles  (Arabic  text),  Leipzig, 
1882;  German  translation  by  the  same, 
Leipzig,  1883. 

7.  See  Bardenhewer,  Die  Pseudo- 
aristotelische  Schrift  iiber  das  reine 
Gute,  bekannt  unter  dem  Namen  Liber 
de  causis,  Freiburg  i.  Br.,  1882. 

8.  See  Valentinus  Rose,  Deutsche 
Literaturzeitimg,  1883,  p.  843. 

9.  See  Husik,  Judah  Messer  Leon's 
Commentary  upon  the  "  Vetus  Logica," 
Leyden,  1906,  p.  11,  97  note. 

xxi,  10.  For  the  following  sketch  of 
the  Kalam  see  Goldziher,  Vorlesungen 
uber  den  Islam,  Heidelberg,  1910, 100  ff, 
127  f. 

xxiv,  II.  See  below,  p.  247. 

XXV,  12.  See  Schreiner,  Der  Kalam  in 
der  jiidischen  Literatur,  Berhn,  1895, 
p.  3;  ibid.,  Studien  iiber  Jeschu'a  ben 
Jehuda,  Berhn,  1900,  p.  12  ff. 

xxvi,  13.  See  L.  Ginzberg,  in  Jewish 


Encyclopedia,    s.    v.     "Anthropomor- 
phism." 

14.  See   Talm.    Bab.    Berakot,    33b. 

iniK  ppnK>o  Dmo  dhid. 

15.  See   Talm.    Bab.    Megillah,   25b. 

16.  Schreiner,  Studien  iiber  Jeschu'a 
ben  Jehudah,  p.  15  note  2. 

17.  See  Bab.   Talm.   Pesakim,   54a, 

Cn  ''b^:^)  Tnai  min  —  min  jn  \bti) 
.iD-n  n^^i'N-i  ^3:p  'n 

18.  Schreiner  1.  c.  p.  12. 

19.  Ibid. 

20.  Schreiner,  Der  Kalam  in  der 
jiidischen  Literatur,  p.  3,  4. 

xxvii,  21.  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,  I, 
ch.  71. 

22.  See  below,  p.  246  ff. 

23.  See  Goldziher,  Vorlesungen  iiber 
den  Islam,  p.  155  ff. 

xxviii,  24.  See  Yahuda,  AI-Hidaja  'Ha 
Fara'id  Al-Qulub  des  Bachja  ibn  Joseph 
Ibn  Paquda,  Leyden,  191 2,  p.  53  ff. 

xxxvii,  25.  Cf.  above,  note  6. 

I,  26.  See  Steinschneider,  Die  He- 
braischen  Uebersetzungen  des  Mit- 
telalters  imd  die  Juden  als  Dolmetscher, 
Berlin,  1893,  §  479  and  notes. 

1,  27.  See  Guttmann,  Die  Scholastik 
des  dreizehnten  Jahrhvmderts  in  ihxen 
Beziehungen  ziun  Judenthum  und  zur 
jiidischen     Literatur,     Breslau,     1902, 

p.  55  ff.      _ 

28.  Omnia  Opera  Ysaac,  Lugduni, 
(Lyons),  1515. 

2,  29.  See  D"aOin  nnjN,  ed.  Am- 
sterdam, p.  X4b. 

30.  S.  Fried,  Das  Buch  iiber  die  Ele- 
mente  (nniD^Pl  "^QD),  Drohobycz,  igoo. 

439 


440 


NOTES 


31.  Published  by  Hirschfeld  in  "Fest- 
schrift zum  achtzigsten  Geburtstag 
Moritz  Steinschneiders,"  Leipzig,  1896, 
pp.  131-141;  cf.  also  pp.  233-4. 

32.  See  note  28  and  the  two  preced- 
ing notes. 

5,  Z2,-  1^2Jm  nnn  IDD  published  by 
Steinschneider  in  the  Hebrew  periodi- 
cal ?D"l3n  I,  pp.  401-405.  Cf.  Gutt- 
mann,  Die  philosophischen  Lehren  des 
Isaak  ben  Salomon  Israeli,  Miinster 
i.  W.,  1911,  p.  31,  note  i. 

10,  34.  Fried,  n'^"lD^^  "isd,  p.  i2f. 

17,  35.  Berlin,  1885,  pp.  65,  77-83, 

151-154- 

36.  See  the  Russian  paper  Woskhod, 
September,  1898. 

24,  37.  Arabic  text  edited  by  S. 
Landauer,  Kitab  al-Amanat  wa'l- 
I'tiqadat,  Leyden  1880.  The  Hebrew 
translation  of  Judah  ibn  Tibbon  has 
been  published  in  many  editions.  The 
references  in  the  following  notes  are 
to  the  Yozefov  edition. 

25,  2>?>-  Cf.  below,  p.  249  ff. 

39.  Pt.  I,  ch.  I,  third  argument, 
p.  58  of  Yozefov  edition. 

40.  Ibid.,  fourth  argument,  p.  59. 

26,  41.  Ibid.,  ch.  3,  p.  63  ff.;  cf.  Gutt- 
maim,  Die  Religionsphilosophie  des 
Saadia,  Gottingen,  1882,  p.  45  f. 

42.  Pt.  II,  chs.  9-12,  pp.  95-101. 

43.  Pt.  VI,  ch.  I,  p.  149. 

44.  Pt.  II,  ch.  2,  pp.  88-9. 

27,  45.  Introduction,  pp.  38-39. 
46.  Ibid.,  p.  40. 

28,  47.  Ibid.,  pp.  43-48. 
48.  Ibid.,  p.  48. 

49-  P-  49- 
SO.  p.  51. 

29,  51.  Pt.  I.  Introduction,  p.  54  f. 
52.  Ibid.,  ch.  I,  p.  56. 

30,  53.  Ibid.,  p.  57. 

54.  Ibid.,  p.  58. 

55.  Ibid.,  p.  59. 

31,  56.  Ch.  2,  p.  60  £f. 

57.  Ch.  3,  third  opinion,  p.  66  £f. 

32,  58.  Ch.  4,  pp.  80-82. 


59.  Pt.  n.  Introduction,  p.  86. 

60.  Ibid.,  ch.  I,  p.  88. 

33,  61.  Pt.  I,  ch.  3,  fifth  opiDion, 
p.  68. 

62.  Pt.  II,  ch.  2,  p.  89. 

34,  63.  Ibid.,  chs.  4-5,  pp.  91-93. 
64.  See   Graf,   Die  Philosophic    und 

Gotteslehre  des  Jahja  ibn  'Adi  und 
spateren  Autoren,  Miinster,  1910, 
p.  32,  note,  p.  52. 

35,  65.  Ill,  ch.  10,  p.  122;  V,  ch.  8, 
p.  147;  VII,  ch.  2,  p.  165. 

66.  II,  chs.  9-12,  pp.  95-102. 

37,  67.  VI,  chs.  1-4,  pp.  148-156. 

38,  68.  Ill,  chs.  1-3,  pp.  104-110. 

40,  69.  Ibid.,  chs.  4-5,  pp.  lio- 
ns- 

70.  Ch.  6,  pp.  113-114. 

71.  Chs.  7-9,  pp.  114-121. 

41,  72.  IV,  pp.  124-136. 

42,  73.  V,  chs.  1-3,  pp.  136-140. 

43,  74.  IX,  chs.  1-4,  pp.  185-190. 

44,  75.  VI,  ch.  8,  pp.  160-162. 

45,  76.  VII,  chs.  1-9,  pp.  162-174. 

77.  VIII,  pp.  175-185. 

78.  IX,  chs.  5-1 1,  pp.  190-197. 

46,  79.  X,  pp.  197-215- 

48,  80.  The  following  sketch  is  based 
upon  Frankl,  Ein  Mu'taziHtischer 
Kalam  aus  dem  loten  Jahrhundert, 
Wien,  1872. 

55,  81.  The  following  sketch  is 
based  upon  Schreiner,  Studien  uber 
Jeschu'a  ben  Jehuda,  Berlin,  1900. 

60,  82.  D"nO-in  ni"lJN  (Letters  of 
Maimonides),  ed.  Amsterdam,  p.  14b. 

61,  83.  See  Munk,  Melanges  de 
Philosophie  Juive  et  Arabe,  Paris,  1859, 
p.  291  ff;  Guttmann,  Die  Scholastik 
des  Dreizehnten  Jahrhunderts,  Breslau, 
1902,  pp.  60-85.  Id.,  Die  Philosophie 
des  Salomon  ibn  Gabirol,  Gottingen, 
1889,  p.  54  ff.  This  last  work  and 
that  of  Munk  represent  the  best  ex- 
position and  criticism  of  Gabirol's 
philosophy  and  of  his  sources  and  in- 
fluences. 

62,  84.    Cf.     Baeumker,     Avence- 


NOTES 


441 


brolis  Fons  Vitae,   Miinster,    1892-95, 
Prolegomena. 

63,  85.  Jourdain,  A.,  Recherches 
Critiques  sur  Page  et  I'origine  des 
traductions  Latines  d'  Aristote,  2  ed. 
Paris,  1843,  P-  197  note. 

86.  Munk,  Melanges,  etc.  (see 
note  ?,:i),  contains  the  Hebrew  extracts 
of  Falaquera.  The  Latin  translation 
was  published  by  Clemens  Baeumker 
in  the  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  der 
Philosophie  des  Mittelalters,  vol.  I, 
pts.  2-4  (cf.  above  note  84).  See  also 
Seyerlen  in  Theologische  Jahrbiicher, 
edited  by  Zeller,  XV  and  XVI. 

64,  87.  Cf.  Munk,  Le  Guide  des 
Egares,  II,  p.  25,  note  i,  end. 

88.  See  Kaufraann,  Studien  uber 
Salomon  ibn  Gabirol,  Budapest,  1899. 

89.  Baeumker,  Fons  Vitae,  V,  p. 
313,  6. 

65,  90.  F.  V.  V,  333-335,  Falaquera 
in  Munk's  Melanges,  V,  §§  67-69. 

91.  F.  V.  IV,  8  ff.,  Falaquera  IV,  §  i. 

92.  F.  V.  V,  296,  10. 

93.  F.  V.  IV,  243,  10. 

94.  F.  V.  Ill,  p.  196,  5  ff.,  Falaq. 
HI,  §  10. 

95.  F.  V.  Ill,  208,  15;  Falaq.  Ill, 
§44. 

67,  96.  F.  V.  Ill,  175,  10  ff.;  Falaq. 
Ill,  §  27  ff. 

97.  F.  V.  IV,  2ii,9ff.,  213,  i7ff.,  217, 
II  ff.,  218,  18;  Falaq.  IV,  §§  1-4  and  ff. 

98.  F.  V.  V,  258,  19;  259,  i;  268, 
8,  14,  is;  322,  12;  Falaq.  V,  §  55. 

68,  99.  F.  V.  V,  306,  7  ff.;  Falaq. 
V,  §  34  ff. 

100.  F.  V.  V,  330,  15  ff.;  Falaq.  V, 
§64ff. 

loi.  F.  V.  V,  326,  3  ff.;  Falaq.  V, 
§6off. 

70,  102.  F.  V.  Ill,  204,  13  ff.;  Falaq. 

in,  §  37. 

71,  103.  S.  Wise,  "Improvement  of 
the  Moral  Qualities,"  New  York,  1901. 
(Columbia  University  Oriental  Studies, 
vol.  I.) 


72,  104.  F.  V.  I,  4,  24  ff.;  Falaq.  I, 
§2. 
78,  105.  See  Munk,  Melanges,  166  ff. 

80,  106.  Yahuda,  Prolegomena  zu 
einer  erstmaUgen  Herausgabe  des 
Kitab  Al-Hidaja  Tla  Fara'id  Al-Qulub, 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1904,  12  ff.;  id.,  Al- 
Hidaja  'Ila  Faraid  Al-Qulub  des  Bachja 
ibn  Joseph  ibn  Paquda,  Ley  den,  19 12, 
63  f. 

107.  Neumark,  Geschichte  der  jiid- 
ischen  Philosophie  des  Mittelalters,  I, 
Berhn,  1907,  485-493- 

81,  loS.  In  his  commentary  on 
Deut.  32,  39.  Cf.  Yahuda,  Prolegomena, 
p.  12,  note  2,  where  35  should  be  cor- 
rected to  39. 

109.  Yahuda,   Al-Hidaja,  etc.,  p.  97. 

85,  no.  nnnijn  nam  (Duties  of  the 

Hearts)   ed.  Warsaw,    1875,  Introduc- 
tion, pp.  9-28. 

86,  III.  Ibid.,  Introduction,  28- 
37- 

112.  Yahuda,  Al-Hidaja,  pp.  53- 
112. 

88,  113.  Duties  of  the  Hearts,  I, 
chs.  1-6,  pp.  41-58. 

89,  114.  Duties,  I,  ch.  6,  pp.  57-8. 

92,  115.  Ibid.,  ch.  7,  pp.  58-69. 

93,  116.  Ch.  8,  pp.  69-72. 
117.  Ch.  9,  pp.  72-76. 

95,  118.  Ch.  10,  pp.  76-84. 

96,  119.  Guide  of  the  Perplexed  I, 
ch.  53- 

120.  Duties,  ch.  i,  p.  44. 

121.  Ibid.,  ch.  10,  end,  p.  92  f. 

97,  122.  Duties,  II,  pp.  95-137. 
99,  123.  Ill,  pp.   138-197. 
loi,  124.    IV,  pp.  198-256. 

125.  Duties,    2nd    volume,    part   V, 

PP-  3-35- 

102,  126.  VI,  pp.  36-58. 

103,  127.  VII,  pp.  58-82. 

104,  128.  VIII,  pp.  82-126. 

105,  129.  IX,  pp.  126-150. 
130.  X,  pp.  151-168. 

106,  131.  Broyde,  Les  Reflexions  sur 
I'ame  par  Babya  ben  Joseph  ibn  Pa- 


442 


NOTES 


kouda,  Paris,  1896;  Hebrew  title,  130 

K'Bjn  nmn. 

132.  Goldziher,  Kitab  Ma'anI  al- 
nafs,  Berlin,  1907. 

133.  See  Guttmann  in  "  Monatschrift 
fiir  Geschichte  und  Wissenschaft  des 
Judenthums,"  XLI  (1897),  241  ff. 

107,  134.  Arabic  text,  p.  41,  12  and 
46,  2;  Hebrew,  p.  55,  i  and  61,  5. 

135.  Ch.  2,  p.  4,  29  (Heb.  p.  s,  last 
line). 

136.  Ibid.,  p.  6,  I  (Heb.  p.  7,  3). 

137.  Ibid.,  p.  s,  16  f.  (Heb.  6,  16  f.). 

138.  Ibid.,  ch.  9,  p.  34,  13  ff-  (Heb. 
p.  44,  10). 

139.  Ch.  2,  p.  6,  6  ff.  (Heb.  p.  7, 
8f.). 

140.  Ch.  12,  p.  42,  23  (Heb.  p.  56,  23). 

108,  141.  Chs.  1-2. 

111,  142.  Chs.  16-17. 
143.  Chs.  6  and  11-12. 

112,  144.  Ch.  2. 
145-  Ch.  9. 

113,  146.  Ch.  7. 
147.  Chs.  19  and  21. 

114,  148.  K^Sjn  IVJn  "IDD,  edited  by 
Freimann,  Leipzig,  i860.  German 
title,  Sefer  Hegjon  ha-Nefesch. 

115,  149.  p.  2a. 

150.  Ibid.,  also  4b. 

151.  See,  however,  below,  p.  119. 

152.  p.  2b. 

116,  153.  p.  I. 

117,  154.  pp.  1-2. 

118,  155.  pp.  4b-5a. 
156.  pp.  2b-4a. 

122,  157.  pp.  5b-8a. 
158.  p.  8b  ff. 

123,  159.  p.  iia. 
160.  pp.  10-12. 

124,  161.  p.  30b  ff. 

125, 162.  See  Doctor,  Die  Philosophie 
des  Joseph  ibn  Zaddik,  Miinster,  1895, 
pp.  1-3;  Horovitz,  Der  Mikrokosmos 
des  Joseph  Ibn  Saddik,  Breslau,  1903, 
I-II. 

163.  Horovitz,  Mikrokosmos,  XIII, 
ff. 


i64.  Letters  of  Maimonides,  ed. 
Amsterdam,  14b. 

126,  165.  Horovitz,  Mikrokosmos,  7, 
24-8,  2. 

127,  166.  Ibid.,  44-46;  53-54;  cf.  be- 
low, p.  145. 

167.  Ibid.,  p.  37,  2  ff.;  cf.  below, 
p.  138. 

129,  168.  pp.  1-2. 

130,  169.  pp.  3-6. 

133,  170.  pp.  7-19- 

134.  171-  PP-  19-25. 
137,  172.  pp.  25-33. 

141,  173.  pp.  33-43. 

142,  174.  pp.  43-47- 

145,  175-  PP-  47-57- 

146,  176.  pp.  57-58. 

149,  177-  PP-  59-79- 

150,  178.  Al-Chazari,  I,  67,  ed. 
Hirschfeld,  Leipzig,  1887,  p.  29, 
24. 

179.  Ibid.,  p.  29,  19-20. 

180.  I,  63;  II,  66;  pp.  29  and  125. 

151,  181.  See  Kaufmann,  Jehuda 
Halewi  in  "  Gesammelte  Schriften," 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1910,  vol.  2,  pp.  99- 

151- 

152,  182.  Al-Chazari  IV,  13,  15;  p. 

253,  18  ff.,  257,  6  ff. 

IS3»  183.  Kaufmann,  Geschichte 
der  Attributenlehre  in  der  jiidischen 
Religionsphilosophie  des  Mittelalters, 
Gotha,  1877,  pp.  1 19-140. 

157,  184.  Al-Chazari  I,  1-67,  pp.  i- 
29. 

158,  185.  Ibid.,  70  ff.,  p.  31  ff. 

159,  186.  II,  6;  p.  75,  22  ff. 
187.  IX,  13;  p.  253,  18  ff. 

160,  188.  IV,  3;  p.  229,  10  ff. 
189,  Ibid.,  15  ff.;  p.  257,  6  ff. 

161,  190.  II,  2-4;  pp.  71-75. 

163,  191.  I,  87  ff.;  p.  39  ff. 

164,  192.  I,  99  ff.;  p.  53  ff. 

193.  II,  10  ff.;  p.  77  ff. 

194.  Ibid.,  36  ff.;  p.  103  ff. 

165,  195.  Ibid.,  68  f.;  p.  125  f. 

167,  196.  IV,  3  ff.;  p.  237,  9  ff. 

168,  197.  II,  26,  p.  95;  48,  p.  107  f. 


NOTES 


443 


169,  198.  Ibid.,  50,  p.  109,  24  f.;  m, 
I  ff.,  p.  141  ff. 

170,  199.  I,  109  fE.;  p.  59  ff. 

173,  200.  V,  20  ff.,  p.  337  ff. 

201.  IV,  25,  p.  267  ff. 

202.  Ibid.,  27,  p.  283  f. 

174,  203.  Ibid.,  29  ff.,  p.  285  ff. 
17s,  204.  See  above,  p.  8. 

205.  Zeitschrift  der  deutschen 
morgenlandischen  Gesellschaft,  XXIX 
(1875),  PP-  335-418. 

177,  206.  V,  I  ff.,  p.  29s  ff. 

179,  207.  IV,  25,  p.  281,  24  ff. 

181,  208.  V,  12,  p.  311  ff. 

182,  209.  Ibid.,  14,  p.  323  ff. 

183,  210.  Ibid.,  16  ff.,  p.  331  ff. 
211.  Ibid.,  22  ff.,  p.  357  ff. 

184,  212.  Quoted  by  Bacher  in  Jewish 
Encyclopedia,  s.  v.  Ibn  Ezra,  Abraham. 

213.  Published  by  Dukes  in  "Zion," 
II,  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1842,  pp.  117- 
123,  134-137,  157-159,  175-  Cf.  also 
Literaturblatt  des  Orients,  X,  748,  where 
Dukes  pubUshes  a  brief  passage  from 
the  "Arugat  Habosem,"  not  found  in 
"Zion."  He  derived  it  from  a  different 
manuscript. 

187,  214.  Jesod  Mora,  published  with 
German  translation  by  M.  Creizenach, 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  and  Leipzig,  1840. 
Hebrew  title  N11D  *71D\  Sefer  Ha- 
Schem,  ed.  Lippmann,  1834.  Cf., 
Bacher,  Jewish  Encyclopedia,  s.  v. 

189,  215.  prn  ''3UJ  miD,  Warsaw, 

1894,  ch.  17  (pDDH  nnan),  pp.  266  ff. 

216.  Die  Religionsphilosophie  Abra- 
ham Ibn  Esra's,  in  "  Monatschrift  fiir 
Geschichte  und  Wissenschaf t  des  Juden- 
thums,"  42  and  43  (1898  and  1899). 

192,  217.  Ibid.,  42   (1898),  pp.  454- 

455- 

193,  218.  Commentary  on  Exod.  33, 
21,  towards  the  end  of  the  long  ex- 
cursus. 

195,  219.  Commentary  on  Exod.  20, 
2. 

220.  Introduction  to  his  commentary 
on  Ecclesiastes. 


197,  221.  Emunah  Ramah  (Heb. 
title  HDI  njlON),  published  with 
German  translation  by  Simson  Weil, 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1852,  p.  2  (Heb.), 

222,  Em.  Ram.,  p.  83. 

198,  223.  See  note  221. 

224.  Em.  Ram.,  2-3. 

225.  See  note  221. 

199,  226.  See  Horovitz,  Ueber  den 
EinJBuss  der  griechischen  Philosophie 
auf  die  Entwicklung  des  Kalam,  Bres- 
lau,  1909. 

200,  227.  But  see  below,  p.  354, 1.  31. 

202,  228.  Em.  Ram.,  p.  i  ff. 

203,  229.  Ibid.,  4. 

204,  230.  Al  Gazali.  Cf.  Guttmann, 
Die  Religionsphilosophie  des  Abraham 
ibn  Daud  aus  Toledo,  Gottingen,  1879, 
p.  117,  note. 

205,  231.  Em.  Ram.,  44-46. 
232.  Ibid.,  4-8. 

207,  233.  Ibid.,  9-13. 

208,  234.  Ibid.,  13-15. 

209,  235.  Ibid.,  15-20. 
216,  236.  Em.  Ram.,  20-41. 
237.  Ibid.,  41-43- 

220,  238.  Em.  Ram.,  44-51. 

221,  239.  Ibid.,  51-57- 

223,  240.  Ibid.,  57-69. 

224,  241.  Ibid.,  69-70. 

226.  242.  Ibid.,  70-75. 
228,  243.  Ibid.,  75-81. 
230,  244.  Ibid.,  93-98. 

232,  245.  See  Guttmann,  Die  Reli- 
gionsphilosophie des  Abraham  Ibn 
Daud,  p.  220,  note  2. 

235,  246.  Ibid.,  98-104. 

236, 247.  jrjinn  ni^o  -nxn,  Bresiau, 

1828.  For  other  editions  and  interesting 
information  concerning  this  treatise 
see  Steinschneider,  Die  Hebraischen 
Uebersetzungen  des  Mittelalters,  Berhn, 
1893,  §  251,  and  Die  Arabische  Litera- 
tiur  der  Juden,  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1902, 
p.  208,  5. 

248.  Introduction  to  the  eleventh 
chapter  (ch.  Helek)  of  the  treatise  San- 
hedrin. 


444 


NOTES 


239,  249.  Letters  of  Maimonides,  ed. 
Amsterdam,  pp.  i3b-i4. 

250.  The  Arabic  text  was  pub- 
lished with  a  French  translation  and 
extremely  valuable  notes  by  Solomon 
Munk,  under  the  title,  Le  Guide  des 
figares,  3  volumes,  Paris,  1856-66.  Eng- 
lish translation  by  M.  Friedlander  in 
3  vols.,  London,  1881-1885,  re-issued 
in  one  volume,  with  omission  of  notes, 
London,  1910.  For  other  translations, 
editions  and  commentaries  see  Kauf- 
mann,  "Der  'Fiihrer'  Maimunis  in  der 
Weltliteratur,"  Archiv  fiir  Geschichte 
der  Philosophie,  XI  (1898),  pp.  335- 
376,  republished  in  Kaufmann's  Gesam- 
melte  Schriften  ed.  Brann,  vol.  2, 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1910,  pp.  152-189. 
See  also  Friedlander's  translation,  Lon- 
don, 1910,  p.  XXVII  ff. 

251.  The  Arabic  text  was  published 
with  a  German  translation  by  M.  Wolff 
under  the  title,  Musa  Maimtini's  Acht 
Kapitel,  2nd  edition,  Leyden,  1903. 
Hebrew  text  with  English  translation 
by  Joseph  I.  Gorfinkle,  The  Eight 
Chapters  of  Maimonides  on  Ethics, 
New  York,  191 2  (Columbia  University 
Oriental  Studies,  vol.  VII). 

240,  252.  Emunah  Ramah,  p.  81  ff. 

241,  253.  Guide,  I,  chs.  i,  3-16,  18- 
30,  37-45,  64-67,  70. 

243,  254.  Ibid.,  ch.  54. 
255-  ni,  28. 

256.  I,  55- 

244,  257-  I,  32. 
258.  Ibid.,  ch.  33. 

245,  259.  Ch.  34. 
260.  Ch.  71. 

246,  261.  Ibid. 

247,  262.  Cf.,  however,  above,  p. 
XXV  f .  (the  view  that  Kalam  originated 
in  Judaism). 

248,  263.  Ch.  71. 

249,  264.  The  following  numbers  do 
not  correspond  to  those  of  Maimonides. 

252.  265.  Guide,  I,  73. 
266.  Ibid.,  74. 


253,  267.    Ibid.,  75. 

268.  Ibid.,  76. 

269.  See  below,  p.  257. 

270.  Below,  p.  259. 

271.  Above,  p.  218. 

272.  Below,  p.  258,  last  line,  and  260. 
257>  273.  Guide  II,  Introduction. 

260,  274.  Ibid.,  ch.  I. 

261,  275.  Ch.  36. 

262,  276.  Ch.  46. 

264,  277.  Ibid.,  chs.  51-53- 

265,  278.  Chs.  55-58. 
279.  Ch.  61. 

268,   280.    See    Munk,    Guide    des 
Egares  II,  p.  69,  note  i. 
281.  Guide  II,  chs.  3-6. 

271,  282.  Chs.  13-18. 

272,  283.  Munk  understands  the  pre- 
ceding sentence  differently.  See  his  edi- 
tion, vol.  II,  p.  157,  note  2. 

274,  284.  Guide  II,  chs.  19-25. 

281,  285.  Ibid.,  chs.  32-48. 
286.  Ill,  ch.  8. 

282,  287.  "  Eight  Chapters,"  ch.  i. 
285,  288.  Ibid.,  chs.  2-5. 

289.  Ch.  7. 

288,  290.  Ch.  8. 

289,  291.  Guide  III,  chs.  10-12. 

290,  292.  Ibid.,  ch.  16. 
292,  293.  Ibid.,  chs.  17-18. 

294,  294.  Ibid.,  chs.  19-21. 

295.  Ibid.,  chs.  26  and  31. 
295,  296.  Ibid.,  ch.  27. 

297,  Ibid.,  ch.  50. 

298,  298.  Ibid.,  chs.  29-50. 

299,  299.  Ibid.,  ch.  54. 
304,  300.  Ibid.,  II,  ch.  30. 

301.  Ibid.,  Ill,  chs.  1-7. 

302.  See  Munk,  Le  Guide  des  £gar6s, 
III,  p.  8,  note. 

303.  Ibid. 

304.  Guide  III,  chs.  22-23. 

305.  305.  See  Kaufmann,  Der 
Fiihrer  Maimflnis  in  der  Weltliteratur 
in  Archiv  fiir  Geschichte  der  Philoso- 
phie XI  (1898)  p.  314  f.;  reprinted  in 
Kaufmann's  Gesammelte  Schriften,  ed. 
Brann,  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1910,  p.  158  f. 


NOTES 


445 


306.  See  Jourdain,  Recherches  cri- 
tiques sur  I'age  et  I'origine  des  traduc- 
tions Latines  d'Aristote,  2nd  ed.,  Paris, 
1843.  German  transl.  by  Stahr,  Halle, 
183 1. 

305,  307.  Augustine,  De  Civitate 
Dei,  Book  VIII,  ch.  5,  "Nulli  nobis 
quam  isti  [sc,  Platonici]  propius  ac- 
cesserunt";  ch.  9,  "Platonem  de  Deo 
ista  sensisse,  quae  multum  congruere 
veritati  nostrae   religionis   agnoscunt." 

306,  308.  See  Mandonnet,  Siger  de 
Brabant  et  TAverroisme  Latin  au 
XIII™®  Siecle,  Louvain,  191 1,  chs.  1-2; 
Isaac  Husik,  An  Anonymous  Medieval 
Christian  Critic  of  Maimonides,  Jewish 
Quarterly  Review,  New  Series,  vol. 
II,  Phila.  191 1,  p.  159  ff. 

309.  See  J.  Perles,  "Die  in  einer 
Miinchener  Handschrift  aufgefundene 
erste  lateinische  Uebersetzung  des 
Maimonidischen  Fiihrers",  in  Monat- 
schrift  fiir  Geschichte  und  Wissen- 
schaft  des  Judenthums,  XXIV  (1875), 

p.  9ff. 

307,  310.  See  M.  Joel,  Verhaltniss 
Albert  des  Grossen  zu  Moses  Maimon- 
ides, Breslau,  1876,  in  M.  Joel,  Bei- 
trage  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic, 
Breslau,  1876.  J.  Guttmarm,  Das  Ver- 
haltniss des  Thomas  von  Aquino  zum 
Judenthum  und  zur  jiidischen  Literatiur, 
Gottingen,  189 1;  id.,  Die  Scholastik  des 
dreizehnten  Jahrhunderts  in  ihren  Be- 
ziehungen  zum  Judenthum  und  zur 
jiidischen  Literatur,  Breslau,  1902;  id., 
Der  Einfluss  der  Maimonidischen  Philo- 
sophic auf  das  christUche  Abendland,  in 
"Moses  ben  Maimon,"  vol.  I,  Leipzig, 
1908. 

308,  311.  See  Graetz,  History  of  the 
Jews,  index  volume,  s.  v.,  "  Maimunist 
Controversy." 

309,  312.  Published  by  M.  L.  Bis- 
hches,  Pressbiu-g,  1837. 

312a.  Edited  by  W.  Bacher  under 
the  title  "Safer  Musar,"  Berlin, 
1910 


313.  Published  by  the  "Mekize  Nir- 
damim"  Society,  Lyck,  1866. 

310,  314.  PubUshed  by  Munk  in  Me- 
langes de  Philosophie  Juive  et  Arabe, 
Paris,  1859. 

315.  Published  by  Bisliches,  Press- 
burg,  1837. 

316.  See  Munk,  Melanges,  p.  494, 
note  i;  H.  Malter,  Shem  Tob  Pal- 
quera,  in  Jewish  Quarterly  Review, 
new  series,  vol.  i,  pp.  151-181,  451- 
Soi. 

317.  PubUshed  by  Werblimer,  Joseph! 
Kaspi  .  .  .  Commentaria  hebraica  in 
R.  Mosis  Maimonides  Tractatum 
Dalalat  al  Haiirin,  Frankfurt  a.  M., 
1848. 

318.  Edited  by  Goldenthal,  Wien, 
1852. 

311,319.  The  English  reader  will  also 
find  a  good  deal  of  material  in  the 
pages  of  the  Jewish  Encyclopedia  under 
the  names  of  the  translators  and  writers 
above  mentioned. 

313,  320.  Guide  I,  ch.  74,  7th  proof, 
end. 

314,  321.  Published  by  the  "Mekize 
Nirdamim,"  Lyck,  1874. 

315,  322.  Tagm.  Hanef.  i. 

3i7>  323.  Ibid.,  ib-7b.  The  defini- 
tion occurs,  p.  7b,  11.  28  flf. 

318,  324.  Ibid.,  8a. 

319,  325.  Ibid.,  8a-ioa. 

322,  326.  Ibid.,  ioa-i3b. 

323,  327.  Ibid.,  i3b-i9b. 

324,  328.  Ibid.,  2oa-2ib. 

326,  329.  Ibid.,  2ib-24b. 
330.  Ibid.,  24. 

327,  331.  Ibid.,  25a-32. 

328,  331a.  See  Heimann  Auerbach, 
Albalag  und  seine  Uebersetzvmg  des 
Makasid  al-GazzaHs,  Breslau,  1906, 
p.  vii  f.;  Guttmann,  Die  Stellung  des 
Simon  ben  Zemach  Duran  in  der 
Geschichte  der  jiidischen  ReUgions- 
philosophie  in  Monatschrift  fiir  Ge- 
schichte imd  Wissenschaft  des  Juden- 
thums, vol.  LVII  (1913),  p.  184  f. 


446 


NOTES 


328,  332.  See  Maywald,  Die  Lehre 
von  der  zweifachen  Wahrheit,  Berlin, 
1871;  Mandonnet,  Siger  de  Brabant 
et  rAverroisme  Latin  au  XIII™^ 
Siecle,  Louvain,  1911,  vol.  i,  p.  148  ff. 

3291  333.  First  edition,  Riva  di 
Trento,  1560;  modern  edition,  Leipzig, 
1866.  The  references  in  the  sequel  are 
to  the  Leipzig  edition. 

334.  See  Husik,  Judah  Messer  Leon's 
Commentary  on  the  "Vetus  Logica," 
Leyden,  1906,  p.  11. 

335.  See  Joel,  Lewi  ben  Gerson  als 
Religionsphilosoph,  Breslau,  1862,  p.  gf. 
(in  M.  Joel,  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte 
der  Philosophie,  Breslau,  1876). 

330>  33^-  Introduction  to  Gersonides' 
commentary  on  the  Pentateuch. 

337.  Introduction  to  "Milhamot 
Adonai,"  pp.  6-7. 

331,  338.  Milhamot  I,  ch.  14,  p.  91. 

339.  Ibid.,  Introduction,  p.  8. 

336,  340.  I,  chs.  1-4,  pp.  12-35. 

337,  341.  Ibid.,  ch.  5,  pp.  35-3^- 

339,  342.  Ch.  6,  pp.  36-48. 

340,  343.  Ibid.,chs.  10-12, pp.  61-88. 
342,   344.   Milhamot    II,    chs.    1-2, 

pp.  92-98. 

345.  Ibid.,  chs.  3,  5  and  6,  pp.  98  f., 
104,  III  f. 

344,  346.  Milhamot  III,  ch.  3,  p.  132. 

345,  347-  ni,  chs.  1-6,  pp.  120-150. 

349,  348.  IV,  chs.  1-7,  pp.  151-187. 

350,  349-  V,  3,  ch.  6,  p.  264  f. 
351,350.  Ibid.,   chs.   4-6,   pp.    247- 

264. 

352,  351.  Ch.  12,  pp.  278-285. 

354,  352.  VI,  I,  chs.  1-9,  pp.  293- 
328. 

353.  Ibid.,  chs.  10-13,  pp.  328-353; 
ch.  15,  p.  356  f. 

355,  354.  Ch.  16,  pp.  359-361. 

357,  355-  Chs.  17-28,  pp.  362-416. 

356,  VI,  2,  ch.  I,  p.  419- 

358,  357-  VI,  2,  chs.  1-8,  pp.  418- 
441. 

360,  358.  Ibid.,  chs.  9-12,  pp.  441- 
460. 


359.  Chs,  13-14,  pp.  460-463. 

363,  360.  Published  by  DeHtzsch  and 
Steinschneider,  Leipzig,  1841. 

364,  361.  Ez  Hayim,  p.  4. 

366,  362.  E.  H.,  pp.  3-5. 

367,  363-  P-  15,  1-  6  f.,  also  p.  18, 
1.  10  f. 

364.  Ch.  4,  pp.  12-13,  1.  24. 

368,  365.  Ch.  9,  pp.  26-27. 

369,  366.  p.  17,  1.  16. 

367-  p.  33- 

372,  368.  Chs.  66-72,  pp.  80-89. 
369.  Ch.  75,  pp.  93-Q6. 

373,  370.  Chs.  76-78,  pp.  96-99. 

375,  371-  Chs.  79-81,  pp.  100-107. 

376,  372.  Chs.  82-89,  pp.  107-133. 

377,  373-  Ch.  89,  pp.  133-136. 

378,  374.  "Guide"  III,  24. 

379,  375-  Ez  Hayim,  ch.  90,  pp.  136- 
144. 

376.  "Guide"  III,  chs.  12, 13,  25  end. 

380,  377.  Ez  Hayim,  ch.  94,  pp.  149- 

154- 

382,  378.  Chs.  96-100,  pp.  160-176. 

379.  Chs.  101-102,  pp.  177-181. 

380.  Ez  Hayim,  pp.  116-117. 

383,  381.  Ch.  103,  pp.  181-185. 

384,  382.  Chs.  104-105,  pp.  185-187. 

385,  383.  Ch.  106,  p.  187  ff.;  ch.  109, 
p.  194  ff. 

384.  Chs.  107-108. 
387,  385.  Chs.  110-112. 

389,  386.  Ed.  Ferara,  1556  (no  pagi- 
nation) . 

390,  387.    "Or    Adonai,"    Introduc- 
tion, pp.  6-7  (not  numbered). 

391,  388.  Book  I,  sections  1-2. 

389.  Ibid.,  section  3,  ch.  2. 

390.  Ibid.,  ch.  3. 

392,  391.  Ibid. 

392.  Ibid.,  ch.  4. 

393,  393-  Book  II,  section  L 
395,  394-  Ibid.,  section  2. 

395.  Section  3. 

396.  Section  4. 
398,  397.  Section  5. 

398.  See  M.  Joel,  "Don  Chasdai  Cres- 
kas'     religionsphilosophische    Lehren," 


NOTES 


447 


Breslau,  1866  (in  M.  Joel,  Beitrage 
zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Breslau, 
1876),  p.  54  f. 

402,  399.  Or  Adonai,  II,  section  6. 
400.  Ibid.,  Ill,  introduction. 

403,  401.  Ibid.,  section  i. 

404,  402.  Section  3. 

405,  403.  Section  4. 

406,  403a.  Simon  ben  Zemach  Duran 
(1361-1444).  He  was  a  relative  of 
Gersonides,  a  Rabbinical  authority, 
and  the  author  of  a  scientific  and  phil- 
osophical work,  entitled  "Magen  Abot." 
Unlike  his  more  distinguished  relative, 
Simon  Duran  was  opposed  to  the  ex- 
treme views  adopted  by  such  men  as 
Albalag,  Moses  of  Narbonne  or  Ger- 
sonides himself,  and  favored  a  return 
to  the  more  moderate  standpoint  of 
Maimonides.  Without  laying  any 
claim  to  originality  his  work  shows 
wide  reading  and  familiarity  with  the 
scientific  and  philosophic  literature 
of  the  time.  See  Guttmann,  "  Die  Stel- 
lung  des  Simon  ben  Zemach  Duran  in 
der  Geschichte  der  jiidischen  Reli- 
gionsphilosophie,"  in  Monatschrift  fiir 
Geschichte  und  Wissenschaf  t  des  Juden- 
thums,  vol.  52  (1908),  pp.  641-672, 
vol.  53  (1909),  pp.  46-97,  199-228. 
From  Guttmann's  investigations  it 
appears  that  Albo  cannot  claim  any 
originality  even  for  the  reduction  of  the 
fundamental  dogmas  of  Judaism  to 
three.  The  first  part  of  the  "Ikkarim" 
turns  out  to  be  a  compilation  from 
Crescas  and  Duran,  and  is  no  more 
original  than  the  rest  of  the  book. 
When  we  consider  that  though  he  owes 
the  central  point  of  his  contribution  to 
Duran,  Albo  never  mentions  him,  the 
charge  of  plagiarism  brought  against 
him  is  not  far  from  justified.  See  below, 
p.  407. 

407,  404-  D^VIjn  npj;  Slt3^3,  pub- 
lished by  Ephraim  Deinard,  Carney,  N. 
J.,  1904.  The  work  was  originally  com- 
posed in  Spanish,  and  was  translated 


into    Hebrew    by  Joseph    Ibn   Shem- 
tob. 
404a.  See  also  note  403a. 

408,  405.  nnpyn  ISD,  ed.  Warsaw, 
1877,  pp.  13-14- 

406.  Ibid.,  pp.  14-17. 

409,  407.  pp.  21-25. 

408.  In  the  introduction  to  his  com- 
mentary on  the  eleventh  chapter  of  the 
Mishnic  treatise  Sanhedrin  (chapter 
Helek). 

410,  409.  Crescas;  cf.  above,  p.  392. 

410.  Ikkarim,  I,  ch.  3,  pp.  25-31. 

411,  411.  Chs.  4-7,  pp.  31-39. 

412,  412.  Ch.  8,  pp.  39-46. 

413.  Ch.  9,  pp.  46-48. 

413,  414.  Chs.  10-11,  pp.  48-58. 

415.  Ch.  12,  pp.  58-60. 

416.  Chs.  13  and  15,  pp.  60-61  and 
64-68. 

414,  417.  Ch.  14,  pp.  61-64. 

415,  418.  Ch.  17,  pp.  7  -76. 
419.  Ch.  18,  pp.  76-78. 

416,  420.  Ch.  23,  pp.  84-86. 

418,  421.  Ch.  24,  pp.  87-90. 

422.  Ch.  25,  pp.  90-92. 

419,  423.  Ch.  26,  p.  93. 

424.  Book  II,  chs.  4-5,  pp.  107-114. 

425.  Ibid.,  ch.  7,  pp.  1 1 7-1 18. 

420,  426.  Chs.  8-10,  pp.  1 18-125. 

427.  Chs.  11-13,  pp.  125-140. 

428.  Ch.  12,  pp.  129-133. 

421, 429.  Book  III,  chs.  1-5,  pp.  197- 
214. 
430.  Chs.  6-7,  pp.  214-218. 

423,  431.  Chs.  8-11,  pp.  218-228. 

424,  432.  Chs.  13-20,  pp.  229-246. 
433.  Book  IV,  chs.  1-6,  pp.  279-294. 

425.  434-  Chs.  7-15,  pp.  294-313. 
427,  435.  Chs.  29-35,  PP-  338-356. 
429, 436.  See  Guttmann  "Die  Familie 

Schemtob  in  ihren  Beziehungen  zur 
Philosophic,"  Monatschrift  fur  Ge- 
schichte und  Wissenschaft  des  Juden- 
thums,  vol.  57  (1913),  P-  177  ff- 

437.  See  Guttmann  as  in  preceding 
note. 

438.  See  preceding  note. 


448 


NOTES 


430,  439.  See  note  436. 

440.  See  Jewish  Encyclopedia  s.  v. 

441.  J.  E.  s.  V. 

431,  442.  See  Zimmels,  "Leo  He- 
braeus,  ein  jiidischer  Philosoph  der 
Renaissance,"  Leipzig,  1886;  Appel, 
"Leone  Medigos  Lehre  vom  Wei  tall 
und    ihr    Verhaltniss    zu    griechischen 


und  zeitgenossischen  Anschauungen," 
in  Archiv  fiir  Geschichte  der  Phil- 
osophie,  vol.  XX,  pp.  387-400,  496- 
520;  Munk,  Melanges,  pp.  522-528. 

443.  Husik,  "Judah  Messer  Leon's 
Commentary  on  the  Vetus  Logica," 
Ley den,   1906. 

444.  Jewish  Encyclopedia,  s.  v. 


LIST  OF  BIBLICAL  AND  RABBINIC  QUOTATIONS 


Bible 

Genesis:  i,  i,  p.  no;  i,  2,  p.  118; 
I,  3,  p.  120;  I,  6,  p.  118;  I,  9,  p.  121; 

1,  II,  p.  121;  I,  21,  p.  121;  I,  25,  p. 
121;  I,  26,  pp.  121,  268;  I,  27,  pp.  94, 
121;  I,  28,  p.  121;  2,  7,  p.  121,  214; 

2,  19,  p.  121;  6,  6,  p.  227;  8,  21,  p. 
102;  II,  7,  p.  268;  14,  22,  p.  369; 
ch.  15,  p.  280;  15,  4,  p.  280;  15,  12  &., 
p.  225;  18,  10,  p.  340;  27,  34-41,  p. 
74;  28,  13,  p.  94;  28,  20,  p.  105;  s6, 

31,  P-  295- 

Exodus:  2,  13,  p.  232;  2,  17,  p. 
232;  3,  14,  P-  95;  5,  2,  p.  160; 
7,  3,  pp.  xiv,  42;  9,  12,  p.  74; 
15,  26,  p.  403;  20,  2,  pp.  194,  233; 
20,  11-12,  p.  233;  20,  17,  p.  83;  20, 
35,  P-  409;  22,  26,  p.  74;  23,  21,  p. 
109;  24,  10,  p.  167;  32,  II,  P-  381; 
33,  13,  P-  243;  33,  23,  p.  37;  34,  6, 
P-  233. 

Leviticus:  19,  17,  p.  83;  19,  18, 
p.  83. 

Numbers:  10,  8,  p.  227;  12,  8, 
p.  167;  IS,  39,  p.  83;  23,  10,  p.  170. 

Deuteronomy:  2,  30,  p.  xiv;  4, 
15,  PP-  35,  95;  4,  39,  PP-  84,  IIS,  220; 
6,  4,  P-  74;  13,  I,  PP-  382, 423;  15,  7, 
p.  83;  17,  IS,  p.  29s;  30,  15,  P-  286; 


12,  p.  208;  40,  26,  p.  369;  43,  I,  p. 
122;  43,  7,  p.  121;  45,  18,  p.  104;  59, 
19,  p.  109. 

Jeremiah:  7,  22,  p.  234;  9,  22-23, 
pp.  124,  148,  205,  299;  18,  I  ff.,  p. 

207:31,  33,  P-  141- 

Ezekiel:  8,  9,  p.  109. 

Hosea:  4,  6,  p.  348;  6,  3,  p.  141. 

Amos:  3,  2,  p.  164;  5,  6,  p.  141. 

Micah:  6,  8,  p.  168. 

Zephaniah:  2,  3,  p.  148. 

Malachi:  I,  9,  p.  41. 

Psalms:  19,  p.  216;  19,  2,  p. 
193;  19,  7,  P-  193;  19,  8,  p.  411; 
19,  9-10,  p.  412;  73,  11-13,  p.  293; 
94,  9,  P-  293;  136,  6,  p.  176;  139, 
p.  205;  14s,  9,  p.  376. 

Proverbs:  8,  22,  p.  109;  25,  16, 
p.  244;  30,  4,  p.  208. 

Job:  10, 10,  p.  378;  19,  26,  p.  116; 
23,  13,  P-  xxvi;  ch.  32,  p.  349;  38, 
36-37,  p.  208. 

ECCLESIASTES:  I,  I4,  p.  47;  2,  3, 
p.  47. 

Daniel:  7,  i,  p.  225;  10, 8,  p.  278; 
10,  17,  p.  381;  12,  2,  p.  404. 
Nehemiah:  9,  5,  p.  95. 

Mishna  and  Talmud 
Berakot  (Bab.  Tal.):  17  a,  p.  44; 


30, 19,  pp.  xiv,  41, 286;  3 1, 1 7,  p.  348;      33  b,  p.  xxvi,  note  14,  p.  41. 


33,  4,  P- 41;  34,  10,  p.  416. 
Joshua:  ch.  10,  p.  360. 

I.  Samuel:  2,  6,  p.  386;  19,  20, 
p.  226. 

II.  Samuel:  23,  2,  p.  34. 
I.  Kings:  22,  20,  p.  xiv. 
Isaiah:  i,  14,  p.  227;  i,  11-17,      p.  408;  106  b,  p.  83. 

p.  82;  5,  20,  p.  374;  6,  I,  8,  p.  280;  Makkot:  23  b,  p.  416. 

II,  1-4,  p.  112;  26,  19,  p.  386;  40,         Abot:  ch.  4,  p.  44. 

449 


Berakot  (Jer.  Tal.):  I,  p.  83. 
Pesaktm:  54  a,  p.  xxvi,  note  17. 
Megillah:  25  b,  p.  xxvi,  note  15. 
Hagigah:  ch.  2,  p.  244;  11  b,  p. 
xvi,  notes  2  and  3. 

Sanhedrin:  38  b,  p.  268;  99  a, 


INDEX 


Aaron  ben  Elijah,  xli,  362-387; 
relation  to  Maimonides,  363  f.;  to 
the  Mu'tazila,  364;  reason  and 
faith,  364  f.;  physics,  366  ff.; 
defends  atomic  theory,  367  f.; 
creation,  ibid.;  existence  of  God, 
368  f.;  unity,  ibid.;  incorporeality, 
ibid.;  attributes,  369  f.;  wiU  of 
God,  372;  problem  of  evil,  373  f., 
376  f.;  Providence,  375  f.;  reward 
and  punishment,  379,  383;  pur- 
pose of  the  world  and  of  man, 
379  f.;  prophecy,  380  f.;  immu- 
tability of  the  Law,  382;  reason  of 
the  commandments,  ibid.;  im- 
mortality, 384;  resurrection,  385  f. 

Aaron  ben  Joseph,  363 

Abarbanel,  Don  Isaac,  304,  312,  328, 
430 

Abarbanel,  Judah  Leo,  431 

Abd  Al  Rahman  III,  59 

Abelard,  305 

Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  xlvi,  114-124; 
standpoint,  115;  physics,  116  f.; 
matter,  ibid.;  form,  117  ff.;  intel- 
lect, soul  and  nature,  119;  ethics, 
119,  122  f.;  reward  and  punish- 
ment, 119,  122  ff.;  immortality, 
120  f.;  problem  of  evil,  123  f.;  128, 

139,  17s,  309,  435 
i^lsculapius,  155 
Afer,  Constantinus,  i 
Aher,  197 
Akiba,  Rabbi,  xxvi 
Al-Ashari,  xxiii 
Albalag,  Isaac,  328,  429,  430,  447, 

note  403a 


Albalia,  Barun,  151 

Al  Basir,  Joseph,  xxv,  xlvii,  48-55; 
priority  of  reason,  48;  atomic 
theory,  49;  existence  of  God,  49  f.; 
creation,  ibid.;  attributes,  50; 
divine  will,  ibid.;  eternity,  51; 
incorporeahty,  unity,  simplicity, 
ibid,  f.;  God's  word,  52;  ethics, 
ibid,  f.;  problem  of  evil,  54; 
freedom,  54  f.;  and  foreknowledge, 
ibid.;  reward  and  punishment,  55; 
56,  57,  81,  126,  127,  128,  141,  146, 
200,  246,  363,  434 

Albertus  Magnus,  i,  200,  306,  312, 

Albo,  Joseph,  1,  406-427;  standpoint, 
406  ff.;  purpose  of  his  work,  408; 
principles  of  rehgion,  ibid.;  crit- 
icism of  Maimonides's  13  articles, 
409  ff.;  Albo's  own  view,  410  f.; 
divine  law  distinguished  from 
natural  and  conventional,  408  ff.; 
freedom,  a  principle,  41 2 ;  creation, 
413,  415;  existence  of  God,  419  f.; 
attributes,  420;  angels,  ibid.; 
revelation,  420  f.;  prophecy,  421; 
immutability  of  the  Law,  423; 
God's  knowledge,  424;  and  hu- 
man freedom,  ibid.;  Providence, 
425;  reward  and  punishment, 
42s  f.;  428,  430,  436,  447,  note 
403a 

Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  xviii,  7, 
60,  290,  313,  321,  332,  334,  335, 
336 

Alexander  the  Great,  xvii 

Alexander  of  Hales,  306 


451 


452 


INDEX 


Alfadhil,  239 

Alfarabi,  xx,  xxi,  xxxix,  xlvi,  2,  26, 

60,  177,  178,  198,  199,  218,  223, 

252,  253,  276,  281,  302,  312,  313, 

362,  391,  392 
Alfasi,  151 
Algazali,  xxxix,  80,  152,  153,  389, 

392,  420,  443,  note  230 
Ali,  86 

Al-Kirkisani,  Joseph  Ha-Maor,  363 
Almohades,  238 
Alphonso  VI,  151 
Al-Mansur,  i 
Almoravid,  151 
Anatoli,  Jacob,  302,  309 
Angels,  xlvi;  in  Abraham  ibn  Ezra, 

190  f.;  in  Ibn  Daud,  221  f.;  in 

Maimonides,  266  f.;  in  Albo,  420 
Anthropomorphism,  xxii,  xxvi,  xlv, 

35,  95,  186,  260  f. 
Appel,  448,  note  442 
Aquinas,  Thomas,  1,61,63,  200,  207, 

306,  307,  312,  313,  323,  331,  332, 

406 
Arama,  Isaac,  430 
Archimedes,  xviii 
AristoteUans,  xl,  150,  165,  246,  364, 

365,  366,  368,  428 
Aristotle,   xvi,   xviii,   xix,   xx,   xxi, 

xxix  ff.,  xxxvii,  xxxix,  xl,  xU,  xlii, 

xlv,  xlvi,  7,  8,  9,  13,  20,  26,  60,  62, 

64,  72,  89,  92,  107,  III,  126,  132, 

138,  139,  155,  157,  173,  175,  177, 
178,  179,  181,  182,  184,  185,  199, 
200,  206,  207,  210,  213,  216,  217, 
218,  236,  240,  247,  252,  253,  254, 
256,  258,  266,  267,  268,  269,  270, 
271,  273,  274,  275,  276,  290,  291, 
299,  300,  303,  305,  306,  307,  309, 
312,  313,  315,  316,  321,  329,  331, 
332,  333,  334,  338,  346,  347,  35°, 
352,  353,  354,  366,  367,  375,  378, 
388,  389,  390,  395,  402,  408,  412, 
425,  429,  430,  431 


"Arugat  Habosem,"  184 

Ashariya,  xxiii,  xxvii,  xlvii,  23,  246, 
251,  291,  362,  36s,  372,  378,  379 

Atomic  theory,  in  the  Kalam,  xxii, 
249  f.;  in  Saadia,  25;  in  Al  Basir, 
49;  in  Jeshua  ben  Judah,  56;  in 
Aaron  ben  Elijah,  367  f. 

Attributes, doctrine  of, in  the  Kalam, 
xxiii,  xxvii,  xl,  xHv;  in  Saadia, 
xhv,  2)3  f-;  in  Mukammas,  18  ff.; 
in  Al  Basir,  50;  in  Bahya,  93  f.; 
in  Ibn  Zaddik,  145  f.;  in  Judah 
Halevi,  161  ff.;  in  Ibn  Daud,  220 
f.;  in  Maimonides,  xlv,  262  ff.;  in 
Levi  ben  Gerson,  xlv,  344  f.,  351  f.; 
in  Aaron  ben  EUjah,  369  f.;  in 
Crescas,  391  f.;  in  Albo,  420 

Auerbach,  Heimann,  445,  note  331a 

Augustine,  xH,  51,  305, 445,  note  307 

Averroes  (Ibn  Roshd),  xx,  xxi,  xxxix, 
xli,  xlvi,  xlvii,  7,  60,  62,  125,  177, 
199,  306,  309,  310,  312,  313,  318, 
321,  322,  323,  329,  332,  334,  335, 
336,  362,  392,  431 

Avicebron,  see  Gabirol,  Solomon 
Ibn 

Avicenna  (Ibn  Sina),  xx,  xxi,  xxxix, 
xlvi,  2,  26,  60,  62,  107,  108,  175, 
177,  178,  179,  198,  199,  207,  210, 
211,  213,  218,  223,  224,  253,  276, 
281,  302,  312,  313,  362,  391,  392, 
420 

Bacher,  W.,  437,  443,  notes  212  and 
214;  445,  note  312a 

Back,  Samuel,  436 

Baeumker,  Clemens,  440,  note  84; 
441,  notes  86  and  89 

Bahya,  Ibn  Pakuda,  xix,  xxviii, 
xxxix,  xlii,  1,  80-105;  duties  of  the 
limbs  and  duties  of  the  heart, 
82  f.;  sources  of  knowledge,  83; 
creation,  86  ff.;  unity,  89  f.;  attri- 
butes, 93  f.;  study  of  nature,  96  f.; 


INDEX 


453 


gratitude  to  God,  97  f.;  submis- 
sion to  God,  98;  freedom,  ibid.; 
the  laws,  98  f.;  trust  in  God,  99  f.; 
"vmity  of  conduct,"  loi  f.;  humil- 
ity, ibid.;  repentance,  102;  self- 
examination,  103;  temperance, 
104;  asceticism,  ibid.;  love  of 
God,  105;  106,  126,  128,  146,  147, 
162,  167,  168,  195,  200,  201,  217, 
241,  246,  252,  309,  362,  428,  434 

Baradaeus,  Jacob,  34 

Bardenhewer,  439,  note  7 

Bardesanes,  375 

Becker,  C.  H.,  xxvi,  xxvii 

Beer,  433 

Bernfeld,  Simon,  viii,  433 

Bisliches,  M.  L.,  445,  notes  312  and 

315 
Bloch,  Philipp,  436 
Brahmins,  380 
Brethren  of  Purity,  xxxix,  60,  107, 

125,  126,  128,  139,  187,  199 
Broyde,  Isaac,  106,  441,  note  131 

Cicero,  431 

Clement  VI,  Pope,  329 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  302 

Chazars,  153 

Crawford,  J.  P.  W.,  436 

Creation,  in  Kalam,  xxii,  xlii,  24, 
247,  252;  in  Saadia,  xlii,  24;  in 
IsraeK,  5  ff.;  in  Al  Basir,  49  f.;  in 
Jeshua  ben  Judah,  56;  in  Gabirol, 
68;  in  Bahya,  xlii,  86  ff.;  in  Pseudo 
Bahya,  no;  in  Abraham  bar 
Hiyya,  116  ff.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
xlii,  143;  in  Judah  Halevi,  157;  in 
Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  190;  in 
Maimonides,  269  ff.;  in  Levi  ben 
Gerson,  352  f.;  in  Aaron  ben 
Elijah,  367  f.;  in  Albo,  413,  415 

Creed,  articles  of,  1;  in  Maimonides, 
409  f.;  in  Crescas,  392  ff.;  in 
Albo,  410  f. 


Creizenach,  M.,  443,  note  214 
Crescas,  Hasdai,  xv,  xix,  xxvii, 
xxxix,  xl,  xlii,  xlix,  1,  173,  200,  312, 
388-405;  standpoint,  389;  exist- 
ence of  God,  389  f.;  imity,  391 
f.;  attributes,  ibid.;  fundamental 
dogmas  of  Judaism,  392  ff.;  God's 
knowledge,  392  f.;  Providence, 
393  f.;  problem  of  evil,  394; 
prophecy,  395;  freedom,  396  f.; 
influence  on  Spinoza,  398  f.;  pur- 
pose of  the  Law,  399  f . ;  immortal- 
ity, 400;  creation,  402;  criticism  of 
Maimonides's  13  articles  of  the 
creed,  402,  404;  reward  and  pun- 
ishment, 403  f.;  resurrection,  404 
f.;  406,  407,  408,  409,  414,  416, 
419,  420,  421,  424,  426,  428,  430, 
436,  447,  notes  403a  and  409 
'Cusari,"  see  "Kusari" 

Daud,  Abraham  Ibn,  xix,  xx,  xxvii, 
xxxix,  xlii,  xliii,  xlv,  xlvi,  xlvii, 
xlviii,  xlix,  61,  62,  62>,  71,  79,  125, 
166,  197-235;  standpoint,  197  f.; 
Ibn  Daud  neglected,  201 ;  purpose 
of  his  book,  201  f.;  duty  to  study 
philosophy,  202;  relative  value  of 
the  sciences,  203  f.;  categories, 
205;  physics,  205  ff.;  matter  and 
form,  ibid.;  motion,  207;  infinity, 
208;  psychology,  209  ff.;  rational 
soul,  212  ff.;  the  three  kinds  of 
intellect,  214;  immortality,  215; 
metempsychosis,  215  f.;  the  heav- 
enly spheres,  216;  existence  of 
God,  217  ff.;  incorporeality,  217; 
luiity,  219  f.;  attributes,  220  f.; 
angels,  221  f.;  active  intellect,  222; 
emanation  of  Intelligences,  223; 
tradition,  223  f.;  prophecy,  224  f.; 
abrogation  of  the  Law,  226  f.; 
freedom,  201  f.,  229  ff.;  problem  of 
evil,   228  f.;  and  foreknowledge, 


454 


INDEX 


229  f.;  ethics,  231  £f.;  virtues,  232; 
reason  of  commandments,  233  f.* 
237,  240,  241,  246,  248,  253,  254, 
257,  266,  267,  276,  281,  302,  307, 
309,  317,  332,  350,  362,  366,  388, 
428,  435 

De  Boer,  439,  note  5 

"Definitions,  Book  of,"  2,  4,  60 

Deinard,  E.,  447,  note  404 

Delitzsch,  446,  note  360 

Delmedigo,  Elijah,  431 

Delmedigo,  Joseph  Solomon,  431 

Democritus,  xxii,  3 

Dieterici,  439,  note  6 

Doctor,  Max,  435,  442,  note  162 

Dominicus  Gundissalinus,  61,  63 

Dukes,  443,  note  213 

Dunash  ben  Labrat,  59 

Duns  Scotus,  61,  63,  200,  307 

Duran,  Simon,  406,  447,  note  403a 

"Duties  of  the  Hearts,"  80,  81 

Duval,  439,  note  5 

"Eight  Chapters,"  239 

Eisler,  Moritz,  433 

"Elements,  Book  of,"  2,  3,  4,  10,  60 

Elias  of  Nisibis,  34 

EHsha  ben  Abuya,  197 

Empedocles,  60,  61,  64,  126,  127, 
145,  179, 184 

"Emunah  Ramah,"  198 

"Emunot  ve-Deot,"  24 

Engelkemper,  D.  J.,  434 

Entelechy,  xxxv,  209 

Ephodi,  328 

Epicurus,  290,  367 

Eriugena,  200 

Ethics,  in  Jewish  Philosophy,  xlvii, 
f.;  in  Saadia,  46  f.;  in  Al  Basir, 
52  f.;  in  Jeshua  ben  Judah,  57; 
in  Gabirol,  71  £f.;  in  Abraham  bar 
Hiyya,  119  ff.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik,  148; 
in  Judah  Halevi,  168;  in  Abraham 
ibn  Ezra,  195;  in  Ibn  Daud,  228 


ff.,  231  ff.;  in  Maimonides,  281 
ff.;  in  Hillel  ben  Samuel,  325.  See 
also  "Virtue." 

Euclid,  xviii,  90 

Evil,  Problem  of,  in  AI  Basir,  54;  in 
Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  123  f.;  in 
Ibn  Zaddik,  148;  in  Abraham  ibn 
Ezra,  19s;  in  Ibn  Daud,  228  f.; 
in  Maimonides,  288  f.;  in  Aaron 
ben  Elijah,  373  f.;  in  Crescas,  394 

Exegesis,  Biblical,  xvi,  xxxvii;  in 
Saadia,  35;  in  Gabirol,  78  f.;  in 
Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  187  f.;  in 
Maimonides,  302  ff.;  in  Levi  ben 
Gerson,  3S7f.;437 

"Ez  Hayim,"  363 

Ezekiel,  Vision  of  divine  chariot, 
xvii,  303 

Falaquera,  Shem  Tob,  61,  63,  64, 
309,  328,  441,  note  86 

"Pons  Vitae,"  60,  61,  72,  80,  etc. 

"Fountain  of  Life,"  see  "Pons 
Vitffi" 

Frankl,  P.  P.,  434,  440,  note  80 

Prankl-Griin,  Ad.,  435 

Freedom  of  the  Will,  xiv,  xlvii;  in 
Saadia,  41  f.;  in  Al  Basir,  54  f.; 
in  Bahya,  98;  in  Judah  Halevi, 
xlviii,  171  ff.;  in  Abraham  ibn 
Ezra,  193;  in  Ibn  Daud,  xlviii, 
229  f.;  in  Maimonides,  xlviii,  285 
ff.;  in  Crescas,  xlviii,  396  ff.;  in 
Albo,  412,  424 

Freimann,  442,  note  148 

Pried,  S.,  439,  note  30;  440,  note  34 

Priedlander,  M.,  444,  note  250 

Gabirol,  Solomon  Ibn,  xix,  xxxix, 
xM,  59-79;  fate  of  G.  in  Jewish 
Literature,  60  f.;  tendency  of  his 
work,  63  f.;  G.  a  Neo-Platonist, 
64;  his  doctrine,  64  ff.;  emanation, 
65;  matter  in  spiritual  substances, 


INDEX 


455 


65,67;  man  typical  of  the  universe, 
65;  Intelligence,  Soul,  Nature,  66; 
matter,  66  f.;  creation,  68;  will, 
68  f.,  70;  mystic  knowledge,  69  f.; 
ethics,  71  ff.;  the  virtues,  72  f.; 
the  "Royal  Crown"  (Keter  Mal- 
kut),  75  f.;  Bibhcal  exegesis,  78  f.; 
influence  on  Jewish  Philosophy,  79; 
on  Kabbala,  ibid.;  80,  81,  89,  91, 
107,  126,  127,  131,  151,  184,  185, 
187,  188,  198,  200,  206,  237,  246, 
307,  309,  328,  428,  434 
Galen,  xviii,  2,  3,  72,  209,  252 
Genesis,  creation  story,  xvii,  xxix, 

303 

Gersonides,  see  Levi  ben  Gerson 

Ginzberg,  L.,  439,  note  13 

God,  in  Aristotle,  xxxiii;  existence  of 
G.  in  Kalam,  xlii,  24,  247;  in 
Saadia,  xlii,  28  £f.;  in  Al  Basir, 
49  f.;  in  Jeshua  ben  Judah,  57;  in 
Bahya,  xlii,  86  ff.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
xlii,  143;  in  Ibn  Daud,  xlii  f., 
217  ff.;  in  Maimonides,  xliii,  248, 
257  ff.;  in  Levi  ben  Gerson,  350  f.; 
in  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  368  f.;  in 
Crescas,  389  ff.;  in  Albo,  419  f. 

Goldenthal,  445,  note  318 

Goldziher,  Ignaz,  106,  433,  439, 
notes  10  and  23;  442,  note  132 

Gorfinkle,  Joseph  I.,  444,  note  251 

Graetz,  H.,  445,  note  311 

Graf,  44c,  note  64 

Gugenheimer,  435 

"  Guide  of  the  Perplexed,"  239 

Guttmann,  Jacob,  434,  435,  436, 
439,  note  27;  440,  notes  2>i,  41  and 
83;  442,  note  133;  443,  notes  230 
and  245;  445,  notes  310  and  331a; 
447,  notes  403a,  436  and  437 

Guttmann,  Julius,  435 

Halevi,  Judah,  xix,  xxxix,  xl,  xlv, 
xlvi,  xlviii,  xlix,  125,  150-183;  his 


standpoint,  150,  152,  157  f.;  his 
life,  151  f.;  philosophy  and  reli- 
gion, 152;  influence  of  Algazali, 
152  f.;  the  "Kusari,"  153  ff.;  the 
"philosopher's"  creed,  154  f.; 
the  Christian's,  155  f.;  the  Mo- 
hammedan's, 156;  the  Jew's,  156 
ff.;  creation,  157;  existence  of 
God,  158;  wiU,  159;  motives  of 
philosopher  and  beUever,  159  f.; 
meaning  of  the  name  of  "Jhvh," 
159  f.,  165;  of  "Elohim,"  160, 
165;  mysticism  in  H.,  160;  attri- 
butes, 161  ff.;  incorporeality,  162; 
superiority  of  Israel,  162  f.;  need 
of  revelation,  163;  superiority  of 
Palestine,  164;  Israel  the  heart 
among  the  nations,  164;  superior- 
ity of  the  Hebrew  language,  164  f. ; 
prophecy,  165  f.;  the  active  Intel- 
lect, 165  f.;  the  ceremonial  law, 
167  f.;  ethics,  168  f.;  immortahty, 
169  f.,  181  f.;  future  world  and 
reward  and  punishment,  170; 
freedom,  171  ff.;  and  foreknowl- 
edge, 172  f.;  interpretation  of 
"Sefer  Yezirah,"  173  f.;  the  Rab- 
bis knew  the  sciences,  174;  exposi- 
tion of  the  current  philosophy, 
i74ff.;  H.  understands  Aristotle's 
definition  of  the  soul,  175;  physics, 

175  ff.;    matter,    175;    criticism, 

176  f.;  emanation  of  Intelligences, 
178;  criticism,  178  f.;  psychology, 
179  f.;  criticism,  181  f.;  197,  198, 
200,  201,  210,  211,  216,  223,  224, 
226,  230,  231,  246,  248,  281,  309, 
332,  362,  389,  392,  396,  414,  420, 
421,  426,  429,  435 

Harizi,  Judah,  125,  184 
Harkavy,  Abraham,  17,  433 
Hasdai  Ibn  Shaprut,  59,  153,  308 
Hayyuj,  187,  309 
Hefez  ben  YazHah,  84 


456 


INDEX 


"Hegyon  ha-Nefesh,"  114 

Hermes,  60,  155,  184 

Hertz,  J.  H.,  434 

Hillel  ben  Samuel,  xlvi,  312-327; 
standpoint,  314;  the  soul,  314  £f.; 
definition  of  soul,  317;  active 
intellect,  317  fif.;  reward  and  pun- 
ishment, 323  ff.;  prophecy,  325; 
ethics,  ibid.;  resurrection,  326; 
interpretation  of  Rabbinic  writ- 
ings, 326  f.,  332 

Hippocrates,  xviii,  2,  3,  72,  209 

Hirschfeld,  440,  note  31;  442,  note 
178 

"Hobot  ha-Lebabot,"  see  "Duties 
of  the  Hearts" 

Homonym,  240,  351,  371 

Horovitz,  S.,  433,  442,  notes  162, 
163  and  165;  443,  note  226 

Husik,  Isaac,  436,  439,  note  9;  445, 
note  308;  446,  note  334;  448, 
note  443 

Hj^ostasis,  xxxviii,  6,  91,  115 

Ibn  Aknin,  Joseph,  302 

Ibn  Badja,  60 

Ibn  Caspi,  Joseph,  302,  310,  329 

Ibn  Daud  (Aven  Death),  61 

Idn    Daud,   Abraham,   see   Daud, 

Abraham  Ibn 
Ibn  Ezra,  Abraham,  xxxix,  79,  80, 
81,  114,  184,  187-196;  Bibhcal 
exegesis,  187  f.;  unity  of  God,  189; 
in  corporeality,  ibid.;  creation,  190; 
matter,  ibid.;  the  universe,  190  f.; 
Intelligences,  ibid.;  angels,  ibid.; 
soul,  191  f.;  reward  and  punish- 
ment, 192;  transmigration,  192; 
freedom,  193;  and  foreknowledge, 
ibid.;  knowledge  of  God,  193  f.; 
prophecy,  194;  classification  of 
the  laws,  194;  problem  of  evil, 
19s;  ethics,  ibid.;  200,  246,  309, 
310,  429,  435 


Ibn  Ezra,  Moses,  xxxix,  xlvi,  79, 125, 
184-187;  man  a  microcosm,  185; 
definition  of  philosophy,  185; 
unity  of  God,  ibid.;  active  intel- 
lect, 186;  200,  246 

Ibn  Migash,  Joseph,  151 

Ibn  Janah,  84,  309 

Ibn  Roshd,  see  Averroes 

Ibn  Sina,  see  Avicenna 

Ibn  Zaddik,  Joseph,  xix,  xxxix, 
xlii,  xlv,  xlvi,  xlix,  60,  79,  125- 
149;  standpoint,  125  f.;  division  of 
his  book,  128;  purpose,  129; 
definition  of  philosophy,  129; 
process  and  sources  of  knowl- 
edge, 129  f.;  physics,  130  ff.; 
matter  and  form,  ibid. ;  substance, 
131;  the  sphere,  131  f.;  the  four 
elements,  132  f.;  the  human  body, 
133  f.;  the  soul,  134  f.;  the  three 
souls,  ibid.;  the  emotions,  ibid.; 
life,  136;  death,  ibid.;  sleep  and 
waking,  ibid.;  the  rational  soul, 
137;  definition  of  soul,  138;  in- 
tellect, 139;  world  soul,  140;  duty 
to  use  the  reason,  ibid.;  criticism 
of  the  Kalam,  141  f.;  creation, 
143;  existence  of  God,  ibid.; 
unity,  ibid.;  self-sufficiency,  144; 
wiU  of  God,  ibid.;  attributes,  145 
f.;  commandments,  147;  rational 
and  traditional,  ibid. ;  the  virtues, 
148;  reward  and  punishment,  148; 
evil,  148  f.;  Messiah,  149;  162, 175, 
184,  200,  206,  209;  211,  237,  246, 

309,317,362,435 

'Ikkarim,"  406 

Immortality,  in  Pseudo-Bahya,  112 
f.;  in  Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  120  f.; 
in  Judah  Halevi,  169  f.,  181  f. ; 
in  Ibn  Daud,  215;  in  Levi  ben 
Gerson,  339  ff.;  in  Aaron  ben 
Elijah,  384;  in  Crescas,  400 

Incorporeahty,  in  Kalam,  xliv,  253; 


INDEX 


457 


in  Saadia,  32;  in  Al  Basir,  51;  in 
Jeshua  ben  Judah,  57;  in  Judah 
Halevi,  162;  in  Abraham  ibn 
Ezra,  189  f.;  in  Ibn  Daud,  217; 
in  Maimonides,  xliv,  257  ff.,  260 
flf.;  in  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  368  f. 

Infinity,  in  Kalam,  251  f.;  in  Saadia, 
25,  30;  in  Bahya,  86,  87;  in  Ibn 
Daud,  208;  in  Maimonides,  251  f., 
254,  256  f.;  in  Crescas,  390 

Intellect,  active,  xli;  in  Jewish 
Philosophy,  xlvi  f.;  acquired  i., 
xlvii;  active  i.  in  prophecy,  xlix, 
109;  in  Ibn  Zaddik,  139;  in  Judah 
Halevi,  155,  162,  165,  181;  in 
Moses  ibn  Ezra,  186;  in  Ibn 
Daud,  222;  in  Maimonides,  268, 
277;  in  Hillel  ben  Samuel,  317  ff.; 
in  Levi  ben  Gerson,  337  £f.  See 
also  "Intelligence,"  "Soul" 

Intelligence,  xlvi;  in  Israeli,  6  f.;  in 
Gabirol,  65,  66;  in  Pseudo-Bahya, 
109;  in  Abraham  bar  Hiyya,  119; 
in  Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  190  f.;  in 
Maimonides,  266  f. 

Israeli,  Isaac,  xix,  xlvi,  xlix,  1-16; 
Maimonides  on  I.,  i  f.;  his  works, 
2;  his  sources,  ibid.;  theory  of 
the  elements,  3,  12;  definition  of 
philosophy,  4;  creation,  5  ff.; 
Intelhgence,  6  f.;  Soul,  8  ff.;  three 
kinds  of  soul,  10  ff.;  element  and 
principle,  12  f.;  prophecy,  15;  17, 
24,  31,  60,  72,  91,  127,  175,  224, 
434 

Jabariya,  xxi,  xlvii 

Jacob  ben  Machir,  309,  310 

Jacobites,  xviii,  34 

Jaulus,  437 

Jeshua  ben  Judah,  xxv,  xlvii,  55-58; 
priority  of  reason,  56;  atomic 
theory,  ibid.;  creation,  ibid.;  exist- 
ence of   God,  57;  incorporeality. 


ibid.;  good  and  evil,  ibid.;  200, 

246,  363,  434 
Jesus,  xxvii,  86,  91 
Job,  XV,  xxvi,  304,  346,  377  f. 
Joel,  M.,  398,  435,  436,  445,  note 

310;  446,  notes  335  and  398;  447, 

note  398  end 
Johannes  Hispanus,  61 
Joseph  ben  Shemtob,  429,  430,  447, 

note  404 
Joseph  ibn  Zaddik,  see  Ibn  Zaddik, 

Joseph 
Jourdain,    A.,    63,    441,    note    85; 

445,  note  306 
Judah  ben  Barzilai,  17 
Judah  Hadassi,  363 
Judah  Halevi,  see  Halevi,  Judah 
Judah  Messer  Leon,  431 
Justinian,  xvii 

Kabbala,  79,  429,  430 
Kadariya,  xxi,  xxii,  xxiii,  23 
Kalam,  xxiv,  xxvii,  16, 17, 48,  50,  52, 
55,  86,  106,  125,  128,  141  f.,  146, 
154,  171,  183,  200,  245,  246  ff., 

362,  366,    428,    433,   439,    note 
10 

Kalisch,  Isidor,  433 

Karaites,  xiii,  xxiv,  xxv,  xli,  xlvii,  23, 
24,  48,  55,  59,  108,  125,  126,  146, 
154,  174,  183,  200,  245,  246,  362, 

363,  364,  365,  370,  2>7S,  377,  378, 
428 

Kaufmann,  David,  152,  153,  433, 
434,  435,  436,  441,  note  88;  442, 
note  181;  444,  notes  250  and  305 

Kellermann,  Benzion,  436 

"Keter  Malkut,"  see  "Royal 
Crown" 

Kindi,  Al,  xxxix 

Klein,  Miksa,  434 

Knowledge,  sources  of,  xl;  in  Saadia, 
27  f.;  in  Bahya,  83;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
129  f. 


4S8 


INDEX 


Koran,  xxi,  xxii,  xxiii,  xxvi,  xxvii, 

xxix,  xliv,  34,  156 
Krochmal,  Nahman,  189,  435 
"Kusari,"  153 

Lactantius,  431 

Landauer,  S.,  175,  440,  note  37 

Laws,  rational  and  traditional,  1;  in 
Saadia,  T)?>  f.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik,  147; 
in  Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  194;  in  Ibn 
Daud,  233  f.;  in  Maimonides,  294 
£f . ;  in  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  382 

Lebid  ibn  Al-A'sam,  xxvi 

Leibnitz,  307 

Leverrier,  275 

Levi  ben  Gerson,  xix,  xx,  xxxix,  xli, 
xliii,  xlvii,  xlix,  7,  16,  166,  217, 
235,  302,  312,  313,  328-361; 
standpoint,  329  f.;  reason  and 
authority,  330  f.;  his  style  and 
method,  331 ;  the  passive  intellect, 
332  ff.;  active  intellect,  337  ff.; 
problem  of  knowledge,  338;  of 
definition,  339;  immortality,  339 
f.;  prognostication  and  prophecy, 
340  flf.;  and  the  contingent,  ibid.; 
God's  knowledge,  342  flf.;  attri- 
butes, 344  f.,  351  f.;  Providence, 
346  fl.;  existence  of  God,  350  f.; 
origin  of  the  world,  352  f.;  eter- 
nal matter,  355  f.;  interpretation 
of  creation  story  in  Genesis,  357; 
miracles,  358  f. ;  362,  363, 369, 384, 
388,  392,  393,  394,  395,  396,  398, 
399,  401,  402,  406,  419,  420,  421, 
428,  429, 430, 436,  447,  note  403a 

Levy,  Louis-Germain,  436 

"Liber  de  Causis,"  xx,  2,  64,  317 

Lippmann,  443,  note  214 

Logos,  xxvii,  xH,  52,  71,  91 

"Ma'amar    Yikkawu    ha-Mayim," 

309 
"Maase  Bereshit,"  xvi,    242,  303, 

430 


"Maase  Merkaba,"  xvi,  242,  303, 
430 

Maimonides,  Moses,  xvi,  xix,  xx, 
xxiv,  XXV,  xxvii,  xxxix,  xh,  xlii, 
xliii,  xlv,  xlvi,  xlvii,  xlix,  1,  i,  2, 16, 
25,  60,  62,  63,  79,  88,  95,  96,  114, 
125,  126,  146,  153,  158,  166,  167, 
198,  199,  200,  201,  207,  218,  221, 
235,  236-311;  his  life,  238  f.;  his 
chef  d'ceuvre,  239  f.;  his  method, 
240;  his  standpoint,  240  ff.;  im- 
portance of  science,  243  f.;  dif- 
ficulty of  metaphysics,  244  f.; 
sketch     of     Jewish     Philosophy, 

245  f.;  exposition  of  the  Kalam, 

246  ff. ;  propositions  of  the  "philos- 
ophers," 254  ff.;  existence  of  God, 
257  ff.;  unity,  ibid.;  incorporeality, 
ibid.,  260  flf.;  attributes,  262  ff.; 
meaning  of  "Jhvh,"  265;  angels, 
266  f . ;  origin  of  the  world,  269  ff. ; 
emanation  of  Intelligences,  272  f.; 
criticism  of  Aristotle,  271  ff.; 
psychology,  281  ff.;  virtue,  282  ff.; 
freedom,  285  ff.;  and  foreknowl- 
edge, 287  f.;  problem  of  evil, 
288  ff.;  God's  knowledge,  289  ff.; 
reason  of  the  commandments, 
294  ff.;  Bible  exegesis,  302  ff.; 
influence  of  M.,  305  ff.;  on 
Scholasticism,  305-307;  on  Ju- 
daism, 307-311;  312,  313,  314, 
317,  323,  325,  329,  332,  342,  343, 

344,  345,  346,  350,  352,  353,  357, 
358,  362,  363,  364,  365,  366,  368, 

369,  370,  371,  372,  374,  375,  376, 
377,  378,  379,  380,  382,  383,  384, 
388,  389,  390,  391,  392,  393,  394, 
395,  396,  398,  399,  400,  402,  403, 
406,  407,  408,  409,  410,  412,  416, 
417,  419,  420,  421,  423,  424,  425, 
426,  428,  429,  430,  431,  435,  447, 
note  403  a 
"  Malmad  Hatalmidim,"  309 


INDEX 


459 


Malter,  H.,  vii,  445,  note  316 

Mandonnet,  P.,  445,  note  308;  446, 
note  332 

Manicheans,  375 

Matter,  rejected  by  Mutakallimun, 
xrii;  doctrine  of,  in  Aristotle,  xxix 
ff.;  in  Plotinus,  xxxviii;  as  source 
of  evil,  38;  in  Gabirol,  66  f.;  in 
Pseudo-Bahya,  109;  in  Abraham 
bar  Hiyya,  117;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
130  fif.;  in  Judah  Halevi,  175;  in 
Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  190;  in  Ibn 
Daud,  205  f.;  in  Maimonides,  256, 
270;  in  Levi  ben  Gerson,  355  f. 

Maywald,  446,  note  332 

"Mekize  Nirdamim,"  445,  notes  313 
and  321 

"  Mekor  Hayyim,"  see  "  Fons  Vitae  " 

Menahem  ben  Saruk,  59 

Messiah,  in  Saadia,  45;  in  Ibn  Zad- 
dik, 149;  in  Crescas,  402,  404;  in 
Albo,  408 

Metempsychosis,  see  Transmigra- 
tion 

"Microcosmus,"  60,  125 

"Milhamot  Adonai,"  329 

Miracles,  in  Levi  ben  Gerson, 
358  f. 

Mohammed,  xxv,  86 

Monophysites,  xviii,  34 

"More  Ha-moreh,"  310 

"More  Nebiikim,"  238 

Morgenstern,  Erno,  434 

Moses  ben  Enoch,  59 

Moses  ben  Maimon,  see  Maimonides 

Moses  of  Narbonne,  309,  310,  328, 
430,  447,  note  403a 

Motion,  in  Aristotle,  xxvi;  in  Ibn 
Daud,  207;  in  Maimonides,  254, 
269 

Mukammas,  David  Al,  2,  17-22; 
definition  of  science  and  philos- 
ophy, 17  f.;  attributes,  18  ff.; 
unity,  18;  reward  and  punishment, 


21  f.;  34,  52,  81,  84,  95,  200,  246, 
434 

Munk,  Solomon,  63,  304,  328,  433, 
434,  440,  note  83;  441,  notes  86, 
87  and  105;  444,  notes  250,  280 
and  302;  445,  notes  314  and  316; 
448,  note  442 

Miinz,  J.,  436 

Mutakallimun,  xxi  f.,  xl,  xli,  xlvii, 
9,  II,  24,  25,  26,  48,  81,  88,  96, 
106,  125,  126,  127,  128,  139,  142, 
145,  149,  158,  182,  183,  199,  240, 
246-253;  256,  27s,  352,  353, 
362,  366  f.,  369,  372,  382,  406, 
428 

Mu'tazila,  xxii  ff.,  xxvii,  xlvii,  3,  17, 
21,  23,  24,  26,  48,  108,  171,  246, 
251,  291,  292,  362,  36s,  366,  375, 
377 

Nachmanides,  426,  429 

Nature,  in  Plotinus,  xxxviii;  in 
Gabirol,  65,  66;  in  Pseudo-Bahya, 
109;  in  Abraham  bar  Hi37ya,  119 

Neo-Platonic,  xx,  xxviii,  xxxix,  xlvi, 
2,  6,  13,  24,  38,  64,  79,  81,  86,  89, 

90,  92,  106,  107,  114,  115,  125, 
126,  127,  129,  138,  139,  177,  178, 
199,  200,  266,  305,  317,  319 

Neo-Platonism,  xxix,  17,  64,  70,  79, 

91,  114,  150,  187,  200,  266,  288, 
317,428 

Neo-Platonists,  xl,  31,  64,  91,  106, 

184,  199 
Neo-Pythagoreans,  188 
Nestorians,  xvui,  34 
Neumark,   David,    viii,    433,   435, 

436,  441,  note  107 
"Nous,"  xxxviii,  7,  91 

"01am  Katon,"  see  "Microcosmus" 
"Or  Adonai,"  389 
Origen,  288,  302 
Orschansky,  G.,  435 


460 


INDEX 


Perles,  J.,  445,  note  309 

Philo,  xvi,  xxvii,  xxxviii,  xli,  23,  91, 
95,  188,  240,  266,  268,  288,  302 

Philoponus,  247,  353 

Philosophy,  and  religion,  xiii;  con- 
tent of  Jewish  P.,  xl-1;  defined  by 
IsraeH,  4;  by  Ibn  Zaddik,  129; 
by  Moses  Ibn  Ezra,  185 

Physics,  in  Kalam,  xxii,  xh;  in 
Aristotle,  xxx;  in  Israeli,  3,  5,  12; 
in  Saadia,  xH;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
xlii,  130  fif.;  in  Judah  Halevi,  175 
ff.;  in  Ibn  Daud,  xlii,  205  ff.;  in 
Maimonides,  xlii,  254  ff.,  269  ff.; 
in  Levi  ben  Gerson,  352  f.,  355  f.; 
in  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  xli,  366  ff. ;  in 
Crescas,  xlii,  389 

Plato,  xxix,  xli,  xlv,  5,  7,  8,  37,  47, 
90,  91,  122,  138,  iss,  179,  181, 
182,  184,  195,  231,  268,  269,  288, 

304,  30s,  353,  413,  431 

Plato  of  Tivoli,  114 

Plotinus,  XX,  xxxvii  f.,  xxxix,  6,  64, 
65,  91, 107,  IIS,  126, 139, 178, 431 

Pollak,  J.,  433 

Porphyry,  60 

Proclus,  XX,  3 

Prophecy,  xlvi,  xlix  f.;  in  Israeli, 
xlix,  15;  in  Saadia,  40;  in  Judah 
Halevi,  xlix,  165;  in  Abraham  ibn 
Ezra,  194;  in  Ibn  Daud,  xlix, 
224  ff.;  in  Maimonides,  xlix,  276 
ff.;  in  Hillel  ben  Samuel,  325;  in 
Levi  ben  Gerson,  xlix,  340  ff.;  in 
Aaron  ben  EUjah,  380  f.;  in 
Crescas,  395;  in  Albo,  421 

Providence,  xl;  in  Maimonides,  290 
ff. ;  in  Levi  ben  Gerson,  346  ff . ;  in 
Aaron  ben  EUjah,  375  f.;  in 
Crescas,  393  f.;  in  Albo,  425 

Pseudo-Bahya,  xlvi,  xlix,  106-113; 
standpoint,  106  f.;  the  soul,  108 
ff..  Ill  ff.;  Intelligence,  Soul, 
Nature,  108  f.,  no;  matter,  109; 


creation,  no;  virtue,  112;  im- 
mortality, II 2  f . ;  reward  and  pim- 
ishment,  113;  122,  126,  139,  148, 

317,  434 
Ptolemy,  xviii,  273,  309 
Pythagoras,  60,  179,  184,  185 
Pythagoreans,  9 

Rashi,  187 

Raymond,  Bishop  of  Toledo,  61 
Reason,   and  authority,  xiii;   r.   in 
Aristotle,  xxxvi;  active  and  pas- 
sive, xxxvi  f.;  in  Plotinus,  xxxviii; 
r.  as  a  source  of  knowledge,  xl; 
r.  and  authority  in  Levi  ben  Ger- 
son, 330  f.    See  also  "Intellect," 
"Soul" 
Resurrection,  1;  in  Saadia,  44  f.;  in 
Hillel  ben  Samuel,  326;  in  Aaron 
ben  Elijah,  385  f . ;  in  Crescas,  404 
Reward     and     Pimishment,     xlvii, 
xlviii,  1;  in  Mukammas,  21  f.;  in 
Saadia,  42  f.;  in  Al  Basir,  55;  in 
Pseudo-Bahya,  113;  in  Abraham 
bar  Hiyya,  119  ff.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
148;   in   Judah   Halevi,    170;   in 
Abraham  Ibn  Ezra,  192;  in  Hillel 
ben  Samuel,  323  ff.;  in  Aaron  ben 
EUjah,  379, 383;  in  Crescas,  403  f.; 
in  Albo,  425  f. 
RosceUinus  of  Compiegne,  305 
Rose,  Valentinus,  439,  note  8 
Rosin,  David,  189,  192,  435 
"Royal  Crown,"  the,  75  f. 

Saadia,  xix,  xxv,  xli,  xUi,  xlv,  xlvi, 
xlix,  I,  17,  23-47;  his  "Emunot 
ve-Deot,"  24  f.;  modeUed  on  the 
Kalam,  ibid.;  atomic  theory,  25; 
reason  for  writing,  26  f.;  sources 
of  truth,  27  f.;  speculation  not 
forbidden,  28;  necessity  of  revela- 
tion, ibid.;  existence  of  God, 
28  ff.;  incorporeaUty,  32;  imity, 


INDEX 


461 


32  f.;  attributes,  2,2>  ^v  categories 
inapplicable  to  God,  35  f.;  the- 
ophanies,  36;  soul,  37  f.;  laws  and 
commandments,  38  f.;  rational 
and  traditional,  ibid.;  prophecy, 
40;  written  and  oral  law,  40; 
abrogation  of  Law,  40  f.;  freedom, 
41  f.;  and  foreknowledge,  ibid.; 
reward  and  punishment,  42  f.,  46; 
future  world,  43  f.;  resurrection, 
44  f.;  ethics,  46  f.;  48,  50,  52,  59, 
81,  82,  83,  84,  87,  88,  89,  92,  94, 
95, 96, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147, 167, 
17s,  186,  19s,  200,  237,  241,  246, 
252,  253,  302,  309,  362,  363,  388, 
428,  434 

Sabeans,  296 

Saladin,  239 

Samuel,  197 

Scahger,  307 

Scheyer,  Simon  B.,  435 

Schmiedl,  A.,  433 

Schreiner,  M.,  xxv,  xxvii,  433,  434, 
439,  notes  12,  16,  18  and  20;  440, 
note  81 

"SeferHa-Kabbala,"  198 

Seyerlen,  62,,  434,  441,  note  86 

Shemtob  ben  Joseph,  430 

Shemtob  ben  Joseph  ibn  Shemtob, 
429 

Socrates,  xxix,  155,  184,  185 

Solomon  ben  Adret,  430 

Solomon  ben  Yeroham,  363 

Sophists,  xxix 

Soul,  in  Aristotle,  xxxv;  world  soul 
in  Plotinus,  xxxviii;  s.  in  Jewish 
philosophy,  xlv  f.;  world-soul  in 
Jewish  Neo-Platonists,  xlvi;  s.  in 
IsraeU,  5,  8  ff.;  in  Saadia,  37  f.; 
in  Gabirol,  65,  66;  in  Pseudo- 
Bahya,  108  £f.;  in  Abraham  bar 
Hiyya,  119;  in  Ibn  Zaddik,  134  f., 
137  f.;  world-soul  in  Ibn  Zaddik, 
140;  s.  in  Judah  Halevi,  179  ff.;  in 


Abraham  Ibn  Ezra,  191  f.;  in 
Ibn  Daud,  209  ff.;  in  Maimonides, 
281  ff.;  in  HUlel  ben  Samuel,  314 
ff.;  in  Crescas,  400.  See  also 
"InteUect,"  "Reason" 

Spinoza,  398  f. 

"Spirit  and  Soul,  Book  of,"  5 

Steinschneider,  Moritz,  311,  439, 
note  26;  440,  notes  31  and  33;  443, 
note  247;  446,  note  360 

St.  Ephrem  of  Nisibis,  xviii 

Sufis,  xxvii  f.;  86,  153 

Syrians,  xvii  ff.,  199,  246 

"Tagmule  ha-Nefesh,"  314 

Tanzer,  A.,  437 

Themistius,  7,  60, 313, 321, 332,  Z3i, 

334, 335 
"Theology  of  Aristotle,"  xx,  xxxix, 

64,  266 
Theophrastus,  xviii 
Tibbon,  Judah  Ibn,  71,  309,  310 
Tibbon,  Moses  Ibn,  309, 440,  note  37 
Tibbon,  Samuel  Ibn,  2,  60,  125,  239, 

302,  309 
"Tikkun  Midot  ha-Nefesh,"  71 
"Torot  ha-Nefesh,"  106 
Tradition,  xiii,  xH,  28,  223  f. 
Transmigration,   in  Saadia,  44;  in 

Abraham  ibn  Ezra,  192;  in  Ibn 

Daud,  215  f. 
Trinity,  xliv,  33,  34,  7i,  Qi 
Truth,  twofold,  328 
"Twenty  Chapters,"  17 

Ueberweg-Baumgartner,  433 
Unity  of  God,  in  Kalam,  xxii,  xliii  f., 
252;  in  Mukammas,  18;  in 
Saadia,  32  f.;  in  Al  Basir,  51;  in 
Bahya,  89  f.;  in  Ibn  Zaddik,  143; 
in  Moses  ibn  Ezra,  185;  in  Abra- 
ham ibn  Ezra,  189;  in  Ibn  Daud, 
219  f. ;  in  Maimonides,  xliv,  2575.; 
in  Aaron  ben  Elijah,  368  f.;  in 
Crescas,  391  f. 


462  INDEX 

Vincent  of  Beauvais,  i  William  of  Occam,  200 

Virtue,  xlix;  in  Gabirol,  72  f.;  in  Wise,  Stephen  S.,  71,  441,  note  103 

Pseudo-Bahya,  112;  in  Ibn  Zad-  WolflF,  M.,  444,  note  251 

dik,  148;  in  Ibn  Daud,  232;  in  Wolfsohn,  Julius,  436 
Maimonides,  282  ff. 

Yahuda,  80,  86,  439,  note  24;  441, 
Weil,  Isidore,  436  notes  106,  108,  109  and  112 

Weil,  Simson,  198,  443,  note  221  Yahya  ben  Adi,  247 

Weinsberg,  Leopold,  435  Yefet  Ha-Levi,  363 

Wenrich,  439,  note  5  "Yezirah,  Sefer"  17,  94,  173,  179 

Werbluner,  445,  note  317  Yohanan  ben  Zakkai,  197 
Will  of  God,  in  Al  Basir,  50;  in 

Gabirol,  68  f.;  in  Bahya,  90;  in  Zeller,  439,  note  4;  441,  note  86 

Ibn  Zaddik,  144;  in  Aaron  ben  Zeno,  25 

Elijah,  372  Zimmels,  448,  note  442 

William  of  Auvergne,  71,  306  Zunz,  Leopold,  184 


Printed  in  the  Umted  States  of  Amerioa. 


